1 


A 


Government   and    Politics 
of  France 


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College;  Government  and  Politics  of  France,  by 
Edward  McChesney  Sait,  Professor  of  Political  Science, 
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FRANCE 

Medallion  by  Louis  Bott'ee 


Edited  by  David  P.  Barrows  and  Thomas  H.  Reed 

(Bobcrnmcnt    i^andboofes 

Government  and  Politics 
of  France 


BY 

EDWARD  McCHESNEY  SAIT,  Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF    POLITICAL    SCIENCE 
UNIVERSITY    OF   CALIFORNIA 


YONKERS-ON-HUDSON    :    :   :    NEW    YORK 

WORLD   BOOK   COMPANY 

1926 


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The  security  of  civilization  depends  very 
largely  upon  the  relationships  that  are  main- 
tained between  the  English-speaking  nations 
and  France.  To  assure  a  continued  under- 
standing between  these  peoples  nothing  is 
more  essential  than  a  better  insight  on  the 
part  of  each  of  them  into  the  national  in- 
stitutions of  the  others.  Yet  events  have 
moved  so  rapidly  that  books  on  political 
science  which  a  few  years  ago  may  have  been 
helpful  are  now  valuable  chiefly  from  a 
historical  standpoint.  It  therefore  gives  the 
publishers  unusual  satisfaction  to  bring  out 
at  this  time  an  authoritative  and  up-to-the- 
minute  account  of  French  political  institu- 
tions—  a  book  that  in  a  large  and  very 
literal  way  is  designed  to  Apply  the 
World's  Knowledge  to  the  World's   Needs 


V339 


cm:  sgpf-3 


Copyright,  1920,  by  World   Book  Company 
Copyright  in  Great  Britain 
All  rights  reserved 


EDITORS'  INTRODUCTION 

OF  all  the  great  powers  engaged  in  the  late  war, 
the  Republic  of  France  had  to  sustain  the 
heaviest  burden.  Her  richest  territories  were 
occupied  by  the  invader;  unparalleled  sacrifices 
were  imposed  upon  the  whole  people.  The 
government,  though  formerly  much  criticized  by 
foreign  observers  and  by  Frenchmen  themselves, 
passed  through  the  ordeal  triumphantly ;  and 
students  of  government  are  manifesting  a  new 
interest  in  this  parliamentary  system,  with  its 
highly  centralized  administrative  organization, 
which  has  proved  so  capable  of  adjusting  itself 
to  grave  emergencies. 
This  volume  by  Professor  Sait  is  the  only  work 
in  English  that  describes  the  structure  and 
practical  working  of  the  French  government  of 
today;  for  the  textbooks  hitherto  used  in  our 
colleges  were  published  a  quarter  of  a  century 
ago  and  have  not  been  adequately  revised.  Much 
has  happened  in  that  quarter  of  a  century. 
In  certain  directions  French  institutions  have 
been  profoundly  modified,  even  transformed. 
For  example,  the  party  system,  with  its  annual 
delegate  conventions  and  its  hierarchy  of  com- 
mittees, has  gradually  taken  form  in  the  past 
fifteen  or  twenty  years. 

O] 


/ 


EDITORS'   INTRODUCTION 

Professor  Sait  has  made  full  use  of  the  extensive 
specialized  literature  which  has  appeared  re- 
cently in  France.  In  doing  this  he  has  not 
confined  his  attention  to  the  constitutional  and 
legal  phases  of  the  subject.  A  chapter  on  politi- 
cal development  reviews  the  events  of  half  a 
century,  laying  particular  emphasis  upon  those 
that  have  affected  public  opinion  most  deeply 
and  given  direction  to  party  interests.  This 
chapter  comes  down  through  the  elections  of  IQIQ, 
the  elevation  of  Paul  Deschanel  to  the  Presi- 
dency, and  the  appointment  of  the  Millerand 
cabinet.  The  national  parties,  which  furnish 
motive  power  to  the  government,  but  which  are 
all  but  ignored  in  French  texts,  receive  adequate 
treatment;  their  history,  platforms,  and  organi- 
zations are  set  forth  in  some  detail.  Prominence 
is  given  also  to  electoral  activities  —  registration, 
nominations,  campaigning,  corrupt  practices, 
the  casting  of  the  vote  —  both  under  the  old 
arrangements  and  under  the  new  arrangements 
set  up  by  the  laws  of  iqi 3,  1914,  and  1919. 

The  author  has  sought  to  express  himself  simply 
and  directly,  without  going  afield  and  without 
obtruding  unnecessarily  his  personal  views. 
Those  who  wish  to  understand  the  actual  con- 
ditions under  which  the  government  of  France 
operates,  the  functioning  of  the  political  and 
administrative  machinery  of  the  present  day, 
will  find  in  this  volume  full  satisfaction. 

The  Editors 
[vi] 


PREFACE 

THE  author  wishes  to  acknowledge  his 
indebtedness  to  those  who  have  assisted 
him,  by  advice  and  criticism,  in  the  preparation 
of  this  volume;  to  his  former  colleagues  in  the 
Department  of  Public  Law  at  Columbia  Univer- 
sity, Professors  Munroe  Smith,  H.  L.  McBain, 
T.  R.  Powell,  and  Charles  A.  Beard,  the  last 
now  director  of  the  New  York  Bureau  of 
Municipal  Research;  and  to  the  editors  of  the 
series,  President  David  P.  Barrows  and  Pro- 
fessor T.  H.  Reed. 

Edward  McChesney  Sait 


Cvii] 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

[C\)R  the  photograph  of  the  medallion  of 
,T  "France,"  which  appears  as  the  frontispiece 
of  this  volume,  the  author  and  the  publishers 
are  under  obligations  to  the  American  Numis- 
matic Society.  Expressions  of  appreciation  are 
due  also  to  the  editors  of  La  France  magazine, 
New  York  City,  for  the  photographs  of  the 
Cabinet  of  Alexandre  Millerand,  in  Chapter 
IV,  and  of  the  bust  by  Rodin  of  former 
Premier  Clemenceau,  in  Chapter   IX. 


[  viii  ] 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction.     Functioning  of  the  Parliamentary 

System  in  War-time xi 

CHAPTER 

I.  The  Constitution  of  1875 1 

II.  The  President  of  the  Republic 31 

III.  The  Ministers:    Their  Political  Role 68 

IV.  The  Ministers:  Their  Administrative  Role.  100 
V.  The  Senate 123 

VI.  The  Chamber  of  Deputies:  Its  Composition  .  144 

VII.  The  Chamber  of  Deputies:    Procedure 186 

VIII.   Local  Government 243 

IX.    Political  Development 272 

X.  Parties 327 

XI.  Administrative  Courts 380 

XII.  The  Ordinary  Courts 398 

Appendix: 

I.   Bibliography 427 

II.  Prime  Ministers  of  France  under  the  Con- 

stitution of  1875 447 

III.  Act  to  Amend  the  Organic  Laws  on  Election 

of  Deputies  and  to  Establish  Scrutin 
de  Liste  with  Proportional  Represen- 
tation    450 

Index 457 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

France.     Medallion  by  Louis  Bottee      Frontispiece 

The  Departments  of  France Facing  page  I 

Paul  Deschanel 32 

Cabinet  of  Alexandre  Millerand 70 

Facade  of  the  Palais  Bourbon      114 

Senate  Chamber  during  Trial  of  Joseph  Caillaux     .    .    .  140 

Distribution  of  Ballots 178 

The  Envelope  System  of  Voting      178 

An  Interpellation  Debate     238 

The  Electoral  Card 254 

Georges  Clemenceau.     Bust  by  Rodin 306 

Rene  Viviani 376 

Aristide  Briand 376 

Court  of  Assizes  (Steinheil  Trial) 418 


Cx] 


AUTHOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

FUNCTIONING     OF      THE     PARLIA- 
MENTARY     SYSTEM      IN     WAR-TIME 

IN  France,  as  in  other  countries,  the  way  lies 
open  to  momentous  readjustments  during 
the  next  generation.  There  can  be  no  question 
that  the  war  has  shaken  the  whole  fabric  of 
society,  set  men  free  to  inquire  into  the  basis 
of  their  creeds,  and  given  play  to  visions  of 
reconstruction  which  a  few  years  ago  would  have 
seemed  academic  and  beyond  the  range  of  the 
practical  business  of  life.  So  far,  however,  the 
structure  and  processes  of  French  government 
show  no  permanent  effects  of  the  war;  they 
remain  today  substantially  what  they  were  in 
1914.  The  changes  which  are  impending  will 
come  not  so  much  as  the  result  of  the  war,  as  of 
tendencies  already  set  in  motion  before  the  war, 
held  in  suspension  during  its  course,  and  now 
given  a  new  impetus,  an  accelerated  pace. 

The  emergency  of  war  did,  of  course,  interrupt 
the  normal  functioning  of  democratic  institutions 
for  the  time.  Silent  enim  leges  inter  arma.  Such 
a  phenomenon  should  not  occasion  surprise  or 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  old  order  has 
passed    away.     After    all,    considering    the    des- 

Cxi] 


AUTHOR'S    INTRODUCTION 

perate  situation  of  France  in  the  first  years  of  the 
war,  it  seems  remarkable  that  the  parliamentary 
system  was  not  more  seriously  deranged.  The 
war-time  modifications  may  be  considered  under 
three  heads:  (i)  The  subsidence  of  party  an- 
tagonisms; (2)  the  invasion  of  the  legislative 
field  by  the  cabinet;  and  (3)  the  invasion  of  the 
executive  field  by  Parliament. 

(1)  In  the  supreme  task  of  saving  the  nation 
domestic  conflicts  were  forgotten.  Party  gov- 
ernment gave  way  to  coalition  government. 
Reorganizing  his  cabinet  in  the  first  months  of 
the  war,  Viviani  brought  in  moderates  like 
Alexandre  Ribot  and  Unified  Socialists  like 
Marcel  Sembat  and  Jules  Guesde.  Aristide 
Briand,  who  became  premier  fourteen  months 
later,  not  only  retained  these  men,  but  secured 
the  cooperation  of  Cochin  (Right),  de  Freycinet 
(moderate  Republican),  Bourgeois  (right  wing  of 
the  Radical-Socialist  party),  and  Combes  (left 
wing  of  the  Radical-Socialist  party).  The  ob- 
literation of  party  lines  was  further  shown  by 
the  votes  of  confidence  in  both  chambers.  This 
by  no  means  foreshadowed  the  permanent  dis- 
appearance of  party  divisions.  Indeed,  when 
the  naval  and  military  forces  of  the  United 
States  were  cast  into  the  balance  and  victory 
was  assured,  the  old  partisan  quarrels  began  to 
obtrude  themselves  once  more.  Those  who 
believe  with  Sir  Henry  Maine  that  political  parties 
originate  in  the  combative  instincts  of  mankind 

[xii] 


AUTHOR'S   INTRODUCTION 

and  suspend  activity  when  actual  warfare  gives 
vent  to  those  instincts  would  have  prophesied 
as  much. 

(2)  During  the  first  five  months  of  the  war  the 
executive  governed  alone.  It  issued  many  decrees 
of  a  legislative  character  which  it  had  no  legal 
right  to  issue  and  which^  it  afterwards  asked 
parliament  to  sanction  ^retroactively.  This  as- 
sumption of  authority,  though  well  suited  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  time,  met  with  widespread 
criticism;  and  in  191 5,  instead  of  terminating 
the  regular  annual  session  of  parliament,  as  the 
constitution  allowed,  after  the  expiration  of  five 
months,  Viviani  announced  that  the  government 
would  not  exercise  its  right  of  prorogation  while 
the  war  lasted.  Henceforth  pressing  war  meas- 
ures were  subject  to  the  vexatious  delays  of  par- 
liamentary procedure.  Only  with  respect  to  a 
few  specified  subjects  did  the  chambers  delegate 
legislative  power  to  the  cabinet.  Their  atti- 
tude was  so  unmistakable  that  Briand  with- 
drew, before  debate  had  begun,  a  government 
bill  which  would  have  given  the  cabinet  legislative 
competence  in  matters  connected  with  national 
defense.  In  January,  1917,  however,  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  adopted  a  special  rule  of  pro- 
cedure for  emergency  war  measures,  a  rule 
reducing  the  time  allowed  for  consideration  in 
committee  and  severely  restricting  the  freedom 
of  debate. 

(3)  From  the  beginning  of  the  regular  session 

[  xiii  ] 


AUTHOR'S    INTRODUCTION 

of  191 5  the  chambers  showed  a  persistent  desire 
to  meddle  in  the  details  of  administration.  They 
were  particularly  bent  upon  discussing  military 
and  diplomatic  questions  in  executive  sittings. 
The  government,  while  professing  to  welcome  par- 
liamentary cooperation,  at  first  refused  to  accept 
interpellations  on  matters  which  demanded 
secrecy.  Finally,  however,  it  yielded  to  insistent 
pressure  on  this  point.  Parliament  then  took 
another  step  forward.  On  June  22,  1916,  after 
executive  sittings  which  had  extended  over  seven 
days,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  declared  itself 
resolved  to  give,  in  collaboration  with  the  gov- 
ernment, "a  more  and  more  vigorous  impulse 
to  national  defense.  It  intends  to  see  that  .  .  . 
the  preparation  of  offensive  and  defensive  meas- 
ures, industrial  as  well  as  military,  shall  be 
pushed  forward  with  a  care,  an  activity,  and  a 
foresight  commensurate  with  the  heroism  of  the 
soldiers  of  the  Republic.',  The  Chamber  would 
therefore  appoint  a  body  of  delegates  to  exercise 
effective  control  over  all  military  services  "on 
the  spot"  (sur  place).  This  proposed  system  of 
delegates,  reminiscent  of  a  sinister  institution  of 
Revolutionary  times,  was  never  set  up.  In- 
stead, the  Chamber  entrusted  the  task  of  con- 
trol to  its  permanent  committees,  which  were 
to  report  the  findings  of  their  agents  both  to 
the  government  and  to  the  Chamber  at  least 
once  every  three  months.  This  was  approxi- 
mately what  the  Senate  had  decided  upon  (July, 
[xiv] 


AUTHOR'S   INTRODUCTION 

1916):  "The  Senate  counts  on  the  government 
to  take,  in  cooperation  with  the  chambers  and 
the  parliamentary  grand  committees,  whose  per- 
manent control  is  indispensable,  all  measures  of 
organization  and  action  that  will  bring  the  hour 
of  victory  nearer."  Thus,  through  the  medium 
of  its  committees  and  of  interpellations  which 
were  sometimes  debated  for  days,  Parliament 
kept  closely  in  touch  with  administrative  affairs 
and  sometimes  imposed  particular  measures  upon 
the  government.  Such  subordination  of  the 
ministers,  aside  from  any  question  as  to  whether 
it  is  consonant  with  the  principles  of  the  par- 
liamentary system,  places  upon  them  a  heavy 
burden.  It  consumes  their  time  and  distracts 
their  attention.  No  one  can  conduct  a  business 
well  if  he  is  constantly  being  asked  to  explain 
and  justify  his  methods.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
this  war-time  activity  of  the  committees  will 
not  serve  as  a  precedent  in  time  of  peace.  Demo- 
cratic government  has  suffered  enough  already 
from  the  incompetence  of  representative  as- 
semblies and  from  their  perverse  hostility  to 
the  growth  of  a  stable  authority  in  the  executive. 


[XV] 


:      .— 


THE   DEPARTMENTS  OF  FRANCE 


/  Ain 

2  Aisne 

3  Allier 

4  Alpes-Maritimes 

5  Ardeche 

6  Ardennes 

7  Ariige 

8  Avbe 

9  Aude 
io  Aveyron 
u  Bus  Rhin 

12  Basses  A I  pes 

1 3  Basses  Pyrtntes 

14  Be/fort  (Territory) 

15  Bouches  du  Rhdne 

1 6  Calvados 

17  Cantal 

18  Charente 

nj  Charente  Inftrieure 
2<>  Cher 

rrize 
23  Corse  (Corsica) 
3  J  Cdte  d'Or 


Cotes  du  Nord 

Creu.se 

Deux  Sevres 

Dordogne 

Doubs 

Drome 

Eure 

Eure  ct  Loire 

Finis  tire 

Card 

Gers 

Gironde 

Hautes  A I  pes 

Haute-Garonne 

Haute-Loire 

Ilaute-Marne 


Ilautes-Pyrinees  6? 


Ha  ut -Rhin 
Haute-Sadne 

llaute-Savoie 
Haute-Fienne 

Hiraull 

IUe-et-l'ilaine 


Indre 

Indre-et-Loire 

1  sere 

Jura 

Landes 

Loire 

Loire-et-Cher 

Loire -luferieure 

Loiret 

Lot 

Lot-et-Garonne 

Lozire 

Maine-et-Loire 

Manche 

Marne 

May  nine 

Meurthc-et-Mosellc 

Meuse 

Morbihan 

Moselle 

Nievre 

Nord 

Oist 


70  Orne 

71  Pas-de-Calais 

72  Puy-de-Ddme 

7.1  PyrSnies-Orientalei 

74  Rhone 

75  Saone-et-Loire 

76  Sarthe 

77  Savoie 

78  Seine 

70  Seine-lnjirieure 

80  Seine-et-Marnc 

81  Seine-et-Oise 

82  So  mme 
8i    Turn 

84  Tarn-et-Caronnt 

8s  Var 

8(>  lauchise 

87  t'endte 

88  Vienne 
80  Vosges 
90  Yonne 


French 
Revolu- 


Government  and   Politics 
of  France 

CHAPTER    I 

THE      CONSTITUTION      OF      I  8  7  5 

IT  used  to  be  the  fashion  to  speak  of  France  Political 

as    a    country    of  revolution    and    unsettled  dlsturb_ 

■*  ances 

government;   of  the  French  people  as  vola-  after  the 

tile  and  unstable,  deficient  in  political  genius 
The  troubled  course  of  French  history  during  tion 
the  eight  decades  which  followed  the  meeting' of 
the  States-General  in  1789  lent  to  this  view  a 
certain  appearance  of  plausibility,  k  was-,  a 
time  of  perturbation.  Nothing  seemed  to  en- 
dure. The  First  Republic,  gradually  assuming 
reactionary  forms,  merged  in  the  Empire  of 
Napoleon;  the  Bourbon  monarchy,  restored 
after  Waterloo,  gave  place  in  1830  to  a  new 
monarchy  which  recognized  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  and  the  tricolor  flag  of  the  Revolu- 
tion; the  second  republic  of  1848  was  over- 
thrown by  its  own  president  who  maintained 
himself  as  Emperor  until  the  military  disasters 
of  1870.  France  had  a  dozen  different  constitu- 
tions. But  too  much  emphasis  has  been  laid  upon 
this  epidemic  of  revolutions-     Such  violent  com- 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

motions  are  by  no  means  peculiar  to  modern 
France.  Everywhere,  though  in  varying  degree, 
they  have  attended  the  evolution  of  new  politi- 
cal systems.  Even  in  England,  where  the  con- 
stitution has  "slowly  broadened  down  from 
precedent  to  precedent,"  the  adjustments  of  the 
seventeenth  century  were  reached  through  civil 
war  and  revolution;  and  in  fact  French  observers 
of  that  time,  looking  with  satisfaction  upon  the 
stability  of  their  own  government,  were  inclined 
to  doubt  the  political  capacity  of  English- 
men. 
Persist-  Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  the  period  of 

f^*of  disturbance  and  experiment,  being  concerned 
mental  very  largely  with  questions  of  external  form 
insitu-  (republic  or  monarchy,  universal  or  restricted 
suffrage),  did  not  interrupt  the  continuous 
growth  of  institutions.  The  wonderful  adminis- 
trative machinery  of  today  was  originated  by 
Bourbon  kings  and  perfected  by  Napoleon. 
Through  its  inherited  institutions  the  Third 
Republic  is  firmly  rooted  in  the  past;  and  be- 
cause of  that  fact  it  has  confounded  dismal 
prophecies  and,  in  the  course  of  almost  half  a 
century,  withstood  shocks  which  with  weaker 
foundations  it  could  hardly  have  survived.  Indeed 
the  circumstances  attending  the  establishment 
of  the  Republic  were,  contrary  to  superficial  indi- 
cations, favorable  to  its  development  of  perma- 
nence and  vigor.  Unlike  the  fragile  governments 
which  Napoleon  and  his  nephew  had  swept  aside, 

[2] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

it  was  not  based  upon  logical  schemes  or  attrac- 
tive political  theories.  It  was  based  upon  expe- 
diency, upon  compromise,  upon  a  wise  acceptance 
of  facts  which  made  an  extreme  or  doctrinaire 
attitude  impracticable. 

The  Republic,  though  not  definitely  organized  Third 
until  1875,  had  come  into  being  on  September  4,  *e7P0ubllc' 
1870,  immediately  after  the  capture  of  Louis 
Napoleon  and  his  army  at  Sedan.  For  the  next 
five  months  a  "government  of  national  defense," 
practically  self-constituted,  offered  desperate  re- 
sistance to  the  German  invasion.  But  with  the 
fall  of  Paris  it  seemed  altogether  hopeless  to  con- 
tinue the  struggle.  On  February  8,  1871,  under 
the  terms  of  an  armistice,  a  National  Assembly 
was  elected  by  universal  manhood  suffrage  and 
entrusted  with  the  decision  of  peace  or  war. 
This  Assembly  not  only  made  peace  with  Ger- 
many, but,  going  beyond  the  stated  purpose  for 
which  it  had  been  convoked,  governed  France 
for  the  next  five  years  and,  before  dissolving, 
formulated  the  existing  republican  constitution 
of  1875. 

The  elections  had  been  held  to  determine,  not   Mon- 
the  future  form  of  government,  but  whether  the   "^fL 

»  _  majority 

war  should  be  continued  or  ended.     No  political   in 
issue  was  raised  directly.     It  so  happened,  how-   J^J? 
ever,  that  Leon  Gambetta  and  other  leaders  of  My 
the    Republican    party   opposed    all    thought   of 
peace.     "War  to  the   bitter  end,   resistance  to 
the  last  stage  of  exhaustion, "  they  urged  in  an 

[3] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

official  circular.  And  because  the  masses  of  the 
people  were  tired  of  war  and  no  longer  enter- 
tained any  hope  of  success,  Republican  candi- 
dates fared  badly.  There  were  738  members  in 
the  Assembly.1  Although  their  distribution 
among  the  various  parties  cannot  accurately  be 
fixed,2  it  has  been  estimated  that  some  30  were 
Imperialists,  200  Legitimists,  200  Orleanists,  and 
200  Republicans,  the  rest  of  the  members  having 
no  settled  or  declared  party  affiliations.  That 
these  figures  did  not  represent  the  relative 
strength  of  parties  in  the  country  was  demon- 
strated soon  after  the  conclusion  of  peace;  for 
in  the  by-elections  of  July,  1871,  Republicans 
were  chosen  to  fill  100  out  of  11 1  vacancies. 
Under  the  circumstances,  seeing  that  they  had 
a  substantial  majority  in  the  Assembly  and 
could  count  on  no  such  good  fortune  in  a  fresh 
election,  the  monarchists  naturally  enough  as- 
cribed to  the  assembly  constituent  powers  and 
wished  to  prolong  its  life  until  arrangements  for 
a  restoration  of  monarchy  could  be  effected. 
Their  difficulty  was  neatly  indicated  by  Thiers. 
"There  is  only  one  throne,"  he  said,  "and  there 
are  three  claimants  for  a  seat  on  it."  Only  two 
of  the  three  could  be  considered  seriously  at  the 
time.     The  Legitimist  claimant  was  the  Count 

1  After  the  members  from  Alsace-Lorraine  (ceded  territory) 
had  withdrawn. 

2  See   Leon   Jacques,   Les   Partis   politiques    (1913),    pages 
90-166. 

[4] 


THE  CONSTITUTION   OF    1875 

of  Chambord,  grandson  of  Charles  X,  an  honor- 
able, narrow-minded  man,  who  clung  obstinately 
to  the  doctrine  of  divine  right;  the  Orleanist 
claimant  was  the  Count  of  Paris,  grandson  of 
Louis  Philippe.  Independent  action  by  either 
party  gave  little  promise  of  success;  positive 
results  could  be  achieved  only  through  a  pooling 
of  interests,  a  union  of  parliamentary  forces. 
Bitter  as  had  been  the  antagonism  between  the 
two  branches  of  the  royal  house,  reconciliation 
now  seemed,  in  the  face  of  such  an  opportunity, 
imperative.  Since  the  Count  of  Chambord 
was  childless  and  more  than  fifty  years  of 
age,  the  Orleanists  might  be  satisfied  with  an 
agreement  designating  the  Count  of  Paris  as  his 
successor. 

Meanwhile  the  Republic  existed    as    a    provi-   Provi- 
sional, working  form  of  government.     The  Na-   ^r°^_ 
tional    Assembly,    soon    after    its    election,    had    zation 
chosen  as  "head  of  the  executive  power  of  the   °ftheul, 

.  Republic 

French  Republic"  Adolphe  Thiers,  the  vener- 
able statesman  who  had  been  prime  minister 
under  Louis  Philippe  and  who,  because  of  his 
services  in  seeking  European  intervention  and 
arranging  the  armistice,  enjoyed  a  remarkable 
popularity.1  Six  months  later,  under  the  Rivet 
law  of  August  31,  1 871,  he  received  the  title  of 
President;  and  it  was  provided  that  he  as  well 
as  the  ministers  whom  he  appointed  should  be 
responsible  to  the  Assembly  and  that  all  his 
1  He  had  been  elected  to  the  Assembly  in  26  departments. 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

acts  should  be  countersigned  by  the  ministers.1 
Thiers,  being  a  member  of  the  Assembly  and 
responsible  to  it,  did  not  assume  the  place  of  a 
mere  titular  executive,  notwithstanding  the  re- 
quirement that  his  acts  must  be  countersigned. 
Mounting  the  tribune  and  advocating  a  personal 
policy,  he  actually  absorbed  the  authority  of 
the  ministers;  and  this  situation  was  not  much 
altered  when  a  subsequent  law  restricted  his 
right  of  addressing  the  Assembly  and  required 
interpellations  to  be  addressed  to  the  ministers 
alone.2  The  change  accomplished  by  the  Rivet 
law,  while  apparently  conceding  a  more  regular 
status  to  the  Republic,  was  made  under  care- 
ful reservations.  According  to  the  preamble  of 
the  law,  it  was  designed  as  a  temporary  arrange- 
ment "  until  the  establishment  of  the  definitive 
institutions  of  the  country  .  .  .  without  in  any 
degree  altering  the  basis  of  things."  Indeed  the 
Rivet  law  somewhat  embarrassed  Republican 
deputies  because,  in  making  this  constitutional 
change,  the  National  Assembly  had  expressly 
declared  that  "it  has  the  right  to  use  the  con- 
stituent power,  an  essential  attribute  of  the 
sovereignty   with    which    it   is    invested."      If  it 

1  Anderson,  The  Constitutions  and  Other  Select  Documents 
Illustrative  of  the  History  of  France  1789- 1 907  (1908),  page  604. 

2  See  law  of  March  13,  1873,  in  Anderson,  op.  cit.,  page  606. 
When  MacMahon  became  President,  being  a  soldier  and  not 
an  orator,  he  communicated  with  the  assembly  by  written 
messages  alone.  In  this  way  ministerial  responsibility,  as 
understood  in  the  parliamentary  system,  began  to  take  shape. 

[6] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

could  set  up  a  president,  it  could  equally  well 
set  up  a  king,  and  the  monarchists,  possessing, 
when  united,  a  decisive  majority,  had  only  to 
reach  an  agreement  as  to  who  should  be  the 
king.  Their  chief  obstacle  lay  in  the  obstinacy 
of  the  Legitimist  pretender.  He  would  not  sacri- 
fice the  white  flag  of  the  Old  Regime.  "France 
will  call  me,"  he  announced,  "and  I  will  come  to 
her  just  as  I  am,  with  my  principles  and  my  flag. 
On  the  subject  of  that  flag  conditions  have  been 
mentioned  to  which  I  cannot  submit."  l  Since 
the  army  and  the  nation  were  devoted  to  the 
tricolor,  —  "that  beloved  flag,"  as  one  of  the 
Orleanist  princes  styled  it,  —  Chambord's  atti- 
tude placed  his  adherents  in  an  awkward 
situation.  It  also  converted  Thiers  to  open 
acceptance  of  the  Republic. 

Thiers  was  not  a  Republican  when  he  became   Thiers 
"head  of  the  executive  power";    the  Orleanists   abandons 

.  mon- 

regarded  him  as  an  indispensable  leader  of  their  archists 
party;  the  Left  2  distrusted  him.  Upon  assum- 
ing office,  it  is  true,  he  promised  to  make  a 
"loyal  experiment"  with  the  Republic  and  en- 
trusted the  three  most  important  cabinet  posts 
to  Republicans.  But  he  represented  himself  to 
Legitimists  and  Orleanists  as  favorable  to  a 
restoration  based  upon  the  fusion  of  the  two  par- 

1  Manifesto   of  July   5,    1871.      Hanotaux,    Contemporary 
France,  Vol.  I,  page  121. 

2  For  the  meaning  of  the  terms  "Right,"  "Left,'  "Center" 
see  Chapter  VII. 

[7] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

ties;  and  on  March  10,  1871,  he  gave  a  definite 
undertaking,  known  as  the  Bordeaux  Compact,1 
that  while  the  work  of  national  reorganiza- 
tion proceeded  under  a  Republican  government, 
nothing  would  be  done  to  prejudice  the  interests 
of  the  monarchical  parties.  It  was  the  obvious 
failure  of  fusion  which  led  him  to  advocate  a 
permanent  organization  of  the  Republic — "the 
form  of  government,"  he  said,  "which  divides  us 
least."  This  he  did  in  November,  1872.  "The 
reason  which  determined  me,  who  am  an  old 
partisan  of  the  monarchy,"  he  explained  later,2 
"is  that  today,  for  you,  for  me,  practically,  the 
monarchy  is  absolutely  impossible."  But  Legiti- 
mists and  Orleanists  did  not  believe  it  impossi- 
ble; they  still  entertained  vague  hopes;  and  on 
May  23,  1873,  after  the  personnel  of  the  cabinet 
had  been  modified  in  a  Republican  direction  and 
a  bill  had  been  introduced  providing  for  perma- 
nent Republican  institutions,3  they  carried  a  vote 
of  want  of  confidence.  Next  day  Thiers  resigned. 
Failure  The  defection  of  Thiers,  the  slender  majority 

°f  hTt"      °^  x3  (including  a  dozen  Imperialists)  which  had 
schemes     been  mustered  to  overthrow  him,  and  the  impres- 
sive success  of  the  Left  in  by-elections  warned 
monarchist   leaders   that   their   opportunity  was 
slipping  away,  that  fusion  must  be  consummated 

1  The  assembly  sat  at  Bordeaux  for  a  few  weeks,  removing 
later  to  Versailles. 

2  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  page  635. 

3  Anderson,  op.  cit.,  page  622. 

[8] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

forthwith  or  not  at  all.  They  chose  as  the  new 
President,  Marshal  MacMahon,  a  distinguished 
soldier  who  had  served  Charles  X,  Louis  Philippe, 
and  Louis  Napoleon  with  equal  fidelity  and  who, 
though  actively  identified  with  no  party,  was 
known  to  sympathize  with  the  Legitimist  cause. 
An  Orleanist,  de  Broglie,  became  prime  minister. 
He  proceeded  to  discipline  Republican  newspapers 
and  to  "purify"  the  civil  service.  Final  prepara- 
tions were  made  for  the  restoration.  First  the 
conflicting  claims  of  the  two  pretenders  were 
adjusted.  The  Count  of  Paris,  visiting  Chambord 
at  Frohsdorf,  recognized  him  as  the  legitimate 
king  and  promised  that  no  member  of  the  Orleans 
family  would  stand  in  his  way.  There  still  re- 
mained the  question  of  the  flag.  But  in  October 
that  too  seemed  to  have  been  adjusted.  Cham- 
bord was  represented,  though  incorrectly,  as 
being  ready  to  make  a  compromise  with  the 
assembly;  and  the  Royalists,  knowing  that  some 
such  concession  was  essential  to  their  plans, 
believed  or  pretended  to  believe  that  the  im- 
possible had  actually  happened.  Everything  was 
ready,  even  to  the  fleur-de-lis  carpet  for  the  royal 
carriage.  At  this  critical  moment,  on  October 
27,  the  pretender's  sublime  conceit  and  mistaken 
sense  of  honor  interposed  to  wreck  the  whole 
scheme.  As  a  phrase  of  the  time  expressed  it, 
he  threw  his  crown  out  of  the  window.  He  de- 
clared that  he  could  not  accept  conditions  and  be- 
come "the  legitimist  king  of  the  Revolution.  .  .  . 

[9] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

My  person  is  nothing:  my  principle  is  every- 
thing. ...  I  am  the  necessary  pilot,  the  only 
one  capable  of  guiding  the  ship  to  port,  be- 
cause I  have  the  mission  and  authority  for 
that."  l 
The  Fusion  had  failed.     It  now  remained  to  save 

Septen-      wnat   could    be    saved    for   the   future.     To   the 

nate 

Royalists  the  presidency  of  MacMahon  was,  as 
Broglie  said,  "the  clay  rampart"  which  might 
protect  them  from  the  rising  flood  of  radicalism. 
On  November  19,  therefore,  the  presidential 
office  was  entrusted  to  him  for  a  period  of  seven 
years,  the  Septennate,  and  provision  was  made 
for  the  appointment  of  a  committee  of  30  mem- 
bers wThich  should  undertake  the  drafting  of  a 
new  constitution.  The  immediate  voting  of  the 
Septennate  and  the  postponement  of  other  con- 
stitutional arrangements  suited  the  Orleanists 
especially,  for  they  cherished  the  pious  hope 
that  Chambord's  death,  in  the  interval,  might 
leave  the  way  clear  for  the  Count  of  Paris;  and 
it  suited  the  Legitimists  as  well,  they  being 
equally  anxious  to  reserve  the  future.  But  the 
policy  of  postponement  had  its  limitations.  Both 
parties  must  eventually  face  the  alternative  of 
accepting  the  Republic  or  appealing  to  the  people 
for  a  decision.  The  moderate  Right,  regarding 
dissolution  and  Bonapartism  as  the  two  evils  to 
be  chiefly  feared,  gradually  came  to  acquiesce  in 
the  establishment  of  a  "conservative  republic." 
1  Anderson,  op.  cit.,  pages  627-630. 
[10] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF    1875 

The  committee  of  thirty,  after  long  delay,  re-  Adop- 
ported  a  constitutional  measure  which  did  not  ti0°. 
contemplate  the  Republic  as  a  permanent  system,  Consti- 
but  which  simply  organized  the  Septennate  (a  JfJJL 
bicameral  legislature  taking  the  place  of  the 
assembly)  and  provided  that  at  the  end  of 
MacMahon's  term  the  chambers  should  unite 
and  "decide  upon  the  measures  to  be  taken."  l 
To  the  first  article  an  amendment  was  offered, 
the  famous  "Wallon  amendment"  of  January 
30,  1 875.2  M.  Wallon,  who  knew  that  the  As- 
sembly was  not  yet  prepared  to  endorse  the 
principle  of  a  Republic,  resorted  to  strategy.  His 
amendment,  looking  beyond  Marshal  MacMahon, 
fixed  the  method  of  electing  the  President  and 
the  term  of  office.  Every  one  understood  what 
it  implied;  Wallon  was  accused  of  proclaiming 
the  Republic.  "Gentlemen,"  he  replied,  "I 
proclaim  nothing.  I  am  simply  taking  things  as 
they  are.  ...  I  do  not  ask  you  to  make  it  final. 
What  is  final?  But  do  not  call  it  provisional. 
Make  a  government  which  has  within  it  the 
germs  of  life  and  preservation."  3  Wallon  has  been 
called  the  "father  of  the  constitution";  for  al- 
though his  amendment  carried  by  only  one  vote 
(353  to  352)>  lt  rnade  a  breach  in  the  resistance 
of  the  moderate  Royalists  and  enabled  him  to 
secure    further    modifications.      The    bill    finally 

1  Anderson,  op.  cit.,  page  632. 

2  Anderson,  op.  cit.,  page  633. 

3  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  Ill,  page  154. 

["] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

passed,  on  February  25,  by  a  majority  which 
had  grown  to  171.  It  was  not  in  any  sense  a 
comprehensive  measure.  The  situation  within 
the  Assembly  was  so  uncertain,  the  necessity  of 
reducing  controversy  and  friction  was  so  impera- 
tive, that  the  bill  did  nothing  more  than  formu- 
late the  essential  features  of  executive  and 
legislative  organization.  Afterwards,  omissions 
had  to  be  supplied.  Instead  of  amending  the 
original  law,  however,  the  Assembly  enacted, 
on  July  16,  a  supplementary  law  regulating  the 
relations  of  the  public  powers,  i.e.  the  organs  of 
government.  These  two  laws,  along  with  the 
law  of  February  24  which  deals  exclusively  with 
the  Senate,  form  the  Constitution  of  1875. 

These  three  "constitutional  laws,"  as  they  are 
called,  deserve  careful  examination.  For  rea- 
sons which  will  soon  appear  they  differ  radically 
from  such  a  fundamental  Instrument  as  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  fixes 
the  respective  spheres  of  central  and  local  gov- 
ernment and  depends,  for  its  exact  meaning, 
upon  elaborate  judicial  interpretation.  No  one 
can  hope  to  understand  this  difference  or  to 
realize  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  French 
system  without  some  knowledge  of  the  texts 
themselves.1  But  it  may  be  serviceable  to  in- 
clude here  an  abstract  of  their  provisions. 

1  For  the  text  of  the  constitutional  laws  see:  Anderson, 
op.  cit.;  Currier,  Constitutional  and  Organic  Laws  of  France 
in  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy ,  March,  1893;   Duguit 

[12] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF    1875 

The  law  of  February  25  has  nine  articles.  It  Consti- 
lodges  the  legislative  power  in  a  Chamber  of  ^noifl 
Deputies  which  shall  be  elected  by  universal  suf-  Febru- 
frage  and  a  Senate  whose  composition  and  powers  ary25 
shall  be  regulated  by  a  special  law  (Art.  1).  It 
prescribes  the  method  of  choosing  the  Presi- 
dent, the  two  chambers  meeting  together  for 
that  purpose  (Art.  2),  briefly  enumerates  his 
powers,  and  requires  that  his  every  act  must  be 
countersigned  by  a  minister  (Art.  3).  The  minis- 
ters are  responsible  to  the  chambers,  the  Presi- 
dent is  responsible  only  in  case  of  high  treason 
(Art.  6).  When  the  presidential  office  becomes 
vacant  through  death  or  resignation,  the  cham- 
bers shall  proceed  immediately  to  the  choice  of 
a  new  President,  the  council  of  ministers  mean- 
while exercising  the  executive  power  (Art.  7). 
The  President  may,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Senate,  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  (Art. 
5).  To  amend  the  constitution  the  chambers, 
having  previously  decided  in  favor  of  revision, 
shall  meet  in  National  Assembly;  but  during 
the  term  of  Marshal  MacMahon  revision  can 
take  place  only  upon  his  initiative  (Art.  8).  The 
law  also  regulates  the  appointment  and  dis- 
missal of  councilors  of  state  x  (Art.  4)  and  fixes 
the   seat   of  government   at    Versailles    (Art  9). 

et  Monier,  Les  Constitutions  et  les  principals  his   politiques 
de  la  France  depuis  178Q   (1898;    new  edition,    19 15);     and 
Dodd,  Modern  Constitutions  (1909),  Vol.  I. 
1  See  Chapters  IV  and  XL 

[13] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Consti-  The  law  of  February  24  l  has  eleven  articles, 

tutionai      jt  Ascribes  how  the  100  Senators  shall  be  chosen 

law  of 

Febm-  and  the  term  for  which  they  shall  sit  (Arts.  1-7 
61724  and  10).  It  gives  the  Senate  a  legislative  au- 
thority coordinate  with  that  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  except  in  the  case  of  money  bills 
(Art.  8)  and  provides  that  the  Senate  may  be 
constituted  as  a  high  court  of  justice  to  try  the 
President,  or  the  ministers,  or  persons  accused  of 
attacks  upon  the  security  of  the  state  (Art.  9). 
Consti-  The  law  of  July  16  has  14  articles.     It  enters 

tutionai  jnto  some  detail  regarding  the  sessions  of  the 
July  16  chambers  and  the  right  of  the  President  to  ad- 
journ them  (Arts.  1,  2,  4,  5).  It  establishes  the 
usual  parliamentary  privileges  of  freedom  of 
speech  and  freedom  from  arrest,  makes  the 
chambers  judge  of  the  eligibility  and  election  of 
their  own  members,  and  requires  them  to  elect 
their  bureaux  of  officials  annually  (Arts.  10-11, 
13-14).  The  President  may  communicate  with 
the  chambers  by  means  of  messages;  and  the 
ministers,  who  have  free  access  to  both  cham- 
bers, may  speak  at  any  time  and,  in  the  discus- 
sion of  any  bill,  be  represented  by  commissioners 
(Art.  6).  The  President  is  entrusted  with  a 
suspensive  veto;  that  is,  with  the  right  of  re- 
quiring the  chambers  to  reconsider  any  bill 
which  they  have  passed  (Art.  7).  Without  the 
consent  of  the  chambers  he  cannot   declare  war 

1  Promulgated,  in   accordance  with  Article   11,  after  the 
law  of  Feb.  25. 

[14] 


THE  CONSTITUTION   OF    1875 

or  ratify  treaties  which  touch  upon  certain 
enumerated  subjects  (Arts.  8-9).  Precautions 
are  taken  to  ensure  the  prompt  meeting  of  the 
chambers  as  the  National  Assembly  to  elect  a 
new  President  (Art.  3).  Further  details  are 
given  regarding  the  procedure  in  the  impeach- 
ment of  President  or  ministers  and  in  the  trial 
of  persons  accused  of  making  attacks  upon  the 
safety  of  the  state  (Art.  12). 

A  cursory  reading  of  the  constitution  reveals  Pecu- 
its  unsystematic,  fragmentary  character.  The  l!f"Ue 
arrangement  is  disorderly;  the  area  covered  is  consti- 
incomplete.  It  includes  some  matters  which  tution 
are  of  quite  minor  importance;  providing,  for 
example,  that  the  chambers  shall  meet  in  public 
except  when,  under  their  own  rules,  they  decide 
to  meet  in  secret  and  that  they  shall  elect  anew 
each  year  their  presiding  officers.  It  ignores, 
on  the  other  hand,  some  matters  which  Ameri- 
cans might  consider  essential  to  any  constitu- 
tional scheme.  There  is  not  a  word  about  the 
judicial  power,  not  a  word  about  civil  liberty, 
the  private  rights  and  immunities  of  the  indi- 
vidual. "These  are  regrettable  lacunae,"  says 
Raymond  Poincare.1  They  are  all  the  more  singu- 
lar because  of  the  vogue  which  the  Rights  of 
Man  and  the  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  powers 
had  in  revolutionary  days.  The  method  of  elect- 
ing the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  aside  from  the  fact 
that  it  must  be  chosen  by  universal  suffrage,  is 
1  How  France  is  Governed  (1913),  page  162. 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

not  prescribed,  nor  is  the  length  of  its  mandate; 
the  duration  of  an  existing  chamber  may  be  and 
has  been  extended  by  statute.  In  fact,  without 
pursuing  the  subject  further,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  constitution,  while  attempting  to  do  no 
more  than  indicate  the  bare  framework  of  gov- 
ernment, does  not  by  any  means  occupy  the 
whole  of  its  limited  field. 
Consti-  The    explanation   of   the   peculiarities    of  the 

^ti01^        constitution   has    already    been    suggested.    The 

based  on  .  -'  toe> 

com-  National  Assembly,  elected  to  make  peace,  under- 
promise  took  t0  make  a  constitution.  Under  the  pressure 
of  circumstances,  with  faltering  steps,  it  created 
first  the  Presidency,  then  the  Septennate;  and, 
when  intending  merely  to  organize  the  Septen- 
nate, it  was  persuaded  to  sanction  a  continuing 
Republican  system.  The  majority,  happening 
to  be  royalist  because  the  Royalists  had  favored 
peace,  wished  to  establish  a  monarchy  and 
actually  did  establish  a  republic.  They  had 
been  compelled  to  accept  compromise,  to  agree 
upon  a  solution  which  would  leave  the  future 
completely  untrammeled  and  "let  each  man 
preserve  his  faith  and  his  hopes."  l  The  moder- 
ate Royalists  and  the  moderate  Republicans  had 
effected  a  combination,  the  former  abandoning 
their  opposition  to  the  Republic,  the  latter  sup- 
porting a  method  of  constitutional  amendment 
which   would   facilitate   a   subsequent   transition 

1  Casimir  de  Ventavon  in  the  National  Assembly,  Hanotaux, 
op.  cit.y  Vol.  Ill,  page  135. 

[16] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

to  monarchy.  The  constitution,  therefore,  re- 
sembles a  treaty,  a  treaty  of  practical  adjust- 
ment at  the  end  of  an  inconclusive  conflict;  and 
the  matters  dealt  with  are  those  which  were 
most  discussed  at  the  time  and  which  it  seemed 
most  desirable  to  render  plain.1  The  constitu- 
tion did  not  pretend  to  speak  the  final  word,  to 
secure  the  triumph  of  one  party  or  the  other. 
There  lay  its  greatest  merit;  for  it  is  idle  to 
suppose  that  the  terms  of  such  a  compact  could 
arrest  the  social  and  economic  forces  which  ulti- 
mately shape  a  nation's  destinies. 

Indeed  the  constitution  of  a  country  does  not   impor- 
consist  merely  in  a  written  instrument  presumed   tanceof 

r  prece- 

to  be  binding  on  the  government  which  operates    dentin 
under  it.    Great  Britain  possesses  no  such  instru-   the  new 

.  .  .  system 

ment;    the   written    constitution   of  the   United 

States  is,  as  Mr.  Wilson  has  said,2  "only  the 
sap-center  of  a  system  of  government  vastly 
larger  than  the  stock  from  which  it  has  branched. " 
A  constitution  may  broadly  be  defined  as  the 
sum  of  laws  and  practices  which  regulate  the 
fundamental  concerns  of  government.  Nowa- 
days we  often  speak  of  this  or  that  political 
practice  as  being  part  of  the  "unwritten  con- 
stitution"; and  because  we  have  found  that  law 
may  be  overlaid  by  custom  and  made  to  accom- 

1  Esmein,  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel  (1914),  page  628; 
Saleilles,  "The  Development  of  the  Present  Constitution  of 
France,"  Annals  of  the  American  Academy,  July,  1895,  page  12. 

2  Congressional  Government  (1885),  page  7. 

[17] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

plish  ends  quite  contrary  to  its  intention,  written 
constitutions  no  longer  exercise,  as  they  did  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  a  magic  spell.  That  the 
constitutional  laws  of  1875  embody  only  a  part 
of  the  French  constitution,  considered  in  the 
broad  sense,  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that 
such  important  subjects  as  justice,  administra- 
tion, and  local  government  lie  altogether  outside 
their  purview.  The  larger  part  must  be  sought 
in  the  legislation  of  an  earlier  as  well  as  of  a  later 
time  and  in  a  mass  of  precedents;  for  notwith- 
standing the  rather  tumultuous  course  of  political 
development  since  the  Revolution,  it  is  an  ac- 
cepted principle  of  French  public  law  that  the 
legislative  acts  of  a  de  facto  government,  however 
irregular  its  origin  and  however  short  its  dura- 
tion, remain  in  force  until  they  have  been  form- 
ally repealed.  French  publicists  constantly 
support  their  contentions  by  precedents  drawn 
from  an  earlier  period,  even  from  the  Old  Re- 
gime. Thus  Duguit  maintains  x  that,  in  spite  of 
the  silence  of  the  constitutional  laws,  revenue 
and  supply  must  be  voted  annually,  the  principle 
of  annual  taxes  having  been  consecrated  in  the 
Constitution  of  1848  and  the  principle  of  annual 
supply  in  the  Constitution  of  1791.  If  govern- 
ment is  an  organic  thing  constantly  changing  in 
response  to  its  environment,  then  the  most  vigor- 
ous government,  like  the  most  vigorous  plant  or 
animal,  is  the  one  that  can  most  easily  adjust 
1  Traite  de  droit  constitutionnel  (191 1),  Vol.  II,  page  381. 

[18] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

itself  to  varying  conditions.  The  French  govern- 
ment, because  of  the  freedom  with  which  it 
develops  outside  the  domain  of  written  law, 
has  shown  itself  capable  of  a  healthy,  spontaneous 
growth.  "It  is  undeniable,"  said  an  acute 
critic,1  "that  by  placing  the  French  constitution 
in  the  midst  of  the  organic  elements  of  the  coun- 
try and  depriving  it  of  the  character  of  a  written 
constitution,  which  the  least  revolution  has 
proved  sufficient  to  overthrow,  the  convention 
of  1875  has  assured,  contrary,  it  is  true,  to  its 
aims  and  secret  wishes,  the  existence  of  the  or- 
ganization which  it  has  founded.  It  has  restored, 
in  fact,  the  French  constitution  to  the  domain 
of  historical  evolution.  This  alone,  in  view  of 
the  inextricable  complications  which  are  con- 
stantly occurring,  can  place  the  political  organi- 
zation of  the  country  upon  a  solid  basis  capable 
of  resisting  all  internal   shocks." 

One  striking  illustration  may  be  given  of  the   is  the 
way    in    which    the    constitution     maintains    its   Declara' 
contact  with  the  past.     The  constitutional  laws    Rights 
of  1875  contain  no  bill  of  rights,  create  no  sphere   stm 
of    civil    liberty    which    the    government    must   tive? 
respect;    and  in  this    they    differ   from    all    pre- 
ceding constitutions,  even  those  of  the  Napole- 
onic   period.      But    such    an    omission   does   not 
necessarily   imply    that    the    Declaration    of  the 
Rights  of  Man,  which  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  Constitution   of  1791,   has    lost    all    binding 
1  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  page  15. 

[19] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

force.  It  survives  in  parliamentary  debates  and 
in  political  arguments  very  much  as  Magna 
Carta  survives  in  England;  and  when,  in  the 
discussion  of  some  controversial  measure,  more 
practical  grounds  of  criticism  fail,  its  opponents 
are  quite  likely  to  urge  that  it  is  unconstitutional 
as  violating  the  principle  of  liberty  or  the  prin- 
ciple of  equality  or  some  other  principle  of  the 
Declaration.  Do  laws  which  restrict  the  freedom 
of  contract  between  employer  and  employee  vio- 
late the  principle  of  liberty?  Is  the  principle  of 
equality  violated  by  a  law  which  forbids  the 
members  of  unauthorized  religious  orders  to 
teach  in  the  schools?  Professor  Duguit  goes 
so  far  as  to  maintain  that  the  Declaration,  formu- 
lating the  contract  of  a  new  society  set  up  by  the 
Revolution,  has  a  permanent  character  and  is 
superior  to  constitutions  themselves.1  It  "has 
preserved,  even  in  our  time,  all  its  positive  legal 
force.  We  believe  that,  if  today  the  legislator 
made  a  law  violating  one  of  the  principles  formu- 
lated in  the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  1789,  that 
law  would  be  unconstitutional.  We  even  believe 
that  the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  1789  is  binding 
not  only  upon  the  ordinary  lawmaker,  but  also 
upon  the  constituent  lawmaker.',  In  other  words 
a  constitutional  amendment,  though  adopted  in 
strict  conformity  with  the  prescribed  procedure, 
would  not  be  valid  if  it  encroached  upon  the 
provisions  of  the  Declaration.  This  is,  of  course, 
1  Op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  13. 

[20] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF    1875 

an  extreme  position  shared  by  few  authoritative 
writers.  Esmein  maintains  that  the  Declara- 
tion has  no  legal  force  today,  that  it  never  pos- 
sessed more  than  a  dogmatic  value,  and  that 
"the  legal  situation  is  very  much  the  same 
whether  it  exists  or  does  not  exist."  1 

But  even  if  Professor  Duguit  is  right,  it  must  be  No  judi- 
held  in  mind  that  the  term  "unconstitutional"  cial  con" 
does  not  mean  to  a  Frenchman  what  it  means  to  France 
an  American.  In  the  United  States  an  unconsti- 
tutional act  is  one  which,  conflicting  with  the 
express  or  implied  provisions  of  the  constitution, 
the  courts  will  not  recognize  as  law.  In  France, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  obstructive  tactics  of  the 
courts  before  1789  irritated  the  friends  of  reform 
and  led  the  National  Assembly,  in  a  law  of  1790 
and  in  the  Constitution  of  1791,  to  prohibit  their 
interfering  directly  or  indirectly  with  the  exer- 
cise of  legislative  power.  These  prohibitions  still 
prevail  as  a  part  of  French  public  law.  The 
highest  court  of  the  land  has  on  more  than  one 
occasion  refused  to  inquire  into  the  constitu- 
tionality of  a  law.  The  leading  case  is  that  of 
the  proprietors  and  publishers  of  the  newspaper 
National  who  were  tried  without  jury  under  a 
law  of  1830  and  who  appealed  on  the  ground 
that  their  constitutional  rights,  as  fixed  in  the 
Charter  of  1830,  had  been  denied.  The  Court  of 
Cassation  held  that  a  law  "deliberated  and  pro- 
mulgated according  to  the  constitutional   forms 

1  Op.  cit.,  page  564. 

[21] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

prescribed  by  the  Charter"  could  not  be  attacked 
as  unconstitutional.1  There  has  been  until 
recently  no  disposition  to  criticize  this  decision 
or  to  invest  the  courts  with  control  over  the 
discretion  of  the  legislature.  When  in  the  Con- 
stitutions of  1799  and  1852  machinery  was  de- 
vised to  prevent  legislative  encroachments,  the 
necessary  powers  were  conferred  not  upon  the 
courts,  but  upon  the  Senate,  this  body  becoming, 
under  both  the  Napoleons,  little  more  than  a 
docile  instrument. 
Why  The  question  of  judicial   control  is  a  question 

judicial  Qf  expediency.  All  political  institutions  must 
is  op-  ultimately  be  judged,  as  Bismarck  contended, 
posed  not  by  the  test  of  theory,  but  by  the  test  of 
practical  results.  In  France,  according  to  the 
dominant  opinion,  the  American  system  would 
be  unnecessary,  if  not  anomalous,  because  in  the 
first  place  the  government  is  unitary  —  there  is 
no  balance  to  maintain  between  central  and  local 
authorities;  and  because  in  the  second  place 
there  are  no  limitations  upon  Parliament  in  favor 
of  personal  and  property  rights.  If,  notwith- 
standing these  facts,  the  courts  were  permitted 
to  determine  the  validity  of  statutes,  they  might 
very  well  attribute  constitutional  force  to  the 
vague  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  and 
thereby  exert  a  vexatious  restraint  upon  Parlia- 
ment;   in  fact  those  who  propose  to  invest  them 

1  Sirey,  Recueil  (1833),  Vol.  I,  page  357.    See  also  Duguit, 
op.  cit.y  Vol.  I,  page  158. 
[22] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

with  this  power  propose  at  the  same  time  to 
include  in  the  constitution  guarantees  of  civil 
liberty.1  Such  are  the  practical  considerations. 
But  French  jurists,  who  prefer  to  deal  with  ab- 
stract principles  and  who  are  therefore  not 
always  safe  guides  to  an  understanding  of  politi- 
cal questions,  do  not  ask  how  judicial  control 
would  work.  They  argue  instead  that  it  would 
violate  the  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  powers 
as  well  as  the  doctrine  that  law  is  an  expression 
of  the  sovereign  will.  Those  who  favor  judicial 
control  aptly  answer  that  law  is  nothing  more 
than  the  expression  of  Parliament's  will  and 
that  the  separation  of  powers  would  not  be 
violated  by  a  court  which  refused  to  recognize 
an  unconstitutional  act  as  law;  for  if  the  judicial 
power  must  be  bound  by  an  unconstitutional 
law,  then  it  is  inferior  to  the  legislative  power 
and  the  separation  of  powers  is  violated. 

There    is    a    considerable,    and    apparently    a    Tend- 
growing,  body  of  opinion  favorable  to  the  estab-   ®ncy 
lishment  of  judicial  control.     Two  conservative    its  es- 
parties,  the  Liberal  Action  and  the  Progressists,    t 
have  included  it  in  their  platforms.2    A  number 
of  eminent  publicists,  such  as  Maurice  Hauriou 
and    Gaston    Jeze,    have    expressed    themselves 
strongly  in  its  favor.3     Some  contend  that  the 

1  Desfougeres,  Le  Controle  judiciaire  de  la  constitutionnalite 
des  his  (1913),  page  116. 

2  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages  486,  489. 

3  Garner,  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  IX,  page  661. 

[23] 


ment 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

courts  should,  as  in  the  United  States,  assert 
the  prerogative  without  formal  authorization; l 
others  urge  the  necessity  of  constitutional  amend- 
ments.2 The  most  interesting  point  of  view  is 
developed  by  Professor  Duguit  who  formerly 
believed  "that  there  would  be  no  advantage  in 
importing  the  American  system  into  France  and 
that  it  might  even  provoke  conflicts,  create  a 
new  cause  of  agitation  and  division."  3  Accord- 
ing to  his  later  opinion,  continental  countries  are 
tending  to  accept  the  doctrine  of  judicial  control, 
this  appearing  in  the  attitude  of  German  pub- 
licists and  in  the  actual  assumption  of  power  by 
the  courts  of  Norway  (1904)  and  Roumania 
(1912).  "In  the  near  future/'  he  says,  "French 
jurisprudence  will  be  led  by  the  force  of  things 
to  find  the  same  solution."  4  The  Council  of 
State  (the  highest  administrative  court)  5  has 
since  1907  assumed  the  right  to  determine  the 
constitutionality  of  ordinances  which  have  been 
issued  by  virtue  of  a  delegation  of  legislative 
power  to  the  executive.6  Now  if  there  is  delega- 
tion of  legislative  power,  such  ordinances  must 

1  For  instance  Jeze  in  Revue  generate  d' administration,  1895, 
Vol.  II,  page  411. 

2  Such   as  offered   in  1894,  1903,  1904,  1907,  1909.     Des- 
fougeres,  op.  cit.,  pages  127  et  seq. 

3  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  159. 

4  Les  Transformations  du  droit  public  (19 13),  page  102. 
6  See  Chapter  XI. 

8  Revue  du   droit    public,   Vol.    XXV,    page   51;    Political 
Science  Review,  Vol.  IX,  page  649. 

C24] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

logically  be  regarded  as  acts  of  Parliament, 
because  the  term  "delegation"  implies  a  transfer 
of  competence  or  it  has  no  meaning  at  all.  Will 
not  the  Council  of  State  as  a  next  step  be  com- 
pelled to  receive  complaints  against  the  validity 
of  formal  laws?  "The  distance  is  short  and  will 
be  traveled  easily." 

This    anxiety    to    restrict    the    competence    of  Public 
Parliament  —  or,  in   other  words,  the   free   plav    opinlon 

8.S  3.  S&f  G— 

of  public  opinion  expressing  itself  through  Parlia-  guard 
ment  —  is  regarded  with  suspicion  by  the  parties 
on  the  Left.  To  them  it  seems  to  rest  partly  upon 
the  dissatisfaction  of  conservative  and  clerical 
interests  with  the  prevailing  sentiments  of  the 
electorate  and  partly  upon  the  preoccupation 
of  the  writers  with  theories  rather  than  facts. 
Theorists  are  dissatisfied  with  the  imperfections 
of  the  existing  constitution  from  the  standpoint 
of  logic  and  political  philosophy,  forgetting  that 
its  practical  character  has  given  it  a  permanence 
which  the  philosophical  constitutions  of  the  Abbe 
Sieves  did  not  achieve.  If  it  could  be  shown 
that  Parliament  had  abused  its  unrestricted 
power,  that  it  had  shown  little  respect  for  the 
rights  of  property  and  person,  the  argument  for 
judicial  control  would  at  least  have  a  plausible 
basis.  But  Parliament  has  manifested  no  such 
inclinations.  Public  opinion  is  alert  in  France  and 
constitutes  the  best  guarantee  a  people  can  have. 
It  is  so  in  England;  as  Esmein  observes,1  there  is 
1  Op.  cit.,  page  564. 

[25] 


consti- 
stution 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

no  country  in  the  world  where  private  rights  are 
better  assured  than  in  England  and  where  the 
freedom  of  the  legislature  is  at  the  same  time 
more  absolute.  And  even  if  the  agitation  for 
judicial  control  should  succeed,  public  opinion 
could  assert  itself  against  the  courts  by  securing 
amendments  to  the  constitutional  laws. 
Method  The  process  of  amendment,  as  described  in 
Article  8  of  the  law  of  February  2?,  is  exceed- 

amend-        .  J       J 

ins  the  ingly  simple.1  ''The  chambers  shall  have  the 
right,  by  separate  resolutions,  taken  in  each  by 
an  absolute  majority  of  votes,  either  upon  their 
own  initiative  or  upon  the  request  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic,  to  declare  a  revision  of  the 
constitutional  laws  necessary.  After  each  of  the 
two  chambers  shall  have  come  to  this  decision, 
they  shall  meet  together  in  National  Assembly 
to  proceed  with  the  revision.  The  acts  effecting 
revision  of  the  constitutional  laws,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  shall  be  passed  by  an  absolute  majority 
of  the  members  composing  the  National  Assem- 
bly." By  an  amendment  of  1884  "the  Republi- 
can form  of  government  shall  not  be  made  the 
subject  of  a  proposed  revision."  The  machinery, 
therefore,  is  set  in  motion  by  the  two  chambers, 
which  adopt  resolutions  upon  the  initiative  either 
of  private  members  or  of  the  cabinet  (which  acts 
in  the  name  of  the  President),  these  resolutions 
being  theoretically  distinct  and  actually  identical. 

1  See  Jean  Auffray,  fctude  sur  la  facilite  de  la  revision  de 
noire  constitution  (1908). 

[26] 


THE   CONSTITUTION   OF    1875 

The  National  Assembly l  then  meets  of  full 
right.  Although  similar  in  name  and  composi- 
tion to  the  National  Assembly  which  elects  the 
President,  it  is  legally  a  different  body.  Nor 
can  it  be  regarded  simply  as  a  combination  of 
the  two  chambers.  It  is  an  entirely  new  assembly 
consisting  of  all  the  senators  and  all  the  deputies; 
and  hence  the  President  cannot,  by  an  adjourn- 
ment of  both  chambers  or  by  a  dissolution  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  prevent  or  postpone  its 
meeting.2  Under  a  law  of  1879  it  is  required  to 
sit  at  Versailles,  the  purpose  being  not  only  to 
secure  a  hall  of  adequate  size,  but  also  to  avoid 
the  possible  dangers  of  Paris.  Decisions  must 
be  taken  "by  an  absolute  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers composing  the  National  Assembly/'  which 
means,  according  to  textbooks  and  the  interpre- 
tation adopted  in  1884  by  the  assembly  itself, 
half  plus  one  of  the  legal  number  of  members 
without  deducting  vacancies  caused  by  resigna- 
tion, death,  or  otherwise.3 

The  powers  of  the  National  Assembly,  when    National 

once  it  has  convened,   are  not  made   altogether   ?fsem" 
.  .  .  Dly Wltn" 

plain  by  the  constitution.     Is  it  subject  to  any   outiimi- 

limitations?    In  1884  it  apparently  imposed  upon    tations 
itself  a   limitation    by   providing    that    the    Re- 
publican form  of  government  could  not  be  made 
the  subject  of  a  proposed  amendment.     Esmein 

1  Popularly  known  as  the  "Congress." 

2  Duguit,  Traite  de  droit  const itutionnel,  Vol.  II,  page  527. 

3  Id.,  page  528;  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  1072. 

[27] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

holds  that  this  is  binding  upon  the  National 
Assembly; !  so  does  Raymond  Poincare.  "Any 
revision  which  would  have  as  its  object  the  sub- 
stitution of  a  monarchical  system  for  the  Repub- 
lic/' says  the  latter,2  "would  be  illegal  and 
revolutionary.  The  head  of  the  state  would 
have  the  right,  as  it  would  be  his  duty,  to  refuse 
to  promulgate  such  a  law  if  voted."  It  is  mani- 
fest, however,  that  the  President  can  legally 
exercise  no  discretion  in  promulgating  constitu- 
tional amendments  and  that  he  cannot  even  use 
the  suspensive  veto  which  he  possesses  in  the 
case  of  ordinary  legislation.3  The  sound  view 
seems  to  be  that  what  the  National  Assembly 
has  enacted  it  may  at  a  later  time  repeal; 4 
and  this  view  was  taken  by  the  prime  minister, 
Jules  Ferry,  when  he  proposed  the  amendment 
in  question.  "We  would  not  be  worthy  of  pre- 
siding over  the  government  of  this  great  coun- 
try," he  said,  "or  of  enjoying  the  confidence  of 
Parliament,  if  we  labored  under  the  illusion  that 
a  clause  in  a  constitution  can  make  that  consti- 
tution eternal.  What  we  ask  of  you  is  to  declare 
that  the  Republic  is  the  definitive  form  of 
government."      A   further  question   arises  as   to 

1  Op.  cit.,  page  1074. 

2  Op.  cit.,  page  163. 

3  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  108 1;  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II, 
page  532. 

4  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  530;  Burgess,  Political 
Science  and  Comparative  Constitutional  Law  (1890),  Vol.  I, 
page  172. 

[28] 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF   1875 

whether  the  National  Assembly  is  limited  by 
the  specific  proposals  contained  in  the  resolutions 
of  the  chambers.  If  the  chambers  have  proposed 
the  amendment  of  a  particular  article  of  the  con- 
stitution, perhaps  in  a  particular  sense,  can  the 
National  Assembly  proceed  to  amend  other 
articles  or  to  revise  the  whole  constitution? 
"We  do  not  hesitate  to  reply,"  says  Professor 
Duguit,1  "that  the  assembly  is  not  at  all  bound 
by  the  resolutions  of  the  chambers. "  If  it  is 
constituent,  it  remains  so  even  when  the  resolu- 
tions cover  only  specific  points.  Practice  sus- 
tains this  view;  for  in  1884,  going  beyond  the 
scope  of  the  resolutions,  the  assembly  provided 
that  "members  of  families  which  have  reigned  in 
France  are  ineligible  to  the  Presidency."  The 
argument  on  the  other  side  can  hardly  be  taken 
seriously.  It  maintains  that  since  the  consent 
of  the  chambers  is  necessary  for  a  meeting  of 
the  National  Assembly,  that  consent  may  be 
given  conditionally,  that  is,  for  certain  limited 
purposes  alone.2  But  this  deduction,  besides 
finding  no  support  in  precedent  or  in  the  language 
of  the  constitution,  is  logically  unsound. 

The   constitution    has    been    amended    by   the   Changes 
National  Assembly  on  two  occasions:    Tune  19,    lnthe 

•  1  s>  •  consti- 

1879,  when  Article  9  of  the  Constitutional  Law  tution 
of  February  25,  which  fixed  the  seat  of  the  ex-  JJjJ" 
ecutive  power  and  of  the  two  chambers  at  Ver- 

1  Op.  city  Vol.  II,  page  531. 

2  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  1074. 

[>9J 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

sailles,  was  repealed;  and  August  13,  1884,  when 
four  amendments  were  adopted.  The  first  pro- 
vided that  after  a  dissolution  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  a  new  election .  should  be  held  within 
two  months;  the  second,  that  the  Republican 
form  of  government  could  not  be  made  the  sub- 
ject of  a  proposed  revision  and  that  the  mem- 
bers of  families  which  had  reigned  in  France 
should  be  ineligible  to  the  presidency;  the  third, 
that  the  first  seven  articles  of  the  law  of  Febru- 
ary 24  on  the  organization  of  the  Senate  should 
no  longer  have  a  constitutional  character;  and 
the  fourth  repealed  Paragraph  3,  Article  1,  of 
the  law  of  July  16  which  had  required  public 
prayers  on  the  Sunday  after  the  opening  of  the 
parliamentary   session. 


[303 


Presi- 
dent is 


constitu 
tional 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

THE  French  President  occupies  the  position  The 
of  a  constitutional  king.  He  is  a  titular 
executive,  nominally  endowed  with  large  powers  like  a 
and  really  restrained  from  employing  them  by 
the  action  of  a  responsible  parliamentary  cabinet,  king 
That  his  tenure  is  elective  and  not  hereditary, 
temporary  and  not  permanent,  does  not  essen- 
tially change  his  legal  status.  He  is,  as  Professor 
Duguit  describes  him,  "a  constitutional  king  for 
seven  years."  1  If  reelected  for  successive  terms, 
he  might  hold  office  longer  than  Napoleon  or 
Louis  XVIII  or  any  post-revolutionary  ruler  of 
France.  Naturally  he  does  not  enjoy  the  social 
prestige  of  an  hereditary  king;  but  if  he  possesses 
political  experience,  sound  judgment,  and  force 
of  character,  he  can  exercise  an  important  in- 
fluence upon  his  ministers  and  upon  public 
opinion.2  He  lives  in  almost  regal  state.  Parlia- 
ment appropriates  each  year  $240,000,  half  for 
salary  and  half  for  household  and  traveling  ex- 
penses. The  nation  has  placed  at  his  disposal 
two  official  residences:  the  Palace  of  the  filysee 

1  Traite  de  droit  constitutionnel,  Vol.  I,  page  406.  f 

2  See    Munroe    Smith   in    Review   of  Reviews   (American), 
Vol.  XXXIII  (1906),  page  165. 

[31] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

which  dates  from  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  and  the  Chateau  of  Rambouillet  which 
has  a  splendid  park  and  forest,  the  scene  of  many 
official  hunting  parties.  In  the  Elysee  the  Presi- 
dent entertains  on  a  lavish  scale,  giving  dinners 
and  receptions,  garden  parties  and  dances.  He 
presides  on  the  occasion  of  any  national  ceremony. 
The  elaborate  civil  and  military  honors  which  are 
accorded  him  as  he  travels  through  the  country 
contribute  not  a  little  to  the  dignity  of  his  position. 
Election  The  President  is  elected  by  the  Senate  and 
n7  ti  nai  Chamber  of  Deputies  united  in  National  Assembly 
Assembly  and  sitting  at  Versailles.1  Normally  the  election 
takes  place  one  month  before  the  expiration  of  a 
presidential  term  or,  in  case  the  government  has 
failed  in  its  duty  of  convoking  the  Assembly, 
fifteen  days  before,  the  chambers  then  meeting  of 
full  right  and  without  a  formal  summons.2  But, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  only  four  Presidents  have 
served  a  full  term:  Jules  Grevy  (first  term  1879- 
1886);  fimile  Loubet  (1899-1906);  Armand 
Fallieres  (1906-1913);  and  Raymond  Poincare 
(1913-1920).  Five  times  the  National  Assembly 
has  been  convoked  to  fill  a  vacancy.  Three  Presi- 
dents resigned:  MacMahon  in  1879,  Grevy  in 
1887  (second  term),  and  Casimir-Perier  in  1895. 
Two  died  in  office:  Sadi  Carnot  in  1894  and  Felix 
Faure  in  1899.     The  constitution  expressly  con- 

1  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  2;   and  law  of  1879. 

2  Constitutional   law  of  July  16,  Art.   3;    Duguit,  op.  cit., 
Vol.  II,  page  419. 

[32] 


PAUL  DESCHANEL 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

templates  vacancies  occurring  because  of  death 
or  resignation  and  provides,  by  way  of  precaution, 
for  vacancies  which  may  occur  "for  any  other 
reason."  1  It  does  not  provide,  as  in  the  United 
States,  that  another  officer  shall  complete  the 
unexpired  term;  there  is  no  vice  president. 
Since  the  method  of  election  is  so  simple  and 
expeditious,  the  constitution  merely  requires  the 
National  Assembly  to  convene  at  once  and  pro- 
ceed to  the  election  of  a  new  President.2  During 
this  brief  interregnum,  a  period  of  two  or  three 
days  at  the  most,  the  cabinet  is  invested  with  the 
executive  power.3  Curiously  no  provision  has 
been  made  for  cases  in  which  the  President, 
through  severe  illness  or  absence  from  the  country 
or  other  cause,  is  unable  to  discharge  the  duties 
of  his  office.  Nothing  in  the  laws  or  the  constitu- 
tion prevents  the  President  from  traveling  abroad; 
and  the  precedent  established  by  Faure's  visit  to 
Russia  in  1897  has  been  followed  by  all  his 
successors.  The  absence  of  the  President  might, 
in  time  of  crisis,  prove  embarrassing.  Many  im- 
portant acts  of  state  require  his  signature.  Presi- 
dent Poincare  and  his  prime  minister,  Rene 
Viviani,  found  themselves  under  the  necessity  of 

1  Constitutional  laws  of  July  16,  Art.  3,  and  Feb.  25,  Art.  7. 

2  Constitutional  laws  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  7,  and  July  16,  Art.  3. 
If  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  dissolved  at  the  time,  new 
elections  shall  be  held  forthwith.  Constitutional  law  of  July 
16,  Art.  3. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  7. 

[33] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 


Influence 
of  the 
caucus 


returning  to  France  somewhat  precipitately  in  the 
summer  of  1914. 

Any  Frenchman  who  enjoys  full  civil  and 
political  rights  l  and  who  does  not  belong  to  the 
royal  or  imperial  houses  2  may  be  elected  to  the 
presidency.  The  National  Assembly  exercises  a 
complete  freedom  of  choice;  it  is  limited  by  no 
formal  nominating  machinery.  But  nevertheless, 
by  a  practice  which  will  recall  to  Americans  the 
Congressional  caucus  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century,  the  Republican  parties  have  always  at- 
tempted to  unite  upon  a  candidate.3  In  1879, 
when  MacMahon  had  resigned  and  the  future  of 
the  Republic  still  seemed  uncertain,  Gambetta 
urged  the  various  groups  of  the  Left  to  endorse 
Grevy  as  the  most  worthy  and  the  most  Re- 
publican. This  they  did,  first  in  separate  meet- 
ings, then  in  a  general  caucus  which  included  the 
Republicans  of  both  Senate  and  Chamber.  Two 
hours  later  Grevy  became  President.  Only  on 
three  occasions  since  that  time,  in  1899,  1906,  and 
1920,4  has  the  caucus  succeeded  in  imposing  its 
candidate  upon  the  National  Assembly.    In  1887, 

1  Duguit,  op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  418. 

2  Constitutional  amendment,  1884. 

8  Leyret,  Le  President  de  la  Republique  (1913),  page  209 
et  seq. 

4  The  caucus  of  1920,  attended  not  by  the  parties  of  the 
Left  alone,  but  by  almost  ninety  per  cent  of  all  the  deputies 
and  senators,  gave  Deschanel  408  votes,  Clemenceau  389, 
Poincare  16,  Jonnart  4,  Bourgeois  3,  Foch  1.  Clemenceau 
then  withdrew,  asking  his  friends  to  support  Poincare. 

[34] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

for  instance,  although  it  met  three  times  on  the 
very  day  of  the  election  and  nominated  Jules 
Ferry  on  each  occasion,  the  radicals  finally  refused 
to  be  bound  by  the  decision.  In  the  caucus  of 
1913  the  Radical-Socialists  put  forward  M.  Pams, 
the  minister  of  agriculture,  who  received  on  the 
third  ballot  323  votes  as  against  309  for  Raymond 
Poincare,  the  prime  minister.  But  the  latter, 
declaring  that  the  issue  between  himself  and  Pams 
was  personal  rather  than  political,  refused  to 
withdraw  and,  supported  in  the  National  Assem- 
bly by  the  Catholic  Right,  succeeded  in  bearing 
ofF  the  prize.1  There  is,  of  course,  no  presiden-  No 
tial  campaign  in  the  American  sense.  A  candi- 
date who  tried  to  force  the  hands  of  the  National 
Assembly  by  making  a  popular  appeal  would 
damage  his  chances  irreparably;  France  has  good 
reason  to  suspect  the  arts  of  the  demagogue.  Yet 
quietly  and  unobtrusively  something  may  be 
accomplished.  The  aspirant  may  show  himself 
frequently  at  public  functions.  Traveling  in  the 
provinces,  he  may  praise  the  civic  enterprise  of  a 
community,  subscribe  to  the  funds  of  the  local 
hospital,  kiss  a  few  babies,  and  make  himself 
generally  agreeable.2  If  he  delivers  speeches, 
they  must  be  innocent  and  colorless,  divorced  as 

1  Great  pressure  was  brought  upon  Poincare  to  secure  the 
withdrawal  of  his  candidacy.  See  Gaston  Jeze,  "La  Presi- 
dence  de  la  Republique,"  Revue  du  droit  publicy  Vol.  XXX 
(1913),  note  pages  1 19-122. 

2  Andre  Tridon,  Review  of  Reviews  (American),  Vol.  XLVI 
(1912),  page  693. 

[35  3 


election 
campaign 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

far  as  possible  from  current  political  controversies; 
for  the  presidency,  like  the  constitutional  mon- 
archy, is  supposed  to  be  above  politics. 
Proce-  Under   the   constitution    the    president   of  the 

dure  in       Senate    acts    as    president    of   the    National   As- 

National  \ 

Assembly  sembly;  l  and  this  must  be  so  even  when,  as  in 
the  case  of  Loubet  (1899)  and  Fallieres  (1906), 
he  happens  to  be  the  most  prominent  candidate. 
The  National  Assembly  which  elects  the  President, 
however  much  it  may  resemble  the  National 
Assembly  which  amends  the  constitution,  is  re- 
garded as  a  distinct  body.  It  is  an  electoral 
college,  regulated  as  such  by  a  decree  of  1852.2 
No  debate  is  permitted.  In  1894  when  a  member 
proposed  a  constitutional  amendment  to  abolish 
the  presidency,  he  was  declared  out  of  order; 
indeed  guards  have  sometimes  been  stationed  at 
the  approaches  to  the  tribune.  There  can  be  no 
nominating  speeches.  The  members  vote  in 
silence  as  their  names  are  called  and  continue  to 
vote  until  some  one  candidate  has  received  the 
"absolute  majority"  required  by  the  constitution. 
This  absolute  majority  is  different  from  the  one 
required  for  constitutional  amendments;  it  is 
reckoned  not  on  the  basis  of  the  legal  membership, 
but  on  the  basis  of  votes  actually  cast  for  candi- 
dates (blank  or  void  ballots  not  being  counted). 
Except  in  1886,  1895,  and  1913,  no  second  ballot 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  II. 

2  The  decree  of  February  2,  1852,  still  forms  the  basis  of 
French  electoral  law.      Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  417. 

[36] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

has  been  necessary.1  The  President-elect  is  in- 
augurated at  the  Elysee  where  his  predecessor, 
surrounded  by  the  cabinet  ministers  and  the 
members  of  Parliament,  transmits  to  him  the 
powers  of  office.  It  is  a  dignified  and  impressive 
ceremony.  If  the  executive  powers  have  been 
exercised  by  the  cabinet  because  of  a  vacancy  in 
the  presidential  office,  the  inauguration  takes 
place  at  Versailles  immediately  after  the  election, 
the  cabinet  and  the  bureau  of  each  chamber 
being  present.  According  to  the  constitution  the 
President  may  be  reelected  an  indefinite  number 
of  times.  But  as  in  the  United  States,  where  a 
third  term  has  never  been  accorded,  custom  has 
intervened  and,  resting  apparently  upon  popular 
prejudice,  limited  the  President  to  a  single  term. 
The  reelection  of  Jules  Grevy  in  1886  —  he  then  single- 
having  reached  the  advanced  age  of  79  —  proved 
unfortunate;  for  when  political  scandals  occurred 
in  the  filysee  and  the  President  refused  to  believe 
in  the  guilt  of  his  son-in-law,  Parliament  felt 
obliged  to  demand  his  resignation.  The  next 
President,  Carnot,  was  assassinated  (1894);  Casi- 
mir-Perier,  finding  the  limitations  of  his  position 
irksome,  resigned  after  six  months  (1895);  Faure 
died  in  office  (1899).  Thus  in  a  negative  way  and 
by  reason  of  accidental  circumstances  a  single- 
term  doctrine  began  to  develop;   and  when  Presi- 

1  In  19 1 3  the  vote  on  the  first  ballot  was:  Poincare  429, 
Pams  327,  Vaillant  63,  Deschanel  18,  Ribot  16,  scattering  13; 
on  the  second  ballot:  Poincare  483,  Pams  296,  Vaillant  69. 

[37] 


term 
doctrine 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Ablest 
politi- 
cians not 
chosen 


dents  Loubet  and  Fallieres  successively  announced 
that  they  would  not  accept  a  second  term,1  a 
precedent  was  created  which  may  prove  no  less 
effective  than  a  constitutional  amendment. 

What  kind  of  men  are  chosen  as  Presidents  of 
the  Republic?  Critics  complain  that  the  most 
prominent  figures  in  political  life  —  the  aggressive 
party  leaders,  the  Gambettas  and  Ferrys  and 
Waldeck-Rousseaus  —  have  been  overlooked;  that 
men  of  mediocre  attainments,  lacking  in  character 
and  personal  force,  have  been  preferred.  After 
the  election  Frenchmen  are  supposed  to  ask  who 
this  obscure  man  is.  Clemenceau,  according  to 
his  own  confession,  wished  to  make  Carnot 
President  because  of  his  " perfect  insignificance." 
All  of  this  has  a  familiar  sound  to  Americans  who 
remember  how  frequently  "available"  men  and 
"dark  horses"  have  made  their  way  to  the  White 
House.  But  supposing  the  criticism  to  be  equally 
true  of  France  and  of  the  United  States,  its 
significance  in  the  two  countries  would  neverthe- 
less be  quite  different;  for  the  French  President 
does  not  control  the  executive  powers  of  the 
government;  the  ministers  do.  A  vigorous  and 
partisan  President  would  be  as  much  out  of  place 
at  the  filysee  as  Sir  Edward  Carson  or  Ramsay 
Macdonald  would  be  at  Buckingham  Palace.  A 
titular  executive  cannot  be  an  active  party  leader; 
he  should  have  the  reputation   of  giving  sound 

1  Poincare  is  reported  to  have  made  a  similar  announce- 
ment towards  the  end  of  his  term. 

[38] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF   THE  REPUBLIC 

and  impartial  advice  to  which  ministers  of  any 
political  faith  could  listen  with  respect  and  profit. 

If  the  National  Assembly  has  not  always  acted  But  ex- 
with  perfect  wisdom,  it  has  at  least  been  animated  tensive 

.  .  political 

by  two  fundamental  considerations:  first  that  experience 
the  President's  loyalty  to  the  doctrine  of  legis-  re<iulred 
lative  supremacy  should  be  beyond  question,  and 
second  that  his  political  experience  should  have 
been  wide  enough  to  give  him  some  influence  over 
the  ministers.  All  the  Presidents  since  MacMahon 
have  had  a  parliamentary  career  which,  if  it  did 
not  bring  them  quite  to  the  front  rank  among 
party  leaders,  at  least  demonstrated  their  fitness 
for  high  office.  Jules  Grevy  served  as  president 
of  the  National  Assembly  and  as  president  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies;  Sadi  Carnot,  grandson  of 
the  famous  "organizer  of  victory,"  as  under- 
secretary, minister  of  public  works,  and  minister 
of  finance;  Casimir-Perier  as  undersecretary, 
president  of  the  Chamber,  and  prime  minister; 
Felix  Faure  as  undersecretary  in  three  cabinets, 
vice  president  of  the  Chamber,  and  minister  of 
marine;  fimile  Loubet  as  minister  of  public 
works,  minister  of  the  interior,  prime  minister, 
and  president  of  the  Senate;  Armand  Fallieres  as 
undersecretary,  minister  in  six  cabinets,  prime 
minister,  and  president  of  the  Senate;  Raymond 
Poincare  as  vice  president  of  the  Chamber  three 
times,  minister  four  times,  and  prime  minister; 
Paul  Deschanel  as  president  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  fifteen  times.    The  fact  that  almost  all 

[39] 


dent 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF    FRANCE 

of  these  achieved  success  in  public  life  without 
provoking  antagonisms  may  suggest  a  certain 
neutrality  of  character,  perhaps  a  lack  of  firm- 
ness and  decision;  Casimir-Perier  and  Poincare 
may  be  regarded  as  exceptions.1  But  it  should 
not  be  forgotten  that  in  the  earlier  days  of  the 
Republic,  when  dangers  threatened  on  every  side, 
the  election  of  an  ambitious  and  energetic  man 
would  have  seemed  a  tempting  of  providence. 
Execu-  The  powers  of  the  President,  as  described  in  the 

constitution,  are   both   executive   and   legislative 

powers         .  t        i  •  •  •  i 

of  the  in  character.  In  his  executive  capacity  the 
President  supervises  and  secures  the  execution 
of  the  laws;2  appoints  and,  by  implication,  re- 
moves all  civil  and  military  officers;3  grants  par- 
dons;4 disposes  of  the  armed  forces;6  presides 
over  public  ceremonies;6  receives  the  diplomatic 
agents  of  foreign  powers;7  negotiates  and  ratifies 
treaties;8  constitutes  the  Senate  as  a  high  court 
of  justice  to  try  persons  accused  of  attempts  upon 
the  safety  of  the  state; 9  and  with  the  consent  of 

1  The  former  was  chosen  because  the  anarchist  outrages 
indicated  the  necessity  of  a  more  vigorous  government;  the 
latter,  because  a  patriotic  feeling  had  been  evoked  by  the 
imminent  danger  of  war  with  Germany. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  3. 
*  Id.  and  Esmein,  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel,  page  694. 
4  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  3. 

6  Id.        6  Id. 

7  Id. 

8  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  8. 

9  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  12. 
[40] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

the  two  chambers  declares  war.1  Although  war 
may  be  declared '  only  when  the  President  asks 
and  the  chambers  give  their  consent,  a  provision 
of  this  kind  can  hardly  be  more  than  formal.  If 
France  is  attacked,  she  must  defend  herself;  and 
otherwise  the  executive,  conducting  the  diplomatic 
relations  with  other  countries  and  controlling  the 
armed  forces,  might  consult  the  chambers  only 
after  creating  a  situation  which  affected  the 
honor  and  safety  of  the  state.  Between  1871  and 
1914  France  was  involved  in  a  number  of  small 
wars  and  military  enterprises  —  the  conquest  of 
Tonkin  in  1884,  the  Dahomey  expedition  of  1892, 
the  subjugation  of  Madagascar  in  1895,  and  the 
suppression  of  the  Boxer  uprising  in  1900.  In 
none  of  these  cases  was  war  declared  or  a  direct 
application  made  to  Parliament  for  authority. 
Regarding  appointments  something  will  be  said 
in  another  place.  It  may  be  noted  here  that, 
notwithstanding  the  explicit  language  of  the 
constitution  ("he  appoints  to  all  civil  and  mili- 
tary positions"),  many  appointments,  as  regulated 
in  various  laws  and  ordinances,  are  made  not  by 
the  President,  but  by  subordinate  officers  and 
under  the  restrictions  of  a  competitive  merit  sys- 
tem. The  councilors  of  state  are  the  only  officials 
whose  appointment  cannot  be  lodged  with  sub- 
ordinate officials.2    Apparently  Parliament  might 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  9. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  4;    Esmein,  op.  cit., 
page  691;  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  439. 

C41] 


making 
power 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

even  substitute  the  elective  for  the  appointive 
principle,  as  has  been  proposed  in  the  case  of 
Treaty-  judges.1  In  the  matter  of  removals  it  may  impose 
whatever  conditions  it  pleases,  even  to  the  extent 
of  establishing  permanent  tenure.2  The  Presi- 
dent's power  in  the  making  of  treaties  is  subject 
to  important  limitations.  In  negotiating  them, 
it  is  true,  he  has  a  free  hand.3  Gambetta,  when 
president  of  the  Chamber  in  1880,  would  not 
permit  the  introduction  of. an  amendment  to  the 
tariff  bill  which  sought  to  restrict  this  freedom. 
"I  cannot,"  he  said,  ''allow  the  right  of  the 
government  to  treat  in  the  full  liberty  of  its 
powers  to  be  brought  under  discussion."  4  The 
committee  which  drafted  the  tariff  law  of  1892 
admitted  that  the  minimum  rate  provisions  might 
be  modified  by  commercial  treaties.  According 
to  Eugene  Pierre,  the  leading  authority  on  parlia- 
mentary law,  any  proposal  tending  to  limit  the 
government's  right  of  negotiation  would  be  un- 
constitutional.5 For  the  ratification  of  treaties, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  consent  of  Parliament  is 
usually  required.  Under  the  terms  of  the  consti- 
tution 6  treaties  of  peace  and  commerce,  treaties 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  691. 

2  Id.,  page  695. 

3  Duguit,   op.   cit.,  Vol.    II,   page  475;     Esmein,   op.   at., 
page  767. 

4  Pierre,  Traite  de  droit  politique,  electoral,  et  parlementaire 
(1908),  Sec.  550. 

6  Id. 

6  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  £>. 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

which  involve  the  finances  of  the  state  or  the 
persons  and  property  of  Frenchmen  residing 
abroad  must  be  submitted  to  the  chambers  for 
approval;  and  no  cession  or  exchange  or  annexa- 
tion of  territory  can  take  place  except  by  virtue 
of  a  law.  These  requirements,  while  covering  a 
wide  range,  do  not  render  the  President's  inde- 
pendent right  of  ratification  altogether  illusory. 
They  do  not  include  general  treaties  of  peace 
made  at  the  close  of  a  war  in  which  France  did 
not  participate  (Treaty  of  Berlin,  1878),  treaties 
which  establish  a  French  protectorate,  and  treaties 
of  alliance  such  as  the  treaty  with  Russia.  The 
chambers  were  not  consulted  with  regard  to  the 
Franco-German  convention  of  191 1  which  fixed 
the  political  status  of  Morocco  and  bound  the 
French  government  to  concede  equal  commercial 
rights;  or  in  regard  to  the  agreement  of  1889 
which  delimited  the  boundaries  of  French  and 
English  possessions  on  the  west  coast  of  Africa. 
In  such  cases  the  President  must  inform  Parlia- 
ment "as  soon  as  the  interests  and  safety  of  the 
state  permit  ";  1  but  he  and  not  Parliament 
determines  whether  secrecy  is  desirable.2 

In  his  legislative  capacity  the  President  may   Legisia 
convene  a  special   session  of  Parliament  at  any   ttve 

r  J     powers 

time  and  must  do  so  when  an  absolute  majority   of  the 
of  the  members  of  each  chamber  request  it.3    He 


Presi- 
dent 


1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  8. 

2  Duguit,  of.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  477. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Arts.  1-2. 

[43] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

may  adjourn  Parliament,  but  not  more  than  twice 
during  the  regular  annual  session  or  for  a  longer 
period  than  one  month  in  each  case.1  He  may 
prorogue  Parliament,  but  only  after  its  session 
has  lasted  for  five  months.2  With  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  he  may  dissolve  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  but  new  elections  must  be  held  within 
two  months  and  the  Chamber  convened  ten  days 
later.3  He  may  initiate  legislation,4  and  appoint 
commissioners  to  assist  the  ministers  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  any  bill.5  He  may  communicate  with 
the  chambers  by  messages  which  shall  be  read 
from  the  tribune  by  a  minister.6  He  must  pro- 
mulgate laws  within  one  month  or,  if  Parliament 
has  declared  promulgation  urgent,  within  three 
days;  and  within  the  period  thus  fixed  he  may, 
by  a  message  with  reasons  assigned,  request  a 
new  consideration  of  the  bill,  which  cannot  be 
refused.7  He  may  propose  to  the  chambers  that 
they  unite  in  National  Assembly  for  the  amend- 
ment of  the  constitution.8  Promulgation  takes 
place  when  the  President  signs  a  law,  affirming 
that  it  has  been  regularly  passed  by  both  chambers 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  2;    Duguit,  op.  cit., 
Vol.  II,  page  298. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  1. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  5;    amendment  of  1884. 

4  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  3. 

5  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  6. 

6  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  6. 

7  Id.,  Art.  7. 

8  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  8. 

[44] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

and  that  it  will  be  executed  as  a  law  of  the  state.1 
If  the  legislative  procedure  has  been  irregular; 
if,  for  instance,  the  Senate  has  voted  the  law  in 
two  articles  while  the  Chamber  has  voted  it  in 
one,  he  should  refuse  to  promulgate  it,  even 
though  the  two  texts  are  otherwise  identical.2  If 
there  has  been  no  irregularity,  however,  his  re- 
fusal would  clearly  be  unconstitutional  and  would 
involve  him  in  a  conflict  with  the  cabinet  and 
Parliament.3  The  date  of  a  law  is  the  date 
of  its  promulgation;  but  it  does  not  go  into 
effect  until  it  has  been  published  in  the  Journal 
officiel.4 

The  President  possesses  an  extensive  ordinance  His  ordi- 
power.  In  part  this  power  is  conveyed  to  him 
by  the  constitution  itself;  for  most  of  his  consti- 
tutional rights  and  duties,  including  the  general 
duty  of  supervising  and  securing  the  execution  of 
the  laws,  are  accomplished  by  means  of  decrees. 
The  validity  of  such  decrees  may  be  questioned 
in  both  the  ordinary  and  the  administrative 
courts.  The  former  may,  in  any  particular  case, 
refuse  to  apply  an  illegal  decree;  the  latter  may 
actually  annul  any  decree  which  the  President 
was  legally  incompetent  to  issue.5  The  President 
exercises  the  most  important  part  of  his  ordinance 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  506;  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  443. 

2  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement  1914,  Sec.  506. 

3  Id.,  Sec.  505. 

4  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  509;  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  445. 
6  See  infra,  Chapter  XL 

[45] 


nance 
power 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

power,  however,  not  under  the  constitution,  but 
under  specific  laws.  The  French  Parliament,  like 
all  modern  legislative  bodies,  finds  its  burden 
greater  than  it  can  bear  and  seeks  relief  by  dele- 
gating authority  to  the  executive.  It  frames 
legislation  in  general  terms  without  the  minute 
and  confusing  details  which  are  so  characteristic 
of  English  and  American  statutes,  deciding  upon 
a  policy  and  entrusting  the  detailed  enforcement 
of  that  policy  to  capable  and  experienced  hands. 
Almost  all  the  notable  statutes  of  recent  times 
provide  that  "an  ordinance  of  public  administra- 
tion shall  determine  the  measures  proper  for 
securing  the  execution  of  the  present  law."  Such 
ordinances  are  described  as  "completing"  the 
law.  Parliament,  going  still  further,  frequently 
empowers  the  President  to  issue  ordinances  of 
public  administration  on  particular  subjects 
which  as  yet  have  not  been  regulated  by  law. 
Thus  the  finance  act  of  1906  requires  him  to  fix 
the  conditions  under  which  judges  shall  be  ap- 
pointed and  promoted;  the  public  health  act  of 
1902  requires  him,  in  certain  cases,  to  determine 
the  measures  necessary  to  prevent  the  spread  of 
an  epidemic;  he  has  even  been  given  authority 
to  establish  new  taxes.1 
Council  These  ordinances  of  public  administration  differ 

annuisT  ^rom  other  ordinances:  they  are  issued  by  virtue 
ordi-  of  a  specific  statutory  grant  of  power  and  only 
after  the  government  has  consulted  the  Council 
1   Duguit,  op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  457. 

C46] 


nances 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

of  State  in  general  assembly  and  received  its 
advice.  They  resemble  acts  of  Parliament  in  the 
fact  that  they  proceed  from  a  delegation  of  legis- 
lative power;  l  and  since  no  court  can  question 
the  competence  of  Parliament,  the  Council  of 
State  long  refused  to  entertain  any  question  as 
to  their  validity.  But  in  1907  a  new  and  momen- 
tous doctrine  was  evolved.  The  Council  of 
State  then  held  that  since  under  the  law  of  1872 
the  acts  of  all  administrative  authorities  may  be 
attacked  on  the  ground  of  excess  of  power  and 
since  the  President  is  an  administrative  authority, 
therefore,  although  ordinances  of  public  adminis- 
tration are  issued  by  virtue  of  a  delegation  of 
legislative  power,  their  validity  may  be  attacked.2 
Similar  decisions  were  rendered  in  1908  and  191 1. 
They  rest  upon  two  presumptions  which  may  or 
may  not  be  sound:  first  that  the  act  of  a  delegated 
authority  differs  from  a  similar  act  performed  by 
the  delegating  authority;  and  second  that  the 
President  is  not,  as  the  constitution  would  seem 
to  imply  by  investing  him  with  the  executive 
power,  a  representative  of  national  sovereignty, 
but  a  mere  administrative  agent  subordinate  to 
the  chambers  which  elect  him.  The  only  presi- 
dential decrees  which  now  remain  beyond  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  administrative  courts  are 
those  which  relate  to  foreign  affairs  (treaties, 
annexations  of  territory,  etc.)  and  to  the  action 

1  According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Council  of  State. 

2  Revue  du  droit  public^  1908,  page  38. 

[47] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  the  President  upon  Parliament  (adjournment, 
dissolution,  etc.). 
Presi-  Now,  however  imposing  the  presidential  powers 

dentiai  may  ^  ^e  constitution  makes  it  perfectly  clear 
controlled  that  they  cannot  be  exercised  by  the  President 
bymims-  frimse\t  Every  act  0f  the  President  must  be 
countersigned  by  a  minister.1  An  "act"  of  the 
President  is  a  written  act,  a  message  or  decree; 
for  no  minister  could  countersign  his  public  dis- 
courses or  his  conversations  with  foreign  diplo- 
mats, even  though  these  may  have  an  important 
political  effect.2  As  the  countersign  involves 
responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  minister,  he  will 
not  affix  it  to  any  document  which  he  disapproves; 
he  determines  that  the  presidential  powers  shall 
not  be  exercised  in  this  or  that  way.  Further,  as 
he  holds  office  by  the  will  of  Parliament  and  not 
by  the  will  of  the  President,  he  is  in  a  position  to 
determine  affirmatively  what  acts  the  President 
shall  submit  to  be  countersigned.  In  actual  fact 
decrees  are  formulated  by  a  minister  and  signed 
by  the  President  as  a  matter  of  routine.  Every 
one  familiar  with  the  mysteries  of  English  govern- 
ment knows  that  the  powers  of  the  Crown  do  not 
belong  to  the  king;  the  Crown  is  not  a  person; 
it  is  simply  a  convenient  working  hypothesis,  a 


1  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  3;  J.  Laferriere,  "  Le 
Contreseing  ministeriel,"  Revue  generate  a" administration,  April 
and  May,  1908. 

2  But,  as  in  England,  the  ministers  are  responsible  in  such 
cases.     Esmein,  op.  cit.y  page  814. 

[48] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

name  employed  to  designate  an  aggregate  of 
powers  which  the  ministers  exercise.  The  powers 
of  the  French  President  resemble  the  powers  of 
the  Crown.  They  function  through  a  responsible 
parliamentary  executive.  To  make  the  situation 
still  more  definite  the  constitution  provides  that 
the  titular  executive  shall  be  responsible  only 
in  case  of  high  treason  !  and  that  he  shall  be  tried 
only  before  the  Senate  on  charges  preferred  by 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.2  This  does  not  mean 
that  the  President  is  above  the  civil  and  criminal 
law;  he  may  be  prosecuted  like  an  ordinary 
citizen  except  that  in  criminal  cases  the  Senate 
alone  can  assert  jurisdiction.3  It  means  that  the 
President,  unlike  the  ministers,  is  politically  ir- 
responsible, that  he  cannot  be  removed  from 
office  unless,  in  the  exercise  of  his  functions,  he 
has  been  guilty  of  high  treason.  Although  the 
crime  of  high  treason  has  not  been  defined  by  law, 
the  Senate  might  adopt  a  definition  of  its  own 
and,  without  imposing  any  other  penalties,  re- 
move the  convicted  President.4  The  constitution 
obviously  intends  that  high  treason  should  be 
regarded  in  the  political  rather  than  in  the  strictly 

1  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  6. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  12. 

3  Esmein,  op.  cit.y  page  786;   Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page 

399- 

4  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  787;  but  in  the  contrary  sense 
Duguit,  op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  408.  See  also  J.  Barthelemy, 
La  mise  en  accusation  du  President  de  la  Republique  et 
des  ministres  (19 19), 

[49] 


GOVERNMENT  AND    POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

criminal  sense.  What  is  the  effect  of  this  irre- 
sponsibility upon  the  position  of  the  President? 
It  makes  his  tenure  of  office  independent  of  parlia- 
mentary majorities.  But  if  he  cannot  be  voted 
out  of  office  as  Thiers  was  in  1873,  he  cannot 
exercise,  like  Thiers,  a  substantial  control  over 
his  ministers.  He  becomes,  as  Professor  Duguit 
says,1  "the  prisoner  of  the  ministry  and  of  Par- 
liament. In  monarchical  countries  the  king 
represents  a  social  force  and,  in  spite  of  his  irre- 
sponsibility, he  may,  by  resting  upon  this  social 
force,  play  an  active  part  in  the  affairs  of  the 
country.  A  President  of  the  Republic,  elected 
by  the  chambers  and  irresponsible,  represents  no 
social  force  and  can  play  no  active  part  unless 
he  possesses  a  considerable  personal  authority,  a 
situation  which  will  arise  very  seldom  and  perhaps 
never  at  all." 

Appoint-         Is   the   President   a   captive  of  the   ministry? 

"J6.1?*         What  are  the  relations  between  these  two  execu- 

or  the 

prime  tive  organs?  While  the  constitution  says  nothing 
minister  djrectly  about  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of 
ministers,  it  empowers  the  President  to  appoint 
all  civil  and  military  officers.2  But  as  the  ministers 
are  responsible  to  Parliament,3  the  President  is 
necessarily  circumscribed  in  his  choice.  Marshal 
MacMahon  discovered  this  in  the  crisis  of  1877. 
On  May  16  he  practically  forced  the  resignation 

1  Op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  481. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  3. 


3  1d.y  Art.  6. 


[50] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

of  Jules  Simon,  who  was  supported  by  a  majority 
of  two  to  one  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and 
appointed  in  his  stead  the  Duke  de  Broglie,  a 
monarchist.  With  the  consent  of  the  Senate  he 
dissolved  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  But,  the 
elections  having  resulted  favorably  to  the  Re- 
publicans, de  Broglie  resigned;  and  his  successor, 
Rochebouet,  finding  it  impossible  to  procure  a 
vote  of  supplies,  soon  followed  suit.  MacMahon 
at  last  gave  way  and  summoned  the  Republican 
leader  Dufaure  to  form  a  cabinet.  That  ex- 
perience proved  decisive:  the  President  must 
choose  as  prime  minister  a  man  who  has  the 
confidence  of  the  majority  in  the  Chamber.  This 
does  not  imply  that  the  President  is  altogether 
without  discretion.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
there  are  so  many  political  groups  in  the  Chamber 
and  that  a  majority  may  be  formed  by  several 
different  combinations  among  them,  he  is  not 
always  limited  to  one  particular  politician.  In 
England,  when  a  cabinet  resigns,  the  king  sends 
for  the  leader  of  the  opposition;  he  has  no  al- 
ternative. But  in  France  any  one  of  half  a 
dozen  men,  some  of  them  perhaps  members  of 
the  outgoing  cabinet,  might  succeed  in  winning 
the  support  of  the  majority;  and  within  that 
small  circle  the  President  is  free  to  choose.  Not 
that  the  choice  is  final.  It  must  be  ratified  by  a 
vote  of  confidence.  Thus  on  June  3,  1914,  fol- 
lowing the  resignation  of  the  Doumergue  cabinet, 
President  Poincare  invited  Rene  Viviani  to  take 

[5i  ] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

office;  and  when  Viviani,  after  negotiation  with 
the  various  groups,  declined,  Poincare  applied 
successively  and  with  the  same  result  to  Des- 
chanel,  Delcasse,  Dupuy,  and  Peytral.  Ribot 
accepted.  But  on  June  12,  when  the  Chamber 
refused  a  vote  of  confidence,  he  had  to  resign. 
Next  day  Viviani  succeeded  in  forming  a  cabinet 
which  could  count  on  having  a  majority  behind 
it.  In  practice  the  President  does  not  designate 
a  new  prime  minister  until  he  has  carefully 
analyzed  the  political  situation  with  the  assistance 
of  the  presidents  of  both  chambers.  He  does  not 
consult  them  as  a  matter  of  courtesy,  but  because 
they  are  better  situated  than  any  one  else  to 
indicate  the  will  of  the  chambers.  Latterly, 
indeed,  the  custom  has  been  to  consult  with  the 
party  leaders  as  well.  On  the  occasion  of  a 
ministerial  crisis  they  flock  to  the  Elysee,  promis- 
ing to  support  the  future  combination  provided 
that  they  or  their  friends  are  included  in  it.  The 
President  chooses  only  the  prime  minister,  not 
the  other  members  of  the  cabinet.  In  1877 
Dufaure  refused  to  take  office  until  Marshal 
MacMahon,  who  first  had  insisted  on  naming  the 
ministers  of  war,  marine,  and  foreign  affairs 
himself,  gave  him  a  free  hand;  and  the  precedent 
thus  established  has  never  been  questioned  since.1 
At  the  same  time  the  advice  of  the  President 
may  have  great  influence. 

Can  the  President  dismiss  his  ministers?    Presi- 
1  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  488, 

[52] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

dent     MacMahon     practically     dismissed     Jules   Dis- 
Simon;    that  is,  he  sent  Simon  a  hostile  letter   "J188*1. 

...  .of  minis- 

which  provoked  his  resignation,  as  it  was  in-  ters 
tended  to  do.1  But  the  outcome  of  that  crisis 
has  certainly  not  encouraged  any  of  his  successors 
to  imitate  MacMahon.  The  dismissal  of  a 
minister  who  enjoys  the  confidence  of  the  lower 
house  is  as  unlikely  to  happen  in  France  as  in 
England.  The  legal  right  remains.  Supposing  a 
disagreement  between  the  two  chambers,  the 
President  might  dismiss  the  prime  minister,  ap- 
point another  having  the  support  of  the  Senate, 
and,  with  the  consent  of  that  body,  dissolve  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  But  to  do  this  he  must 
obtain  the  countersign  of  the  dismissed  minister 
for  the  appointment  of  his  successor.2  Jules 
Simon  countersigned  the  appointment  of  Broglie. 
An  outgoing  minister  has  never  definitely  refused 
to  give  his  signature.  But  he  might  refuse. 
Casimir-Perier  resigned  as  President  in  1895 
partly  because  he  was  placed  in  a  ridiculous  sit- 
uation by  the  outgoing  minister,  Charles  Dupuy, 
who  withheld  for  several  days  the  necessary 
countersign.3  When  a  new  President  is  inaugu- 
rated, the  ministers  all  tender  their  resignations 

1  Anderson,  Constitutions  and  Documents,  page  641. 

2  Dugult,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  488.  But  Esmein  maintains 
that  the  new  minister  might  countersign  his  own  appointment. 
Op.  cit.,  page  813. 

3  Andre  Tridon,  Review  of  Reviews  (American),  Vol.  XL VI 
(1912),  page  694. 

[53] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

as  a  matter  of  form.  That  they  are  invariably 
reappointed  serves  as  a  further  illustration  of  the 
small  part  that  the  personal  inclinations  of  the 
President  are  allowed  to  play.1 
Subordi-  Twice  a  week  the  President  attends  a  meeting 
°f,te  .       of  the  cabinet  which  is  then  technically  known  as 

role  of  ...  . 

Presi-  the  council  of  ministers.  For  certain  purposes 
dent  his  presence  is  required.  It  is  by  decrees  "issued 
in  the  council  of  ministers"  that  the  President 
constitutes  the  Senate  as  a  high  court  of  justice 
and  appoints  or  removes  councilors  of  state; 2 
and  statutes  sometimes  prescribe  that  the  decrees 
authorized  therein  shall  be  issued  in  the  same 
way.3  Moreover,  the  practice  of  parliamentary 
government  as  developed  in  France  requires  the 
participation  of  the  President  when  the  general 
policy  of  the  government  is  discussed.  The  Presi- 
dent acts  as  presiding  officer;  but  he  has  no 
vote  4  and  at  least  until  very  recently  appears  to 
have  taken  no  active  part  in  the  deliberations 
and  exercised  no  important  political  influence. 
When  Fallieres  presided  for  the  first  time  in  the 

1  J.  Barthelemy,  Le  Role  du  pouvoir  executif  dans  les 
republiques  modernes  (1906),  page  707.  The  earlier  practice 
was  conflicting,  "but  it  seems  that,  in  these  last  years,  the 
theory  tends  to  become  established  that  the  President  must 
refuse  to  accept  the  resignation  offered  by  a  cabinet  simply 
because  of  a  change  in  the  presidency." 

2  Constitutional  laws  of  July  16,  Art.  12,  and  Feb.  25, 
Art.  4. 

3  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  802. 

4  Id.,  page  807. 

[54] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

council  of  ministers,  he  said:  '  "I  shall  always 
tell  you  my  opinion  very  frankly,  even  should  it 
displease  you.  You  will  find  me  a  sincere  ad- 
viser, a  sure  friend,  and  occasionally  a  critic; 
but  the  very  plainness  of  this  attitude  will  guaran- 
tee that,  no  more  under  my  presidency  than 
under  that  of  my  predecessor,  will  there  be,  over 
against  the  government,  a  policy  of  the  Elysee." 
Henri  Leyret  pictures  one  of  these  meetings.2 
Under  the  indifferent  eye  of  the  President  the 
ministers  inquire  who  can  be  the  author  of  an 
abusive  newspaper  article,  or  they  seek  for  some 
means  of  minimizing  the  effect  of  an  impending 
interpellation,  or  they  consider  how  to  apportion 
patronage  among  their  impatient  followers.  This, 
he  says,  is  not  as  it  ought  to  be.  The  President 
should  call  them  to  order.  "It  is  a  great  error 
to  suppose  that  he  should  preside  purely  as  a 
matter  of  form.  He  has  the  right  to  speak,  to 
discuss,  to  convert  the  ministers  to  his  personal 
ideas.  On  the  decisions  which  are  to  be  taken  .  .  . 
he  gives  his  opinion  and,  if  need  be,  interposes  a 
definite  refusal. "  3  In  fact  Leyret  believes  that 
the  President  may  and  should  bend  the  ministers 
to  his  own  point  of  view.  If  his  tact  and  his 
experience  do  not  prevail,  he  has  a  means  of 
defense  and  compulsion  which  the  constitution 
has  given  him.4    Decrees  must  bear  his  signature 

1  Leyret,  Le  President  de  la  Republique,  page  37. 

2  Id.,  page  69. 

3  Id.,  page  71.  4  Id.,  page  116. 

[55] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

as  well  as  the  signature  of  a  minister;  and  by- 
withholding  it  he  can  force  compliance  with  his 
wishes.  This  theory  has,  apparently,  no  basis  in 
existing  practice.  President  Loubet  was  much 
opposed  to  the  pardoning  of  Dreyfus;  but  when 
the  ministers  insisted  and  one  of  them  threatened 
to  resign,  he  finally  gave  his  consent.1 
Presi-  The    dependence   of  the    President    upon    his 

dentiai  ministers  will  appear  more  clearly  from  a  con- 
sages  sideration  of  some  of  his  nominal  powers.  The 
constitution  gives  him  the  right  to  communicate 
with  the  chambers  by  means  of  written  messages.2 
These  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  ministerial 
declarations  in  which  the  cabinets  announce  their 
policy  to  the  chambers.  The  message  is  sent  on 
the  initiative  of  the  President  and  presumably 
embodies  his  own  opinions.  But  at  the  same 
time,  since  it  must  be  countersigned  and  since 
the  cabinet  thus  becomes  responsible  for  it,  the 
President  can  say  only  what  he  is  allowed  to  say. 
Even  in  the  case  of  MacMahon,  who  sought  to 
control  the  executive  and  impose  a  personal 
policy,  the  character  of  the  messages  changed 
with  every  change  of  ministry.  MacMahon  sent 
numerous  messages,  three  in  a  single  fortnight; 
but  since  his  time  no  president  has  exercised  this 
right  except  to  thank  the  chambers  for  electing 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.>  page  721.  But  Loubet  once  remarked: 
"Whatever  may  be  said,  I  do  not  sign  everything."  See  J. 
Barthelemy,  op.  cit.,  page  709.  x 

2  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  6. 

[56] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

him  or  to  offer  his  resignation.  "Shameful  re- 
nouncement!" says  Leyret.1  "How  can  the 
President  of  the  Republic  pretend  to  any  in- 
fluence whatever  in  the  state  if  he  does  not  use 
means  of  action  which  publicly  attest  his  vigi- 
lance?" The  inaugural  messages  are  all  colorless; 
they  have  a  family  air,  almost  as  if  the  same  hand 
had  written  them.  Perhaps  Poincare's  message 
may  be  regarded  as  an  exception.  He  declared 
that  the  authority  of  the  head  of  the  state  should 
be  preserved  intact  under  the  control  of  the 
chambers.2  "It  is  his  function  to  be  a  guide  and 
adviser  for  public  opinion  in  times  of  crisis,  to 
seek  to  make  a  rational  choice  among  conflicting 
interests,  to  distinguish  the  general  from  the 
particular,  the  permanent  from  the  accidental,  to 
strive  to  disentangle  in  each  new  idea  the  still- 
born portion  from  that  part  which  may  be  kept 
for  the  future  as  living  and  productive."  But 
surely  in  such  vague  language  no  one  could  find 
any  indication  of  a  personal  policy. 

The  messages  of  resignation  show  less  reserve;  Letters 
for  by  a  benevolent  custom  no  obstacle  is  placed  of  *esig" 
in  the  President's  way,  no  countersign  is  required 
for  this  final  act  of  self-effacement.  Strictly 
speaking  the  President  does  not  announce  his 
resignation  in  a  message,  but  in  a  personal  letter 
to  the  presidents  of  the  two  chambers,  this  ap- 
parently explaining  the  absence  of  the  counter- 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  146. 

2  Annual  Register,  1913,  page  280. 

[57] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

sign.1  MacMahon  resigned  in  1879  rather  than 
consent  to  certain  changes  in  the  high  command 
of  the  army,  which  seemed  to  be  political  rather 
than  military  in  their  object.2  Jules  Grevy  re- 
signed in  1887,  two  years  after  his  reelection, 
because  of  a  scandal  involving  his  disreputable 
son-in-law,  Daniel  Wilson,  in  the  sale  of  decora- 
tions. The  chambers  forced  him  out.  When  he 
refused  to  expel  Wilson  from  the  Elysee,  they 
overthrew  the  cabinet,  prevented  the  formation 
of  a  new  one,  and  adopted  a  resolution  inviting 
him  to  resign.  In  his  message  Grevy  declared 
that  he  gave  way  because,  in  the  disturbed 
political  condition  of  the  time,  a  conflict  between 
executive  and  Parliament  would  be  perilous. 
Casimir-Perier  resigned  in  1895,  having  found 
his  situation  intolerable.  He  had  read  in  the 
Journal  officiel  decrees,  purporting  to  be  his  own, 
which  he  had  never  seen  before  and  which  he  did 
not  approve;3  he  had  obtained  information  re- 
garding the  diplomatic  correspondence  with  Ger- 
many, not  from  his  foreign  minister  Hanotaux, 
but  from  the  German  ambassador.4  His  letter  of 
resignation    took    the    form   of   a   dignified    and 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  note  on  page  655. 

2  Vizetelly,  Republican  France,  page  225. 

3  Andre  Tridon,  Review  of  Reviews  (American),  Vol.  XLVI 
(1912),  page  694. 

4  Vizetelly,  op.  cit.,  page  413.  In  the  same  way  the  foreign 
minister  kept  President  Fallieres  in  ignorance  of  a  secret 
treaty  with  Spain  in  regard  to  Morocco.  Revue  du  droit 
public,  Vol.  XXIX  (1912),  page  316. 

[58] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

spirited  protest.1  It  is  interesting  to  recall  that 
one  of  the  offending  ministers  was  Raymond 
Poincare,  who  as  President  seemed  to  take  a 
different  view  of  the  presidential  powers,  and 
that  Casimir-Perier  himself,  when  prime  minister, 
asserted  in  definite  language  the  doctrine  of 
ministerial  control  of  the  executive  power.2 

The  constitution  entrusts  the  President  with  a  Veto 
suspensive  veto.  Within  the  period  fixed  for  po,ver 
promulgation  he  may  require  the  chambers  to 
reconsider  any  bill  they  have  passed.3  This  veto 
power  has  never  been  employed.  The  reason  is 
obvious.  If  the  prime  minister  has  approved  the 
passage  of  the  bill,  the  President  can  hardly  ask 
him  to  countersign  a  veto  message.  If  it  has 
been  carried  against  the  wishes  of  the  prime 
minister,  he  will  resign;  and  how  can  the  new 
minister,  who  approves  the  bill,  be  asked  to  veto 
it?4  Duguit  maintains,  however,  that  these  con- 
siderations are  not  valid.  When  a  bill  is  carried 
against  the  ministers,  he  says,5  the  President  may 
ask  them  to  remain  in  office  and  send  a  veto 
message;  when  the  ministers  accept  an  objection- 
able bill,  he  may  remove  them  and  send  a  veto 
message  countersigned  by  a  new  minister.  "The 
President  has  only  to  require  it.    But  hitherto  he 

1  For  the  text  see  Leyret,  op.  cit.,  page  248. 

2  Id.,  page  34.        3  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  7. 

4  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  674;  Bompard,  Le  Veto  du  President 
(1906),  page  273. 

6  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  449. 

[59] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

has  not  required  it  and  he  probably  will  not  as 
long  as  he  is  elected  by  the  chambers.  Only  a 
President  having  in  the  country  a  strong  personal 
position,  due  to  his  name,  his  prestige,  eminent 
services  rendered  to  the  country  could,  in  spite 
of  the  method  of  presidential  election,  exercise 
the  right  of  veto  and  the  right  of  dissolution." 
Dissoiu-  The  President  may,  with  the  consent  of  the 
of°the  Senate,  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.1  That 
Chamber  this  provision  requiring  the  consent  of  the  Senate 
is  inconsistent  with  the  proper  functioning  of  the 
parliamentary  system  will  be  demonstrated  later 
on;2  it  deprives  the  ministers  of  the  right  to 
appeal  against  transient  majorities  and  against 
the  obstructive  tactics  of  the  upper  house.  The 
immediate  question  is  whether  the  President  may 
exercise  this  constitutional  power.  A  position 
must  be  assumed  in  which  the  President  and  the 
Senate  wish  to  overthrow  a  cabinet  in  which  the 
Chamber  has  confidence.  The  President  might 
then  dismiss  the  prime  minister,  appoint  a  new 
one  enjoying  the  support  of  the  Senate,  and  dis- 
solve the  Chamber.  Such  was  the  course  which 
MacMahon  followed  in  1877.  It  would  involve 
difficulties  which  have  already  been  indicated; 
for  the  President  must  first  dismiss  a  minister 
who    enjoys    the    confidence    of    the    Chamber 

1  Constitutional  law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  5.     See  P.  Matret, 

" Histoire  du  droit  de  dissolution  en  France"  Annates  de 
I'ecole  libre  des  sciences  politique  s>  1898,  pages  220-248,  374- 
401.  2  See  Chapter  III. 

[60] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

and  therefore,  apparently,  the  confidence  of  the 
electorate,  then  persuade  him  to  acquiesce  in  his 
own  deposition  by  countersigning  the  appoint- 
ment of  his  successor,  and  finally  invite  the 
electorate  to  justify  a  course  of  action  which 
suggests  personal  policy  on  the  part  of  the  titular 
executive.  There  has  been  no  dissolution  since 
1877  and,  considering  the  unfortunate  experience 
of  MacMahon,  there  is  not  likely  to  be  another. 

The  peculiar  position  which  the  President  must   Real  use- 
occupy  under  a  parliamentary  government  is  not   £fjj^s 
thoroughly  understood.      "It  is   probable,"   said    Presi- 
Casimir-Perier,1  "that  many  Frenchmen  do  not   dency 
understand  it  at  all."    One  would  gather  from  the 
language  of  some    writers  that  the  constitution 
had  intended  the  President  to  possess  a  large  inde- 
pendent authority  and  that  somehow  the  usurp- 
ing ministers  had  deprived  him  of  it.     The  con- 
stitution   intended    nothing    of   the    kind.     The 
powers  of  the  President  are  simply  the  executive 
powers,  placed  in  the  hands  of  responsible  minis- 
ters.    When  Gambetta  described  "the  executive 
power"   as   the   strongest   which   had   ever   been 
constituted  in  a  democracy,  he  was  not  thinking 
of  the  President,  as  Leyret  assumes,  but  of  the 
ministers.      "The   President   can   do   nothing  by 
himself,"  said  Casimir-Perier;  2    "he  can  in  due 
form  place  his  signature  beside  another,  if  he  is 
asked  to  do  so;   but  otherwise,  except  in  the  case 

1  Leyret,  op.  cit.,  page  257. 

2  Id.,  page  255. 

[61] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  resignation,  his  signature  would  only  serve 
the  purpose  of  an  autograph  collection.  .  .  . 
Among  all  the  powers  which  seem  to  be  attributed 
to  him,  there  is  only  one  which  the  President  of 
the  Republic  can  exercise  freely  and  personally  — 
the  presidency  of  national  ceremonies. "  This 
being  the  case,  why  have  a  President?  Why  not 
do  away  with  this  "pompous,  expensive,  and 
perfectly  useless  officer,"  as  Radicals  and  Social- 
ists have  at  times  proposed?  In  the  early  years 
of  Victoria's  reign  Englishmen  were  asking  a 
similar  question.  But  it  has  now  become  toler- 
ably clear  that  a  titular  executive  fills  an  im- 
portant place  in  the  parliamentary  system.  He 
relieves  the  ministers  from  harassing  social 
obligations.  He  has,  as  Bagehot  said  of  the  con- 
stitutional sovereign  in  England,  the  right  to  en- 
courage his  ministers  and  to  warn  them.  If  he 
is  a  man  of  character  and  force  and  if  he  comes 
into  office  with  a  ripe  political  experience,  his 
advice  will  always  be  received  with  respectful 
attention.  While  cabinets  come  and  go,  he 
remains  in  office,  accumulating  a  knowledge 
of  the  practical  working  of  the  machinery  of 
government  which  ministers  cannot  afford  to 
ignore. 

"Our  political  customs  have  deprived  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  of  effective  authority,"  says 
Joseph  Barthelemy;  "but  they  do  not  deny  him 
a  moral  authority  and  a  power  of  persuasion 
which  he  is  admirably  situated  to  exercise.     He 

[62] 


THE   PRESIDENT  OF  THE   REPUBLIC 

retains,  in  his  relations  with  the  ministers,  a 
highly  useful  mission:  unoccupied  with  the  details 
of  departmental  administration,  with  a  task  which 
is  particularly  burdensome,  he  has  the  necessary 
leisure  to  consider  broadly  problems  which  the 
ministers  are  inclined  to  view  from  one  side  only. 
He  sees  things  which  cannot  be  seen  too  close  at 
hand.  When  different  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment disagree,  he  is  in  a  favorable  position  to 
suggest  the  basis  of  an  understanding.  He  has 
time  to  fix  his  attention  on  general  policy,  both 
internal  and  external.  If  he  has  an  inquiring  and 
alert  mind,  he  may  follow,  as  he  has  good  op- 
portunity to  do,  the  questions  which  interest  the 
country.  In  this  way,  having  superior  advan- 
tages, he  creates  a  domain  of  his  own  in  which 
he  easily  becomes  preeminent.  If  he  works  and 
if  he  remains  long  enough  in  office,  he  will  finally 
acquire  an  exceptional  authority  on  important 
questions  and  be  a  valuable  guide  for  the  minis- 
ters. Without  any  effort  to  impose  his  will,  his 
opinions  will  necessarily  receive  attention,  and 
thus  he  will  be  able  to  render  himself  very  useful 
to  his  country."  1 

It  is  difficult  to  measure  such  influence.     But    should 
certainly  most  of  the  Presidents  have  possessed   ^g._ 
it.    Jules  Grevy,  who  is  sometimes   represented    dent 
as  having  established  a  tradition  of  inertia  and    exert 

.    .  .  .  .  .        more 

passivity,  took  an  effective  part  in  shaping  public   authority? 

1  Barthelemy,   Le  Role  du  pouvoir  executif  dans  les  repu- 
bliques  modernes,  page  708. 

[63] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

policy.1  He  helped  to  adjust  party  quarrels. 
When  in  1882  de  Freycinet  was  outvoted  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  Grevy  persuaded  him  to 
withdraw  his  resignation  and  to  ask  once  more 
for  a  vote  of  confidence.  Sadi  Carnot  exerted  such 
influence  in  two  cabinet  crises  that  he  was  accused 
of  intriguing  for  reelection.  Although  it  is  the 
fundamental  principle  of  the  constitution  that  "the 
President  should  hunt  rabbits  and  not  govern,"  2 
yet  he  is  by  no  means  a  superfluous  ornament. 

Conservative  Republicans  propose  that  the 
President  should  assume  a  more  energetic  role. 
They  are  not  satisfied  with  the  functioning  of 
parliamentary  government.  In  the  vicissitudes  of 
French  cabinets,  in  their  uneasy  and  uncertain  life, 
in  the  maneuvers  which  are  necessary  to  secure 
the  support  of  this  or  that  party  group,  they 
profess  to  see  the  need  of  a  steadying  hand,  of 
a  leader  who  will  be  above  petty  politics  and 
devoted  to  the  general  public  interest.  "The 
country  would  like  to  have  a  President  elected 
because  of  merit  and  ascendancy,"  says  Leyret,3 
"a  chief  having  the  special  competence  character- 
ized by  Thiers  in  these  precise  terms:  political 
experience  and   business  habits.     This  does  not 

1  Barthelemy,  op.  cit.,  pages  710-71 1. 

2  Leyret,  op.  cit.,  page  12,  quoting  J.  J.  Weiss.  Barthelemy, 
op.  cit.,  page  672,  says:  "The  presidency  is  an  honorable  retreat 
for  a  veteran  who  is  tired  of  political  struggles  and  whose 
advice  is  asked  without  any  intention  of  following  it." 

3  Leyret,  op.  cit.,  page  226. 

[64] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

mean  that  he  should  either  engage  in  a  sys- 
tematic struggle  with  Parliament  or  play  an 
ambitious  part;  it  means  that  he  should  restore 
to  the  functions  of  the  head  of  the  state,  before 
the  eyes  of  attentive  France,  the  influence  and 
the  credit  of  his  office. "  In  spite  of  this  innocuous 
statement,  Leyret  shows,  in  specific  arguments, 
that  he  really  desires  a  diversion  of  power  from 
the  responsible  ministers  to  the  irresponsible 
President.  The  latter  may  refuse  his  signature; 
he  may  dismiss  his  ministers.  Obviously  such 
conduct  would  precipitate  a  struggle  with  Parlia- 
ment; and,  aside  from  this  peril,  the  executive 
power  would  simply  be  dissipated,  not  strength- 
ened. If  the  ministers  are  too  dependent  upon 
the  individual  parliamentary  groups,  a  remedy 
must  be  found  by  modifying  their  relations  with 
the  chambers  rather  than  their  relations  with  the 
President. 

The  election  of  Raymond  Poincare  portended  Poincare 
no  fundamental  change  in  the  position  of  the 
President.  It  is  true  that  he  was  elected  with  nei 
the  help  of  the  Center  and  Catholic  Right l  and 
that  his  triumph  over  the  Radical-Socialist  candi- 
date was  regarded  as  an  important  success  for  the 
conservative  parties.  Newspapers  like  Le  Gaulois 
and    Le   Figaro   were   naturally   delighted.     The 

1  Charles  Dawbarn,  Makers  of  New  France  (1915),  page  15. 
When  the  result  of  the  election  was  announced  tc  the  National 
Assembly  there  were  cries  of  "A  bas  la  dictature!"  "A  bas 
l'elu  de  la  droite!" 

C65] 


and 
Descha- 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Radical-Socialists  were  perturbed.  When  their 
convention  assembled  at  Pau  in  October,  1913,  it 
passed  a  resolution  which  denounced  "the  aspira- 
tions of  personal  policy"  as  tending  to  diminish 
the  authority  of  Parliament  and  to  encourage  the 
return  of  every  kind  of  reaction.1  But  Poincare 
was  a  tried  and  loyal  Republican  and,  as  his  civil 
marriage  indicated,  unfavorable  to  the  pretensions 
of  the  clergy.  His  motives  were  beyond  any 
suspicion.  With  the  exception  of  Casimir-Perier 
he  was  the  youngest  and  most  gifted  of  the  Presi- 
dents; and  his  conspicuous  force  of  character, 
his  sound  judgment,  his  remarkable  popularity, 
enabled  him  to  restore  somewhat  "the  influence 
and  credit"  of  the  presidency  without  trenching 
in  any  way  upon  the  prerogatives  of  the  cabinet. 
Indeed  his  acquiescence  in  the  retirement  of  the 
Briand  and  Barthou  cabinets  in  1913  and  the 
tone  of  his  public  addresses  grievously  disap- 
pointed those  who  looked  for  vigorous  action. 
"In  any  case,"  Professor  Dimnet  wrote  in  1914,2 
"he  will  never  be  again,  unless  he  should  make 
a  coup  d'etat,  the  representative  of  the  generous 
spirit  which  uplifted  France  and  gathered  every 
energy  round  him  while  he  was  prime  minister." 
Paul  Deschanel,  who  succeeded  him  in  1920, 
belongs  to  the  same  political  party,  represents 
the  same  ideal  of  national  solidarity.  For  the 
seven  years  preceding  his  election  he  had  served 

1  Annual  Register,  191 3,  page  291. 

2  Dimnet,  France  Herself  Again,  page  344. 

[66] 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 

as  president  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  refusing 
more  than  once  to  assume  the  office  of  premier 
and  to  take  part  again  in  the  sharp  conflict  of 
parties.  That  he  received  in  the  National  As- 
sembly 734  of  the  889  votes  cast  indicates  once 
more  the  decline  of  the  Radical-Socialist  party  as 
well  as  the  general  conviction  that  the  duties  of 
the  presidency  require  a  man  of  broad  sympathies 
and  judicial  temperament.  To  many  Frenchmen 
it  would  have  seemed  more  fitting  to  bestow  the 
office  upon  the  aged  war  premier,  Georges  Clemen- 
ceau;  but  the  very  qualities  which  enabled  the 
Radical-Socialist  statesman  to  become  the  savior 
of  France  —  his  courage,  his  daring,  his  impetuous 
fighting  spirit  —  were  unsuited  to  the  rarified 
atmosphere  of  the  Elysee. 


[67] 


CHAPTER  III 
the   ministers:   their   political 

ROLE 

R6ie         'TPHE   French    cabinet   tends  to  become,  like 
of  the  X     the   English   cabinet,  the   center  of  gravity 

cabinet        .  .  ,.  T 

in  the  parliamentary  system.  It  serves  as  a 
coordinating  agency  among  the  different  organs 
of  government.  Associated  with  the  President, 
the  cabinet  ministers  perform  manifold  legislative 
and  executive  duties  in  his  name  and  are  re- 
sponsible for  all  his  acts.  Associated  with  the 
permanent  civil  service,  they  superintend  the 
processes  of  administration,  directing  an  elaborate 
mechanism  which,  because  France  is  so  highly 
centralized,  extends  its  operations  even  through- 
out the  field  of  local  government  and  which, 
because  state  socialism  has  advanced  so  rapidly, 
touches  the  interests  of  the  individual  at  countless 
points.  Finally,  associated  with  Parliament,  they 
take  the  initiative  in  shaping  all  important  legisla- 
tion and  at  the  same  time  explain  and  justify 
their  conduct  as  administrative  officers.  Parlia- 
ment can  turn  them  out;  but  while  they  are  in, 
it  must  accept  their  leadership  whether  that 
leadership  be  strong  or  weak.  The  constitution, 
though  referring  to  the  ministers  in  half  a  dozen 
[68] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 


of  parlia- 
ment 


clauses,1  implies  rather  than  defines  their  position. 
By  providing  that  they  shall  be  responsible  to 
Parliament,  individually  and  collectively,  and 
that  they  shall  countersign  every  act  of  the  Presi- 
dent, the  obvious  intention  was  to  perpetuate  the 
arrangements  which  had  become  familiar  under 
Thiers  and  MacMahon;  and  as  the  principles  of 
this  parliamentary  system  were  well  understood, 
it  naturally  left  them  to  be  regulated  by  precedent. 

The    ministers    are    usually    members    of   the   Ministers 
Chamber  of  Deputies  or  the  Senate,  cabinet  office   usualJy 

r  #  t  members 

being  legally  compatible  with  the  legislative  man- 
date. In  France,  as  in  England,  experience  has 
demonstrated  the  necessity  of  connecting  the 
cabinet  as  closely  as  possible  with  Parliament,  in 
order  to  ensure,  for  Parliament  and  cabinet  alike, 
effective  means  of  control.  The  prime  minister, 
in  selecting  his  colleagues,  must  think  less  of 
their  administrative  efficiency  than  of  their 
political  strength,  the  votes  which  they  can  con- 
tribute to  swell  the  common  fund.  Men  who 
have  displayed  qualities  of  leadership  under  the 
exacting  conditions  of  parliamentary  life  are 
potentially  dangerous  critics  or  valuable  allies. 
Not  only  are  they  familiar  with  the  intricacies  of 
procedure  and  the  tactics  of  debate,  not  only  can 
they  speak  with  authority  in  the  name  of  the 
Chamber  itself,  but  as  a  matter  of  course  their 
adherents  become  the  adherents  of  the  cabinet 

1  Law  of  February  25,  1875,  Arts.  3,  4,  6,  and  7;    law  of 
July  16,  1875,  Arts.  6  and  12, 

[69: 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

and  help  to  maintain  it  in  power.  Practice  de- 
pends, then,  upon  considerations  of  this  kind  and 
not  upon  any  legal  requirements.  The  constitu- 
tion expressly  provides  that  the  ministers  may 
appear  in  either  house  and  be  heard  whenever 
they  request  it.1  Legally  the  ministers  might  all 
be  taken  from  outside  parliament,  as  happened  in 
the  case  of  the  Rochebouet  cabinet  of  1877; 2  and 
even  now  the  ministers  of  war  and  marine  are 
frequently  professional  men  quite  innocent  of  the 
game  of  politics.3  These  two  executive  depart- 
ments occupy  a  peculiar  position,  it  is  said,  be- 
cause they  are  technical  services.  But  in  reality 
an  exceptional  arrangement  can  be  justified  only 
on  the  ground  that  the  army  and  navy  should  be 
freed  as  far  as  possible  from  political  influences. 
Other  services  are  equally  technical.  If  the  min- 
ister of  marine  should  be  an  admiral,  then  the 
minister  of  public  works  should  be  an  engineer. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  he  is  not  an  engineer  but  a 
politician;  for  his  business  is  not  to  run  railroad 
trains  or  to  build  bridges,  but  to  see  that  the 
policies  formulated  by  Parliament  in  regard  to 
railroads  or  highways  are  enforced  by  appropriate 

1  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  6. 

2  In  the  Millerand  ministry  of  January,  1920,  three 
ministers  and  one  undersecretary  were  without  seats  in 
Parliament. 

3  De  Freycinet,  minister  of  war  for  five  years  (1888-1892), 
was  the  first  civilian  to  hold  that  post  since  1848.  His 
conspicuous  success  seemed  to  justify  the  departure  from 
precedent. 

[70] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

administrative  action.  He  serves  as  a  medium  of 
communication  between  Parliament  and  the 
permanent  technical  officers;  he  consults  these 
officers  in  preparing  any  measure  for  submission 
to  Parliament,  secures  from  them  the  information 
necessary  to  support  it  in  debate,  and  finally 
supervises  their  enforcement  of  it  as  a  law  of  the 
land.  In  parliamentary  debates  the  minister  need 
not  rely  altogether  upon  his  own  superficial  and 
secondhand  knowledge  of  a  difficult  subject.  By 
presidential  decree  commissioners  may  be  ap- 
pointed to  assist  him  in  the  discussion  of  any 
particular  bill,1  such  commissioners  being  almost 
invariably  high  officials  of  the  civil  service.  They 
act  simply  as  assistants  of  the  minister,  without 
initiative  and  without  responsibility.  Although 
the  constitution  authorizes  these  appointments 
only  "for  the  discussion  of  a  particular  bill," 
a  decree  of  1880  designated  the  governor-general 
of  Algeria  to  assist  the  minister  of  the  interior 
"in  all  debates  and  interpellations"  relative  to 
that  colony;  and  commissioners,  speaking  to 
interpellations  in  the  Chamber,  have  actually 
sought  to  justify  acts  which  they  performed  under 
the  responsibility  of  the  minister.2  "In  the  end," 
remarks  Charles  Benoist,  "we  shall  see  officials 
defending  their  chiefs  before  the  chambers." 

The  constitution  does  not  create  or  provide  for 
the  creation  of  the  executive  departments  —  the 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  6. 

2  Revue  du  droit  public,  1905,  page  200. 

[71] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Size  of 
cabinet 
deter- 
mined by 
execu- 
tive act 


ministries,  as  they  are  always  styled  in  France. 
In  view  of  this  silence  is  the  executive  competent 
to  act,  or  the  legislature?  By  a  somewhat  dubious 
construction  of  the  presidential  powers  the  execu- 
tive has  asserted  its  competence.  It  is  contended 
that  since  the  President  has  the  right  to  fill  all 
civil  and  military  offices,1  he  has  also  the  right  to 
create  the  offices  themselves;  since  he  has  the 
right  to  appoint  ministers,  he  has  the  right  to 
create  ministries.2  The  cabinet,  therefore,  by 
means  of  presidential  decrees,  determines  at  any 
given  time  the  number  of  ministers  and  the 
distribution  of  functions  among  them.  When 
Aristide  Briand  became  prime  minister  in  October, 
191 5,  he  brought  into  the  cabinet  a  general 
secretary  of  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs,  a 
minister  of  state,  and  four  ministers  without  port- 
folio. But  this  power  does  not  rest  exclusively 
with  the  cabinet.  Not  only  may  Parliament 
interfere  in  a  negative  way  by  refusing  the  neces- 
sary supplies,  but  it  may  establish  a  new  ministry 
and  regulate  its  duties.  This  it  has  done  on  only 
one  occasion.  The  ministry  of  colonies  was  es- 
tablished by  a  law  of  1894.  There  were,  before  the 
war,  twelve  executive  departments  ranking  in  this 
order:  justice;  foreign  affairs;  interior;  finances; 
war;   marine;    public   instruction   and    fine    arts; 


1  Constitutional  law  of  February  25,  1875,  Art.  3. 

2  Pierre,  Traite  de  droit  politique,  Supplement  of  19 14,  Sec. 
100;  Noell,  U Administration  de  la  France:  Les  Ministeres,  etc. 
(191 1),  page  56. 

[72] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL  ROLE 

public  works,  posts,  and  telegraphs;  commerce  and 
industry;  agriculture;  colonies;  labor  and  public 
welfare,  the  last  established  in  1906  by  decree. 
In  the  Millerand  cabinet,  appointed  in  January, 
1920,  three  additional  departments  were  included: 
public  health,  pensions,  and  liberated  regions; 
and  the  service  of  public  welfare  was  transferred 
to  the  new  department  of  public  health.  All 
ministers  alike  receive  a  salary  of  #12,000.  They 
also  are  entitled  to  occupy  official  residences 
which  the  state  provides  with  furniture,  light, 
and  heat.1  If  a  minister  takes  advantage  of  this 
privilege,  however,  it  is  usually  because  his  wife 
and  daughters,  alive  to  their  social  opportunities, 
bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  him.  So  short,  so 
uncertain  is  the  minister's  career  that  he  may  be 
evicted  from  his  official  home  before  he  has  really 
managed  to  move  in.  The  civil  and  military 
honors  which  are  paid  to  the  minister  as  he  enters 
a  provincial  town  remain  very  much  what  they 
were  in  the  days  of  the  First  Empire.2  He  is  met 
by  the  prefect,  the  under-prefect,  the  mayor,  and 
the  mayor's  deputies;  troops  line  the  streets; 
bugles  sound,  bands  play  the  national  anthem, 
officers  salute,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry  is  as- 
signed as  a  guard  of  honor.  Although  he  no 
longer  appears  in   a  distinctive  uniform,   public 

1  See  decree  of  March  11,  191 1. 

2  The  famous  decree  Messidor  has  been  replaced  by  the 
decree  of  June  16,  1907;  see  also  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Supplement, 
Sec.  1 144. 

[73] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

attention  is  attracted  by  the  tricolor  cockade 
worn  by  his  coachman  or  chauffeur,  emblematic 
of  Republican  authority  like  the  fasces  of  ancient 
Rome.  On  ceremonial  occasions  the  ministers 
take  rank  after  the  presidents  of  the  two  cham- 
bers; l  among  themselves  they  follow  the  prime 
minister  in  the  order  indicated  above,  the  minister 
of  justice  coming  first,  the  minister  of  labor  last. 
The  The  English  ministers,  having  access  to  only 

under-  one  brancn  0f  tne  legislature  and  needing  repre- 
tarics  sentatives  in  the  other,2  are  assisted  by  under- 
secretaries; but  in  France,  where  the  ministers 
participate  freely  in  the  debates  of  both  chambers, 
a  different  practice  prevails.  Undersecretaries  are 
assigned,  not  to  all  executive  departments,  but  to 
those  in  which  the  ministers  find  themselves  over- 
burdened with  work.3  Thus  the  prime  minister, 
whatever  portfolio  he  may  hold,  can  hardly  dis- 
charge his  complex  duties  without  relying,  in  less 
important  matters,  upon  the  services  of  an 
assistant.  Before  the  war  there  were  usually  four 
undersecretaries.4  One  assisted  the  prime  minister; 
another  was  undersecretary  of  fine  arts;   a  third 

1  Decree  of  June  16,  1907. 

2  See  Lowell,  Government  of  England,  Vol.  I,  page  73. 

3  Regarding  the  undersecretaries  see  Pierre,  op.  cit.y  Sup- 
plement, Sec.  109;  Esmein,  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel 
(1914),  page  795  et  seq.;  Duguit,  Traite  de  droit  constitu- 
tionnel (191 1),  Vol.  II,  page  491  et  seq. 

4  In  1915,  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  the  war,  Briand 
appointed  eight  undersecretaries,  four  connected  with  the 
ministry  of  war,  one  with  the  ministry  of  marine. 

[74] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

usually  supervised  the  postal  and  telegraphic  serv- 
ices; the  fourth  was  attached  to  this  or  that 
ministry  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  time. 
In  view  of  the  heavy  burden  falling  upon  the 
government  in  the  work  of  reconstruction,  Mille- 
rand  included  in  his  post-war  ministry  (1920)  ten 
undersecretaries.1  A  presidential  decree  defines,  in 
some  detail,  the  duties  of  each  one.  While  the 
undersecretaries  go  in  and  out  of  office  with  the 
cabinet,  they  are  not  ministers  in  the  constitu- 
tional sense  of  the  term.  They  have  no  authority 
to  countersign  the  acts  of  the  President.  Legally 
the  ministers  should  be  ready  to  assume,  before 
Parliament,  full  responsibility  for  their  conduct  as 
for  the  conduct  of  any  other  subordinate.  But 
in  practice  the  undersecretaries  seem  to  have  be- 
come directly  responsible,  two  of  them  at  least 
having  retired  in  consequence  of  votes  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  If  this  practice  finds  no 
warrant  in  the  constitution,  it  is  none  the  less 
effective  on  that  account.  Another  anomalous 
practice  was  introduced  in  1906  when  the  under- 
secretaries began  to  attend  meetings  of  the  council 
of  ministers,  a  body  which  performs  certain  specific 
constitutional  duties  and  which  was  presumably 
intended  to  include  the  President,  the  ministers, 

1  These  were  attached  to  the  following  departments:  foreign 
affairs  (premier),  interior,  finances,  agriculture,  public  in- 
struction, commerce  (undersecretary  for  revictualling),  and 
public  works  (posts  and  telegraphs,  ports  and  merchant 
marine,  water  power,  aeronautics). 

[75] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

and  no  one  else.  The  undersecretaries  are  almost 
invariably  members  of  Parliament.  In  fact  the 
offices  exist  not  only  to  relieve  overburdened 
ministers,  but  also  to  provide  means  for  satisfying 
ambitious  young  deputies  whom  itwould  be  unwise 
to  overlook.  Doubtless  the  prime  minister  would 
find  Parliament  easier  to  control  if  he  had,  like 
his  English  prototype,  some  sixty  or  seventy  offices 
to  distribute  instead  of  twenty-five;  1  for  the 
deputy  who  gets  an  office  or  whose  friend  gets 
an  office  has  a  definite  interest  in  the  fortunes 
of  the  cabinet.  The  undersecretaries  may  speak 
in  both  houses;  they  are  entitled  to  the  same  civil 
and  military  honors  as  the  ministers;  but  their 
salaries  are  considerably  lower,  varying  from 
$5,000  to  $7,000. 
Reia-  The    prime    minister  —  or    president    of    the 

tions         council  of  ministers,  to  use  his  official  designa- 
premier      tion  —  is    appointed    as   such    by   decree   of  the 
with  his      presj(jent  of  the  Republic.     He  does  not  wield 
leagues      over  his  colleagues  an  autocratic  authority.     He 
appoints  them,  it  is  true,  and  may  remove  them; 
he  has,  apparently,  the  power  of  life  and  death. 
But  owing  to  his  dependence  upon  a  coalition  of 
parliamentary  groups  —  the  necessity  of  consult- 
ing and  harmonizing  their  wishes,  the  perpetual 
haunting  fear  of  secession  in  this  quarter  or  that  — ■ 
he  is  more  often  engaged  in  soothing  ruffled  feel- 
ings than  in  devising  measures  of  discipline.     It 

1  In   the   Millerand   ministry    (1920)   there    were    fifteen 
ministers  and  ten  undersecretaries. 

[76] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

is  significant  that  he  usually  elects  to  preside 
over  the  ministry  of  the  interior.  He  should 
possess,  as  Louis  Barthou  has  said,1  "the  means 
of  action  which  the  ministry  of  the  interior  alone 
confers."  It  gives  him  control  of  the  police,  the 
prefects,  the  subprefects,  the  prefectoral  councils, 
the  municipal  councils,  and  the  electoral  ma- 
chinery; and  if  he  does  not  exercise  this  control, 
some  other  minister  does.  "Such  powers  have 
awakened  in  a  colleague's  mind"  —  M.  Barthou 
is  apparently  alluding  to  the  case  of  M.  Clemen- 
ceau,  who  as  minister  of  the  interior  dominated 
the  Sarrien  cabinet  (1906)  and  in  a  few  months 
actually  became  premier —  "the  ambitions  of  an 
heir."  Unfortunately  no  single  man  is  adequate 
to  the  double  task  of  superintending  the  general 
conduct  of  the  government  and  directing  a  great 
executive  department;  parliamentary  life  is  too 
intense.  A  prime  minister  of  dominant  personal- 
ity —  another  Waldeck-Rousseau  —  might  main- 
tain his  ascendancy  in  the  cabinet  without 
holding  a  portfolio;  Rene  Viviani  in  the  war 
cabinet  of  1914  and  Georges  Clemenceau  in  the 
war  cabinet  of  19 17  held  no  portfolio;  2  but  under 
normal  circumstances  the  prime  minister  would  be 
heavily  handicapped,  controlling  without  means 

1  Revue  hebdoviadaire,  Vol.  IV  (191 1),  page  608. 

2  In  the  other  war  cabinets  Briand  (1915)  and  Ribot 
(1917)  chose  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs;  Painleve  (1917), 
the  ministry  of  war.  In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
time  these  departments  were  of  the  first  importance. 

[77] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  control  and  acting  without  means  of  action. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  English  prime  minister, 
having  an  assured  position,  almost  always  occupies 
a  titular  office. 
Cabinet  The  existence  of  the  cabinet,  so  long  ingeniously 
meetings  disguised  in  English  law,  is  expressly  recognized 
in  the  French  Constitution  of  1875.  Not  only 
does  the  constitution  make  the  ministers  "col- 
lectively" responsible  to  the  chambers,  but  it 
provides  that  certain  acts  must  be  performed 
"in  the  council  of  ministers"  and  that  during  a 
presidential  interregnum  "the  council  of  minis- 
ters" shall  be  invested  with  the  executive  power. 
Likewise  many  important  laws  authorize  the 
issuing  of  decrees  in  the  council  of  ministers  —  for 
instance,  the  law  of  1884  which  permits  the  dis- 
solution of  municipal  councils  by  decree.  By 
virtue  of  an  unbroken  tradition  which  extends 
back  to  the  days  of  the  monarchy,  the  President 
presides  in  the  council  of  ministers;  but  the 
ministers  have  the  privilege  of  meeting  by  them- 
selves, of  holding  what  are  called  cabinet  councils, 
as  frequently  as  they  please.  Latterly  it  has 
been  the  custom  to  hold  a  council  of  ministers 
at  the  £lysee  twice  each  week  from  nine  to  twelve 
in  the  morning;  and  to  hold  one  cabinet  council 
at  the  offices  of  the  prime  minister.1  Presumably 
all  questions  of  general  policy  are  laid  before  the 
council   of  ministers.     The   proceedings  of  both 

1  Poincare,  How  France  is  Governed,  page    197;    Esmein, 
op.  cit.,  page  806. 

[78] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL    ROLE 

bodies  are  secret.  There  is  no  secretary,  no 
record.  The  brief  summary  which  the  prime 
minister  frequently  gives  to  the  newspapers  con- 
tains no  reference  to  serious  discussions  or  to 
conflicts  of  opinion.1 

The  constitution  provides  2  that  the  ministers    Minis- 
shall  be  collectively  responsible  to  the  chambers   terial 

r  i  i  l-  r      i  i     resP°nsi- 

for  the  general  policy  ot  the  government  and  brnty 
individually  for  their  personal  acts.  In  other 
words  they  can  remain  in  office  only  so  long  as 
their  direction  of  affairs  meets  with  parliamentary 
approval.  Corporate  responsibility  insures  con- 
tinuous cooperation,  continuous  harmony  be- 
tween the  cabinet  and  Parliament.  It  does  not 
imply  that  the  cabinet  should  seek  to  discover 
and  follow  the  will  of  Parliament.  "The  govern- 
ment," as  Raymond  Poincare  said  in  1906,3 
"must  in  no  way  abandon  its  role  of  leadership; 
...  in  a  word  it  must  claim  decisively  the  honor 
and  the  responsibility  of  governing."  But  when- 
ever Parliament  refuses  to  accept  such  leader- 
ship, the  cabinet  should  resign;  and  this  refusal 
usually  takes  the  form  of  a  vote  of  want  of  con- 
fidence. Individual  responsibility  hardly  seems 
consistent  with  the  character  of  parliamentary 
government;  it  suggests  divided  counsel,  con- 
flicting views  within  the  cabinet;  it  enables 
deputies  to  interfere  in  technical  administrative 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  807. 

2  Law  of  Feb.  25,  Art.  6. 

3  Le  Temps,  May  30,  1906. 

[79] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

matters  which  they  are  hardly  competent  to 
judge.  Although  individual  ministers  have  some- 
times been  forced  to  retire  (for  instance  General 
Andre  in  1904  and  Admiral  Thomson  in  1908), 
the  acquiescence  of  the  cabinet,  its  failure  to 
intervene  and  protect  the  minister  by  demanding 
a  vote  of  confidence,  is  regarded  as  a  confession 
of  weakness.  Beyond  question  the  tendency  now 
is  to  substitute  corporate  for  individual  responsi- 
bility. This  agrees  with  the  English  doctrine. 
When  official  misconduct  has  involved  the  com- 
mission of  criminal  offenses,  Parliament  may  feel 
that  enforced  resignation  is  an  inadequate  remedy. 
It  may  then  resort  to  impeachment  proceedings, 
the  Chamber  formulating  charges,  the  Senate 
assuming  jurisdiction; x  but  whether  offenses  of  a 
political  nature,  not  defined  in  the  criminal  code, 
can  properly  be  taken  as  the  basis  of  action 
remains  in  dispute.2  In  the  only  impeachment 
trial,  that  of  Louis  J.  Malvy,  minister  of  the 
interior  19 14-19 17,  the  Senate  did  not  base  its 
decision  on  the  criminal  code.  It  found  him 
guilty  of  acts  falling  short  of  treason  and  sen- 
tenced him  to  banishment  for  five  years.3    Esmein 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  12. 

2  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  843;  Duguit,  op.  cit.y  Vol.  II, 
page  507;  A.  Bel,  "La  Res  pons  abilite  des  mirtistres,"  Grande 
Revue,  Feb.,  1900,  page  431. 

3  See  Revue  politique  et  park merit  aire.  Vol.  XCVI,  pages 
306-9;  Vol.  XCVII,  pages  266-280;  and  Aug.  10,  1919, 
pages  137-148.  In  convicting  Malvy  of  an  act  not  contem- 
plated by  the  code,  observes  Duguit,  in  imposing  upon  him 

[80] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR    POLITICAL    ROLE 

maintains  that  the  ministers  may  be  tried  in  the 
ordinary  courts  for  any  breach  of  the  criminal 
law.1  It  seems  to  be  doubtful  whether  they  can, 
without  previous  action  on  the  part  of  the  legis- 
lature, be  held  liable  in  the  civil  or  administrative 
courts  for  damages  which  their  official  acts  have 
occasioned.2 

It    is    to    "the   chambers,"   according  to    the   Are  the 
constitution,   that    the    ministers   are   politically  tegoba, 
responsible.     Is  this  language   to  be  taken  in  its   sibie  to 
literal  sense?     Has  the  Senate  the  same  power  as   cham_ 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies   to  make  and  unmake   bers? 
cabinets?     Both  chambers    may  exercise  control 
over  the  cabinet  by  means   of  questions  and  in- 
terpellations,   amendments    to  money  bills,    and 
parliamentary   inquiries;      both  may  vote  orders 
of  the  day  deliberately    announcing  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  the  cabinet;    and  since  the  constitution 
speaks  of  responsibility  "to  the  chambers"  with- 
out making  any  exception  in  favor  of  one  or  the 
other,  some  eminent  autho  rities  contend  that  the 
ministers    are    dependent    upon  the  Senate    and 
Chamber  of  Deputies  in  precisely  the  same  way.3 

a  penalty  prescribed  by  no  law,  the  Senate  violated  article 
8  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  1789  and  article  4  of  the 
criminal  code.  See  also  J.  Barthelemy,  La  Mise  en  accusa- 
tion du  President  de  la  Re-pub1 : que  et  des  ministres  (19 19). 

1  Op.  cit.,  page  844. 

2  Esmein,   op.   cit.,    page   850;   Duguit,  op.   cit.,  Vol.   II, 
page  597. 

3  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  504,  citing  other  writers 
in  his  support. 

[81] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  validity  of  this  argument,  however,  is  open 
to  question.  The  phrase  employed  in  the  consti- 
tution was  current  in  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe 
when  the  ministers  were  responsible  to  the  lower 
house  alone;  and  neither  the  debates  in  the 
National  Assembly  nor  the  political  literature  of 
the  time  indicate  any  intention  to  give  it  a  dif- 
ferent meaning.1  Whatever  the  intentions  of  the 
National  Assembly  may  have  been,  the  actual 
working  of  the  constitution  is  infinitely  more  im- 
portant. In  practice  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
has  established  its  ascendancy.  During  the  first 
twenty  years  cabinets  were  never  directly  at- 
tacked by  the  Senate,  nor  did  they  feel  called 
upon  to  resign  because  of  its  rejection  of  govern- 
ment bills.2  Thus  in  1882,  when  an  article  of  the 
education  bill  was  rejected,  de  Freycinet,  remain- 
ing in  office,  accomplished  the  object  which  he 
had  in  view  by  issuing  a  presidential  decree;  and 
the  propriety  of  his  course  was  not  questioned.3 
Resigna-  But  in  1 896  the  Senate  for  once  took  an  aggressive 
Bour-f  attitude  and  boldly  insisted  on  its  right  to  force 
geois,  the  Bourgeois  cabinet  out.4  Five  times,  between 
1896  February  11  and  April  21,  it  voted  want  of  con- 

fidence by  large  majorities.     Bourgeois,  sustained 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.y  pages  828  ei  seq. 

2  In  1890  the  Tirard  cabinet  retired  when  the  Senate 
refused  to  ratify  a  treaty  with  Greece,  this  being  the  only 
exception  to  the  general  practice. 

3  De  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  page  313. 

4  For  the  details  see  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  pages  830-833. 

[82] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

by  the  Chamber,  held  his  ground.  Finally,  how- 
ever, when  the  Senate  refused  to  appropriate 
supplies  for  the  Madagascar  expedition  "until  it 
shall  have  before  it  a  constitutional  ministry 
possessing  the  confidence  of  the  two  chambers," 
he  felt  that  the  national  safety  was  endangered 
and,  with  that  explanation,  resigned.  Meline, 
who  succeeded  him,  described  accurately  enough 
both  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the 
Chamber's  position.  "The  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
issue  of  universal  suffrage,  exercises  a  preponder- 
ant influence  upon  general  policy;  but  although 
it  possesses,  because  of  its  origin  and  because  of 
the  constitution,  incontestable  rights,  it  cannot 
legislate  without  the  cooperation  of  the  Senate. 
There  we  have  a  situation  which  dominates 
theoretical  discussions  and  renders  them  useless. 
Reciprocal  good  will  has  hitherto  sufficed  to  settle 
all  difficulties;   to  that  we  again  appeal." 

The  incident  of  1896  stands  alone.    Frequently   Briand 
the  prime  minister  has  informed  the  Senate  that   ^dt^e 

.  .  Senate, 

he  would  regard  the  adoption  of  a  particular  1913 
measure  as  a  matter  of  confidence,  thus  forc- 
ing it  to  choose  between  accepting  his  leader- 
ship or  acquiescing  in  his  retirement.1  This 
does  not  imply  any  recognition  of  the  claims 
that  were  put  forward  in  1896;  it  is  simply  a 
means,  voluntarily  adopted,  of  compelling  favor- 

1  For  instance,  Dupuy  on  February  28,  1899;  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  on  June  2,  1900;  Rouvier  on  November  9,  1905; 
Clemenceau  on  June  26,  1908. 

[83] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

able  action.  Today  there  can  be  no  serious 
doubt  that  the  ministers  are  responsible  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  alone.  Since  1896  only  one 
cabinet,  that  of  Aristide  Briand,  has  retired  before 
a  hostile  vote  of  the  Senate.  But  unfortunately, 
since  the  ministers  cannot  dissolve  the  Chamber 
and  appeal  to  the  country  for  support  against  the 
Senate,  they  are  not  in  a  position  effectively  to 
prevent  their  measures  being  mutilated.  One 
thing  they  can  do  —  make  the  passage  of  govern- 
ment bills  a  matter  of  confidence.  In  March, 
1913,  Briand  did  this  in  the  case  of  the  propor- 
tional representation  bill  which  had  already 
passed  the  Chamber,  for  he  believed  that  a 
cabinet  should  never  hesitate  to  employ  its  last 
resource  in  the  effort  to  make  the  will  of  the 
Chamber  prevail.1  He  sacrificed  office  to  principle. 
A  year  later,  when  the  income  tax  bill  was  de- 
feated, he  reproached  Doumergue  for  having 
neglected  to  put  the  question  of  confidence. 
Cabinet  Conflicts  with  the  Senate,  such  as  occurred  in 

cannot       jg^  an(j  lgI^9  might,  of  course,  be  settled  by  an 
Senate       appeal  to  the  electorate,  the  premier  requesting 

by,diis"       (in  the  name  of  the  President)   and  the  Senate 
solution       v  ' 

consenting  to   a  dissolution  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.     According   to   the   principles   of  the 

1  Briand  has  been  criticized  for  resigning.  He  should  have 
secured  a  new  vote  of  confidence  from  the  Chamber,  says 
de  Lanessan  (La  Crise  de  la  Republique,  page  314),  and  then 
either  carried  the  bill  through  the  Chamber  again  or  asked 
the  President  at  once  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Chamber. 

[84] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL  ROLE 

parliamentary  system  both  sides  would  accept 
the  result  of  the  election  as  conclusive.  But  why 
should  the  Senate  consent?  Why  should  it  sur- 
render, for  the  uncertainties  of  a  popular  verdict, 
the  advantages  of  a  known  situation  in  which  it 
can  with  impunity  block  the  whole  legislative 
program  of  the  government?  The  very  fact  that 
the  government  desired  to  consult  the  people 
would  suggest  that  it  expected  a  favorable  result. 
In  England,  where  the  ministers  enjoy  the  inde- 
pendent right  of  dissolving  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, a  general  election  has  been  the  normal 
method  of  forcing  compliance  on  the  part  of  the 
upper  house.1  The  absence  of  such  a  right  in 
France  has  been  productive  of  continual  em- 
barrassment. Not  only  are  the  ministers  power- 
less in  the  face  of  deadlock  between  the  chambers, 
but  they  can  take  no  appeal  against  the  action 
of  artificial  and  evanescent  majorities  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  itself.  They  may  be  over- 
thrown by  intrigues,  by  combinations  hastily 
effected  in  the  lobbies.  Fully  appreciating  the 
insecurity  of  their  position,  they  are  sometimes 
driven  to  assume  an  almost  servile  attitude,  like 
the  revolutionary  agitator  who,  hearing  the 
tumult  of  a  passing  mob,  exclaimed:  "I  am  their 
leader;  I  must  follow  them!"  Effective  leader- 
ship is  necessary.  The  ministers  would  be  in  a 
better  position  to  exercise  it  if,  when  the  Chamber 

1  The   Parliament  Act  of    191 1   seems  to  have  rendered 
dissolution  unnecessary. 

[85] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

withdrew  its  confidence,  they  could  ask  the 
country  to  decide  between  them  and  their  ad- 
versaries. The  wrecking  of  cabinets,  now  under- 
taken with  so  light  a  heart,  would  become  a 
dangerous  employment;  it  would  involve  the 
deputy  in  election  expenses  and  perhaps  in  the 
loss  of  his  seat.  That  the  House  of  Commons 
in  England  or  Canada  lacks  the  power  to 
overthrow  cabinets,  that  it  can  only  criticize 
and,  as  a  final  resort,  ask  the  electors  to  over- 
throw them  has  made  leadership  on  the  one 
hand  and  popular  control  on  the  other  all  the 
more  effective. 
Cabinet  But  the  weakness  of  French  cabinets,  while  em- 

depend-     phasized   by  the  absence  of  the  right  of  dissolu- 

ent  on  \  f  .  i*      •   •  r     t_ 

coalition     tion,  is  mainly  due  to  certain  peculiarities  or  the 
of  party  system.      In  the  Chamber  there  were,  after 

groups  V        i         ■  r  ■  t*  » 

the  elections  or  19 14,  ten  parties  or  groups, 
the  strongest  of  which  included  little  more  than 
a  quarter  of  the  deputies,  and  a  considerable 
number  of  free  lances  who  would  not  sacrifice 
their  independence  by  affiliating  with  any  group, 
however  slack  its  organization  and  discipline 
might  be;  in  the  present  Chamber  there  are 
seven  groups  and  about  the  former  number  (50) 
of  independents.  In  forming  his  cabinet  the  prime 
minister  must  distribute  the  portfolios  in  such  a 
way  as  to  combine  several  groups  into  a  working 
majority.  The  difficulties  of  such  a  task  are 
obvious.  Each  group  is  inclined  to  make  inordi- 
nate demands  both  as  to  the  portfolios  which  shall 
[86] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

be  conceded  to  it  and  the  policies  which  shall  be 
embodied  in  the  government  program.  "During 
the  exciting  days  of  a  ministerial  crisis,"  says  Pro- 
fessor Garner,1  "the  Parisian  journals  give  detailed 
accounts  of  the  hurried  visits  of  the  newly  ap- 
pointed premier  to  the  houses  of  prominent  politi- 
cians, of  his  interviews,  pourparlers,  overtures, 
solicitations  and  possible  combinations,  and  each 
day  there  is  a  summary  of  his  failures  and  his 
successes.  Sometimes  his  demarches  are  prolonged 
through  a  period  of  several  weeks  before  the 
cabinet  is  finally  completed;  not  infrequently  at 
the  last  moment,  after  the  list  has  been  sent  to 
the  Journal  officiel  for  publication,  the  combination 
is  upset  by  withdrawals."  The  cabinet,  when 
formed,  includes  more  or  less  discordant  elements; 
it  is,  as  Burke  said  of  the  Chatham  cabinet,  a 
diversified  mosaic;  and  if  the  prime  minister 
experienced  difficulty  in  putting  it  together,  his 
resources  are  equally  strained  in  the  effort  to 
keep  it  from  falling  apart.  If  the  coalition  of 
groups  dissolves,  so  does  the  cabinet,  for  it  loses 
its  majority  in  the  Chamber.  It  is  a  curious  fact 
that  while  the  general  elections  always  result 
favorably  to  the  government,  in  the  interval  of 
four  years  between  elections  the  Chamber  may 
overturn  half  a  dozen  cabinets,  sometimes  on 
most  trivial  grounds.  "Every  effort  of  the 
parties  in  the  chambers   (where  they  are  much 

1  "  Cabinet  Government  in  France,"  Political  Science  Review, 
Vol.  VIII  (1914),  page  366. 

[87] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Unfortu- 
nate re- 
sults of 
this  de- 
pendence 


divided), "  wrote  Professor  Esmein,1  "is  con- 
centrated in  a  struggle  for  the  conquest  of  power, 
that  is,  of  the  ministry.  Hence  the  incessant 
intrigues  and  surprises  of  each  day,  abnormal 
coalitions,  uncertainty,  the  unforeseen. "  The 
overthrow  of  cabinets  is  frequently  due,  not  to 
any  consideration  of  policy,  but  to  the  insatiable 
thirst  for  office.  Thus  when  a  cabinet  was  over- 
thrown ostensibly  because  of  its  refusal  to  abolish 
the  sub-prefects,  its  successor  ignored  altogether 
the  question  which  had  precipitated  the  crisis.2 
The  extreme  Left  and  the  extreme  Right,  having 
nothing  else  in  common,  may  yet  combine  mo- 
mentarily for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  a 
cabinet. 

What  are  the  consequences  of  this  situation? 
"The  ministers,"  says  Leon  Duguit,3  "never  sure 
of  the  morrow,  always  absorbed  by  the  fear  of  an 
interpellation  and  a  possible  fall,  think  only  of 
recruiting  friends  in  parliament  by  distributing 
the  government  favors  which  they  control."  As 
a  result  "the  Chamber  of  Deputies  tends  more 
and  more  to  interfere  in  all  branches  of  the  ad- 
ministration; it  seeks  to  make  its  action  felt 
in  all  the  details  of  daily  administrative  life; 
there  is  no  minor  incident  of  local  police,  there 
is  no  appointment  of  the  lowest  official,  which  is 

1  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel,  page  1046. 

2  De  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  page  285. 
*  "  Le    Fonctionnement    du    regime    parlementaire"    Revue 

politique  et  parlementaire>  Vol.  XXV  (1900),  page  367. 

[88] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

not  made  the  subject  of  an  interpellation.  .  .  . 
This  is  not  the  parliamentary  system,  but  a 
caricature."  The  Chamber  has  not  been  willing 
to  trust  and  follow  its  chosen  leaders.  "Instead 
of  limiting  itself  to  cooperation  with  the  ex- 
ecutive power  in  developing  general  rules  of 
policy,"  says  Joseph  Barthelemy,1  "it  has  sought 
to  impose  its  own  ideas.  ...  It  does  not  ad- 
vise, it  orders;  it  is  the  supreme  guide  of  the 
administration.  .  .  .  The  deputy  who  intervenes 
in  the  administration  is  defending  his  own  in- 
terest, the  minister  who  resists  him  is  defending 
only  the  public  interest:  the  deputy  is  necessarily 
the  stronger.  Servants  of  their  constituents,  the 
deputies  are  obliged  to  bring  to  the  head  of  the 
State  men  who  will  obey  them;  the  ministers  are 
so  highly  placed  only  that  they  may  obey  the 
better.  Authority  starts  at  the  bottom.  The 
government  does  not  govern;  it  executes."  Ac- 
cording to  Emile  Faguet 2  France  is  governed 
eight  months  of  the  year  by  Parliament,  four 
months  by  the  ministers.  Individually  the 
deputies  exert  such  pressure  upon  the  ministers 
that  Camille  Sabatier  has  coined  the  word  "depu- 
tantism"  to  describe  the  existing  form  of  govern- 
ment.3   This  critical  attitude  is  so  general  among 

1  Le  Role  du  pouvoir  executif  dans  les  republiques  modernes 
(1906),  pages  681,  683. 

2  Problemes  politiques  (1903),  page  8. 

3  Revue  politique  et  parlementaire,  Vol.  LXX  (191 1),  page 
204. 

[89] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

leading  politicians  and  publicists  that  it  cannot 
be  ascribed  to  partisan  interest  or  to  superficial 
observation.  Indeed  the  prevalence  of  criticism, 
the  belief  that  reform  is  imperative,  has  already 
led  to  important  changes  in  parliamentary  pro- 
cedure. These  are  discussed  in  Chapter  VII. 
Here  it  may  be  noted  that  the  deputies  have  con- 
sented to  a  modest  curtailment  of  their  right  to 
amend  money  bills;  that  the  exaggerated  use  of 
the  interpellation,  by  which  the  minority  endeavor 
to  discredit  the  ministers  and  carry  a  vote  of  want 
of  confidence,  has  been  somewhat  restrained;  and 
that  the  committees,  now  chosen  by  a  method 
of  proportional  representation,  reflect  exactly  the 
strength  of  the  various  groups  and  accept  govern- 
ment policies  more  readily  than  they  used  to  do 
when  chosen  practically  by  lot.  But  these 
changes,  after  all,  while  they  improve  the  position 
of  the  ministers,  leave  untouched  the  primary 
cause  of  their  weakness.  French  writers  unite 
in  condemning  the  group  system,  the  multiplicity 
of  parties  in  the  Chamber,  as  inconsistent  with  the 
proper  functioning  of  parliamentary  government; 1 
and  the  groups  have  diminished  little  in  number. 
The  alliance  of  four  groups  of  the  Left,  which 
gave  the  ministers  a  fairly  coherent  and  reliable 
majority  during  the  first  years  of  the  century, 
did  not  prove  a  permanent  solution.  Notwith- 
standing the  elimination  of  the  monarchists  as  a 

1  Garner,  op.  cit.,  pages  363-364  and  notes;  and  especially 
de  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  passim. 

[90] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

serious  political  force  and  the  tendency  to  develop 
a  strong  Republican  Center,  France  still  seems 
far  from  realizing  the  ideal  of  President  Poincare 
—  "a  single  central  party,  very  strong,  but  still 
homogeneous,  which  .  .  .  would  strive  to  estab- 
lish a  practical  harmony  between  those  two  cor- 
relative notions"  of  conservatism  and  socialism.1 

The  cabinets,  like  the  majorities  on  which  they  Short 
depend,  are  ephemeral.2  Their  average  life  under  dJ""at/on 
the  present  Constitution  has  scarcely  exceeded  inets 
ten  months.  Only  six  presidents  of  the  council 
of  ministers  have  held  office  continuously  for 
more  than  two  years:  Jules  Ferry  (1883-5),  Jules 
Meline  (1896-8),  Waldeck-Rousseau  (1899-1902), 
Emile  Combes  (1902-5),  and  Georges  Clemenceau 
twice  (1906-1909  and  19 17-1920),  the  average 
period  for  the  six  being  about  two  years  and  a 
half.  Three  retired  before  the  end  of  a  month: 
Rochebouet  (1877),  Armand  Fallieres  (1883),  and 
Ribot  (1914,  four  days).  With  the  fall  of  a 
cabinet,  even  though  some  of  its  members  con- 
tinue in  office  under  the  new  premier,  each  min- 
istry commonly  passes  into  the  hands  of  a  new 
man.  There  have  been  exceptional  cases;  Charles 
de  Freycinet  as  minister  of  war  and  Theophile 
Delcasse   as  minister  of  foreign   affairs   retained 

1  Revue  de  Paris,  Vol.  II  (1898),  page  649. 

2  Leon  Muel,  Gouvernements,  minister es  et  constitutions  de 
la  France  de  1789  a  1895  and  Histoire  politique  de  la  septieme 
legislature  (1898-1902);  Garner,  op.  cit.,  pages  368-369;  and 
list  of  cabinets  given  in  Appendix  Two. 

[91] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

their  portfolios  in  five  successive  cabinets,  the 
former  for  five  years  (1888-92),  the  latter  for 
seven  (1898-1905);  and  continuity  in  the  control 
of  departments  is  now  perhaps  more  common  than 
it  used  to  be.  Malvy  was  minister  of  the  interior 
for  more  than  three  years  (19 14-19 17);  Clementel 
minister  of  commerce  for  more  than  four  years 
(1915-1920).  That  there  was  little  precedent  for 
the  long  tenure  of  Delcasse  may  be  gathered  from 
the  complaint  of  the  Czar  Alexander  III.  "Dur- 
ing the  last  sixteen  years,"  he  said,  "the  French 
minister  of  foreign  affairs  has  been  changed  fifteen 
times,  so  that  one  never  knows  if  one  can  rely  on 
any  real  continuity  in  French  foreign  policy."  * 
One  interesting  consequence  of  cabinet  instability 
is  the  presence  in  both  chambers  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  men  who  have  at  some  time  achieved  the 
dignity  of  minister.  In  1913,  according  to  Joseph 
Barthelemy,2  there  were  some  thirty  in  the  Cham- 
ber, forty  in  the  Senate,  and  thirty  outside 
Parliament.  These  politicians,  having  won  their 
way  to  office,  perhaps  more  than  once,  and  thus 
established  a  kind  of  claim  to  future  considera- 
tion, are  known  as  ministrables;  and  Charles  de 
Freycinet,  prime  minister  in  four  cabinets  and 
minister  in  nine  others,  may  be  taken  as  the 
archetype.  The  newspapers,  somewhat  face- 
tiously, represent  the  ministrables  as  perpetually 
consumed  by  a  thirst  for  office  and  interested  in 

1  Vizetelly,  Republican  France,  page  432. 

2  Revue  du  droit  public,  Vol.  XXX  (1913),  page  394. 

[92] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR    POLITICAL   ROLE 


nothing  so  much  as  the  fall  of  a  cabinet.  The 
multiplication  of  groups  has  been  largely  due  to 
the  ambition  of  politicians  to  gain  entrance  to  the 
cabinet;  by  forming  and  heading  separate  factions 
they  are  able  to  insist  upon  recognition.  That 
ministerial  crises  should  occur  with  such  frequency 
cannot  be  regarded  as  inevitable  or  even  normal 
under  the  parliamentary  system.  Since  1867, 
when  the  Canadian  provinces  federated,  the 
Dominion  has  been  governed  mainly  by  three 
men:  Sir  John  A.  Macdonald  1 867-1 874  and 
1878-1891,  Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier  1896-1911,  and  Sir 
Robert  Borden  from  191 1.  Canadians  are  so  well 
satisfied  with  the  working  of  the  two-party  system, 
the  existence  in  the  House  of  Commons  of  a 
government  and  an  alternative  government  or 
"opposition,"  that  they  have  made  the  leader  of 
the  opposition  a  state  official,  paying  him  a  salary 
of  $8,000  a  year  and  expecting  him  not  only  to 
expose  the  mistakes  of  the  cabinet  but  to  formu- 
late a  positive  policy  of  his  own.  The  contrast 
with  English  practice  is  equally  striking.  In  the 
first  thirteen  years  of  the  century  France  had 
ten  prime  ministers;  England  had  only  ten  in 
the  fifty-five  years  preceding  the  war.  Since 
1875  France  has  had  more  than  fifty  cabinets, 
England  only  a  dozen. 

It   must  not   be  taken   for  granted   that   the 
instability  of  cabinets  involves  equal  instability 
policies   and    administration.      In   England    a 
a  new  set  of  men  and,  to 

[93] 


in 


new  cabinet  brings  in 


It  does 
not  entail 
discon- 
tinuity of 
policy 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

some  extent,  a  new  set  of  measures.  But  in 
France,  where  the  new  cabinet  depends  on  very 
much  the  same  majority  as  the  old  and  must 
therefore  include  representatives  of  very  much 
the  same  groups,  the  personnel  seldom  undergoes 
a  complete  change.  Five  times  out  of  six  (this 
is  almost  exactly  the  average)  some  of  the  minis- 
ters hold  over.  Thus  Poincare  in  191 2  retained 
five  members  of  the  outgoing  cabinet;  Briand 
in  1913,  six;  Barthou  in  the  same  year,  five. 
Years  ago,  when  Clemenceau  was  reproved  for 
concerting  the  downfall  of  so  many  cabinets,  he 
said:  "I  fought  only  one;  they  are  all  the  same." 
It  is  no  less  significant  that  the  chiefs  of  more 
than  one  third  of  the  cabinets  have  held  office 
under  their  immediate  predecessors.  Latterly 
this  proportion  has  been  much  higher;  since  the 
retirement  of  Sarrien  in  1906  eleven  of  the  sixteen 
prime  ministers  have  been  taken  from  the  out- 
going cabinet.  This  continuity  in  personnel  im- 
plies continuity  in  policy  —  a  result  which  is  all 
the  more  likely  to  follow  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
cabinets  are  driven  from  office  not  by  the  voters 
on  some  question  of  general  policy,  but  by  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  usually  on  some  issue  of 
relative  insignificance.  "It  thus  happens,"  says 
Professor  Garner,1  "that  the  French  chamber  will 
overthrow  a  ministry  one  day  and  the  next  day 
acclaim  with  enthusiasm  and  give  its  confidence 
to  a  new  ministry,  a  majority  of  whose  members 
1  Op.  cit.,  page  373. 
[94] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

belonged  to  the  one  condemned  the  day  before 
and  who  were  responsible  wholly  or  in  part  for 
the  policy  which  caused  its  downfall."  Some 
American  writers  profess  to  see  positive  ad- 
vantages in  the  weakness  of  the  cabinet.  "The 
change  of  cabinets  in  France,"  says  Professor 
Shotwell,1  "has  not  the  significance  it  would  have 
in  England.  It  does  not  mean  a  reversal  of 
policy.  Generally  it  means  more  efficiency  in 
carrying  out  the  same  policy.  The  new  cabinet 
takes  up  the  burden  where  the  last  one  lays  it 
down.  Behind  them  all  stands  Parliament,  abso- 
lute master  of  the  whole  situation,  ready  to  dis- 
miss the  new  ministers  as  soon  as  they  show 
weakness  or  commit  a  blunder.  The  passing  of 
French  ministers  is  rather  a  sign  of  stable  policy 
than  of  variability,  as  would  be  the  case  in  Eng- 
land. .  .  .  There  is  no  senseless  swinging  of  the 
pendulum  from  extreme  conservatism  to  extreme 
radicalism.  ...  It  has  not  been  a  choice  between 
opposite  poles,  but  between  more  or  less  of  the 
same  thing.  ...  A  country  which  seems  a 
paradise  of  anarchy  when  one  reads  of  its  shifting 
ministries  exhibits  upon  examination  a  surprising 
degree  of  regularity,  where  year  by  year  the 
scope  of  reforms  is  enlarged,  the  democratic  bases 
of  the  Republic  are  strengthened,  and  its  enemies 
in  army  or  church  suppressed." 

Nevertheless  the  fickleness  of  the  parliamentary 

1  "  The  Political  Capacity  of  the  French"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  Vol.  XXIV  (1908),  pages  1 19-120. 

[95] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

But  it        groups  and  the  vicissitudes  of  the  ministers  entail 
iiTdis-      some    serious    practical    disadvantages.      In   the 
sipate        first  place  there  is  a  dissipation  of  responsibility. 
bmty1151"    ^ne  mmisters  are  not  m  office  long  enough  to 
develop  a  program  and  bring  it  to  fruition;   the 
task  is  dropped  when  half  complete  and  taken  up 
by  new  men  who  may  give  it  a  different  character 
or  abandon  it  altogether.     M.  Ribot,  in  a  caustic 
mood,  once  remarked  that  the  short  life  of  cabinets 
was  an  excellent    thing,    since    ministers    could 
not,  under  the   circumstances,    be   criticized   for 
failing  to  keep   their  promises.     And  while  the 
ministers  remain  in  office  they  are  so  beset  and 
subjected  by  the  chambers  that  the  voters  can 
never  tell  where  the  praise  or  blame  should  rest; 
in  England,  on  the  other  hand,  where  the  minis- 
ters   dominate    parliament,    they    can    be    held 
accountable  for  the  whole  work  of  a  parliamentary 
session,  for  the  things  done  and  for  the  things 
(2)  hamper  undone.     In  the  second  place  legislation  suffers, 
legis-         jt  js  tme  tjlat  tjie  chamDers  have  some  notable 

lation, 

achievements  to  their  credit,  that  they  have 
accomplished  in  recent  years  some  striking  re- 
forms. But  when  Esmein  alludes  to  ".the  dis- 
organization of  legislative  work"  and  to  the  fact 
that  "the  time  lost  in  these  struggles  and  these 
skirmishes  prevents  the  chambers  from  applying 
themselves  to  serious  and  sufficient  legislative 
work,"  '  he  is  voicing  an  opinion  that  is  very 
general  among  French  writers.  Parliament  must 
1  Op.  cit.y  page  1046. 

[96] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

be  judged  by  what  it  has  failed  to  do  as  well  as 
by  what  it  has  done;  and  its  sins  of  omission  are 
not  all  venial.  Why,  for  instance,  has  France  no 
general  law  regulating  the  status  of  civil  servants? 
The  government  employees  have  demanded  it; 
the  Chamber  has  shown  itself  favorably  disposed; 
Clemenceau  and  other  ministers  have  introduced 
government  bills.1  Ten  years  ago  legislation 
seemed  imminent;  ever  since  that  time  ministers 
and  committees  have  been  tinkering  with  bills; 
but  new  ministers  and  new  committees,  interven- 
ing from  time  to  time,  have  prevented  any  final 
action  being  taken.  Down  to  1914  eight  different 
income-tax  bills  were  shaped  in  committee  and 
debated  by  the  Chamber  without  being  enacted 
into  law.  Over  revenue  and  supply  bills  the  min- 
isters have  no  adequate  control;  and  the  abuses 
which  naturally  develop  under  such  circum- 
stances have  been  condemned  by  all  authorita- 
tive writers  on  public  finance.  The  deplorable 
condition  of  the  finances  was  revealed  in  the 
Senate  debates  on  the  budget  of  1914.  The 
reporter  demonstrated  that  instead  of  a  surplus 
of  420,000  francs  there  would  be  a  deficit  of 
465,000,000  francs;  this  being  disguised  by  de- 
ceptive statements.  He  attributed  the  situation 
to  the  absence  of  cabinet  leadership  —  to  the 
pressure  successfully  exerted  by  irresponsible 
members  of  Parliament.     "We  have  no  budget 

1  See  A.  Lefas,  L'Etat  et  les  fonctionnaires   (1913),  page 
257  and  300  et  seq. 

[97] 


GOVERNMENT   AND    POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 

because  we  have  no  government,"  says  de  Lancs- 

san,1  "and  we  have  no  government  because  our 

parliamentary  system  lacks  the  great  parties  in- 

and  (3)       dispensable  to  its  proper  functioning."     In  the 

!"*I*  ,      third  place  administration  suffers.     This  results 

the  busl-  r 

nessof  partly  from  the  fact  that  Parliament,  having 
tratTn8"  subordinated  the  ministers,  insists  upon  ad- 
ministering itself.  But  still  more  serious  is  the 
lack  of  supervision  over  the  executive  depart- 
ments. However  perfect  a  bureaucratic  organiza- 
tion may  be,  it  always  tends  to  develop  certain 
faults.  It  adheres  too  closely  to  precedent;  it 
becomes  wedded  to  routine.  The  business  of  the 
political  chief  is  not  only  to  determine  what 
policy  shall  be  pursued,  but  also  to  discover  and 
correct  abuses  which  the  permanent  official  may 
hardly  be  conscious  of;  and  unless  he  has  time 
to  familiarize  himself  with  the  working  of  the 
administrative  machine,  he  is  not  in  a  position 
either  to  appreciate  the  need  of  reforms  or  to 
inaugurate  them.  That  the  French  civil  service 
has  felt  the  absence  of  such  control  can  hardly  be 
a  matter  of  dispute.  Henri  Chardon  has  shown, 
in  several  of  his  writings,  what  absurd  delays 
official  red  tape  imposes.2  In  recent  years  public 
criticism  has  grown  more  and  more  insistent, 
more  and  more  impatient,  over  the  deficiencies  of 
the  postal  service,  the  telephone  service,  the  rail- 

1  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  page  235. 

2  See,  for  instance,   Les  Travaux  publics  (1904),  page  126 
et  seq.  and  310. 

[98] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   POLITICAL   ROLE 

road  service.  In  fact,  says  Georges  Cahen,1  after 
describing  some  of  the  conditions  which  have 
been  most  generally  attacked,  "there  is  not  a 
single  service  which  has  escaped  criticism,  not  a 
single  one  which  citizens  have  not  had  to  com- 
plain of."  But,  as  he  points  out,  the  root  of  the 
trouble  is  not  any  incapacity  on  the  part  of 
permanent  officials.  The  ministers  are  responsi- 
ble, and  yet,  holding  office  for  a  few  brief  months, 
have  no  means  of  discharging  their  responsibility. 
"When  ministers  come  and  go  with  such  rapidity," 
says  Percy  Ashley,2  "it  is  certain  that  each  new- 
comer —  anticipating  but  a  short  stay  —  will  be 
disinclined  (unless  he  be  a  man  of  exceptional 
force)  to  attempt  to  inaugurate  any  considerable 
changes,  that  he  will  be  ready  to  let  matters  go 
on  in  the  old  departmental  way." 

1  Les  Fonctionnaires:  leur  action  corporative  (191 1),  page  51. 

2  Local  and  Central  Government  (1906),  page  72. 


[99] 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    ministers:    their 

ADMINISTRATIVE    ROLE 

Minis-  '  I  ^HE  ministers  are,  of  course,  something  more 
tersas  X  than  parliamentary  leaders.  They  are 
trative  heads  of  executive  departments,  directing  the 
chiefs  various  branches  of  administration,  deciding  in- 
numerable matters  which  touch  private  interests, 
and  commanding  a  great  force  of  civil  servants 
now  hardly  less  than  half  a  million  strong.1  It 
is  in  this  executive  capacity  that  their  power  is 
most  notably  displayed.  In  shaping  national 
policies  and  formulating  them  as  law  the  ministers 
are,  for  reasons  which  have  been  indicated,  rela- 
tively weak;  they  do  not  dominate  Parliament 
as  English  and  Canadian  ministers  do;  few 
premiers  have  remained  in  office  long  enough  to 
impress  their  personalities  upon  the  country  or 
to  establish  any  effective  political  ascendancy. 
But  as  heads  of  departments  they  possess  a  wide 
range  of  power.  This  is  due  partly  to  the  rapid 
growth   of  state   activities,   of  public  ownership 

1  For  the  number  of  government  employees  see  A.  Lefas, 
L'Etat  et  les  fonctionnaires  (19 13),  pages  25-40.     The  figure 
given  above  does  not  include   laborers,  the  army  and  navy, 
or  the  officials  of  departments  and  communes. 
[  IOo] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

and  public  regulation.  But  it  is  due  still  more  to 
the  fact  that  France  is  a  unitary  state,  subject  in 
matters  of  both  local  and  national  concern  to 
the  will  of  Parliament,  and  at  the  same  time 
highly  centralized.  The  field  of  local  autonomy 
which  Parliament  has  marked  out  for  the  sub- 
ordinate divisions  of  the  country  —  for  the 
departments  and  communes  —  is  somewhat  re- 
stricted; and  even  where  competent  to  act,  the 
local  authorities  are  in  many  ways  subject  to 
supervision  and  control. 

This  centralization  is  well  exemplified' by  the   French 
position  of  the  prefect.    Appointed  by  the  minister   J^JJJ^ 
of  the  interior  and  subject  to  removal  en  purely    ,\)  un- 
political grounds,  he  is  at  once  the  representative   tralized 
of  the  national  government  and  the  chief  execu- 
tive officer  of  the  department.     In  the  latter  role 
he  executes  the  resolutions  of  a  local  assembly, 
the  general  council;    but  because  his  tenure  of 
office  is  independent  of  its  will  and  because  on 
his  advice  its  resolutions  may  be  annulled  by  the 
minister,  he  is  far  from   being  a  mere  agent  of 
the  council;   he  usually  quite  overshadows  it.    As 
the  representative  of  the  national  government  he 
carries  out  the  instructions  of  the  ministers  and 
supervises  the  conduct  of  national  business  within 
the  department.    His  duties  cover  an  astonishing 
range.     They  relate  to  such  diverse  subjects  as 
elections,    agriculture,    police,    sanitation,    public 
lands,    highways,    education,    communal    affairs, 
and  recruiting  for  the  army.    He  is,  for  instance, 

[IOI] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

chairman  of  the  departmental  council  of  primary 
instruction  and  appoints  teachers  in  the  primary 
schools.  The  main  highways,  even  where  they 
pass  through  the  confines  of  a  large  city,  come 
under  his  jurisdiction  as  agent  of  the  minister  of 
public  works.  He  exercises  a  large  measure  of 
control  over  the  communes.  "In  fact,"  says 
Paul  Deschanel,1  "most  of  the  communes  are 
administered  by  the  bureaux  of  the  prefectures 
and  subprefectures." 
(2)  con-  But  administrative  power  is  not  only  central- 
ceatr&ted  jze(j. —  t|lfi  national  government  supervising  and 
restricting  the  action  of  local  government;  it  is 
also  concentrated.  Little  initiative  or  discretion 
is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  agents  of  the  central 
ministries.  Supervision  has  been  pushed  to  an 
extreme  which  often  results  in  absurd  delays  and 
impairs  administrative  efficiency.  According  to 
Noell,2  not  a  franc  can  be  spent,  not  a  chair  or  a 
towel  purchased  without  authority  from  Paris. 
On  one  occasion  an  official  had  to  wait  two  years 
for  permission  to  buy  a  box  of  pins,  the  request 
passing  successively  through  the  hands  of  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  higher  officials.  With  improvements 
in  the  means  of  intercourse  the  tendency  towards 
concentration  has  been  accentuated.  "A  minister 
who  can  talk  familiarly  from  his  cabinet  with  the 
prefect  of  Pau  or  Lille,"  says  the  Marquis  d'Ave- 

1  Revue  hebdomadaire,  April,  1910,  page  44. 

2  U  Administration  de  la  France:  les  ministeres,  etc.  (191 1), 
page  209. 

[102] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

nel,1  "  evidently  possesses  an  authority  more  ex- 
tensive than  his  predecessors  of  sixty  years  ago. 
A  prefect  who  can  be  scolded  from  the  cabinet  is 
no  more  than  a  bureau  chief."  These  circum- 
stances explain  the  widespread  and  growing  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  "deconcentration,"  of  entrusting 
to  local  agents  a  larger  power  of  decision.  Such 
a  reform  would  not  deprive  the  minister  of 
effective  control.  He  would  still  exert  pressure 
as  he  does  now  by  means  of  periodic  inspection. 
The  inspectors  (who  are  attached  to  all  the  execu- 
tive departments  except  those  of  justice  and 
foreign  affairs)  are  appointed  by  presidential 
decree,  sometimes  after  competitive  examination. 
They  make  tours  of  inspection  during  the  summer 
months  and,  after  rendering  their  reports,  re- 
main in  Paris  to  advise  the  minister  on  matters 
relating  to  the  exterior  services. 

Whatever  minor  divergencies   may  exist,   the   Theory 
same   general    plan   of  organization    prevails    in   ^ctice 
each    of  the    fifteen    ministries.2     The    minister   of  minis- 
rules,  as  over  a  principality,  with  almost  despotic   *0^ol 
sway.     He  controls  the  personnel;   he  renders  all 
final  decisions;    he  is  responsible  for  everything. 
Such  is  the  theory.     In  practice  limitations  con- 
front him  at  every  turn.     In  appointing  and  re- 
moving subordinates  he  is  subject  to  restraints 
which  have  gone  far  towards  the  elimination  of 
patronage    and    spoils.      Physical    facts    circum- 

1  Id.,  page  208. 

2  On  this  subject  see  H.  Noell,  op.  cit. 

[103] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

scribe  his  power  of  decision.  The  mass  of 
administrative  business  is  so  formidable  that, 
considering  the  many  demands  upon  his  time, 
he  cannot  hope  to  be  familiar  with  anything  but 
its  broader  aspects.  He  spends  the  morning  in 
consultation  with  the  other  ministers  or  with 
politicians  who,  for  themselves  or  their  friends, 
press  him  for  favors  and  concessions;  the  more 
extensive  his  patronage,  the  more  numerous  and 
insistent  are  his  visitors.  In  the  afternoon  he  is 
occupied  with  parliamentary  duties,  committee 
meetings,  the  preparation  of  a  speech,  or  some 
other  political  interest.  Towards  six  o'clock, 
according  to  the  lively  description  of  Henri 
Chardon,1  letters  and  documents  of  all  kinds, 
representing  the  labors  of  the  departmental 
bureaux  for  the  day  or  for  several  days,  are 
hurried  to  his  private  office  to  be  signed.  The 
officials  wait  impatiently  and  anxiously  in  the 
antechamber.  If  he  does  not  sign,  the  whole 
business  of  the  department  will  be  suspended. 
Where  is  he?  What  is  he  doing?  "At  last  the 
minister  takes  his  courage  in  both  hands;  he 
signs;  he  signs  with  all  his  might,  thus  accepting 
responsibility  for  a  mass  of  documents  with 
which  he  has  not  time  to  acquire  the  most  super- 
ficial acquaintance.  No  elaborate  ruse  would  be 
needed  to  obtain  his  signature  for  some  matter 
which  would  raise  the  greatest  objections.    What 

1  V Administration  de  la   France:  les  fonctionnaires  (1908), 
page  no. 

C 104] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

errors,  what  stupidities  and  iniquities  the  most 
intelligent  and  upright  man  might  authorize !" 
The  official  says  to  the  minister,  not  in  words, 
but  in  his  very  attitude:  "Here  is  an  order  which 
you  have  not  given;  it  refers  to  matters  which, 
according  to  all  appearances,  you  know  nothing 
about.  We  conceived  it  before  your  advent; 
we  will  execute  it  after  your  departure.  But  we 
need  your  signature  and,  without  it,  can  do 
nothing. "  l 

The  legal  situation  is  evidently  anomalous.  Proposed 
The  minister  must  sign  everything  and  assume  control  of 
the  responsibility.  Yet  he  does  not  know  what  ments  by 
he  is  signing;    for  it  wTould  take  hours  to  master   the 

i  r  ■       i       •  tt       Perma- 

tne  contents  or  a  single  important  paper.  He  nent  of- 
regulates  the  personnel.  Yet  in  a  few  brief  ficials- 
months  of  office,  before  he  has  even  familiarized 
himself  with  the  business  of  the  department, 
how  can  he  decide  wisely  upon  administrative 
reforms  or  upon  questions  affecting  the  personnel 
under  him?  There  is  an  unmistakable  movement 
in  France  to  reduce  the  minister's  authority  or 
at  least  to  bring  the  theory  of  his  position  into 
closer  relation  with  actualities.2  He  has  neither 
the  time  nor  the  knowledge  to  administer  directly. 
Parliament,  the  organ  which  formulates  the  public 

1  Robert  de  Jouvenal  quoted  in  de  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de 
la  Republique,  page  288. 

2  Hauriou,  Principes  de  droit  public  (1910),  page  489,  and 
Precis  de  droit  administratif  (1914),  page  145;  Duguit,  op.  cit.f 
Vol.  I,  page  460  et  seq. 

[105] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

policies,  put  him  in  office,  not  to  execute  those 
policies,  but  to  supervise  their  execution;  to 
watch  the  working  of  the  administrative  machine, 
to  remove  its  defects,  and  to  keep  it  always  at  a 
high  level  of  efficiency.  He  should  be,  says 
Chardon,  not  one  twelfth  of  a  king  or  emperor, 
but  a  mere  controller-general.  Indeed  the  syndi- 
calists actually  propose  to  suppress  the  minister 
entirely  and  to  substitute  collective  management 
by  the  permanent  officials.  This  proposal, 
though  in  a  modified  form,  has  found  support 
among  publicists  of  sound  judgment  and  eminent 
standing  who  believe  that  with  the  decay  of  the 
conception  of  sovereignty  and  with  the  steady 
growth  of  technical  public  services  it  is  bound  to 
be  accepted.  It  seems,  says  Leon  Duguit,1  "to 
furnish  the  altogether  natural  solution  of  one  of 
the  gravest  problems  which  our  modern  societies 
face  and  which  may  be  formulated  thus:  how  to 
harmonize  the  constant  and  necessary  increase 
in  the  number  of  public  services  with  the  protec- 
tion of  the  individual  against  the  omnipotence 
of  his  rulers  and  with  the  free  development  of 
individual  energies.  ...  If  the  rulers  exploited 
all  these  services  directly  or  by  agents  abso- 
lutely dependent  upon  themselves,  their  power 
would  become  formidable.  Economic  forces 
would  crush  the  individual." 

What  is  this  syndicalist  system  which  would 
supplant  the  minister?     It  would   apply  to  the 
1  Op.  cit.y  Vol.  I,  page  465. 

[106] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

technical  services  (education,  posts,  railroads,  How 
etc.),  not  to  those  which  provide  for  internal  would 
security  and  protection  from  foreign  dangers,  operate 
Control  by  the  government  would  be  fully  guaran- 
teed and  maintained.  The  government  would  be 
able  to  intervene  to  insure  the  proper  functioning 
of  the  service  and  due  respect  for  the  law.  It 
would  have  the  right  to  approve  or  disapprove, 
the  right  to  annul  any  act  which  violated  the  law; 
and  while  the  corporate  group  of  permanent 
civil  servants  would  conduct  the  service,  acting 
in  obedience  to  chiefs  elected  by  themselves  and 
profiting  in  some  degree  from  the  results  of  care- 
ful management,  they  would  be  liable  individually 
and  collectively  for  mistakes  and  derelictions. 
The  first  tentative  steps  have  been  taken.  Repre- 
sentatives of  the  permanent  officials  already  have 
a  voice  in  questions  of  promotion  and  discipline. 
But  whatever  the  future  has  in  store,  no  con- 
siderable breach  has  yet  been  made  in  the  existing 
system. 

The  minister,  occupied  with  political  duties  as    Depart- 
a  parliamentary  leader  and  with  executive  duties   ™ganizl 
as  head  of  a  ministry,  cannot  carry  his  burden    tion: 
alone.     Nor  can  he  depend  altogether  upon  the   cablnet 
permanent    officials,    because    that    would    mean 
confiding  control  to  those  who  are  to  be  controlled. 
He  must  have  as  lieutenants  men  who  enjoy  his 
absolute   confidence    and    share   his   ideas.     The 
undersecretaries  do  not  meet  these  requirements. 
Aside  from  the  fact  that  they  exist  only  by  way 

[io7] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  exception  (being  attached  to  the  four  or  five 
busiest  departments),  they  are  not  intended  to 
act  as  general  assistants  to  the  ministers.  They 
are  rather  ministers  of  a  second  grade,  assigned 
in  any  given  department  to  some  particular 
branch  of  administration  which  separates  itself 
naturally  from  the  rest.  The  men  who  assist 
and  advise  the  minister,  who  act  as  the  indis- 
pensable intermediaries  between  him  and  the 
permanent  staff,  form  what  is  known  as  the 
cabinet.  The  cabinet  always  includes  a  chief, 
an  assistant  chief,  a  secretary,  and  several  at- 
taches. The  minister,  in  making  these  appoint- 
ments, is  subject  to  no  limiting  civil  service  rules; 
in  view  of  his  confidential  relationship  with  the 
cabinet,  restrictions  of  any  kind  would  be  out  of 
place.  Sometimes  the  minister  chooses  the  cabinet 
chief  from  his  own  family:  the  future  President 
Casimir-Perier  entered  public  life  in  that  way 
when  his  father  was  minister  of  the  interior. 
More  often,  because  mature  experience  and  tested 
judgment  are  required,  his  choice  falls  upon 
some  permanent  official  of  high  rank.  The  at- 
taches are  young  men  who,  having  just  taken 
their  law  degree  or  completed  their  studies  at 
the  Ecole  des  sciences  politiques,  are  anxious  to 
make  a  government  career.  It  is  not  the  salary 
that  attracts  them;  for  there  is  usually  no 
salary.  They  like  the  position  because  of  the 
prestige  which  it  confers,  the  future  possibilities 
it  holds  in  store.  There  is  the  liveliest  competition 
[108] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

for  appointment.  In  no  other  way  can  an  inex- 
perienced young  man  suddenly  assume  importance 
and  bear  a  part,  however  humble  it  may  be,  in 
shaping  the  destinies  of  the  country.  He  ac- 
companies the  minister  on  special  trains;  he 
drives  to  the  unveiling  of  a  monument  or  the 
opening  of  an  exposition,  surrounded  by  military 
pomp  and  display.  The  cabinet  incarnates  the 
authority  of  the  minister.  It  lives  his  life,  it 
shares  his  fortunes:  an  unstable  situation,  but  a 
privileged  one.  And  before  the  minister  descends 
from  office  he  makes  it  a  point  to  find  for  the 
members  of  his  cabinet  desirable  places  in  the 
permanent  service,  places  which  are  opened  to 
them  by  his  personal  intervention,  by  special 
decrees  (if  necessary)  suspending  the  ordinary 
rules  that  govern  appointments.  The  cabinet 
has  been  much  criticized  in  recent  years,  partly 
because  inexperienced  attaches  show  a  meddle- 
some disposition  which  the  permanent  officials 
resent,  partly  because  the  minister,  responding 
to  pressure,  appoints  an  excessive  number  of 
attaches  and  later  procures  for  them  civil  service 
posts  that  they  are  not  qualified  to  fill. 

The    minister    and    his    cabinet    are    political    (2)  the 
officers.    Their  tenure  is  dependent  upon  the  will    JJJ***" 
of  Parliament,  the  policy-determining  organ;   and    orserv- 
they  give   effect   to   the  will   of  Parliament   by   lces 
issuing    orders    to    the    permanent    staff.      The 
highest  rank  in  the  permanent  staff  is  held  by 
the  directors,  the  chiefs  of  the  four  or  five  direc- 

[109] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS   OF    FRANCE 

tions  or  services  into  which  each  ministry  is 
divided.  In  view  of  the  recurring  ministerial 
crises  and  the  consequent  difficulty  of  maintain- 
ing continuity  and  tradition,  it  seems  unfortunate 
that  the  different  services  are  no  longer  correlated, 
as  they  used  to  be,  under  a  single  permanent 
chief;  1  but  the  directors  meet  together  occasion- 
ally as  a  "  council  of  directors,"  with  the  minister 
as  chairman,  to  consider  the  general  business  of  the 
department.  They  sit  on  many  of  the  advisory 
commissions  which  cooperate  in  administrative 
work.2  When  the  departmental  budget  is  before 
Parliament,  the  minister  appoints  them  to  assist 
in  the  debates  as  "government  commissioners." 
They  sit  in  the  Council  of  State  as  councilors  in 
(3)  the  special  service.3  But  their  energies  are  chiefly 
given  to  supervising  the  labors  of  the  four  or  five 
bureaux  which  compose  each  direction.  The 
director,  when  any  question  is  referred  to  him  by 

1  Note  the  opinion  of  Jules  Meline  in  Revue  hebdomadaire, 
Vol.  Ill  (191 1),  page  18  et  seq. 

2  These  commissions  are  an  excellent  feature  of  French 
administration;  they  bring  together  political,  administrative, 
and  lay  elements  in  useful  cooperation.  They  are  for  the 
most  part  technical  bodies  to  which  matters  are  referred  for 
advice,  some  being  appointed  by  decree  or  ministerial  order 
and  some  (like  the  superior  council  of  public  instruction) 
being  elected.  The  number  connected  with  each  ministry 
varies  from  five  to  forty-three.  See  the  full  list  in  the  Al- 
manack national. 

3  Not  all  the  directors,  but  an  aggregate  of  twenty-one 
drawn  from  the  different  ministries.  For  the  Council  of  State 
see  Chapter  XL 

[no] 


bureaux 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

the  minister's  cabinet,  examines  it  and  transmits 
it,  with  instructions,  to  the  competent  bureau 
chief.  The  bureau  is  the  fundamental  unit  in 
the  administrative  machine.  Everything  passes 
through  its  hands;  and  while  the  minister  is  pre- 
sumed to  make  the  decisions,  he  does  so  on  the 
basis  of  information  furnished  by  the  bureau  or  in 
conformity  with  the  specific  solutions  it  suggests. 
Being  so  much  occupied  with  political  duties  and 
so  unfamiliar  with  the  details  of  departmental 
business,  he  finds  himself  at  a  disadvantage  in 
dealing  with  the  experts.  Sometimes  they  quite 
escape  from  his  control.  Camille  Pelletan,  minis- 
ter of  marine  under  Combes,  complained  that  the 
bureaux  blocked  his  projects  of  reform.  "In  the 
place  of  a  parliament  which  makes  the  ministers, 
they  in  turn  regulating  the  action  of  the  bureaux," 
he  declared,  "we  have  bureaux  which  regulate 
the  action  of  the  ministers  and  through  them  give 
impetus  to  parliament."  x 

The  minister  cannot  interfere  arbitrarily  with    CivU- 
the  organization  and   personnel   of  the  bureaux,    ^j™^ 
The  rules  that  govern   such  matters  as  appoint-   the 
ment,   promotion,   discipline,    and   salary  are  es-   g^ces 
tablished  not  by  simple  ministerial  orders  (arretes), 
but  by  ordinances  of  public  administration  which 
are  issued  in  the  council  of  ministers  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  Council  of  State  for  its  opinion. 
In  other  words,  the  minister  can  alter  these  rules 
or  suspend  them  only  by  a  special  procedure  en- 
1  Noell,  op.  cit.,  page  112. 

Cm] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tailing  delay,  publicity,  and  possible  criticism. 
Patronage  exists,  but  in  a  restricted,  attenuated 
form.  The  employees  are  grouped  into  grades 
and  classified  within  the  grades  according  to  the 
salaries  they  receive.  For  the  most  part  appoint- 
ments are  made  by  competitive  examination,  but 
in  the  lower  grades,  under  a  law  of  1905,  places 
are  reserved  for  non-commissioned  officers  who 
have  served  ten  years  in  the  army  and  have  been 
recommended  by  a  special  committee  in  the 
ministry  of  war.1  In  promoting  from  grade  to 
grade  and  from  class  to  class  the  minister  is 
limited  to  the  names  appearing  on  the  annual 
promotion  list,  a  list  prepared  by  the  council  of 
directors 2  in  conformity  with  conditions  laid 
down  by  decree.  Thus  an  official  can  normally 
pass  into  a  higher  grade  only  after  a  minimum 
service  of  five  years.3  Measures  of  discipline  may 
take  the  form  of  reprimand,  removal  from  the 
promotion  list,  reduction  in  class  or  grade,  or 
dismissal.  In  every  case  the  accused  official  may 
demand  a  statement  of  the  charges  against  him; 
and,  if  the  charges  are  serious,  he  has  the  right  to 
appear  before  the  council  of  directors  (including, 
for  this  purpose,  two  officials  of  his  own  grade) 
and  to  present  testimony  to  controvert  the 
charges.4      For    various    reasons    places    in    the 

1  Id.,  page  147. 

2  That  is,  by  the  heads  of  the  several  directions  or  services 
in  the  department  acting  in  concert. 

8  Id.,  page  160  et  seq.        4  Id.,  page  165. 
[112] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

ministries  are  highly  valued.  They  carry  with 
them  residence  in  Paris,  something  of  a  social 
position,  security  of  tenure,  and  ultimately  a 
pension.  Nor  are  the  hours  of  labor  oppressive  — 
six  or  seven  a  day,  with  a  vacation  of  two  or  four 
weeks  on  full  pay.  These  circumstances  help  to 
explain  the  smallness  of  the  salaries.  The  directors 
get  from  #2400  to  #4000;  the  bureau  chiefs, 
$1200  to  #2400;  employees  in  the  two  lowest 
grades  (who  usually  draw  in  addition  a  small  army 
pension)  #420  to  ^o^o.1 

It  should  be  held  in  mind  that  state  officials,  Pensions 
whether  in  the  central  services  at  Paris  or  in  the 
exterior  services,  have  enjoyed  since  1853  the 
advantages  of  a  generous  pension  system.2  The 
cost  is  partly  defrayed  by  an  annual  assessment 
of  five  per  cent  on  salaries  and  partly  by  a  charge 
on  the  national  budget.  The  law  distinguishes 
between  sedentary  and  active  employment;  of- 
ficials retire  in  the  first  case  at  sixty  after  thirty 
years  of  service,  in  the  second  case  at  fifty  after 
twenty-five  years  of  service.  These  provisions 
are  not  rigidly  applied.  The  Council  of  State, 
in  adjusting  individual  claims,  has  developed  a 
humane  and  liberal  system  of  law.  It  has  au- 
thorized the  payment  of  pensions  where  an 
official  had  served  the  required  period  without 
reaching   the    age   limit    and   where    an   official, 

1  Noell,  page  155. 

2  On  this  subject  see  Hauriou,  Precis  de  droit  administratif 
(1-914),  page  652  et  seq. 

[113] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

being  seriously  injured  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duties,  lacked  both  age  and  service  requirements. 
The  amount  of  the  pension  is  based  on  the  average 
salary  received  in  the  last  six  years;  the  claimant 
receives  one-sixtieth  of  this  average  for  each  year 
of  service  with  a  possible  maximum  of  three 
fourths  of  the  average.  Certain  officials,  because 
of  the  instability  of  their  positions,  may  claim 
pensions  without  making  any  contributions,  the 
prefects  being  included  in  this  class.  Laborers 
come  under  the  workingmen's  pension  law  of 
1910.  No  one  questions  the  advisability  of  grant- 
ing pensions;  even  in  private  employment  it  is 
becoming  the  rule.  If  the  system  were  abolished, 
the  state  would  have  to  increase  salaries;  for 
officials  consider  the  pension  in  reckoning  the 
size  of  their  salaries.  The  supreme  advantage  is 
that  men  who  have  passed  the  age  of  usefulness 
can  be  retired  without  being  reduced  to  penury 
and  that  young  men  can  consequently  look 
forward  to  more  rapid  promotion, 
civil-  The  central  services  include  only  a  small  frac- 

nLs°in  tlon  °f  tne  government  employees,  a  few  thou- 
theex-  sands  of  clerks  as  compared  with  the  hundreds  of 
services  thousands  engaged  in  the  exterior  services.  The 
laws  of  1882  and  1900  which,  to  a  limited  extent, 
protect  officials  of  the  central  services  from 
arbitrary  treatment  do  not  apply  to  the  exterior 
services.  Only  in  the  case  of  the  army  and  navy, 
the  judiciary  (which  is  considered  in  the  last 
chapter),    and    university    professors    have   laws 

["4] 


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MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

been  enacted  to  establish  security  of  tenure  and 
freedom  from  political  influence.  Professors  can- 
not be  suspended  or  removed  unless  the  decision 
of  the  local  university  council  is  confirmed  by  a 
two  thirds  vote  of  the  superior  council  of  public 
instruction.1  But  the  absence  of  legal  regulation 
does  not  imply  absolute  dependence  upon  the 
caprice  of  the  politicians.  By  decrees  or  minis- 
terial orders  a  fairly  coherent  merit  system  has 
begun  to  take  shape.  While  in  theory  the  minister 
continues  to  wield  a  despotic  authority,  he  is 
checked  at  every  turn  by  decrees  which  he  has 
the  power  to  suspend  or  supersede,  but  which 
he  hesitates  to  touch  unless  the  political  necessity 
is  great.  Thus  appointments  are  normally  made 
under  a  system  of  competitive  examinations. 
Promotions  are  made  partly  by  seniority,  partly 
by  choice.  As  with  the  central  services,  the 
minister  must  confine  his  choice  to  the  names 
appearing  on  the  annual  promotion  list  compiled 
by  a  council  which  (in  some  services)  includes 
members  elected  by  the  officials  themselves.2 
Similar  councils  have  been  established  to  deal 
with  questions  of  discipline.3  They  have  de- 
veloped forms  of  procedure  which  invest  them 
with  the  dignity  of  administrative  courts.    While 

1  Hauriou,  op.  cit.,  page  642  et  seq.;   Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  I, 
page  497  et  seq. 

2  Georges  Cahen,  Les  Fonctionnaires:  leur  action  corporative 
(191 1),  pages  227  and  251. 

3  Id.,  pages  231-235;   Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  page  505. 

[»5] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  minister  is  not  legally  bound  by  their  findings, 
he  usually  accepts  them  without  modification.  In 
the  postal  service  the  accused  official  may  have 
access  to  the  record  of  the  charges  against  him 
at  least  three  days  before  the  council  meets  and 
may  be  defended  by  an  attorney  or  by  another 
official  of  the  same  grade.  The  minister  cannot 
impose  a  higher  penalty  than  the  council  fixes. 
These  are  substantial  rights;  but  the  postal  em- 
ployees demand  still  more.  They  demand  that 
the  elective  members  of  the  council  should  equal 
in  number  the  appointed  members,  that  the  pro- 
ceedings should  be  public,  and  that  the  reasons 
for  the  decision  should  be  given.  The  most 
severe  disciplinary  measure  is  removal,  which 
carries  with  it  the  loss  of  pension  rights.  Under 
the  decisions  of  the  Council  of  State  an  employee 
can  be  removed  only  by  the  authority  which 
made  the  appointment  and  in  the  same  form.  If 
no  formal  irregularity  exists,  the  act  of  removal 
cannot  be  annulled;  but  where  the  official 
has  been  removed  unjustly  or  abruptly  and 
for  no  fault  of  his  own,  the  Council  of  State 
has  in  recent  years  (since  1903)  conceded  an 
indemnity. 

It  appears,  then,  that  under  the  normal  func- 
tioning of  the  civil  service  the  official  has  a  fairly 
Their  secure  and  independent  position.  But  abuses 
exist;  and  they  attract  all  the  more  attention 
because  they  stand  out  as  exceptions  to  an  ideal 
which  has  been  so  nearly  achieved.    The  minister 

[n6] 


defects 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

who  wishes  to  find  places  for  his  adherents  is 
confronted  by  no  statutory  obstacles.  Should  he 
deliberately  override  the  rules,  his  appointments 
may  be  attacked  before  the  Council  of  State  and 
annulled  as  in  excess  of  power;  and  this  would 
be  possible  even  if  the  rules  were  of  his  own  mak- 
ing. But  the  course  he  usually  pursues  is  open 
to  no  legal  objection.  The  decrees  and  orders 
which  regulate  the  civil  service  may  be  suspended 
by  other  decrees  and  orders.  In  one  ministry 
the  rules  were  thus  set  aside  ten  times  in  four 
years  to  make  room  for  cabinet  attaches.  In- 
stances of  favoritism  are  numerous.1  "Most  of 
the  high  places  in  the  administration,"  M.  Steeg 
declared  in  Parliament,2  "and  always  those  which 
are  the  least  onerous  and  the  best  paid,  are  filled, 
now  as  formerly,  neither  by  the  senior  officials 
nor  by  those  who  have  demonstrated  their  in- 
telligence, activity,  and  competence.  They  go 
to  the  young  attaches  who,  after  having  elegantly 
decorated  the  minister's  anteroom,  are  established 
in  the  best  posts."  While  favoritism  is  the  chief 
subject  of  complaint,  it  is  by  no  means  the  only 
one.  The  salaries  are  too  low.  "A  large  number 
of  minor  officials  do  not  get  three  francs  a  day," 
says  Georges  Cahen.3    "A  teacher  with  a  family 

1  Lefas,  op.  cit.,  pages  62-68;  Georges  Cahen,  op.  cit., 
page  20  et  seq.;  Noell,  op.  cit.,  note,  pages  50-51;  Chardon, 
op.  cit.,  pages  147-148. 

2  Quoted  in  Lefas,  page  64. 
*  Op.  cit.,  page  17. 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

must  live  on  1200  francs/'  Pierre  Baudin,  who 
has  served  as  minister  of  marine  and  minister  of 
public  works,  wrote  in  191 2:  1  "The  French  state 
has  too  many  underpaid  officials.  Few  servants, 
but  servants  who  work  and  who  are  well  paid  — 
such  should  be  the  rule  of  conduct  for  the  modern 
state.  Unhappily  we  are  far  from  that  ideal. 
We  maintain  a  multitude  of  employees  who  do 
too  little  work  and  receive  too  little  pay.  Our 
public  workshops,  such  as  those  of  the  marine, 
are  overcrowded  with  workmen  whose  salaries 
are  insufficient  and  whose  mechanical  equipment 
is  mediocre.,, 
Agitation  The  officials  demand  a  higher  scale  of  salaries; 
eW^  but  they  are  still  more  insistent  in  pressing  for 
service  complete  emancipation  from  the  interference  of 
politicians,  for  a  stable  condition  which  will 
definitely  fix  their  rights  and  duties.  They  urge 
the  government  to  enact  a  civil-service  law;  and 
they  expect  that  law  to  provide  for  appointment 
by  competitive  examination,  automatic  promotion 
by  seniority,  and  discipline  administered  under 
settled  rules  by  a  council  which  should  contain, 
besides  high  officials,  a  judicial  element  and 
representatives  elected  by  the  lower  grades.2  The 
ministers  have  been  reluctant  to  grant  these 
demands.  They  cling  jealously  to  the  patronage 
that  remains  in  their  hands  and  with  respect 
to  salaries  content  themselves  with  replying  that 

1  Quoted  in  Lefas,  page  53. 

2  See  the  detailed  discussion  in  Lefas,  op.  cit.,  pages  95-136. 

[118] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR   ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

even  a  small  increase  would  in  the  aggregate  lay 
a  heavy  burden  upon  the  national  budget.  On 
the  other  hand  the  officials  are  so  numerous  and 
so  well  organized  that  their  political  action  cannot 
be  taken  lightly  by  the  government.  At  the 
opening  of  the  century  they  formed  professional 
associations  which  at  the  time  of  their  federation 
in  1905  had  a  membership  of  some  two  hundred 
thousand.1  They  sought  by  every  legal  means 
to  safeguard  the  interests  of  their  members.  They 
succeeded  in  having  improper  appointments 
annulled  by  the  Council  of  State.  In  no  uncer- 
tain tones  they  formulated  demands  for  legisla- 
tion. The  failure  of  the  government  to  meet 
these  demands  set  loose  a  new  and  menacing 
agitation. 

Syndicalism  had  spread  from  private  industry    Syndicai- 
to  public  industry  before  the  close  of  the  nine-   J^in 
teenth  century.     First  the  workmen  engaged  in    public 
the  manufacture  of  tobacco  and  matches  (state    semces 
monopolies)    organized;     then    the    postal    em- 
ployees.    The   formation   of  syndicates   was   at 
that  time  illegal  and,  according  to  the  leading 
authorities,2   remained   so    (for  government   em- 

1  Georges  Cahen,  op.  cit.>  pages  109-110;  Lefas,  op.  cit., 
pages  150-159.  According  to  the  latter  there  were  over  six 
hundred  associations  in  1913  with  about  four  hundred  thou- 
sand members. 

2  Hauriou,  op.  cit.,  pages  647-648;  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  I, 
page  514.  The  latter  says  in  another  place  (Le  Droit  social, 
131):  "No  officials  of  any  kind  can  form  a  syndicate.  .  .  . 
This  is  beyond  question." 

[«9] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

ployees)  after  the  passage  of  the  Associations 
Law  of  1901.  Their  avowed  purpose,  which  is  to 
regulate  the  government  services  by  resorting 
to  the  strike,  conflicts  with  certain  provisions  of 
the  penal  code.  But  while  the  ministers  checked 
the  movement  in  some  cases  (the  school  teachers 
in  1887,  the  railroad  employees  in  1894),  they 
acquiesced  in  others.  In  1902  Camille  Pelletan, 
the  minister  of  marine,  allowed  the  arsenal  workers 
to  organize.  Three  or  four  years  later  the  pro- 
fessional associations,  exasperated  over  the  dilatory 
tactics  of  the  government,  began  to  transform 
themselves  into  syndicates  and  enter  into  alliance 
with  the  General  Federation  of  Labor.  The 
school  teachers  held  a  great  syndicalist  congress 
in  Paris  early  in  1906.  The  first  practical  mani- 
festation of  the  new  spirit  occurred  in  1904  when 
the  arsenal  workers  struck.  Pelletan  announced 
that  those  who  did  not  return  to  work  would  lose 
their  places.  His  threats  had  no  effect;  and 
finally  the  men  succeeded  in  obtaining  substantial 
concessions,  the  eight-hour  day  included.1  Two 
strikes  of  postal  employees  followed  in  1906  and 
1909:  the  first,  confined  to  Paris,  was  broken  by 
the  use  of  soldiers  in  distributing  the  mail;  the 
second,  affecting  the  whole  postal  service,  was 
successful.  Finally,  in  the  autumn  of  1910,  came 
the  railroad  strike  which,  by  interrupting  the 
transportation  of  foodstuffs,  affected  the  interests 

1  For  the  strikes  of  1906-1910  and  the  legal  and  practical 
questions  involved  see  Lefas,  op.  cit.,  pages  175-210. 
[  120] 


MINISTERS:    THEIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ROLE 

of  the  whole  community.  There  was  some  rioting 
and  destruction  of  property.  But  the  prime 
minister,  Aristide  Briand,  braving  the  anger  of 
the  Socialist  party,  called  the  strikers  into  military 
service  and  thus  averted  the  crisis. 

Briand's  resolute   attitude  had   a  far-reaching   Attitude 
effect.    It  not  only  ended  the  railroad  strike,  but    *f.  ^ 

J  *  Aristide 

it  also  discouraged  the  malcontents  in  other  Briand 
public  services.  For  the  moment  syndicalism 
faltered.  The  original  impulse  seemed  to  be 
spent.  But  if  the  government  had  at  last  come 
to  the  point  of  opposing  force  to  force,  the  dis- 
orders of  the  past  few  years  had  shown  the 
necessity  of  administrative  reform.  Briand  him- 
self fully  appreciated  the  situation.  "Why  be 
astonished  at  the  growing  discontent  of  the 
officials?"  he  had  asked  in  1906.  "In  their 
discouragement  they  are  turning  toward  the 
workingmen;  they  perceive  that,  by  uniting  in 
syndicates,  the  workingmen  have  been  able  to  de- 
fend their  interests  against  their  more  powerful 
employers.  .  .  .  The  remedy  lies  neither  in  men- 
ace nor  in  persecution."  x  He  believed  that  the 
grievances  of  the  officials  should  be  satisfied  by 
legislation.  Since  that  time  various  bills  have 
been  before  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.2  But 
final  action  has  been  delayed  by  the  disagreements 
between  the  ministers  and  the  legislative  com- 
mittees, by  the  recurring  cabinet  crises  with  conse- 

1  Quoted  in  Georges  Cahen,  op.  cit.,  page  124. 

2  For  the  details  see  Lefas,  op.  cit.,  pages  298-379. 

[121  2 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

quent  shifts  in  policy,  and  by  the  emergence  of 
other  important  questions,  such  as  electoral  re- 
form and  military  service.  From  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  the  energies  of  the  government  were 
completely  absorbed  by  new  problems. 


C  122  'J 


CHAPTER  V 

THE     SENATE 

FROM  the  standpoint  of  its  powers  the  French   The 
Parliament    enjoys    a    much    freer  range  of  ^£|£_0 
action  than  the  American  Congress.     True,  it  is   mentary 
limited  by  a  written  constitution.     But  that  con-   p0^" 
stitution,  which    does    little  more  than  describe 
the   framework   of   government,    diverts   no    au- 
thority from  the  central  organs  in  the  interests  of 
local  areas  or  of  personal  or  property  rights;   and 
since  the  courts  may  not  question  the  validity  of 
a    statute,  even    a  statute  manifestly  in  conflict 
with  the  constitution,   Parliament,  after  all,  de- 
termines finally  the  extent  of  its  own  powers.     It 
may  also,  by  a  very  simple  process,  amend  the 
constitution. 

Parliament  is  a  bicameral  body,  with  a  Cham-   Senate  a 
ber  of  Deputies  sitting  in  the  Palais  Bourbon  and   ™°5iist 
a    Senate  sitting  in   the   Luxembourg.     This  bi-   institu- 
cameral  system  does  not  accord  with  Republican 
traditions,  for   the  First  and  Second   Republics, 
like    the   Third    Republic   down    to    1876,   were 
governed   by  single  chambers.     But  to  the  mon- 
archists in  the  National  Assembly  an  upper  house, 
sheltered    from  the  direct  play  of  universal  suf- 
frage, seemed  essential  as  a  barrier  to  democracy 
and   as  a  means  of  safeguarding  their  future  in- 

[123] 


accept  it 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

terests.  They  refused  to  settle  anything,  even 
the  continuing  form  of  government,  until  the 
existence  of  a  conservative  Senate  had  been 
assured.  It  is  significant  that  the  constitutional 
law  of  February  24,  adopted  before  any  other 
part  of  the  constitution,  dealt  exclusively  with 
the  upper  house  and  determined  matters  of  detail 
which,  in  the  case  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
were  left  to  statutory  regulation.  "The  Consti- 
tution of  1875/'  as  M.  de  Belcastel  said,1  "is 
first  of  all  a  Senate." 
Radicals  That  the  Republicans  gave  way  before  this 
insistence  illustrates  the  spirit  of  compromise 
which  animated  the  assembly.  The  Right  and 
Left  Centers,  it  will  be  remembered,  arranged 
something  in  the  nature  of  a  treaty  involving 
sacrifices  on  both  sides;  and  the  Left,  following 
the  advice  of  Gambetta,  made  the  Republic  pos- 
sible by  accepting  a  second  chamber.2  The  Radi- 
cals alone  held  aloof.  For  the  next  quarter  of  a 
century  they  demanded  the  abolition  of  the 
Senate.  That  the  party  has  experienced  a  change 
of  heart  in  recent  years,  however,  is  seen  in  the 
silence  of  its  national  platforms  on  this  point  and 
in   the   tone  of  deference  which   its  newspapers 

1  J.  Barthelemy,  "  Les  Resistances  du  Senat"  Revue  du 
droit  publique,  Vol.  XXX  (1913),  page  373. 

2  Gambetta,  who  had  earlier  led  the  Republican  opposition 
to  a  second  chamber,  accepted  it  in  1875  on  the  ground  of 
expediency  and  justified  it  in  1882  as  a  necessary  feature  of 
democratic  government.    See  Barthelemy,  op.  cit.t  page  375. 

[  124] 


. 


THE  SENATE 


employ  when  alluding  to  the  Senate.  The  Radi- 
cals like  the  Senate  because  they  control  it.  In 
1914  more  than  half  the  members  (167  of  300) 
belonged  to  their  group,1  these  including  such 
prominent  leaders  as  Leon  Bourgeois  (who  fought 
the  Senate  when  premier  in  1896),  Clemenceau, 
Pelletan,  Peytral,  Combes,  Doumergue,  Pams, 
Sarrien,  and  Steeg.  The  elections  of  1920  re- 
duced their  numbers  but  slightly.  Antonin  Du- 
bost,  who  once  wrote  a  book  against  the  Senate, 
was  for  years  its  president;  Leon  Bourgeois  suc- 
ceeded him  in  1920.  Nowadays  the  Senate  is 
hardly  less  radical  than  the  Chamber  and  meets 
with  constant  criticism  in  such  moderate  news- 
papers as  the  Temps  and  Debats. 

But  the  monarchists  of  1875  intended  the 
Senate  to  serve  as  a  bulwark  of  conservatism  and 
to  impose  restraints  upon  the  rashness  and  radi- 
calism of  the  other  house.  This  purpose  found 
expression  in  various  ways.  To  ensure  delibera- 
tive calm  the  membership  was  fixed  at  300  (it 
has  now  been  fixed  at  314)  2  or  approximately 
half  that  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies:  a  wise 
arrangement  and  one  which  has  contributed  to 


Senate 
was  in- 
tended to 
restrain 
radical- 
ism 


1  Samuel  et  Bonet-Maury,  Les  Parlementaires  jranqais 
(1914).  See  table  of  senate  groups  at  end  of  the  volume. 
The  Radicals  form  the  Democratic  Left  of  the  Senate. 

2  The  law  of  October  19,  1919,  which  divided  Alsace- 
Lorraine  into  the  departments  of  the  Upper  Rhine,  the  Lower 
Rhine,  and  the  Moselle,  assigned  to  these  departments  re* 
spectively  four,  five,  and  five  seats  in  the  Senate. 


0 


inal 
structure 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  decorum  of  procedure.  But  it  places  the 
Senate  at  a  disadvantage  when  the  two  chambers 
unite  in  national  assembly  to  choose  a  President; 
and  this  inferiority  encourages  a  spirit  of  revenge. 
Thus,  in  1913,  when  Raymond  Poincare  was  elected 
in  the  face  of  bitter  opposition  from  a  majority 
of  the  Senate,  the  Radical-Socialists  retaliated 
almost  immediately  by  rejecting  Briand's  electoral 
reform  bill  which  the  Chamber  had  adopted. 
Several  days  before  the  vote  the  announcement 
was  made  that  162  senators  had  pledged  them- 
selves to  this  course.  Afterwards  Briand's  elo- 
quence and  his  demand  for  a  vote  of  confidence 
fell  on  deaf  ears, 
itsorig-  The  constitution  originally  divided  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Senate  into  two  categories.  A  quarter 
of  them,  chosen  by  the  National  Assembly,  were 
to  sit  for  life,  the  Senate  itself  filling  vacancies 
due  to  death,  resignation,  or  other  cause.  "The 
majority  was  anxious,"  says  Esmein,1  "to  assure 
the  executive  power  of  a  permanent  support  in 
the  Senate,  which  would  not  depend  upon  the 
shifting  currents  of  public  opinion:  the  seventy- 
five  were  to  be  this  unshakable  rock."  If  the 
monarchists  had  worked  together,  they  could 
have  secured  every  one  of  the  seventy-five;  but 
a  cleavage  in  their  ranks  enabled  the  Republicans, 
with  the  help  of  Legitimist  votes,  to  secure  more 
than  two  thirds  of  them  and  thus  defeat  the  pur- 
pose for  which  the  life  senatorships  had  been 
1  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel  (1914),  page  917. 
[136] 


< 


THE  SENATE 

established.  The  other  seats,  225  in  number, 
were  distributed  among  the  departments  and 
colonies  with  some  regard  to  population,  the 
maximum  quota  being  five  (for  the  Seine  and 
Nord)  and  the  minimum  one.  The  colonies  re- 
ceived seven  seats.1  The  National  Assembly  had 
some  difficulty  in  deciding  on  the  system  of  elec- 
tion. At  one  time  monarchist  dissensions  made 
it  possible  for  the  Assembly  to  adopt,  by  a  nar- 
row majority,  direct  universal  suffrage;  but 
Marshal  MacMahon  demanded  a  reconsideration 
of  the  vote.  The  ultimate  solution  was  suggested 
by  the  method  then  employed  in  the  election  of 
United  States  senators.  An  electoral  college  in 
each  department  took  the  place  of  the  state  legis- 
lature under  the  American  plan.  The  electoral 
college  included  four  different  elements:  (1)  the 
deputies  sitting  for  districts  within  the  depart- 
ment; (2)  the  general  councilors,  who  constitute 
the  departmental  legislature;  (3)  the  councilors 
of  each  arrondissement  (or  subordinate  division 
of  the  department);  and  (4)  one  delegate  chosen 
by  each  communal  council.  This  scheme  was 
admirably  suited  to  serve  the  interests  of  the 
Right.  It  left  control  in  the  hands  of  the  con- 
servative rural  communes.  The  deputies  and 
councilors,  proceeding  directly  from  universal 
suffrage,  formed  less  than  a  sixth  of  the  senatorial 
electors;  the  thirty-six  thousand  communes  of 
France,   each    represented   by   a   single   delegate 

1  Constitutional  law  of  February  24,  Art.  2. 

[127] 


tions  in 
1884 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

whether  its  population  was  five  hundred  or  fifty 
thousand,  determined  the  character  of  the  Senate 
which  became,  according  to  Gambetta's  phrase, 
"the  grand  council  of  the  communes."  Equal 
representation  of  the  communes  as  social  groups 
had  been  shrewdly  devised.  "The  desire  was 
to  make  the  Senate  profoundly  conservative  by 
giving  the  preponderance  in  the  electoral  college 
to  the  rural  communes  which  were  by  far 
the  most  numerous  and  whose  tendencies  were 
known."  l 

Modifica-  The  Republicans,  while  generally  becoming 
reconciled  to  the  Senate  as  a  permanent  organ  of 
government,  condemned  as  undemocratic  both 
the  life  mandates  and  the  equal  representation  of 
the  communes.  After  1879,  when  they  first  se- 
cured a  majority  in  the  Senate,  they  were  in  a 
position  to  modify  its  structure;  and,  by  a  con- 
stitutional amendment  of  1884,  Parliament  was 
left  free  to  deal  with  the  whole  subject.2  A  re- 
form statute  was  passed  in  the  same  year.3  It 
provided  that  the  life  senatorships  should  be 
abolished  as  each  became  vacant  (the  last  one 
lapsed  during  the  late  war)  and  that  the  seventy- 
five   seats  should   be  distributed   by  lot   among 

1  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  913;   and  note  the  observations  of 
Du^uit,  Traite  de  droit  constitutionnel,  Vol.  II,  page  243. 

2  The  first  seven  articles  of  the  constitutional  law  of  Febru- 
ary 24  were  deprived  of  their  constitutional  character. 

8  December  9.     For  the  text  see  Dodd,  Modern  Constitu- 
tions. 

[128] 


THE  SENATE 

the  most  populous  departments,  the  Seine  receiv- 
ing an  increase  of  five,  the  Nord  three,  and 
so  on.1  The  statute  also  changed  the  basis  of 
communal  representation.  While  abandoning  the 
principle  of  equality  because  of  the  conservative  in- 
fluence of  landed  property  in  the  rural  communes, 
it  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  substitute  the  principle 
of  population;  moderate  Republicans  feared  the 
growing  class-consciousness  of  the  workingmen  in 
large  centers.  The  idea  was  to  give  a  prepon- 
derant voice  to  communes  of  moderate  size  (four 
or  five  thousand  population),  these  being  strong- 
holds of  the  middle  bourgeoisie.2  The  number  of 
delegates  now  varies  with  the  size  of  the  council 
which,  under  the  municipal  code  of  1884  (Article 
10),  depends  to  some  extent  upon  the  size  of  the 
commune.  Thus  communes  with  a  population  of 
500  or  less  have  a  council  of  ten  members  and 
send  one  delegate  to  the  electoral  college;  com- 
munes with  a  population  of  more  than  60,000 
send  the  maximum  of  24  delegates.  The  in- 
equalities of  this  system  have  been  much  criti- 
cized. Joseph  Barthelemy,  for  instance,  has 
pointed  out 3  that  while  Marseilles  with  over 
400,000  inhabitants  has  24  delegates,  17  other 
towns  in  the  same  department  with  an  aggregate 
population  of  30,000  have  the  same  representa- 

1  The  institution  of  life  senatorships  had,  however,  much 
to  recommend  it.    See  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  247. 

2  Barthelemy,  op.  cit.,  page  389. 

3  Op.  cit.,  page  389. 

[I20] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tion;  and  that  Lille  with  over  200,000  inhabitants 
has  the  same  number  of  delegates  as  24  little 
towns  with  an  aggregate  population  of  4000. 
But  the  inequalites  are  less  striking  than  they 
were  under  the  original  scheme.1 
Senate  Senators  are  elected  for  nine  years,  but  not  all 

resent!^  are  e^ectec^  at  once-  Every  three  years,  dating 
tiveof  from  1876,  the  term  of  one  third  of  the  Senators 
Wr  expires.  This  practice  of  partial  elections,  which 
opinion  was  applied  to  the  American  Senate  nearly  a 
hundred  years  earlier,  tends  to  preserve  con- 
tinuity, but  it  also  tends  to  make  the  Senate  less 
responsive  to  the  current  opinion  of  the  voters. 
The  indirect  system  of  election  emphasizes  this 
irresponsiveness.  A  senator  who  is  drawing  near 
to  the  end  of  his  nine-year  term  is  more  than  nine 
years  from  the  voters,  because  the  members  of 
the  electoral  college  may  themselves  have  been 
nearing  the  end  of  a  term  of  four  years  (in  the 
case  of  deputies  and  municipal  councilors)  or 
six  years  (in  the  case  of  councilors  of  the  depart- 
ment and  arrondissements).  The  Senate  therefore 
represents  old  ideas.  In  1913,  when  it  over- 
threw Aristide  Briand,  it  represented  not  the  new 
spirit  of  France,  the  spirit  of  national  unity  and 
conciliation,   but    the   Radical-Socialist  doctrines 

1  In  1896  and  at  various  times  since  then  bills  have  been 
introduced  providing  for  the  direct  election  of  the  Senate  by 
universal  suffrage.  The  bill  of  1896  passed  the  Chamber,  but 
the  others  were  not  brought  to  debate.  See  Esmein,  op.  cit., 
page  926,  and  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  246. 

[130] 


of 

senators 


THE  SENATE 

typified  by  Combes  (premier  from  1902  to  1905). 
That  the  country  had  grown  tired  of  these  doc- 
trines had  just  been  demonstrated  by  the  election 
of  Raymond  Poincare  to  the  presidency  and  by 
the  enthusiasm  with  which  the  country  greeted 
him.  The  strength  of  the  Radical-Socialist  party 
in  the  Senate  reflects  the  strength  which  it  pos- 
sessed in  the  country  ten  or  fifteen  years  ago. 

Candidates  for  the  Senate  must  be  French  Election 
citizens  forty  years  of  age  enjoying  full  political 
and  civil  rights.  The  statutes  also  lay  down 
certain  absolute  disqualifications,  these  applying 
to  persons  who  belong  to  the  former  royal  families 
of  France,  who  have  not  satisfied  the  require- 
ments of  the  military  law,  and  (with  exceptions) 
who  are  engaged  in  active  service  with  the  army 
or  navy;  and  there  are  also  "relative"  disquali- 
fications applying  to  a  number  of  officials  (such 
as  prefects  and  school  inspectors)  who  may 
not  be  chosen  from  the  department  where 
their  public  duties  are  carried  on  and  where 
they  might  exert  official  pressure.  Finally  the 
mandate  is  declared  incompatible  with  the  hold- 
ing of  certain  offices  (such  as  councilor  of  state, 
prefect,  judge);  in  other  words,  the  senator  must, 
after  his  election,  resign  the  office  or  vacate  his 
seat.  A  candidate  may  offer  himself  simultane- 
ously in  several  departments,  but,  if  successful  in 
more  than  one,  he  must  make  his  choice  between 
them.  As  a  matter  of  fact  multiple  candidacies 
are  infrequent.     Local   influences,  the  claims  of 

[131] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  party  organization  in  each  of  the  districts 
(arrondissements)  have  to  be  considered;  and  it 
is  often  quite  impossible  to  make  headway  against 
the  political  custom  of  rotation  by  which  each 
district  in  turn  asserts  its  right  to  fill  the  vacancy. 
"How  many  senatorial  elections  could  be  cited, " 
Joseph  Barthelemy  observes,1  "in  which  the 
quarrels  were  not  conflicts  of  ideas  or  even  per- 
sonal rivalries,  but  above  all  geographical  dis- 
putes." The  elections  are  not  altogether  free 
from  corruption.  While  there  have  been  no  such 
scandals  as  occasionally  marked  the  choice  of 
United  States  senators  before  the  adoption  of  the 
Seventeenth  Amendment,  complaints  of  official 
pressure  are  frequently  heard.  As  the  delegates 
are  few  in  number  and  known  long  beforehand, 
the  centralized  administration  has  many  means 
of  action  through  the  prefect.  The  mayor,  who 
is  almost  always  a  delegate  from  his  commune, 
needs  the  prefect's  support  and  therefore  listens 
to  his  advice; 2  a  school  teacher,  who  has  been 
removed  for  misconduct,  is  offered  reinstatement 
if  he  will  resign  his  place  as  delegate.3  But  the 
chief  plague  is  promises,  promises  of  places  and 
favors  and  decorations,  for  the  elector  himself 
or  for  his  friends.  The  vulgar  forms  of  bribery 
are  rarely  employed,  though  cases  have  occurred 
where  a  candidate  has  paid  hotel  bills,  furnished 
theater  tickets,  etc. 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  393. 

2  Barthelemy,  op.  cil.,  page  391.        8  Id.,  page  390. 


THE  SENATE 

The  personnel  of  the  Senate  is  unquestionably  Eminent 
superior  to  that  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.1  ^g^f118 
Usually  those  who  reach  the  Senate  have  demon- 
strated their  capacity  in  some  other  political 
field,  most  of  them  having  served  as  mayors  or 
general  councilors  at  least; 2  and  of  late  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  has  been  the  most  prolific 
field.  The  deputies  look  upon  the  Senate,  with 
its  nine-year  mandate  and  the  less  exacting,  less 
costly  campaign  for  election,  as  a  comfortable 
retreat.  It  is  very  often  the  leading  politicians 
who  emigrate  —  in  recent  years  Bourgeois,  Me- 
line,  Charles  Dupuy,  Clemenceau,  Sarrien,  Ribot, 
all  of  them  former  premiers.  "The  result  is  that 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  has  not  ceased  to  suffer 
from  a  species  of  inverse  selection,"  says  Yves 
Guyot.  "No  body  could  retain  its  vigor  under 
such  a  system.  The  most  experienced  men  have 
left;  the  composition  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
has  steadily  grown  weaker  and  weaker,  while  it 
needed  strength  more  than  ever  before  to  fight 
against  the  demagogic  spurts  which  have  so  often 
sent  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  men  without 
learning,  without  convictions,  without  any  pro- 
gram other  than  that  of  pandering,  when  elected, 
to  the  prejudices  which  led  to  their  election."  3 

1  Id.,  page  393  et  seq.;  Yves  Guyot,  "The  Relations  be- 
tween the  French  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies"  Con- 
temporary Review,  Vol.  XCVII  (Feb.,  1910),  page  148. 

2  Barthelemy,  page  394. 

3  Op.  cit.,  page  148. 

[133] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  cream  of  the  Chamber  is  skimmed;  the  lead- 
ers leave  while  in  the  plenitude  of  their  powers. 
In  their  new  situation,  instead  of  guiding  and 
directing  the  government,  they  are  limited  to  the 
humbler  role  of  revision;  for  the  Senate,  in  spite  of 
its  superior  personnel,  is  decidedly  less  influential 
than  the  Chamber.  It  has  inherited  from  preced- 
ing upper  houses  the  privilege  of  being  ignored.1 
Subordi-  The  National  Assembly  did  not  contemplate 
^e°no  any  such  subordination.  Except  in  regard  to 
Senate  revenue  and  supply  it  gave  the  two  houses  ex- 
actly the  same  legislative  powers,  and,  although 
"  money  bills  shall  first  be  introduced  in  and 
passed  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,"  2  this  clause 
would  not  seem  to  be  a  more  effective  check  than 
the  similar  clause  which  theoretically  deprives  the 
United  States  Senate  of  the  power  to  initiate 
revenue  measures.  As  to  control  over  the  cabi- 
net, the  constitution  provides  that  the  ministers 
shall  be  responsible  to  the  chambers.  Even  if 
the  meaning  of  this  language  is  open  to  doubt, 
the  Senate  has  the  same  means  of  enforcing  re- 
sponsibility as  the  Chamber  has.  It  can  inter- 
pellate the  ministers;  it  can  hold  formal  inquiries 
into  their  conduct  of  executive  business;  it  can 
refuse  supplies,  as  it  did  in  1896.  Moreover,  it 
has  an  important  advantage  in  the  fact  that  only 
with  its  consent  can  the  ministers  dissolve  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  and  appeal  to  the  electorate 

1  J.  Barthelemy,  op.  cit.,  page  371. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  February  24,  Art.  8. 

[134] 


THE  SENATE 

against  opposition  in  either  house.  A  cabinet 
that  is  unable  to  carry  measures  through  the 
Senate  must  acquiesce  or  resign,  no  matter  what 
its  majority  may  be  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies; 
and  if  it  resigns,  the  new  cabinet  will  acquiesce, 
as  happened  when  Meline  succeeded  Bourgeois  in 
1896  and  when  Barthou  succeeded  Briand  in  1913. 
Evidently  the  weakness  of  the  Senate  does  not 
depend  upon  the  express  provisions  of  the  consti- 
tution, nor  will  the  precedents  of  earlier  regimes 
suffice  to  explain  it.  It  is  due  first  of  all  to  the 
fact  that  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  as  the  direct 
offspring  of  universal  suffrage,  is  invested  with  a 
peculiar  prestige,  an  inherited  sanctity  which  not 
all  its  shortcomings  can  wash  away;  and  in  the 
second  place  to  the  fact  that  cabinet  government 
requires  the  ascendancy  of  one  chamber  because 
ministers  cannot  obey  at  the  same  time  two  dif- 
ferent masters  with  conflicting  wills.  Thus  demo- 
cratic principles  and  practical  necessity  conspire 
to  restrict  the  ambitions  of  the  Senate. 

Not  that  the  Senate  has  been  reduced  to  im-   Tactics 
potence.     It  has  often  found  means  of  thwarting   T"d  h 
the  Chamber  without  engaging  in  open  conflict;   opposing 
by  discreet   and   cautious  tactics  it  has  accom-   c      ber 
plished  results  which,  though  mainly    negative, 
have    disconcerted    and    ruined    cabinets.     The 
most  effective  weapon  is  delay.     The  Chamber, 
spurred  to  action  by  popular  agitation  or  political 
exigencies,  hurries  some  bill  to  the  Senate;    and 
there,  when   a  committee  has  at  last  been   ap- 

[135] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

pointed  to  examine  the  measure,  interminable 
delay  follows,  in  the  expectation  that  the  Cham- 
ber, occupied  with  new  concerns,  will  lose  its 
enthusiasm  and  abandon  its  uncompromising  atti- 
tude. Perhaps  in  the  end  leading  politicians  of 
the  two  houses  will  confer  informally  and  make 
some  agreement  in  which  the  Senate  obtains  its 
pound  of  flesh.  Instances  of  dilatory  tactics  are 
innumerable.  An  income-tax  bill,  adopted  by 
the  Chamber  in  March,  1909,  had  not  been  re- 
ported from  the  Senate  committee  four  years 
later; l  the  weekly-rest  bill  passed  the  Chamber 
in  March,  1902,  and  the  Senate  in  July,  1906;  a 
pension  bill,  brought  before  the  Senate  in  1906, 
was  shelved  for  four  years.2  These  cases  are 
mentioned  to  illustrate  the  social  and  economic 
outlook  of  the  Senate.  The  majority  is  Radical- 
Socialist;  it  accepted  without  demur  the  anti- 
clerical policy  of  Combes;  but  at  the  same  time 
it  is  capitalistic  in  sympathy,  opposing  advanced 
forms  of  taxation  and  all  measures  that  look 
towards  state  socialism.3  The  Unified  Socialists, 
in  their  platform  of  1913,  condemned  the  Senate 
as  reactionary  and  hostile  to  the  interests  of  the 
working  class.4     The  policy  of  delay  has   never 

1  J.  Barthelemy,  op.  cit.,  page  402. 

2  See  Second  Chambers  in  Practice,  papers  printed  in  Eng- 
land by  the  Rainbow  Circle  in  191 1,  pages  7-1 1. 

3  Barthelemy,  pages  398-405. 

4  In  spite  of  their  hostility  to  the  Senate  the  Unified 
Socialists  put  forward  candidates  in  the  senatorial  elections 
of  1920;   one  of  these  was  successful. 

[136] 


upon 
legisla- 


THE  SENATE 

been  more  determined  or  less  pardonable  than 
in  the  matter  of  electoral  reform.1  For  nine  years 
the  Chamber  sought  to  establish  secret  voting; 
and  the  Senate,  by  most  discreditable  maneuvers, 
by  amendments  which  showed  no  consistency  of 
principle,  but  only  a  desire  to  wreck  the  bill  by 
indirect  methods,  prevented  its  enactment  until 

I9I3- 

The  best  friends  of  the  bicameral  system  admit  iu  effect 
that  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  Senate  has 
entailed  unfortunate  results.  When  the  Senate  tion 
modifies  and  mutilates  bills  and  the  Chamber, 
out  of  sheer  lassitude,  accepts  the  changes,  de- 
fects and  incoherencies  are  bound  to  appear  in 
legislation.2  Again,  responsibility  is  dissipated. 
Deputies  vote  for  some  illusory  or  dangerous  pro- 
ject, says  Yves  Guyot,  "telling  themselves  and 
telling  those  who  call  their  attention  to  the  dan- 
gers of  their  action,  'It  doesn't  mean  anything; 
don't  attach  any  importance  to  it.  The  Senate 
will  arrange  all  that.'"  3  The  deputies,  especially 
when  the  general  election  approaches,  are  anxious 
to  produce  an  effect  upon  the  voters.  The  tempta- 
tion to  satisfy  extravagant  and  improper  demands 
is  particularly  strong  when,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
the  Senate  is  expected  to  interpose  with  its  veto. 

The   most    serious   issue   that  has    arisen  be-   Conflicts 
tween  the  chambers  relates  to  revenue  and  supply. 
The  language  of  the  constitution  is  not  explicit,    bills 

1  Barthelemy,  pages  398-401. 

2  Id.,  page  406.  3  Op.  cit.,  page  149. 

[137] 


over 
money 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

"Money  bills,"  it  says,1  "shall  be  first  introduced 
in  and  passed  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies." 
Does  this  mean  that  the  Senate,  having  received 
a  money  bill,  may  proceed  as  with  any  other  bill 
to  amend  it  with  absolute  freedom?  May  it  sub- 
stitute a  new  measure  and  by  persistence  force 
the  Chamber  to  give  way?  In  law  the  question 
has  never  been  settled,  but  out  of  the  conflicts, 
which  occurred  frequently  in  the  early  days  of 
the  Republic,  a  practical  adjustment  has  been 
reached.2  The  first  conflict  arose  in  1876  when 
the  Senate  restored  to  the  budget  certain  credits 
which  the  Chamber  had  refused.  Gambetta,  as- 
serting that  this  was  an  exercise  of  initiative 
which  the  Senate  did  not  possess  in  matters  of 
finance,  urged  the  rejection  of  the  amendments. 
Only  through  fear  that  serious  discord  between 
the  chambers  might  imperil  the  life  of  the  young 
Republic  did  the  deputies  finally  agree  to  effect 
a  compromise.  In  subsequent  years  (1878,  1879, 
1880,  1882)  they  resolutely  and  successfully  de- 
nied the  pretensions  of  the  Senate,  developing  in 
this  way  the  constitutional  custom  that  has  be- 
come known  as  "the  doctrine  of  the  last  word" 
which  requires  the  Senate  to  give  way  when  the 
Chamber  has  acted  upon  the  budget  a  second 
time.  Gambetta,  who  wished  to  have  this  doc- 
trine written  into  the  constitution,  described  it  in 

1  Law  of  February  24,  Art.  8. 

2  See  on  this  subject   especially  Eugene   Pierre,  Traite  de 
droit  politique,  electoral,  et  parlementaire,  Sees.  529-532. 

[138] 


THE  SENATE 

these  words:  "When  the  remonstrances  and  ob- 
servations of  the  Senate  have  once  been  presented 
to  the  Chamber,  the  right  of  the  Senate  is  ex- 
hausted. The  Chamber  of  Deputies  enacts 
finally,  says  yes  or  no,  accepts  or  rejects;  and  its 
vote  is  not  open  to  appeal  or  reversal. "  l  But 
while  the  Senate  accepted  the  doctrine  as  a  basis 
of  action,  it  continued  to  claim  in  principle  entire 
equality  with  the  Chamber  2  and  would  consent 
to  no  abridgment  of  its  pretended  powers  by  con- 
stitutional amendment.  This  distinction  between 
legal  right  and  political  expediency  was  clearly 
made  by  Senator  Dauphin  in  1885.  "If  the 
Chamber  rejects  our  amendment,  it  is  good  policy, 
save  in  exceptional  cases,  that  the  Senate  should 
not  a  second  time  reestablish  the  credits.  This 
is  not  a  matter  of  law;  the  law  is  safe.  I  am 
not  speaking  of  principles.  I  simply  say  that  it 
is  good  policy."  3  The  Chamber,  on  its  side, 
does  not  dispute  the  right  of  the  Senate,  when 
passing  the  budget  for  the  first  time,  to  increase 
credits  or  to  reinsert  items  rejected  by  the  Cham- 
ber, provided  only  that  this  be  done  at  the  re- 
quest of  a  minister.  Whether  the  Senate  could, 
with  propriety,  act  upon  its  own  initiative,  seems 
uncertain.  Antonin  Dubost,  reporter  of  the  Senate 
finance  committee,  said  in  1905:  "Your  commit- 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  530. 

2  See  in  Pierre,  op.  cit.  (Sec.  530),  the  argument  presented 
by  Senator  Wallon,  "the  father  of  the  constitution." 

3  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  532. 

[139] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tee  has  already  indicated  that  the  right  of  raisihg 
credits,  at  any  rate  within  the  limits  requested  by  the 
government,  appears  never  to  have  been  contested." 

Professor  Duguit  thus  summarizes  the  financial 
power  of  the  Senate.1  "In  our  opinion  senators 
cannot  propose  to  the  Senate  the  increase  of  an 
appropriation  which  the  Chamber  has  voted  in 
the  budget  or  in  a  separate  bill,  or  a  fortiori  the 
reinsertion  in  the  budget  of  an  appropriation 
which  the  Chamber  has  refused.  A  new  expen- 
diture can  never  be  authorized  on  the  initiative 
of  a  senator.  That  is  the  essential  rule.  That 
rule  would  be  violated  if  the  Senate  could,  on 
the  initiative  of  one  of  its  members,  increase  or 
reestablish  an  appropriation  voted  or  refused  by 
the  Chamber.  The  Senate  can,  however,  in- 
crease appropriations  made  by  the  Chamber  or 
reestablish  appropriations  refused  by  it  when  the 
proposal  of  increase  or  reestablishment  has  been 
brought  forward  by  the  government  and  when  the 
amount  proposed  to  the  Senate  does  not  exceed 
the  amount  originally  proposed  to  the  Cham- 
ber. In  this  way  the  rule  of  priority  and  initia- 
tive is  fully  respected:  the  financial  law  has  just 
been  proposed  to  the  Chamber  and  the  initiative 
in  increasing  or  reestablishing  appropriations  has 
been  taken  not  by  a  senator,  but  by  the  govern- 
ment. It  is  incontestable  that  the  initiative  of 
the  Senate  can  be  freely  exercised  in  financial 
matters  where  it  tends  to  reduce  appropriations. " 

1  Manuel  de  droit  constitutionnel  (3d  ed.,  19 18),  page  429. 

C  140] 


THE  SENATE 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said  that  dis- 
agreements between  the  chambers  over  money- 
bills  are  settled  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
It  has  "the  last  word."  In  the  case  of  other  bills 
two  courses  are  open.  Either  a  conference  com- 
mittee may  be  appointed  or  the  particular  bill 
may  be  carried  back  and  forth  by  the  minister  in 
charge  of  it  until  some  common  understanding 
has  been  reached.1  The  first  method  although 
it  is  the  only  one  sanctioned  by  the  rules  of  the 
chambers,  has  been  employed  only  three  times. 
Eugene  Pierre,  the  great  authority  on  parliamen- 
tary procedure,  believes  that  it  should  be  re- 
sorted to  more  frequently.2 

The  Senate,  like  so  many  other  second   cham-   The 
bers,  has  judicial  as  well  as  legislative  functions,    ^mgh 
It  "may  be  constituted  as  a  high  court  of  justice    Court 
to  try  either  the  President  of  the  Republic  or  the 
ministers  and  to  take  cognizance  of  attempts  upon 
the    safety    of   the    state." 3     The   rather  vague 
phrases  of  the  constitution  have  left  a  great  deal 
to  the  imagination  and  controversial  subtlety  of 
the  jurists,4  but  at  least  the  main  features  of  the 
Senate's  jurisdiction  are  tolerably  clear.     In  the 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement  of  1914,  Sees.  676-677;  Rules 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  (1915),  Nos.  107-109. 

2  Id.,  supplement,  Sec.  677. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  February  24,  Art.  9;  see  constitu- 
tional law  of  July  16  for  further  provisions. 

4  Some  of  the  uncertain  points  are  discussed  by  Esmein, 
op.  cit.,  pages  1054-1066,  and  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  pages 
396-4I5- 

[  141  ] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

first  place,  the  President  and  ministers  are  liable 
to  impeachment,  the  Chamber  preferring  the 
charges,  the  Senate  trying  them.  Different  rules 
apply  in  the  case  of  the  President  and  of  the 
ministers.  Although  the  constitution  declares 
that  the  President  is  responsible  only  when  he 
commits  high  treason,1  authorities  agree  that  he 
may  be  brought  to  trial  for  any  infraction  of 
the  criminal  law;2  but  whether  the  charge  involves 
treason  or  some  less  serious  offense,  the  Senate 
has  exclusive  jurisdiction.  On  the  other  hand, 
according  to  the  weight  of  opinion  on  a  disputed 
point,  ministers  may  be  impeached  only  for 
felonies  (crimes)  committed  in  the  performance 
of  their  duties; 3  and  if  the  Chamber  neglects 
to  prefer  charges,  the  ordinary  procedure  of 
criminal  justice  may  be  set  in  motion.  In  the 
second  place,  the  Senate  may  try  persons  charged 
with  making  attempts  upon  the  safety  of  the 
state.  Such  persons  are  not  impeached;  the 
initiative  rests,  not  with  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
but  with  the  cabinet,  which  issues  a  decree  con- 
stituting the  Senate  as  a  court.4     If  proceedings 

1  Constitutional  law  of  February  25,  Art.  6. 

2  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  399;  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  pages 
784  and  787. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  12.  This  clause  is 
often  mistranslated,  the  technical  word  crime  being  rendered 
as  "offense"  or  "crime"  instead  of  "felony."  The  procedure 
to  be  followed  in  impeachment  trials  is  regulated  by  the  law  of 
January  5,  1918. 

*  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  12. 

[142] 


THE  SENATE 

have  begun  in  the  regular  courts,  however,  and 
if,  before  the  issuing  of  the  decree,  the  "accusa- 
tion chamber"  has  already  laid  the  charges  be- 
fore the  Court  of  Assizes,1  the  Senate  loses 
jurisdiction.2  The  lawyers  disagree  as  to  what 
the  constitution  means  by  "attempts  upon  the 
safety  of  the  state,"  but  in  1889  and  1899  the 
Senate  took  the  view  that  mere  conspiracies 
unaccompanied  by  overt  acts  came  within  the 
scope  of  the  phrase.3 

1  See  infra,  Chapter  XII. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  12. 

3  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  403,  dissents  from  this  view; 
see  also  Esmein,  op.  cit.,  page  1061  et  seq.  For  the  questions 
raised  by  the  trial  and  conviction  of  Louis  J.  Malvy,  see 
supra,  page  80,  note  3.  Joseph  Caillaux  was  convicted  in 
April,  1920,  of  "  commerce  and  correspondence  with  the 
enemy,"  being  sentenced  to  36  months'  imprisonment  with 
loss  of  political  rights  for  ten  years. 


[143] 


The 

suffrage 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE     CHAMBER     OF     DEPUTIES: 
ITS     COMPOSITION 

THE  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  elected  by  uni- 
versal suffrage.1  Contrary  to  the  practice 
which  prevails  in  England,  Germany,  and  other 
countries,  the  voting  qualifications  are  the  same 
for  all  elections  —  national,  departmental,  dis- 
trict, and  municipal.  These  qualifications  are 
by  no  means  complex:2  (i)  French  nationality, 
(2)  male  sex,3  (3)  the  age  of  twenty-one  years, 
(4)  enjoyment  of  civil  and  political  rights  (these 
being  lost  permanently  or  temporarily  upon  con- 
viction for  certain  specified  crimes),4  and  (5)  regis- 

1  Constitutional  law  of  February  25,  Art.  1. 

2  Regarding  the  suffrage  and  electoral  procedure  see  Dalloz, 
Manuel  Electoral  (1910),  an  admirable  handbook  for  popular 
use.  The  appendix  contains  all  the  decrees  and  laws  relating 
to  elections  down  to  the  time  of  publication.  For  the  im- 
portant laws  of  1913  and  1914  see  H.  Gasser,  Manuel  des 
elections  politique  (1914).  For  the  law  of  July  12,  1919, 
which  establishes  the  general  ticket  with  minority  representa- 
tion, see  Appendix  III  at  the  end  of  this  volume.  Another 
useful  book  is  Ch.  Rabany,  Guide  general  des  elections  (2d 
ed.,  1912)  which  considers  especially  municipal  elections. 

3  On  May  20,  1919,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  voted  to 
abolish  the  sex  qualification,  but  the  Senate  did  not  concur. 

4  Dalloz,  op.  cit.f  Sees.  152-203. 

C  144] 


tion  of 
voters 


CHAMBER   OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS   COMPOSITION 

tration.  Not  all  persons  who  possess  the  first 
four  qualifications,  however,  have  the  right  to 
appear  on  the  voters'  list.  The  applicant  must 
have  resided  in  the  commune  for  six  months 
before  the  31st  of  March;  or  he  must  show  that, 
notwithstanding  residence  elsewhere,  the  com- 
mune is  his  place  of  "true  domicil"; l  or  he 
must  have  paid  direct  taxes  there  for  a  period  of 
five  years,  this  being  taken  as  evidence  of  local 
interest.2 

The  register  is  a  permanent  list  subject  to  an  Registra- 
annual  revision  which  proceeds  simultaneously 
in  all  the  communes  of  France.3  The  first  steps 
are  taken  by  an  "administrative  committee  of 
revision"  composed  of  the  mayor,  a  nominee  of 
the  prefect,  and  a  nominee  of  the  communal 
council.  This  board,  meeting  behind  closed  doors 
and  without  the  presence  of  party  agents,  corrects 
the  list  of  the  previous  year  in  the  light  of  such 
information  as  it  may  possess,  removing  the  names 
of  those  who  have  migrated  or  died  or  lost  polit- 
ical rights  and  adding  the  names  of  those  who 
have  become  qualified  by  age  or  residence.  Two 
copies  of  the  revised  list  are  prepared,  one  being 
sent  to  the  prefect  and  the  other  deposited  in 
the  town  hall  where  the  public  can  examine  it 

1  As  in  the  case  of  a  student  who  has  attended  college  in 
another  town. 

2  Dalloz,  Sees.  204-229;    and  note  that  the  law  of  July  29, 
1913,  has  modified  the  old  rule  regarding  direct  taxes. 

3  Dalloz,  op.  cit.y  Sees.  250-462. 

C  145] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF    FRANCE 


Objec- 
tions to 
the 

district 
ticket: 
(1)  un- 
equal 
repre- 
sentation 


fur  a  period  of  three  weeks  (January  15  to  Febru- 
ary 4).  To  act  upon  the  claims  and  objections 
of  electors  the  board  is  then  increased  by  two 
members,  nominees  of  the  municipal  council,  and 
becomes  known  as  the  "municipal  committee  of 
revision."  It  does  not  admit  interested  parties 
to  its  meetings,  but  sends  them  written  notice  of 
its  decisions.  Without  any  cost  whatever  these 
decisions  may  be  appealed  first  to  the  justice  of 
the  peace,  who  must  render  judgment  within  ten 
days,  and  finally  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  which 
is  allowed  a  period  of  two  weeks.  The  lists  close 
on  March  31.  This  system  of  registration  has 
obvious  advantages.  It  places  no  burden  upon 
the  voter,  as  personal  registration  does.  It  in- 
volves no  financial  outlay,  because  the  work  is 
performed  gratuitously  by  public  officials  and 
because  the  list  of  voters,  instead  of  being  printed 
in  the  American  fashion,  is  usually  written  out  in 
longhand.  Of  course  there  is  some  possibility 
that,  in  view  of  the  method  of  appointment,  par- 
tisan interests  may  dominate  the  registration 
board. 

Before  the  enactment  of  the  new  electoral  law 
of  1919,  the  deputies  were  chosen  by  district 
ticket  {scrutin  d 'arrondissement),  that  is,  from 
single-member  constituencies.  Although  this 
method  of  election  was  once  almost  universal 
and  is  still  employed  in  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  several  other  important  countries,  it 
seems  destined  everywhere  to  be  supplanted  by 

[146] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

some  form  of  proportional  representation  with 
large  constituencies.1  It  entails,  indeed,  obvious 
disadvantages.  Since  the  voters  in  any  given 
district  are  grouped  into  several  antagonistic 
parties,  only  a  fraction  of  them  can  be  represented 
by  the  single  deputy  who  is  elected;  from  the 
standpoint  of  parliamentary  representation  the 
others  cease  to  have  any  voice  in  the  govern- 
ment.2 And  since,  among  a  number  of  party 
candidates,  the  successful  one  needs  to  have,  not 
an  absolute  majority  of  the  votes,  but  simply 
more  than  any  other  candidate,  a  small  minority 
may  secure  control  of  the  district.3  Where  there 
are  four  or  five  candidates  the  winning  group 
may  not  include  much  more  than  a  quarter  of 
the  electorate.  Statistics  seem  to  show  that  on 
the  average  less  than  forty-five  per  cent  of  the 
voters  have  been  represented  in  the  Chamber  of 

1  Before  the  war  proportional  representation  had  been 
adopted  for  national  elections  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Serbia, 
South  Africa  (Union  Senate),  and  Sweden;  and  for  certain 
local  elections  in  other  countries.  Since  the  war  it  has  been 
adopted  in  Austria  (constituent  assembly),  France  (partially), 
Germany  (constituent  assembly  and  legislature  under  the  new 
constitution),  Italy,  New  South  Wales,  Poland  (constituent 
assembly),  and  Switzerland  (national  council). 

2  This  argument  overlooks  the  fact  that  party  candidates, 
elected  in  other  constituencies,  represent  the  members  of  the 
party  everywhere. 

3  The  French  election  law  required  the  holding  of  a  second 
election  in  case  no  candidate  obtained  a  clear  majority;  but 
in  the  second  election  a  plurality  sufficed. 

[  147] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Deputies  since  1876.1  Again,  idealists  have  been 
much  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  the  districts, 
which  ought  to  be  as  equal  each  to  each  as  the 
two  triangles  in  Euclid's  eighth  proposition,  have 
shown  material  variations.  Thus  (before  the 
abolition  of  the  scrutin  d'arrondissement  in  19 19) 
the  district  of  Barcelonnette  in  the  Basses-Alpes 
had  13,648  inhabitants;  the  first  district  of  the 
Seine  had  ii2,c>98.2  There  were  rotten  boroughs 
in  France. 
(2)  play  Unequal  representation  has  not  been  the  only 
influ-a  ground  of  complaint.  It  is  said  that  little  dis- 
ences  tricts  make  little  deputies,  men  whose  horizon 
rests  upon  the  frontiers  of  their  districts  and  whose 
conception  of  their  office  goes  no  further  than 
service  to  the  intriguing  politicians  who  managed 
their  election.  They  are  sent  to  Paris  to  pro- 
cure favors  and  subsidies;  their  return  to  Paris 
four  years  later  (when  the  next  election  occurs) 
depends  upon  success  in  achieving  this  diplo- 
matic mission.  "The  role  of  the  French  deputy," 
says  Professor  Garner,3  "is  today  largely  that  of 
a  sort  of  charge  d'affaires  sent  to  Paris  to  see  that 
his  constituency  obtains  its  share  of  the  favors 
which  the  government  has  for  distribution.  In- 
stead therefore  of  occupying  himself  with  ques- 

1  J.    W.    Garner,    Electoral   Reform   in    France,   American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  VII  (1913),  pages  623-624. 

2  Id.,  pages  622-623,  where  literature  on  the  subject  is  cited. 

3  Op.  cit.,  page  617;  and  note  the  citation  of  French  writers, 
pages  617-619. 

[148] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

tions  of  legislation  of  interest  to  the  country  as  a 
whole  he  is  engaged  in  playing  the  role  of  mendi- 
cant for  his  petty  district.  He  spends  his  time 
in  the  ante-room  of  the  ministers  soliciting  favors 
for  his  political  supporters  and  grants  for  his 
arrondissement.  The  ministers,  being  dependent 
on  the  support  of  the  deputies,  naturally  desire 
to  keep  on  good  terms  with  them,  the  importance 
of  which  is  all  the  greater  because  ministerial 
tenure  in  France  is  very  brief  and  uncertain. 
Under  such  conditions  the  deputy  has  become 
the  political  master  of  his  circumscription;  he 
dictates  appointments  and  promotions,  the  con- 
ferring of  decorations  and  the  distribution  of  local 
favors  generally.  He  speaks  of  'my  arrondisse- 
ment' as  though  it  were  his  fief,  and  of  'my  pre- 
fect' as  though  that  official  were  his  vassal." 
Naturally  the  deputy  views  wnth  apprehension  all 
projects  of  administrative  reform  which  contem- 
plate the  abolition  of  sinecures;  he  justifies  the 
existence  of  subprefects  whose  duties  are  negli- 
gible, of  judges  who  decide  twenty  or  thirty  cases 
a  year,  and  of  collectors  who  have  nothing  to 
collect.  Sabatier  calls  the  French  system  of 
government  "deputantism,"  a  mere  perversion 
of  the  parliamentary  system  which  has  been  de- 
veloped in  England.  The  play  of  local  influences 
has  perverted  American  assemblies  in  the  same 
w^ay;  and  at  first  glance  it  seems  reasonable  to 
hold  the  single-member  district  responsible.  That 
such  reasoning  is  superficial  may  be  demonstrated 

[149] 


ernment 
pressure 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

from  the  fact  that  in  England,  under  the  district 
ticket,  the  members  of  Parliament  are  almost 
completely  free  from  local  control;  they  are  occu- 
pied with  national  issues  and  give  whole-hearted 
support,  or  at  least  the  appearance  of  it,  to  the 
policies  of  the  party  leader.  Obviously,  the  sub- 
jection of  the  French  deputy  or  the  American 
representative  to  his  constituents  cannot  be  due 
to  the  method  of  election  alone. 
(3)  gov-  There  is  a  third  objection  to  the  single-member 
district.  Government  pressure  is  easily  applied. 
The  whole  weight  of  the  centralized  administra- 
tion can  be  thrown  into  the  campaign  and,  by 
the  skillful  use  of  patronage  and  promises,  made 
to  play  an  almost  decisive  part.  In  some  degree 
this  will  explain  why  cabinets,  though  hurried  to 
execution  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  every 
eight  or  ten  months,  have  never  been  driven  from 
office  by  the  voters.1  Perhaps  it  will  also  explain 
why  the  Radical-Socialist  party,  in  the  face  of 
its  apparent  loss  of  public  confidence,  actually 
made  gains  in  the  elections  of  1914;  the  Doumer- 
gue  cabinet,  besides  controlling  the  election  ma- 
chinery, made  good  use  of  all  its  resources.  "We 
do  not  know  what  a  ministry  can  accomplish 
through   its   prefect  in    Paris,"   the  Journal  des 

1  The  election  of  1877  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  exception. 
The  de  Broglie  cabinet  had  been  installed  by  MacMahon 
against  the  wishes  of  an  overwhelming  majority  in  the  Cham- 
ber. See  Chapter  IX.  Even  so  de  Broglie  managed  slightly 
to  reduce  the  Republican  majority. 

C 150] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

Debats  observed;  l  "in  large  cities  it  is  still  pos- 
sible to  escape  from  the  omnipotence  of  the 
administration.  But  in  small  towns  and  country 
districts  the  government  can  play  the  tyrant;  it 
possesses  those  means  of  action  that  combined 
to  produce  the  'abject  domination'  of  the  Combes 
system  and  branded  it  as  with  a  hot  iron.  A 
resolute  cabinet  can  easily  bring  into  line  the 
inconstant,  the  timid,  the  hesitating,  and  some 
of  them  are  to  be  found  everywhere."  The  same 
newspaper  describes  the  methods  which  are  em- 
ployed.2 "Each  week,  and  as  a  rule  on  Monday 
morning,  M.  Rene  Renoult  [minister  of  the  in- 
teriorj  receives  several  prefects  and  discusses  the 
political  situation  with  them.  The  prefect  gives 
his  opinion  on  the  chances  of  reelection  of  such 
and  such  a  deputy  or  on  the  dangers  which  face 
another.  .  .  .  When  the  minister  and  the  pre- 
fects agree  on  the  choice  of  official  candidates, 
they  decide  also  on  the  means  of  victory. 
Deputies  offering  themselves  for  reelection  or  can- 
didates backed  by  the  government  receive  tobacco 
licenses  and  other  favors  which  may  be  useful  in 
winning  votes.  They  even  receive,  it  is  said, 
pecuniary  help;  this  at  least  was  publicly  ad- 
mitted by  a  government  candidate  in  the  course 
of  his  campaign.  .  .  .  The  official  candidature 
has  been  perfected  in  these  later  years.  The  pre- 
fect and  subprefect  no  longer  hesitate  to  accom- 
pany the  candidate  in  his  campaign.     They  laud 

1  January  14,  1914.    2  February  20,  1914. 

[151] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Govern- 
ment in- 
fluence 
declining 


his  merits;  they  predict  his  success;  they  inform 
the  voters  that  he  can  render  them  signal  services. 
This  is  a  common  practice  and  not  in  any  way 
disguised.'' 

No  doubt  administrative  influence  has  freer 
play  in  a  small  district  electing  one  member  than 
in  a  large  district  electing  several  members.  But 
the  difference  is  not  considerable  enough  to  be 
taken  seriously  as  a  ground  for  condemning  the 
scrutin  d ' arrondissement.  The  remedy  should  be 
found,  not  in  a  change  of  the  electoral  system, 
but  in  the  development  of  a  healthy  public 
opinion  and  in  restrictive  legislation  applied 
directly  to  the  abuse  of  official  authority.  Much 
has  already  been  accomplished.  Competitive 
examinations  for  appointment  to  the  civil  service 
and  elaborate  rules  in  the  matter  of  promotions 
have  withdrawn  patronage  from  the  government. 
Officials  have  acquired  a  large  measure  of  inde- 
pendence, which  they  guard  jealously  from 
invasion.  The  prefects  themselves,  though  sub- 
ject to  removal  at  the  will  of  the  ministers,  may 
be  of  little  value  to  a  cabinet  which  has  lately 
come  to  power  through  the  shifting  of  party  con- 
trol in  the  Chamber;  for  the  cabinet  cannot 
always  trust  the  prefects  appointed  by  its  adver- 
saries to  manage  the  elections  in  its  interest,  nor 
can  it  hope  for  better  results  by  appointing  new 
prefects  unless  these  are  familiar  with  the  locality 
and  possessed  of  the  requisite  local  influence. 
Moreover,  administrative  pressure  has  begun  to 

[152] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

rouse  the  resentment  of  the  voters.  "The  more 
openly  it  is  employed,"  observes  Georges  La- 
chapelle,1  "the  more  indignation  it  provokes  and 
the  more  dangerous  it  becomes  for  the  deputy 
who  makes  improper  use  of  it."  It  is  dangerous 
for  the  government  officials  as  well.  The  cor- 
rupt practices  act  of  March  31,  1914,2  provides 
that  when  a  public  official  is  convicted  of  bribery 
or  undue  influence  the  penalties  prescribed  in  the 
act  shall  be  doubled. 

Justly  or  unjustly,  however,  the  single-member   Substi- 
district  has  fallen  into  disrepute.     It  would  have   2gCSfor 
disappeared   years   ago   had   its  opponents   been   district 
united  in  support  of  an   alternative.     Formerly   JJf^a 
Republicans  put  their  faith  in  the  general  ticket   general 
(scrutin   de   liste),   that    is,    election    at   large   of  ticket 
several  members  in  districts  of  considerable  size, 
each   elector  voting  for  as  many  candidates   as 
there  are  seats  to  fill.     This  system  was  in  force 
under  the  short-lived  Second  Republic  and  under 
the  Third  Republic  during  its  earlier  years,  the 
district  ticket  being  substituted  by  Napoleon  III 
in  1852  because  it  gave  freer  play  to  the  manage- 
ment of  elections,  and  by  the  National  Assembly 
in  1875  3  because  the  monarchist  majority  favored 
it.4    After  the  existing  constitution  had  gone  into 

1  Journal  des  Debats,  February  20,  19 14. 

2  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement,  Sec.  292. 
8  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875. 

4  See  Magne,  fctude  sur  le  scrutin  de  lisle  et  le  scrutin  uni- 
nominal  (1895). 

[153] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

effect  Gambetta  led  the  Republicans  in  demand- 
ing a  return  to  the  general  ticket.  The  single- 
member  district  he  described  as  "the  last  fortress 
of  the  monarchists"  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
elected  under  such  a  plan  as  a  "broken  mirror" 
in  which  France  could  not  recognize  her  own 
reflection.  But  cogent  arguments  could  be 
offered  on  the  other  side:  the  fact  that  cam- 
paign expenses  would  be  increased  by  the  neces- 
sity of  appealing  to  so  large  a  group  of  electors; 
that  the  strongest  party  would  win  all  the  seats 
in  any  given  constituency; l  and  that  a  candi- 
date offering  himself  simultaneously  in  several 
districts  would  be  able,  by  this  means,  to  invoke 
the  plebiscite  and  put  himself  forward  as  a 
Napoleonic  dictator.  Indeed  the  eloquence  of 
Gambetta  and  his  vigorous  personality  led  many 
Republicans  to  fear  that  he  aspired  to  a  dictator- 
ship. It  was  only  in  1885,  some  two  years  after 
his  death,  that  the  general  ticket  was  restored; 
and  then  the  apprehension  which  Gambetta  had 
inspired  became  stern  reality  during  the  notorious 
campaigns  of  General  Boulanger.  The  Republi- 
cans, hurriedly  recanting,  restored  the  scrutin 
(Tarrondissement  (1889).  But  with  the  collapse 
of  Boulangism  many  returned  to  their  old  faith 
and,  through  the  medium  of  the  Radical-Socialist 

1  Each  party  puts  forward  a  list  of  candidates  for  all  seats 
to  be  filled;  the  members  of  the  party  normally  accept  the 
list  as  it  stands;  and  so  if  one  of  the  candidates  is  elected,  all 
will  be. 

[154] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

party,  have  repeatedly  endorsed  the  scrutin  de 
liste  during  the  last  twenty  years.1  The  Senate, 
under  the  inspiration  of  the  same  party,  has  (2)  pro- 
twice  adopted  a  bill  establishing  this  system,  ^r^nal 
first  in  191 3  and  again  in  1914.2  But  the  Cham-  sentation 
ber  of  Deputies  has  committed  itself  to  a  different 
solution.  Proportional  representation  has  been 
brought  forward  as  a  remedy  for  the  abuses 
that  have  revealed  themselves  under  both  the 
scrutin  d' arrondissement  and  the  scrutin  de  liste 
and,  as  the  name  implies,  seeks  to  have  each 
political  group  represented  in  the  legislature  ac- 
cording to  its  numerical  strength.  Nothing  more 
definite  may  be  said  here  because  the  objects  of 
proportional  representation  may  be  attained  by 
several    different    methods.3     Nor   in    examining 

1  A.  Charpentier,  Le  Parti  Radical  et  Radical-Socialiste 
(1913),  Chap.  III. 

2  For  the  text  see  Petitjean,  "La  Representation  propor- 
tionnelle  devant  les  chambres  francaises"  (1915),  pages  269- 
271. 

3  It  may  be  observed  that  English-speaking  countries  have 
shown  a  decided  preference  for  the  "single  transferable  vote" 
under  which  the  candidates  of  all  parties  are  mingled  on  the 
ballot  (usually  in  alphabetic  order)  and  the  voter  expresses 
first,  second,  third,  and  perhaps  further  choices.  Continental 
countries,  on  the  other  hand,  always  use  the  party  list  or 
ticket.  Under  the  list  system  a  voter  may  be  permitted  to 
vote  for  as  many  candidates  as  there  are  seats  to  fill  and  to 
select  those  candidates  from  different  lists  if  he  so  desires. 
(Cf.  the  French  law  of  1919.)  Usually,  however,  he  can  do 
no  more  than  choose  between  the  competing  lists  (as  in  Bel- 
gium or  Italv);  when  he  votes  for  a  list,  he  even  has  to  accept 

[155] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


the  bills  that  have  been  reported  to  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  since  1905  can  one  discern  a 
tendency  to  recognize  the  superior  merits  of  any 
one  method.1  The  law  of  1919  takes  the  form 
of  a  compromise  between  the  scrutin  de  liste  and 
proportional  representation.  Strictly  speaking, 
indeed,  the  measure  that  became  law  on  July  12, 
1919,2  does  not  establish  proportional  represen- 
tation at  all.  As  will  be  shown  in  a  moment,  it 
takes  the  form  of  an  uneven  compromise  between 
proportional  representation  and  the  scrutin  de  liste, 
giving  to  the  former  a  very  subordinate  place. 

Proportional  representation  was  first  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  1873. 
sentation  Occasionally  during  the  next  thirty  years  bills 
^ore  were  introduced  only  to  be  ridiculed  or  ignored. 
But  when,  in  1905,  the  committee  on  universal 
suffrage  made  a  report  in  favor  of  the  system,  its 
friends  took  heart  and  began  an  active  propa- 

the  order  in  which  the  names  appear  (and  in  which  the  seats 
will  be  awarded)  unless,  as  in  Belgium,  he  is  permitted  at  the 
same  time  to  express  a  preference  for  some  particular  candi- 
date on  the  list.  Actually  all  methods  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation provide  for  the  election  of  several  representatives  in 
each  district;  the  larger  the  number  to  be  elected,  the  fairer 
will  be  the  distribution  of  seats.  In  France  each  district  is 
entitled  to  a  minimum  of  three  seats;   in  Italy,  ten. 

1  The  most  useful  treatment  of  proportional  representation 
for  the  general  reader  is  J.  Humphrey's  Proportional  Repre- 
sentation (191 1).  For  the  history  of  the  movement  in  France 
and  a  list  of  the  best  French  books  see  Petitjean,  op.  cit. 

2  "A  law  ...  to  establish  the  general  ticket  with  propor- 
tional representation."    For  the  text  see  Appendix  III. 

[156] 


Propor- 
tional 
repre 


Chamber 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

ganda  through  the  country.  After  the  election 
of  1906,  when  the  propaganda  had  begun  to  have 
an  effect  upon  public  opinion,  the  committee 
devoted  elaborate  care  to  the  perfecting  of  a 
measure  and  rendered  its  final  report  in  March, 
1909.  A  few  months  later,  Georges  Clemenceau, 
who  stood  firmly  by  the  Radical-Socialist  prin- 
ciple of  the  general  ticket,  gave  way  to  Aristide 
Briand  as  prime  minister;  and  the  latter,  although 
expressing  the  belief  that  proportional  represen- 
tation should  first  be  applied  to  municipal  elec- 
tions in  order  to  determine  its  effects,  allowed  the 
bill  to  be  debated.  By  a  vote  of  281  to  235  the 
Chamber  endorsed  the  principle  of  proportional 
representation;  but  when  it  became  obvious  that 
no  satisfactory  agreement  could  be  reached  as  to 
the  details,  Briand  demanded  that  the  Chamber 
reconsider  its  action,  and  this  it  did  by  a  vote  of 
291  to  225. 1  Briand  unquestionably  took  the 
statesmanlike  course,  because  at  that  time  there 
was  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  chambers  or  the 
country  had  arrived  at  anything  like  a  final  con- 
clusion. He  wisely  aw^aited  the  verdict  of  the 
elections  of  1910. 

The  new  Chamber,  chosen  largely  on  this  issue,    Accepted 
unmistakably  favored  the  reform.     No  less  than    Cbjm^ber 
318  of  the  597  members  associated  themselves  in 
a  "proportional  representation  group."  2     Briand, 
always  practical  in  his  leadership,  felt  that  the 

1  Petitjean,  op.  cit.y  page  125;  Pierre,  op.  at.,  Sec.  216. 

2  Petitjean,  page  135. 

[157] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 

time  was  ripe  for  action;  but  not  till  July,  191 2, 
after  several  changes  of  ministry  and  more  or 
less  fundamental  modifications  in  the  original 
measure  which  he  had  introduced,  did  the  Cham- 
ber finally  adopt  it.  The  bill  as  passed  gave 
particular  recognition  to  the  lists  of  candidates 
put  forward  by  different  political  groups.  It  pro- 
vided that  each  department  should  form  a  sepa- 
rate election  district  with  a  number  of  seats 
apportioned  on  the  basis  of  population;  that  each 
voter  should  have  as  many  votes  (not  cumula- 
tive) as  there  were  seats  to  fill;  that  the  "list 
vote"  should  be  determined  by  dividing  the 
aggregate  votes  of  all  the  candidates  on  a  list  by 
the  number  of  such  candidates;  that  seats  should 
first  be  assigned  by  dividing  the  list  votes  by  the 
electoral  quota,  this  quota  being  obtained  by 
dividing  the  total  number  of  voters  by  the  num- 
ber of  seats;  that  the  seats  not  thus  assigned 
should  be  given  to  lists  which,  before  the  elec- 
tion, had  declared  intention  to  pool  their  interests 
and  whose  combined  votes  contained  the  electoral 
quota;  and  that  any  seats  still  remaining  should 
be  assigned  to  the  list  or  combination  of  lists 
which  had  obtained  the  largest  number  of  votes.1 
The  cabinet  of  the  day,  led  by  Raymond  Poin- 
care,   urgently    pressed   the  bill  to   passage  and 

1  The  meaning  of  these  rather  obscure  and  complex  provi- 
sions may  he  understood  by  reading  the  text  of  the  bill  in 
Petitjean,  op.  cit.,  page  z(>\  ft  .wq.,  and  by  examining  the 
concrete  illustrations  given  in  the  first  pages  of  his  book. 

[158] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

secured  a  vote  of  339  to  220;  but  the  victory 
was  won  without  the  support  of  the  normal  gov- 
ernment majority  which  included  all  the  im- 
portant groups  of  the  Left  except  the  Unified 
Socialists  (Socialist  Republicans,  Radical-Social- 
ists, Radical  Left,  and  Democratic  Left).  Only 
130  of  the  371  deputies  belonging  to  these  groups 
accepted  the  bill.1  Truly  a  singular  phenomenon 
under  the  parliamentary  system  to  have  a  first- 
class  government  measure  carried  mainly  by 
opposition  votes!  The  explanation  is  easily 
found.  Many  believed  that  proportional  repre- 
sentation, as  Waldeck-Rousseau  emphatically  as- 
serted in  1902,  would  increase  the  weight  of  minor 
parties  and  accentuate  the  existing  incoherencies 
of  the  Chamber.2  It  would  give  added  strength 
to  the  so-called  reactionary  parties  (including  the 
Republican  Federation);  therefore  these  parties 
gave  it  unanimous  support.  By  disintegrating 
the  Republican  majority,  as  it  seemed  not  un- 
likely to  do,  it  would  restore  to  the  Unified 
Socialists  the  dominant  position  which  they  had 
held  in  the  time  of  the  Combes  ministry;  and 
apparently  the  Socialists,  always  ready  to  wreck 


1  Petitjean,  op.  cit.,  page  190,  gives  the  detailed  vote  on 
final  passage. 

2  Leon  Bourgeois  expressed  the  same  opinion  in  1909.  "In 
reality  the  results  of  the  so-called  proportional  representation 
would  be  to  increase  artificially  the  strength  of  the  opposition 
parties.  ...  It  is  a  formidable  instrument  of  division  and 
destruction."    Petitjean,  op.  cit.,  page  128. 

[159] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

bourgeois  governments,  saw  here  a  great  oppor- 
tunity. The  attitude  of  parties  had  been  deter- 
mined, not  by  the  abstract  arguments  which 
they  put  forward,  but  by  the  probable  effects  of 
proportional  representation  upon  their  particular 
interests. 
Rejected  When  the  bill  went  before  the  Senate,  it  met 
Senate  with  a  very  cold  reception.  The  Radical-Social- 
ist majority  had  no  intention  of  digging  its  own 
grave.  Although  Briand,  who  had  once  more 
become  prime  minister,  made  the  passage  of  the 
bill  a  matter  of  confidence  in  the  cabinet,  the 
Senate  substituted  a  bill  of  its  own,  providing 
for  the  general  ticket; 1  and  when,  in  November 
of  the  same  year  (1913),  the  Chamber  reiterated 
its  desire  for  proportional  representation  in  a 
somewhat  altered  form,  the  Senate  again  sub- 
stituted its  bill.  So  the  matter  stood  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war. 
Electoral  In  1919,  with  the  Radical-Socialist  Clemenceau 
as  prime  minister,  the  chambers  composed  their 
differences  and  agreed  upon  a  system  of  election 
that  has  far  more  of  the  scrutin  de  liste  about 
it  than  of  proportional  representation.2  The  de- 
partment takes  the  place  of  the  arrondissement 
as  the  electoral  unit,  forming  a  single  constituency 
with  at  least  three  deputies  to  elect.3     Candidates 

1  For  the  text  see  Petit  jean,  op.  cit.y  page  269  et  seq. 

2  Law  of  July  12,  1919;  see  Appendix  III. 

3  The  most  populous  departments  may  be  divided    by  law 
into  districts  returning  at  least  three  deputies  each. 

[160] 


law  of 
1919 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

may  offer  themselves  either  singly  or  in  groups; 
that  is,  if  there  are  five  seats  to  fill,  the  parties 
may  each  put  forward  a  list  bearing  from  one  to 
five  names,  and  independents  may  run  alone  or 
in  combination;  in  any  case  the  candidature, 
single  or  collective,  constitutes  by  itself  a  "list." 
Each  voter  has  as  many  separate,  non-cumulative 
votes  as  there  are  seats  to  fill;  and  since  party 
lines  are  drawn  in  the  elections,  he  may  be  ex- 
pected in  ordinary  circumstances  to  give  all  those 
votes  to  the  candidates  who  appear  on  the  list 
or  ticket  of  his  party.  He  will  not  "split  the 
ticket."  Now  the  law  says  (Art.  10)  that  every 
candidate  who  receives  the  absolute  majority — 
that  is,  the  vote  of  half  plus  one  of  the  actual 
voters  —  shall  be  proclaimed  elected.  In  prac- 
tice, with  the  general  voting  of  the  straight 
ticket,  this  will  permit  one  party  to  make  a  clean 
sweep  of  the  department  and  completely  exclude 
the  minority  from  representation.  How  often 
this  will  happen  will  depend  upon  the  relative 
strength  of  the  parties  in  the  different  constitu- 
encies. In  1914,  when  the  last  elections  under 
the  district  ticket  took  place,  nearly  sixty  per 
cent  of  the  deputies  were  returned  by  absolute 
majority  on  the  first  ballot;  in  1919,  nearly  thirty- 
five  per  cent. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  the  scrutin  de  liste  or 
general  ticket  in  its  normal  operation.  Under 
certain  contingencies,  however,  the  law  does 
provide  for  minority  representation.     The  seats, 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Partial  when  not  filled  by  absolute  majority  vote,  are 
tionoT  to  ^e  distributed  among  the  lists  roughly  in  ao 
propor-  cordance  with  the  vote  received.  The  share  of" 
re  re-  each  list  is  determined  by  the  number  of  times 
sentation  its  " average"  (aggregate  vote  of  all  its  candi- 
dates divided  by  the  number  of  its  candidates) 
contains  the  "electoral  quota"  (number  of  voters 
divided  by  the  number  of  seats).1  Any  seats  re- 
maining shall  be  assigned  to  the  list  that  has 
the  highest  average.  This  arrangement  was  no 
doubt  intended  to  satisfy  at  small  expense  the 
clamor  for  proportional  representation.  Really 
it  concedes  very  little.  Let  us  suppose  that  in  a 
department  of  450,000  population,  returning  six 
deputies  to  the  Chamber,  the  electoral  quota  is 
13,000  (one  sixth  of  the  78,000  actual  voters) 
and  the  list  averages  as  follows:  Radical-Socialist, 
30,000;  Democratic-Republican,  25,000;  Unified 
Socialist,  10,000;  A.  L.  P.,  8000;  Republican 
Federation,  5000.  When  the  list  averages  are 
divided  by  the  electoral  quota,  two  seats  will  be 
assigned  to  the  Radical-Socialist  list,  one  seat  to 
the  Democratic-Republican  list.  The  other  three 
seats  will  go  to  the  Radical-Socialist  list  which 
has  the  highest  average.  If  the  averages  are 
changed  a  little,  if  the  Democratic-Republican 
average  is  increased  to  26,000  and  the  Unified 
Socialist  to .13,000  there  will  be  a  fairer  distribu- 
tion:   three  seats  to  the   Radical-Socialists   two 

1  Within  each  list  the  seats  go  to  the  candidates  polling  the 
highest  vote  or,  in  case  of  equality,  to  the  oldest. 

[162] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS   COMPOSITION 

to  the  Democratic-Republicans,  one  to  the  Uni- 
fied Socialists.  It  is  a  haphazard  system,  evi- 
dently intended  to  sanction  the  principle  of 
minority  representation  without  securing  its 
substance.1 

The  law  provides  (Art.  13)  for  a  second  elec-  Second 
tion  two  weeks  later  in  case  not  more  than  half  eections 
of  the  registered  voters  have  gone  to  the  polls 
or  in  case  no  list  has  obtained  the  electoral  quota. 
The  same  procedure  is  followed  as  in  the  first 
election.  But  on  this  occasion,  if  no  list  obtains 
the  electoral  quota,  then  the  seats  are  assigned 
to  the  candidates  polling  the  highest  vote.  This 
is  nearly  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  list 
polling  the  highest  vote  shall  get  all  the  seats; 
for  all  of  the  candidates  on  a  given  list  are  likely 
to  receive  the  whole  party  vote 

The    practice   of   holding    a    second    election,    Theyen- 
which  would  be  unnecessary  under  a  sound  sys-   ™^g*_ 
tern    of    proportional    representation,    seems    to   lation 
foster  political  chicanery  and  manipulation.     It 
certainly   did   so  while  the  scrutin  d' arrondisse- 
ment  or  district  ticket  prevailed.     The  rule  then 
was  to  hold  a  second  election  (ballottage)  when- 
ever no  candidate  received  in  the  first  election 
an  absolute  majority  of  the  votes  cast  or  whenever 
that  majority  did  not  equal  at  least  one  fourth 
of  the  registered  voters.     The  ballottage  was  open 

1  The  working  of  the  system  is  described  very  clearly  in 
Representation  (organ  of  the  English  Proportional  Representa- 
tion Society),  October,  1919,  pages  10-16. 

[163] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

not  only  to  all  the  former  candidates,  but  also  to 
any  new  candidates  who  chose  to  offer  them- 
selves; l  and  a  mere  plurality  sufficed  for  elec- 
tion. This  arrangement  encouraged  minor 
parties,  which  had  no  hope  of  ultimate  success, 
to  put  forward  candidates  of  their  own  in  the 
first  election.  They  had  nothing  to  lose  by  such 
tactics;  for  if  with  their  support  the  candidate  of 
a  party  close  to  them  in  its  platform  would  have 
secured  the  required  majority,  without  their  sup- 
port no  other  candidate  could  secure  it;  the  deci- 
sion was  simply  postponed.  They  had,  on  the 
other  hand,  much  to  gain.  Besides  maintaining 
their  organization,  they  were  able  to  bargain 
with  the  larger  parties  on  the  basis  of  demon- 
strated voting  strength  and  to  exact  a  price  for 
joining  forces  in  the  second  election.  Intrigues 
and  maneuvers  filled  the  interval  of  two  weeks. 
The  candidate  who  needed  a  few  hundred  votes 
would  pay  a  heavy  price  for  them,  modifying  his 
platform  or  making  secret  promises  to  gain  the 
adhesion  of  a  minor  party.  He  went  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  as  the  representative  of 
conflicting  interests,  which  embarrassed  his  course 
of  action  and  made  consistency  impossible.  These 
local  coalitions,  accompanied  as  they  sometimes 
were  by  scandalous  sacrifice  of  principle,  have 
been    the   subject   of  much    criticism.     The   na- 

1  As  the  law  of  1919  is  silent  on  this  point,  we  may  assume 
that  no  change  is  intended  and  that  new  lists  may  be  put 
forward  in  the  second  election. 

[164] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

tional  parties,  through  their  congresses  and  com- 
mittees, now  seek  to  bind  the  candidates  every- 
where to  a  given  line  of  action  —  the  Unified 
Socialists,  for  instance,  in  1914  laying  down 
specifically  the  conditions  under  which  alliance 
might  be  made  with  the  Radical-Socialists  and 
other  parties. 

The  size  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  fixed  size  of 
with  reference  both  to  population  and  territorial  0^^ 
units.1  Under  the  district  ticket  (prevailing 
before  1919)  seats  were  apportioned  to  each  ar- 
rondissement  on  the  basis  of  population,  one  seat 
for  every  100,000  inhabitants;  but  as  the  law 
recognized  fractions  of  this  number,  however 
small,  an  arrondissement  was  entitled  to  one  seat 
whether  its  population  was  10,000  or  100,000 
and  to  two  seats  whether  its  population  was 
100,001  or  20O,ooo.2  Arrondissements  returning 
more  than  one  deputy  were  divided  into  single- 
member  districts. 

Under  the  law  of  1919,  which  substitutes  the  Now  626 
general  ticket  with  minority  representation  for  eputles 
the  district  ticket,  the  department  takes  the 
place  of  the  arrondissement  as  the  territorial 
unit.  Each  department  is  entitled  to  one  seat 
for  every  75,000  inhabitants  and  to  an  additional 
seat  for  a  major  fraction  of  75,000;  but  irrespec- 
tive of  population  it  is  entitled  to  a  minimum  of 

1  Dalloz,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  493  et  seq. 

2  For  French  criticism  of  this  system  see  Garner,  op.  cit., 
pages  622-624. 

[165] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

three  seats.1  As  a  general  rule  the  department 
forms  a  single  constituency.2  Only  those  depart- 
ments returning  more  than  six  deputies  to  the 
Chamber  may  (by  law)  be  districted.  In  case  of 
such  division  each  district  must  return  at  least 
three  deputies.  On  the  approach  of  a  general 
election  seats  are  reapportioned  by  statute  if  a 
national  census  has  been  taken  since  the  previous 
election.3  Thus  the  reapportionment  act  of  1910 
gave  the  Chamber  597  members;  the  act  of  1914, 
602  members;  and  that  number  remained  un- 
changed in  the  election  law  of  1919,  no  census 
having  been  taken  during  the  war.  With  the 
provisional  organization  of  Alsace-Lorraine,4  re- 
covered by  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany, 
however,  24  deputies  were  assigned  to  the  new  de- 
partments: 7  to  the  Upper  Rhine,  9  to  the  Lower 
Rhine,  and  8  to  the  Moselle.  Next  to  the  House 
of  Commons  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  with  626 
members,  is  the  largest  legislative  assembly  in 
the  world. 
Method  The  French  have  devised  no  elaborate  nomi- 
nation1" natmg  machinery.  They  find  it  difficult  to 
understand  our  complicated  mechanism  of  con- 
ventions and  primaries.  Of  course  the  parties 
determine  by  their  own  rules  how  their  accredited 

1  "For  the  time  being  and  until  a  new  census  is  taken  each 
department  shall  have  the  number  of  seats  at  present  assigned 
to  it."     Law  of  July  12,  1919,  Art.  2. 

2  Id.,  Art.  3.        3  The  census  is  taken  every  five  years. 
*  Law  of  October  19,  1919. 

[166  3 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

candidates  shall  be  selected.1  But,  as  far  as  the 
law  is  concerned,  any  qualified  person  may  be- 
come a  candidate  simply  by  informing  the  pre- 
fect, at  least  five  days  before  the  election,  that 
he  intends  to  run  in  a  particular  district  and  by 
attaching  to  his  declaration  of  candidacy  the 
sworn  signatures  of  ioo  local  voters.2  The  pro- 
vision requiring  signatures  is  a  novel  feature  of 
the  law  of  1919,  doubtless  suggested  by  the  Eng- 
lish practice  of  nomination  by  petition.  Formerly 
there  was  no  such  requirement;  the  candidate 
announced  himself — that  was  all.  The  new  de- 
parture may  portend  more  radical  changes  later 
on,  perhaps  even  a  gradual  approach  to  a  system 
of  regulated  primaries.  Its  immediate  purpose 
seems  to  be  the  discouragement  of  individual  can- 
didacies; for  in  the  case  of  the  regular  lists  bear- 
ing the  names  of  several  candidates  (it  must  be 
remembered  that  each  constituency  now  elects 
three  or  more  deputies)  the  signatures  of  the 
candidates  themselves  are  sufficient.3  There  is 
one  other  limitation,  and  this  dates  back  to  1889. 
A  law  adopted  during  the  Boulanger  panic  makes 
it  impossible  for  a  man  to  stand  in  more  than 
one  constituency  at  the  same  time,  the  fear  being 
that  a  number  of  simultaneous  successes  might 

1  See  Chapter  X. 

2  Law  of  July  12,  1919,  Art.  5,  Sec.  5. 

3  Only  ten  individual  candidates  offered  themselves  in  the 
election  of  November  16,  1919;  three  of  these  (including  Rene 
Viviani)  were  successful. 

[167: 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

encourage  thoughts  of  coup  d'etat.  Not  only  is 
violation  of  the  law  punishable  by  a  heavy  fine, 
but  ballots  cast  for  any  person  not  a  legal  can- 
didate must  be  rejected  as  void.  Thus  in  1889 
JofFrin  was  declared  elected  over  Boulanger  who, 
though  receiving  more  votes  than  JofFrin,  was 
disqualified  under  the  law  of  that  year.  Pro- 
fessor Duguit  condemns  this  law  as  violating  the 
democratic  principle  that  a  citizen  may  offer  him- 
self wherever  he  pleases  and  that  a  citizen  may 
vote  for  whomever  he  pleases  without  respect  to 
the  question  of  formal  candidacy.1  Under  a 
self-nominating  system,  although  candidates  may 
be  numerous,  they  are  not  so  numerous  as  Ameri- 
cans are  likely  to  suppose;  nominations,  being 
free,  are  not  an  object  in  themselves.  Moreover, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  electorate  the  ballot 
is  no  harder  to  vote  with  eight  or  ten  competing 
lists  than  with  two  or  three;  complication  comes 
from  the  multiplicity  of  elective  offices,  not  from 
the  multiplicity  of  candidates  for  a  single  office; 
and  in  France,  as  generally  in  European  coun- 
tries, only  one  office  is  filled  at  any  given  elec- 
tion. There  is  always  a  "short  ballot."  Even 
when  the  general  ticket  is  employed  and  four  or 
five  deputies  are  elected  instead  of  one,  the  task 
of  the  voter  is  still  relatively  an  easy  one.  He 
votes  four  or  five  times;  but  each  time  the  stand- 
ard by  which  he  judges  the  candidates  is  the 
same  because  the  office  to  be  filled  is  the  same. 
1  Op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  240. 

[168] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

With  regard  to  qualifications  for  the  Chamber  QuaUfi- 
of  Deputies  the  general  rule  is  that  any  voter  ^fj^e 
twenty-five  years  of  age  may  be  elected  in  any  Chamber 
constituency.  Neither  by  law  nor  by  custom  is 
local  residence  required.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
Senate,1  there  are  a  few  absolute  disqualifications 
(for  instance,  failure  to  satisfy  the  requirements 
of  the  military  law)  and  "relative"  disqualifica- 
tions which  render  officials  ineligible  within  the 
areas  where  their  functions  are  exercised  The 
law  also  establishes  what  are  termed  "incompati- 
bilities," the  purpose  being  to  prevent  the  abuse 
of  executive  patronage.2  A  salaried  public  offi- 
cial, while  he  may  be  elected  to  the  Chamber, 
cannot  retain  both  his  seat  and  his  office;  within 
eight  days  after  the  election  has  been  validated 
he  must  make  his  choice  between  them.  Thus  a 
prefect,  who  may  be  returned  to  Parliament  by 
any  constituency  outside  of  his  own  department, 
cannot  continue  to  be  both  a  prefect  and  a  deputy. 
The  French  rule,  however,  like  the  English  one 
from  which  it  was  borrowed,  permits  numerous 
exceptions,  among  these  being  ministers,  under- 
secretaries, ambassadors,  the  prefect  of  police, 
the  prefect  of  the  Seine,  and  various  high  judicial 
officers.  It  is  further  provided  that  when,  after 
election,  a  deputy  accepts  any  salaried  public 
office,  other  than  the  office  of  minister  or  under- 

1  See  Chapter  V.    The  rules  applying  to  the  two  chambers 
are  not  identical.    Duguit,  Vol.  II,  page  263. 

2  Law  of  November  30,  1875,  Art.  8. 

[169] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Parlia- 
mentary 
privileges 


secretary,  he  thereby  forfeits  his  seat  '  and  can- 
not seek  reelection  to  the  Chamber  unless  the 
office  is  "compatible"  with  the  mandate.2 

Election  to  Parliament  brings  with  it  certain 
privileges  which  have  been  derived  from  the  old 
English  precedents.  The  chief  of  these  are  free- 
dom of  speech  and  freedom  from  arrest.  "No 
member  of  either  house,"  says  the  constitution,3 
"shall  be  prosecuted  or  held  responsible  for  any 
opinions  expressed  or  votes  cast  by  him  in  the 
performance  of  his  duties";  and  under  the  law 
of  1881  no  action  lies  against  a  member  of  Par- 
liament because  of  any  speech  delivered  in  the 
chambers  or  published  by  their  orders.4  The  con- 
stitution also  declares  that  "no  member  of  either 
house  shall,  during  the  session,  be  prosecuted  or 
arrested  for  any  felony  or  misdemeanor  except 
upon  the  authority  of  the  chamber  of  which  he  is 
a  member,  unless  he  be  taken  in  the  very  act."  5 

1  Law  of  November  30,  1875,  Art.  II. 

8  Senators  may,  without  losing  their  seats,  accept  salaried 
offices  "compatible"  with  the  mandate.  On  the  general  sub- 
ject of  disqualifications  see  especially  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sees. 
337-346;  Duguit,  op.  cit.y  Vol.  II,  page  260  et  seq.;  Esmein, 
op.  cit.y  page  861  et  seq.  Esmein  cites  certain  private  offices 
(connected  with  subventioned  steamship  lines,  for  instance) 
that  are  now  "incompatible"  with  the  legislative  mandate. 

3  July  16,  Art.  13. 

4  See  Duguit,  Vol.  II,  page  281  et  seq. 

5  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  14.  It  was  therefore 
necessary  in  1919  to  deprive  Joseph  Caillaux  of  his  parlia- 
mentary immunity  before  he  could  be  brought  to  trial  on  the 
charge  of  high  treason. 

[170] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

The  members  are  paid.1  They  receive  $3000 
(15,000  francs)  a  year,  or  considerably  less  than 
half  the  sum  paid  to  Congressmen  in  the  United 
States.  In  1906,  when  Parliament  fixed  upon 
this  amount  (an  increase  of  $1200)  and  made  it 
applicable  from  the  beginning  of  the  next  year, 
there  was  widespread  criticism  such  as  the  ''salary 
grab"  of  1873  aroused  in  the  United  States;  but 
the  law  was  not  repealed.  The  presidents  of  both 
chambers  receive  in  addition  to  the  regular  salary 
$14,400  and  an  official  residence. 

The  normal  term  for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  Duration 
is  four  years.2  At  any  time  within  that  period  chamber 
it  may  be  dissolved  by  the  President  with  the 
consent  of  the  Senate; 3  but,  contrary  to  the 
practice  in  England  and  the  English  colonies, 
where  dissolution  invariably  supervenes  before 
the  end  of  the  mandate,  the  life  of  the  Chamber 
has  only  once  been  interrupted  in  that  fashion. 
The  anti-Republican  sentiments  that  actuated 
McMahon  and  the  Senate  in  1877  seem  to  have 
discredited  permanently  a  device  which  is,  in  the 
words  of  a  distinguished  French  publicist,4  "in- 
dispensable to  constitute  parliamentary  majori- 

1  Except  for  the  period  1815-1848  payment  has  been 
accorded  ever  since  1789. 

2  As  the  Senate  is  a  continuous  body,  the  French  follow 
American  practice  and  give  to  each  Parliament  a  new  number 
after  the  election  of  the  Chamber.  The  "first  legislature" 
was  elected  in  1876;   the  twelfth  in  1919. 

3  Constitutional  law  of  February  25,  Art.  5. 

4  Guvot  in  Contemporary  Rrjirj,  xcvii,  page  147. 

[171] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

ties.  ...  In  France  a  ministry  is  formed,  not 
because  it  represents  a  majority;  it  is  only  after 
its  formation  that  it  creates  a  majority."  A 
French  cabinet  is  therefore  less  intimately  in  con- 
tact with  the  people  than  an  English  cabinet  is.1 
Parliamentary  elections  first  occurred  in  the 
spring  of  1876,  but  after  the  dissolution  of  the 
next  year  they  came  in  the  autumn.  As  that 
date  seemed  disadvantageous  in  an  agricultural 
country,  a  law  of  July  22,  1893,  extended  the  life 
of  the  next  Chamber  until  the  end  of  May,  1898 
(that  is,  for  several  months),  so  that  spring  elec- 
tions could  be  restored.  In  view  of  the  silence 
of  the  Constitution  the  right  of  Parliament  to 
enact  such  a  law  cannot  be  contested;  nor  will 
any  one  be  likely  to  assert  that  a  fixed  constitu- 
tional date  for  elections  on  the  American  plan 
would  have  left  France  as  free  to  meet  the  emer- 
gencies of  the  Great  War.  Parliament  was  able, 
by  statute,  to  postpone  all  elections  until  1919. 
Because  of  this  postponement  the  eleventh  legis- 
lature lasted  for  a  year  and  a  half  beyond  its 
normal  term,  the  new  Chamber  being  elected  in 
November,  1919,  five  months  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  with  Germany.     In  order  to  avoid 

1  Some  English  writers  believe  that  in  view  of  the  important 
changes  which  the  Parliament  Act  of  191 1  has  made  in  the 
situation  of  the  House  of  Commons,  English  cabinets  may  no 
longer  resort  to  dissolution.  See  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitu- 
tion (8th  ed.,  1915),  page  Hi;  Low,  Governance  of  England 
(new  ed.,  1914),  page  xviii. 

[•72] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

the  recurrence  of  autumn  elections  it  was  pro- 
vided that  the  mandate  of  the  twelfth  legislature 
should  not  expire  until  May  31,  1924. 

The  quadrennial  elections  take  place,  under  a  The 
decree  issued  by  the  government,  at  some  time  l^°a 
within  the  sixty  days  preceding  the  expiration  of  paign 
the  mandate.1  At  least  twenty  days  must  elapse 
between  the  issuing  of  the  decree  and  the  holding 
of  the  election,2  these  intervening  weeks  being 
known  as  the  electoral  period.3  Throughout  this 
electoral  period  the  campaign  proceeds;  candi-^ 
dates  issue  their  platforms  (professions  de  foi) 
which,  framed  to  suit  local  conditions,  are  fre- 
quently inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  the 
parties  to  which  they  ostensibly  belong.  Candi- 
dates are  much  less  subject  to  party  control  than 
in  the  United  States;  their  personal  views  count 
a  great  deal  with  the  voters.  But  in  the  last 
twenty  years  there  has  been  a  remarkable  de- 
velopment in  the  organization  and  discipline  of 
the  parties;  annual  conventions  which  formulate 
principles  and  choose  the  national  committee 
have  become  the  general  rule;  and  the  more 
powerful  parties  (as  the  Unified  Socialists  and 
the  Radical-Socialists)  permit  no  candidate  to  run 
in  their  interest  unless  his  " profession  of  faith" 
has  been  submitted  and  approved.  The  growing 
strength  of  party  organization  has  also  given  the 
party  leaders  a  larger  voice  in  the  direction  of 

1  Law  of  June,  1885. 

2  Law  of  November  30,  1875.         3  Dalloz,  Sec.  504. 

[173] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  campaign.  They  travel  about  the  country 
more  than  they  used  to  do,  expounding  their 
views  in  public  speeches  and  thus  emphasizing 
the  importance  of  national  policies  over  against 
the  narrower  interests  of  localities.  This  practice 
tends  to  bring  the  candidate  into  closer  contact 
with  his  party.  The  art  of  campaigning  is  much 
the  same  everywhere;  in  canvassing  and  in  ex- 
tending his  personal  popularity  with  the  voters 
a  French  candidate  employs  methods  which  would 
not  seem  out  of  place  in  America.  There  are 
points  of  contrast,  of  course;  and  one  of  these 
is  the  extensive  use  made  of  posters.  In  recent 
years,  as  Esmein  observes,1  each  candidate  has 
tried  to  submerge  the  declarations  of  his  adver- 
saries under  a  flood  of  multicolored  posters. 
Rivalry  in  this  matter  proceeded  so  far  that  it 
became  a  serious  abuse,  entailing  as  it  did  heavy 
expenditures;  and  under  the  law  of  March  20, 
1914,2  communes  must  now  provide  official  bill- 
boards of  stated  size  and  divide  them  equally 
among  the  candidates. 
Elections  As  in  other  Catholic  countries  of  Europe,  the 
elections  invariably  take  place  on  Sunday.3  The 
polls  open  at  eight  —  unless  the  prefect,  at  the 
request  of  the  mayor,  should  fix  an  earlier  hour 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  898. 

2  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement,  Sec.  207;    Esmein,  op.  cit., 
page  899. 

3  This  is  an  advantage  to  the  laboring  class.    Even  in  some 
of  the  Protestant  states  of  Germany  municipal  elections  are 

[  174] 


the 
electoral 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS   COMPOSITION 

—  and  close  at  six.  The  polling-place,  which  the 
prefect  designates,  is  always  a  public  building: 
the  town  hall  or,  if  more  than  one  polling-place 
is  needed,  a  public  school  as  well;  it  need  scarcely 
be  said  that  the  surroundings  are  more  suitable 
to  the  dignity  of  the  occasion  than  those  of 
the  subterranean  laundries  and  tailor  shops  that 
are  often  used  in  American  cities.1  Each  regis- 
tered voter  receives  what  is  called  an  "electoral  Use  of 
card."  This  serves  the  double  purpose  of  in 
forming  him  as  to  the  time  and  place  of  the  elec-  card 
tion  and  of  establishing  his  identity  when  he 
presents  himself  to  vote.  It  bears  his  name,  the 
date  of  his  birth,  his  address,  and  a  statement  of 
his  qualifications  for  the  suffrage.  In  rural  com- 
munes, where  the  cards  are  usually  distributed 
by  the  police,  a  considerable  number  of  voters 
may,  by  design  or  accident,  be  overlooked;  and 
this  circumstance  has  been  held  sufficient  ground 
for  annulling  an  election.2  But  a  voter  who  fails 
to  receive  a  card,  or  to  bring  it  to  the  polls,  is 
still  permitted  to  vote  providing  he  is  personally 
known  to  the  election  board  or  can  produce  two 
other  voters  to  identify  him.     In  the  large  centers 

now  held  on  Sunday.  (Dawson,  Municipal  Life  and  Govern- 
ment in  Germany,  1914,  page  74.)  Until  1871  French  elections 
extended  over  several  days,  as  was  the  case  in  England. 
(Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  256.) 

1  Moreover,  by  using  its  own  buildings,  the  commune  effects 
a  considerable  economy. 

2  Dalloz,  Sees.  557  et  seq.;   Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement  of 
1914,  Sec.  260. 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  population,  where  there  is  so  much  danger  of 
fraud,  the  voter  must  apply  at  the  town  hall  for 
his  card  and  there  affix  his  signature  to  it.  On 
election  day,  if  fraud  is  suspected,  this  signature 
may  be  compared  with  a  new  one  made  in  the 
presence  of  the  election  board.  In  any  case  the 
board  will  not  permit  a  man  to  vote  simply 
because  he  possesses  a  card;  it  must  be  satisfied 
that  the  card  belongs  rightfully  to  him  and  that 
his  name  appears  on  the  register.  When  the 
voter  presents  his  card,  an  election  official  cuts 
off  one  of  the  corners  and  strings  it  on  a  piece 
of  thread  or  places  it  in  a  box  provided  for  that 
purpose.  This  practice  serves  a  double  purpose: 
not  only  is  it  a  safeguard  against  "repeating" 
(voting  more  than  once),  but  it  serves  also  as  a 
means  of  detecting  mistakes  or  frauds  when  a 
discrepancy  is  found  between  the  number  of 
ballots  cast  and  the  number  of  voters  checked 
off  in  the  register.  After  being  clipped  the  card 
is  returned  to  the  voter  who  must  present  it 
again  if  a  second  election  is  held. 
NoAus-  Vote  by  ballot  superseded  the  viva  voce  system 
in  France  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution;  l  but 
the  Australian  ballot,  printed  by  the  state  and 
distributed  inside  the  polling-place,  has  not  yet 
been  fully  adopted.2    All  the  law  requires  is  that 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  342. 

2  There  is  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  its  adoption  will 
not  long  be  delayed.  The  proportional  representation  bill  as 
passed  by  the  Chamber  in  1912  provided  that  "the  ballots 

[176] 


tralian 
ballot 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

the  ballots  shall  be  made  of  white  paper  and  bear 
no  exterior  marks.1  They  may  vary  in  size,  shape, 
and  quality;  they  may  even  be  "lightly  tinted" 
with  blue  or  pink  or  yellow.  In  other  words  the 
candidates,  who  print  their  own  ballots,  may 
easily  give  them  a  distinctive  character  without 
violating  the  law  in  any  way.  Until  1919  these 
ballots  were  distributed  at  the  voters'  homes  some 
time  before  the  election  and  again  outside  the 
polling-place  on  election  day,  a  practice  that 
added  materially  to  the  cost  of  the  campaign.  As 
the  voter  approached  the  polling-place,  ballots 
were  thrust  into  his  hands  by  a  group  of  workers 
whose  hats  were  decorated  with  huge  labels  bearing 
the  names  of  their  respective  candidates.  That 
system  was  somewhat  modified,  however,  by  a  law 
of  October  20,  1919,  applying  only  to  the  election 
of  the  new  Chamber.  The  law  provided  that 
the  candidates  might  have  their  ballots  printed 

of  all  the  lists  in  the  constituency  shall  be  printed  on  the  same 
sheet  under  the  direction  of  the  administration"  and  dis- 
tributed to  each  elector.  As  already  noted,  the  Senate  rejected 
this  bill.  A  similar  provision,  which  required  the  printing  and 
distribution  by  the  state  of  separate  ballots  for  each  list,  was 
incorporated  in  the  bill  of  1919  by  unanimous  vote  of  the 
Chamber,  but  struck  out  by  the  committee  which  reported  the 
bill  to  the  Senate.  In  both  cases  the  government  was  required 
to  print  and  distribute  election  circulars  prepared  by  the 
candidates,  the  size  and  weight  of  these  circulars  being  fixed 
by  ordinance.  The  special  arrangements  made  for  the  elections 
of  1 9 19  are  mentioned  below  in  the  text. 
1  Dalloz,  Sees.  619  et  seq.;  Pierre,  Sec.  245. 

[177] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

by  the  state  (though  not  at  public  expense)  and 
sent  to  the  voters  by  mail  under  an  official  frank, 
election  circulars  of  specified  size  accompanying 
the  ballots.  It  provided  further,  that  on  election 
day  the  voter  should  receive  ballots  from  the 
election  board  inside  the  polling-place  and  in  no 
other  way.  According  to  the  interpretation  of 
the  law  by  the  minister  of  justice,1  the  candidates 
were  still  free  to  print  their  own  ballots  if  they 
so  desired. 

The  procedure  of  voting  has  been  much 
changed  by  recent  legislation.  Formerly  the 
voter  merely  folded  his  ballot  and  handed  it 
to  the  president  of  the  election  board  who  put 
it  in  the  ballot  box.  This  was  called  secret 
voting;  but  it  left  the  way  open  to  many  abuses. 
The  voter,  having  been  bribed  or  intimidated, 
might  be  furnished  with  a  particular  ballot  and 
kept  under  observation  to  prevent  his  substitut- 
ing another;  or  the  president  of  the  board  might 
examine  it,  pretending  to  believe  that  several 
ballots  had  been  folded  together;  or  he  might 
surreptitiously  deface  it  and  render  it  invalid. 
Secrecy:  Under  the  law  of  191 3,  which  provides  for  poll- 
ojjlfand  ing-booths  and  the  "envelope  system,"  absolute 
polling  secrecy  has  been  ensured.2  Each  voter,  after 
presenting  his  electoral  card,  receives  an  official 


booths, 
1913 


1  Le  Temps,  October  31,  1919. 

2  Law  of  July  29,  1913,  as  modified  by  the  law  of  March 
31,  1914.  See  Pierre,  op.  tit.,  supplement,  Sees.  243  and  246; 
Eiraein,  pages  896-897. 

[■78] 


A.  DISTRIBUTION  OF   BALLOTS 

B.  THE  ENVELOPE   SYSTEM  OF  VOTING 


sion  of 
the  poll 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

envelope  made  according  to  a  fixed  pattern  and 
of  opaque  paper;  entering  a  polling-booth  (iso- 
loir),  protected  even  from  the  eyes  of  the  election 
board,  he  puts  a  ballot  into  the  envelope;  and 
finally,  after  satisfying  the  board  that  he  holds 
only  one  envelope,  he  drops  it  into  the  ballot  box 
himself.  These  new  arrangements,  while  they 
require  more  time  for  voting  and  counting  the 
vote,  greatly  reduce  the  possibility  of  corruption. 

The  election  board  consists  of  a  president,  four  Supervi 
assistants  {assesseurs),  and  a  secretary,  the  latter 
having  only  a  consultative  voice.1  As  in  the  case 
of  the  registration  board,  service  is  gratuitous, 
the  cost  of  elections  being  a  negligible  item  in 
France.  The  mayor  of  the  commune  always 
acts  as  president;2  the  councilors  as  assesseurs. 
If  the  designated  councilors  fail  to  appear,  the 
duty  falls  on  the  two  oldest  and  the  two  youngest 
voters  present  at  the  opening  of  the  polls.  The 
law  imposes  no  qualification  except  the  ability  to 
read  and  write.  The  members  of  the  board  may 
therefore  be  salaried  officials  subject  to  govern- 
ment influence  or  even  candidates  for  election. 
The  president  preserves  order.  As  the  voters 
have  a  right  to  remain  throughout  the  proceed- 
ings, this  is  not  always  a  light  task.  While  he 
may  expel  individual  voters  who  create  a  dis- 
turbance, a  general  expulsion  is  permitted  only 

1  Dalloz,  Sees.  575  et  seq.;   Pierre,  Sec.  232. 

2  If  the  commune  contains  more  than  one  polling-place,  the 
adjoints  or  councilors 

[179] 


the  vote 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

in  extreme  cases  where  the  public  order  is  men- 
aced; and  in  either  event  the  validity  of  the 
election  may  be  attacked  on  the  ground  that  he 
made  unwarranted  use  of  his  authority.  Some- 
times, when  party  feeling  runs  high,  there  may 
be  enough  commotion  (spontaneous  or  otherwise) 
to  screen  the  acts  of  a  corrupt  board  from 
observation. 
Counting  After  the  close  of  the  poll  the  count  begins. 
The  board  first  compares  the  number  of  envelopes 
in  the  box  with  the  number  of  voters  shown  by 
the  register  and  by  the  corners  clipped  from  the 
electoral  cards,  discrepancies  being  noted  in  the 
official  record.  If  more  than  three  hundred  votes 
have  been  cast,  the  board  designates  some  of  the 
electors  present  to  assist  in  the  count,  four  sitting 
at  each  table  and  doing  their  best  to  be  accurate 
while  the  voters  wander  about  the  tables  and 
engage  in  animated  controversies.  Ballots  are 
counted  which  in  the  United  States  would  clearly 
be  void:  ballots  bearing  the  names  of  too  many 
candidates  (only  the  first  names  are  considered 
in  such  cases)  or  facetious  comments  or  even 
verses.  Returns  from  all  the  polling-places  in 
the  department  are  examined  by  a  canvassing 
board  (commission  de  recensement)  which  rectifies 
mistakes  and  announces  the  result  of  the  election 
for  the  constituency.1 

1  This  board  is  now  composed  of  four  members  of  the  gen- 
eral council  of  the  department  who  are  not  candidates  in  the 
election,  with  the  president  of  the  district  court  as  chairman. 

[180] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

The  election  returns  as  compiled  in  each  Con- 
department  by  the  canvassing  board  can  be  ^^^ 
reviewed  by  only  one  authority.  Under  the 
constitution  each  chamber  is  judge  of  the 
eligibility  of  its  members  and  of  the  regularity  of 
their  election.1  As  soon  as  the  new  Chamber  of 
Deputies  has  installed  a  provisional  president,  its 
members  are  divided  by  lot  into  eleven  sections 
called  "bureaux."2  The  election  returns  and  all 
documents  bearing  upon  them  are  distributed 
among  these  bureaux  which,  through  the  medium 
of  small  committees  (again  chosen  by  lot),  ex- 
amine them  and  make  report  to  the  Chamber 
on  each  election  separately.  Undisputed  returns 
are  dealt  with  first  so  that  the  Chamber  may 
immediately  seat  a  majority  of  its  members  and 
proceed  with  permanent  organization.  In  the 
case  of  contested  elections,  even  when  the  com- 
plaint has  been  made  informally  by  letter  or 
telegram,  a  review  of  the  alleged  irregularities 
will  entail  some  delay.  The  bureau  must  de- 
termine whether  the  candidate  was  eligible, 
whether  he  obtained  the  required  vote,  whether 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  10.  This  power  of 
deciding  election  contests  has  resided  in  the  legislature  since 
1789.  On  the  general  subject  see  Pierre,  Sees.  354  et  seq.; 
Dalloz,  Sees.  791  et  seq.;   Duguit,  Vol.  II,  page  301  et  seq. 

2  An  ingenious  mechanical  device  is  used  for  this  purpose: 
626  balls  bearing  the  names  of  the  members  roll,  with  the 
movement  of  a  board,  into  as  many  holes  which  have  been 
divided  into  groups  corresponding  with  the  eleven  bureaux. 
Pierre,  Sec.  713.    The  Senate  has  only  nine  bureaux. 

[181] 


GOVERNMENT  AND    POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

the  electoral  operations  were  in  accordance  with 
the  law,  and  whether  there  were  any  circum- 
stances (such  as  corrupt  administrative  influence) 
that  would  vitiate  the  election.  If  the  facts 
prove  difficult  to  establish,  the  Chamber  may,  on 
its  own  initiative  or  at  the  request  of  a  bureau, 
authorize  the  appointment  of  an  investigating 
committee  of  eleven  members  (one  named  by 
each  bureau);  and  this  committee  will  have 
power,  under  a  statute  of  1914  to  compel  the 
attendance  of  witnesses  and  to  put  them  under 
oath.1  When  the  bureau  renders  its  final  report, 
the  Chamber  decides  simply  whether  the  election 
shall  be  validated  or  invalidated;  and  its  deci- 
sion is  not  subject  to  appeal.  There  are  no 
limits  or  restrictions  upon  the  prerogatives  of  the 
Chamber  when  it  verifies  the  powers  of  its  mem- 
bers, according  to  Eugene  Pierre;  it  is  bound 
neither  by  the  laws  nor  by  the  decision  of  universal 
suffrage.  Although  Duguit  expresses  astonish- 
ment that  a  serious  author  could  write  such 
things,2  in  reality  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  like 
every  other  political  body  possessed  of  such  a 
power,  has  usually  been  influenced  by  partisan 
considerations  rather  than  a  nice  sense  of  justice.3 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement,  Sec.  592. 

2  Op.  cit. j  Vol.  II,  page  303. 

3  Down  to  1907  the  American  House  of  Representatives 
Jecided  379  of  382  contests  in  favor  of  the  majority  party. 
Alexander,  History  and  Procedure  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, page  324. 

[182] 


CHAMBER   OF   DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

It  is  true  that  the  bureaux,  because  chosen  by 
lot,  may  recommend  action  unfavorable  to  the 
interests  of  the  majority  and  that  the  majority 
itself,  being  composed  of  several  more  or  less 
antagonistic  groups,  may  not  always  hold  to- 
gether. But  the  vote  is  taken  without  adequate 
information,  few  members  having  the  time  or  in- 
clination to  study  voluminous  reports;  and  unless 
the  facts  are  so  clear  as  to  admit  no  difference  of 
opinion,  each  group  will  support  the  claims  of 
its  own  candidates  and  purchase  the  support 
of  allied  groups  by  the  familiar  practice  of  log- 
rolling. Partisan  advantage  is  never  overlooked. 
Naturally  the  groups  that  suffer  most  from  this 
abuse  advocate  a  change.  Influenced  by  the 
practice  of  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies,  where 
for  half  a  century  the  courts  have  determined 
election  contests,  they  propose  to  entrust  this 
power  to  the  Council  of  State  which  already  has 
jurisdiction  over  municipal  elections.  The  Re- 
publican Federation  (formerly  known  as  the 
Progressist  party)  recommends  a  commission 
drawn,  in  equal  numbers,  from  the  Council  of 
State  and  the  Court  of  Cassation.1  But  the  ma- 
jority, well  satisfied  with  existing  methods,  is  not 
likely  to  sanction  a  change  of  that  sort. 

When  the  Chamber  voids  an  election  because   Corrupt 
of  corrupt  practices,  no  further  penalty  is  thereby 
imposed  on  the  guilty  parties;   the  unseated  can- 
didate,  even   though   shown   to  have  bribed   or 
1  Jacques,  Les  Partis  politique 's  (19 1 3),  page  209. 

[183] 


practices 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

intimidated  voters,  may  offer  himself  in  the  en- 
suing by-election.  Violations  of  the  law  are 
punished,  not  by  the  Chamber,  but  by  the 
criminal  courts.1  If  the  public  prosecutor  fails 
to  act,  any  voter  of  the  constituency  may  set  the 
machinery  of  the  criminal  law  in  motion.  Under 
the  decree  of  February  2,  1852  —  which  defined 
such  offenses  as  false  registration,  illegal  voting, 
tampering  with  the  ballots  or  the  returns,  in- 
timidation, bribery  —  conviction  was  difficult  to 
secure.  "It  may  safely  be  said,"  Aristide  Briand 
observed  in  1910,2  "that  corruption  generally 
escapes  all  repression."  Critics  pointed  to  many 
defects  in  the  law.  These  defects  have  been 
remedied,  however,  by  the  laws  of  July  29,  1913, 
and  March  31,  1914.3  The  former  deals  with 
offenses  in  connection  with  voting  and  counting 
the  vote.  The  latter  punishes  with  a  fine  of  five 
thousand  francs  and  imprisonment  for  two  years 
those  who,  by  money  or  favors  or  promises, 
attempt  to  influence  the  voters  and  those  who 
accept  or  solicit  such  bribes;  it  punishes  with 
like  severity  those  who  are  guilty  of  undue  in- 
fluence (for  example,  intimidation  or  threat  of 
the  loss  of  employment);   and  any  one  convicted 

1  On  the  subject  of  corrupt  practices  see  Dalloz,  Sees.  853— 
884,  and  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  and  supplement,  Sees.  285-299. 

2  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  292. 

3  For  the  text  of  these  laws  see  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement, 
Sec.  292.  A  useful  summary  will  be  found  in  Duguit,  Manuel 
de  droit  constitutionnel  (3d  ed.,  1918),  pages  371-374. 

[184] 


CHAMBER  OF    DEPUTIES:    ITS  COMPOSITION 

under  the  act  is  incapable  of  being  elected  to 
Parliament  for  a  period  of  two  years.  Moreover, 
the  act  expressly  condemns  government  pressure, 
which  has  always  played  a  prominent  part  in 
elections;  the  mere  promise  of  administrative 
favors  is  now  illegal;  and  whenever  a  public 
official  violates  a  provision  of  the  law  he  is  liable 
to  double  penalties.  Those  familiar  with  Eng- 
lish and  American  legislation  will  be  surprised  to 
find  that  campaign  expenditures  are  not  limited 
in  any  way.  It  seems  that  large  sums  of  money 
are  rarely  spent  by  French  candidates. 


C185] 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES: 
PROCEDURE 

AS  in  the  United  States,  the  constitution  fixes 
a  definite  time  for  the  meeting  of  Parlia- 
ment —  the  second  Tuesday  in  January.1  This 
regular  session  must  last  for  five  months.  It  is 
true  that  in  April  of  every  fourth  year,  when  a 
new  Chamber  is  elected,  adjournment  takes  place 
after  a  session  of  little  more  than  three  months; 
but  the  newly-elected  deputies,  acting  upon  a 
resolution  of  the  outgoing  Chamber,  assemble  on 
June  i  to  complete  the  regular  session.  The 
constitutional  provision  requiring  Parliament  to 
meet  every  year  and  at  a  particular  time  is  really 
superfluous.  It  may  satisfy  the  doctrinaire  who 
thinks  that  political  life  can  be  controlled  by 
formulae;  but  the  necessity  of  voting  the  budget 
every  year,  indeed  the  very  functioning  of  the 
parliamentary  system,  makes  it  certain  that  par- 
liament will  be  active  enough,  if  not  too  active, 
without  a  safeguard  of  this  kind.  The  elastic 
English  practice  under  which  the  session  begins 
without  compulsion  of  law  whenever  circum- 
stances make  it  advisable  seems  to  accord  better 
with  sound  principles  of  government. 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  I. 

[186] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

Except  in  election  years  the  regular  session  special 
invariably  lasts  more  than  five  months,  terminat- 
ing almost  always  towards  the  end  of  July. 
Then  every  year,  in  the  early  part  of  November, 
there  is  a  special  session  rendered  necessary  by 
the  failure  of  Parliament  to  pass  the  budget  in 
the  regular  session.  The  intervening  period 
(August,  September,  October)  represents  nothing 
more  than  the  indispensable  parliamentary  recess. 
This  special  session,  and  indeed  any  special 
session,  is  called  by  the  President  either  on  the 
advice  of  his  ministers  or  at  the  request  of  an 
absolute  majority  in  each  chamber.1  No  such 
request  from  the  chambers  has  ever  been  made, 
and  there  is  some  doubt  as  to  what  constitutes 
an  absolute  majority.2  Special  sessions  have 
always  been  called  on  the  initiat  ve  of  the  cabinet. 

The  President  may  adjourn  the  chambers,3  but   Adjourn- 
not  more  than  twice  in  the  same  regular  session 
and  not  for  a  longer  period  than  one  month  in   Hon 
each  case.4     If  the  chambers  themselves  adjourn, 
the  period  of  recess  is  counted  in  reckoning  the 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Arts.  I  and  2. 

2  Esmein,  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel,  page  742,  main- 
tains that  vacant  seats  should  be  deducted  from  the  total; 
Duguit,  Traite  de  droit  constitutionnel,  Vol.  II,  page  296,  holds 
that  under  Esmein's  construction  the  majority  might  become 
a  minority  later  on  because  of  by-elections. 

3  The  term  adjournment  is  used  here  to  denote  a  temporary 
interruption  of  the  session;  prorogation,  to  denote  the  ending 
of  the  session. 

4  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  2. 

[187] 


ment  and 
proroga- 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

session  of  five  months  required  by  the  constitu- 
tion. Subject  to  the  five-months'  rule  the  Presi- 
dent may  at  any  time  prorogue  Parliament,1  that 
is,  close  the  session.2  But  of  course  when  he 
adjourns  or  prorogues  Parliament,  his  act  is  con- 
trolled by  the  responsible  ministers.  Prorogation 
does  not  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  as  it  does 
in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  terminate  all 
pending  business;  when  the  next  session  opens 
bills  may  be  taken  up  precisely  where  they  were 
abandoned.  Upon  dissolution  of  the  Chamber, 
however,  all  bills  that  have  not  been  enacted 
are  quashed  and  can  be  considered  by  the  new 
Chamber  only  by  being  reintroduced  and  once 
more  referred  to  committee.  The  Senate,  being 
a  continuous  body,  is  subject  to  no  such  regula- 
tion. It  may  deal  with  bills  passed  by  a  defunct 
Chamber  and  enact  them  into  law  even  though 
the  quadrennial  elections  have  shown  that  the 
voters  are  not  favorable  to  their  passage.  < 
The  Each  daily  sitting  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 

Bitthies  opens  with  an  impressive  ceremony.3  The  presi- 
dent of  the  Chamber  makes  his  entrance  preceded 
by  two  ushers  and  followed  by  the  secretaries;  a 
guard  of  honor  forms  in  line  and  presents  arms 
while  drums  beat  a  salute.  As  soon  as  the  presi- 
dent has  mounted  to  his  chair  in  the  tribune, 
ushers  announce  the  fact  through  the  palace   and 

1  See  note  3,  p.  187.  2  See  note  4,  p.  187. 

3  Pierre,  Traite  de  droit  politique,  electoral,  et  parlementaire. 
Sec.  793. 

[188] 


sittings 


CHAMBER   OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

electric  bells  are  rung  to  ensure  an  adequate 
attendance.  The  Chamber  usually  meets  at  two 
o'clock  and  rises  in  time  for  dinner,  that  is,  at 
some  time  between  six  and  seven.  When  the 
hour  of  rising  comes,  —  an  hour  fixed  by  custom 
and  not  by  the  rules,  —  or  when  the  deputies  are 
"visibly  fatigued,''  the  president  consults  the 
Chamber  as  to  the  day  and  hour  of  the  next  sitting.1 
Towards  the  end  of  the  annual  session  and  at 
other  times  when  there  is  a  great  accumulation 
of  business  the  Chamber  is  compelled  to  give  more 
than  the  normal  four  or  five  hours  a  day  to  its 
work.  Instead  of  continuing  into  the  night  like 
the  British  House  of  Commons  2  resort  is  had  to 
sittings  in  the  morning,  which  begin  at  nine  or  ten 
o'clock,  and  the  afternoon  sitting  is  postponed  until 
three.  Under  the  constitution  the  sittings  are  nor- 
mally open  to  the  public.3  But  "each  chamber 
may  form  itself  into  secret  committee  on  the  de- 
mand of  a  certain  number  of  members  fixed  by  the 
rules.  It  then  shall  decide,  by  absolute  majority, 
if  the  sitting  should  be  resumed  in  public  on  the 
same  subject."  In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  a 
motion  to  go  into  secret  committee  requires  the 
signature  of  twenty  members  and  must  be  voted 
on    without    debate.     These    provisions    of   the 

*  Id.,  Sec.  795- 

2  Except  on  Fridays  the  House  of  Commons  does  not  rise 
till  11.30  p.m.;  occasionally  the  sittings  extend  into  the  early 
hours  of  the  morning. 

8  Constitutional  law  of  July  t6,  Art.  5. 

[189] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

constitution  and  rules  were  put  into  effect  for  the 
first  time  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.1 
Fixing  In  all  legislative  bodies  it  is  obviously  of  prime 

^order  importance  to  decide  what  shall  be  done,  how 
of  the  time  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  numerous 
measures  pressing  for  consideration.  The  fate 
of  bills  often  depends  upon  their  being  brought 
forward  at  the  right  juncture.  A  proposed  re- 
form may  be  compromised  if  it  is  acted  upon 
inopportunely  or  hastily;  it  may  fail  to  receive 
any  attention  if  it  is  held  back  till  the  rush  of  the 
closing  days  of  the  session.  The  Chamber  of 
Deputies  regulates  the  transaction  of  its  business 
by  what  is  known  as  "the  order  of  the  day."2 
The  method  of  determining  the  order  of  the  day 
has  been  much  changed  in  recent  years. 
Formerly  the  matter  was  left  largely  in  the 
hands  of  the  president  who,  at  the  close  of  the 
sitting,  when  the  attendance  was  small  and  the 
remaining  members  were  anxious  to  leave,  would 
briefly  state  his  proposals  for  the  next  day's 
business  and  ask  for  their  confirmation.  No 
doubt  he  formulated  these  proposals  in  consulta- 
tion with  the  recognized  leaders  of  the  Chamber. 
Nevertheless,  the  arrangement  met  with  some 
objection  because,  it  was  urged,  a  minority  of 
the  members  might  remain  to  the  close  of  the 
sitting  and  mold  the  order  of  the  day  to  their 
own   advantage.     These  objections   prevailed   in 

1  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  supplement  of  1914,  Sec.  800. 

2  Pierre,  op.  cit.,  Sec.  803;  also  supplement,  Sec.  803. 
[  IQO] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

spite  of  the  fact  that  the  majority  could  then, 
as  now,  change  the  order  of  the  day  at  any  time 
and  thus  circumvent  minority  plottings  of  the 
previous  day.  A  new  rule,  adopted  in  191 1  and 
modified  afterwards,1  has  changed  the  procedure. 
Once  a  week,  under  this  new  rule,  the  president 
of  the  Chamber  confers  with  the  presidents  of 
the  party  groups  and  of  the  twenty-one  standing 
committees  upon  the  state  of  business,  the  cabi- 
net also  being  represented  if  it  so  desires.  In 
other  words  this  group  of  parliamentary  leaders 
draws  up  a  program  for  the  ensuing  week,  a  pro- 
gram which  is  printed  in  the  Journal  officiel  and 
afterward  submitted  to  the  Chamber  for  ap- 
proval.2 No  motion  to  change  the  proposed 
order  of  the  day  can  be  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  Chamber  unless  it  is  supported  by  the 
government  or  by  fifty  deputies.  Do  these  new 
provisions  of  the  rules  give  the  government  suffi- 
cient influence  over  the  course  of  legislation? 
Not  such  influence  as  the  British  cabinet  possesses. 
The  order  of  the  day  is  drafted  by  the  presidents 
of  the  nine  or  ten  groups  and  of  the  nineteen 
standing  committees.  While  the  latter  will 
usually  be  sympathetic  to  the  government  views 
(the  committees  now  being  elected  by  propor- 
tional representation  and  thus  reflecting  the  will 

1  Pierre,  supplement  of  1914,  Sec.  804,  and  Rule  94  (1915). 

2  It  also  supervises  committee  meetings  so  as  to  prevent  a 
situation  arising  where  a  deputy  who  belongs  to  two  com- 
mittees finds  them  both  in  session  at  the  same  time. 

[191] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 


Interior 
arrange- 
ment of 
the 
Chamber 


<* 


of  the  Chamber  as  a  whole),  the  support  of  less 
than  half  the  groups  can  be  counted  on,  and 
every  group  has  the  same  voice  irrespective  of 
its  numerical  strength.  The  premier  may  have 
to  use  threats  or  persuasive  arguments;  he  may 
often  be  compelled  to  resort  to  bargain  or  com- 
promise —  logrolling. 

The  interior  of  the  hall  in  which  the  deputies 
meet  is  semicircular  in  shape.1  At  an  elevation 
of  some  ten  feet,  approached  by  a  narrow  stair- 
case on  either  side,  is  the  chair  of  the  president. 
Immediately  in  front  of  him,  but  two  or  three 
feet  lower,  is  the  tribune  from  which  the  mem- 
bers speak.  Facing  the  tribune  there  are  a  dozen 
concentric  rows  of  seats  which  rise  one  above  the 
other  in  the  style  of  an  amphitheater  or  demon- 
stration room,  the  back  of  each  seat  having  a 
miniature  desk  attached  to  it.  Here  the  mem- 
bers sit.  Once  every  four  years,  after  the  general 
election,  the  deputies  are  required  to  segregate 
themselves  into  political  groups,  no  one  belong- 
ing to  more  than  one  group.2  Then  the  officers 
of  the  groups,  consulting  with  the  president, 
divide  the  seats  into  sectors  and  from  right  to 
left  of  the  president's  chair  assign  these  sectors 
to  the  groups  in  accordance  with  their  degree  of 


1  The  Chamber  of  Deputies  sits  in  the  Palais  Bourbon,  a 
building  in  the  Grecian  style  which  stands  on  the  banks  of  the 
Seine  and  which  dates  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

*  Rule  12  (1915). 

[192] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

conservatism  or  radicalism.1  On  the  extreme 
right,  therefore,  sit  the  reactionaries;  on  the 
extreme  left  the  Unified  Socialists.  The  seats  in 
the  front  row  are  reserved  for  special  purposes, 
part  of  them  being  occupied  by  the  cabinet 
ministers  and  part  by  whatever  standing  com- 
mittee has  reported  the  bill  now  under  considera- 
tion in  the  Chamber.  Unfortunately  these  seats 
are  often  invaded  by  deputies  who  are  neither 
ministers  nor  committeemen  and  who  come  down 
from  their  places  in  order  to  be  nearer  to  the 
tribune.  The  practice  of  speaking  from  the  tri- 
bune has  prevailed  in  France  since  1790.2  No 
doubt  the  explanation  of  this  practice,  which  has 
spread  to  most  of  the  continental  countries,  is 
that  an  amphitheater  will  hardly  permit  of  any- 
thing else.  Gallic  eloquence,  not  to  speak  of 
Gallic  gestures  (which  the  foreign  visitor  may 
find  rather  diverting),  cannot  be  effective  when 
directed  to  the  backs  of  an  audience.  It  may  be 
a  great  audience  capable  of  being  deeply  stirred; 

1  Some  deputies  prefer  to  plow  a  lonely  furrow  and 
identify  themselves  with  no  group.  Within  twenty-four  hours 
after  the  sectors  have  been  assigned  they  may,  by  applying 
to  the  president,  receive  seats  between  the  groups  with  which 
they  are  most  nearly  in  accord.    Rule  135  (1915). 

2  Except  under  Napoleon  III,  1852-1865.  See  Pierre,  Sees. 
888-889.  The  present  rule  of  the  Chamber  (No.  41)  simply 
says  that  a  deputy  shall  speak  "at  the  tribune  or  from  his 
place";  and  this  apparently  means  that  the  president  may 
allow  him  to  speak  from  his  place  either  because  of  physical 
disability  or  because  of  a  desire  to  shorten  the  debate. 

[193] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

for  behind  the  last  row  of  members  and  separated 
from  it  by  twenty  columns  of  polished  marble 
there  are  two  galleries,  each  of  which  will  ac- 
commodate three  or  four  hundred  persons.1 
Mounting  the  tribune,  the  deputy  must  feel 
almost  as  if  he  were  behind  the  footlights  and  as 
if  his  chief  concern  were  to  play  upon  the  emo- 
tions of  pit  and  gallery.  Physical  surroundings 
as  well  as  racial  temperament  have  given  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  a  character  quite  different 
from  that  of  the  American  House  of  Representa- 
tives or  the  British  House  of  Commons.  In  the 
American  House  oratory  calls  to  mind  high-school 
declamations;  in  the  British  House,  where  there 
are  usually  few  members  in  attendance  and 
where  they  are  compactly  seated,  the  debates 
may  be  of  a  rather  conversational  kind;  in  the 
French  Chamber  one  hears  speeches  more  often 
than  debates,  but  speeches  which,  if  a  little 
theatrical  at  times  and  a  little  too  reminiscent  of 
the  Athenian  ecclesia,  never  descend  to  the  level 
of  the  high  school. 

Officials  of  the  Chamber 

The  affairs  of  the  Chamber  are  directed  by 
officials  known  collectively  as  the  Bureau.2     The 

1  Some  of  the  seats  are  freely  open  to  the  public;  others  by 
ticket,  the  deputies  receiving  each  day  a  certain  number  of 
tickets  for  distribution. 

2  The  reader  is  reminded  that  the  term  "bureau"  has  a 
variety  of  applications  in  parliamentary  life.    The  officials  of 

[  104] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 
Bureau  includes  a  president,  four  vice-presidents,    The 


Bureau 
of  the 


eight  secretaries,  and  three  questors.1  The  vice- 
presidents  relieve  the  president  upon  occasion,  chamber 
The  secretaries,  four  of  whom  sit  at  one  time, 
keep  the  minutes,  inscribe  the  members  who  wish 
to  speak,  and  count  all  votes.2  The  questors 
have  the  business  management  of  the  Chamber 
in  their  hands.  They  look  after  the  funds  of 
the  Chamber,  paying  the  deputies  and  employees 
and  supervising  other  expenditures;  they  have 
charge  of  the  archives,  the  library,  and  the  build- 
ing generally.  All  of  these  officials  are  elected 
annually  from  among  the  deputies  and  serve 
until  the  opening  of  the  regular  session  of  the 

each  political  group  in  the  Chamber  constitute  a  bureau;  for 
certain  purposes  the  626  members  of  the  Chamber  are  divided 
by  lot  into  eleven  bureaux  each  month. 

1  When  a  new  Chamber  first  meets  after  the  elections  the 
oldest  member  presides,  the  six  youngest  act  as  secretaries. 
Then  a  provisional  bureau  is  chosen  to  serve  until  the  election 
of  half  plus  one  of  the  members  has  been  validated.  In 
subsequent  sessions  of  the  same  Chamber  a  provisional  bureau 
consisting  of  the  oldest  member  as  president  and  the  six 
youngest  as  secretaries  assumes  office  and  retires  as  soon  as 
the  "definitive  bureau"  has  been  elected.    Pierre,  Sec.  407. 

2  The  transactions  of  the  Chamber  are  recorded  in  various 
ways:  (1)  The  proces-verbal  gives  a  list  of  bills  and  reports,  a 
resume  of  the  debates,  and  a  statement  of  the  votes.  (2)  The 
comptes  rendus  (prepared  under  direction  of  the  secretaries, 
guaranteed  as  to  their  authenticity,  and  covered  by  legal  im- 
munities) are  of  three  kinds :  the  compU  rendu  in  exUnso  which 
is  a  stenographic  report  printed  daily  in  the  Journal  officiel 
and  given  to  newspapers  in  proof-sheets;    the  compte  rendu 

[195] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

following  year.1  No  constitutional  or  statutory 
provision  stands  in  the  way  of  their  reelection 
for  any  number  of  terms;  but  in  the  case  of  the 
secretaries  the  party  groups  have  imposed  a 
system  of  rotation  which  permits  only  two  suc- 
cessive terms.2  In  the  elections  a  secret  vote  is 
required  and  (until  the  third  balloting  when  a 
mere  plurality  suffices)  an  absolute  majority 
(half  plus  one).3  Each  office  is  filled  by  a  sepa- 
rate election.  The  general  ticket,  with  ballots 
printed  beforehand,  is  used  for  all  multiple  offices 

sommaire.,  compiled  during  the  course  of  each  sitting,  and  sent 
oyer  the  telegraph,  bit  by  bit,  to  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
the  president  of  the  Senate,  and  a  Paris  newspaper  syndicate; 
and  the  compte  rendu  analytique  furnished  free  of  charge  to  the 
Paris  newspapers  (some  four  columns  of  copy)  either  in  parts 
during  the  course  of  the  sitting  or  complete  at  nine  o'clock  in 
the  evening  when  it  goes  to  members  of  Parliament  and  to  the 
provincial  newspapers  by  post.  The  debates  are  printed  in 
the  Journal  officiel  and  in  the  Annales  parkmentaires;  the 
latter  also  contains  the  texts  of  all  parliamentary  documents. 
Pierre,  Sees.  951-967. 

1  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  11.  "The  bureau  of 
each  chamber  shall  be  elected  each  year  for  the  entire  session 
and  for  every  special  session  which  may  be  held  before  the 
regular  session  of  the  following  year."  In  the  revolutionary 
assemblies  the  presiding  officer  was  chosen  every  two  weeks 
without  being  immediately  reeligible;  under  the  Republic  of 
1848  the  term  was  one  month.    Pierre,  Sec.  429. 

2  Pierre,  Sec.  430. 

3  When  there  is  no  general  favorite  running  for  the  office 
of  president,  group  caucuses  are  sometimes  held.  Thus  in 
May,  1912,  the  Radical  Left  and  the  Radical-Socialists  met 
together  in  caucus  to  pick  the  successor  of  Henri  Brisson. 

[196] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

—  that  is,  except  in  the  case  of  the  presidency. 
There  are  two  ballot  boxes.1  In  one  each  mem- 
ber deposits  his  ballot  enclosed  in  an  envelope; 
in  the  other  he  deposits  a  "ball  of  control. "  It 
is  not  quite  certain  why  these  balls  of  control  are 
used  —  whether  to  make  sure  that  a  quorum  is 
present  or  to  determine  the  number  of  votes  for 
a  calculation  of  the  majority  needed.2  This 
much  is  certain,  that  because  of  the  balls  of  con- 
trol controversies  have  arisen  which  have  put 
the  Chamber  in  an  absurd  position.  For  in- 
stance, when  the  president  of  the  Chamber  was 
elected  in  1898  (June)  the  balls  of  control  num- 
bered 557;  the  ballots,  556:  Deschanel,  277; 
Brisson,  276;  blank,  3  (blanks  not  counted  in 
figuring  the  majority).  Had  a  ballot  been  lost 
or  a  ball  of  control  been  put  into  the  box  by 
mistake?  In  the  former  case,  if  the  lost  ballot 
had  been  cast  for  Brisson,  the  result  would  have 
been  inconclusive.  Deschanel,  while  believing 
himself  regularly  elected,  demanded  a  second 
ballot  and  was  elected.  Similar  situations  have 
arisen  from  time  to  time.  In  the  election  of 
secretaries  that  same  year  (1898)  421  ballots 
were  cast,  but  422  balls  of  control.  On  the  basis 
of  the  ballots  the  absolute  majority  was  211. 
Jourdre  had  211;  Binder,  210;  and  Jourdre, 
feeling  that  he  could  not  accept  election  under 
these  circumstances,  demanded  a  second  election 
in  which  he  was  successful. 

1  Pierre,  Sec.  415.  *  Id.,  Sec.  427. 

[197: 


the 
Chamber 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  president  of  the  Chamber  is  the  third 
personage  in  the  country,  taking  rank  after  the 
President  of  the  Republic  and  the  president  of 
the  Senate.  He  lives  in  the  Palais  Bourbon, 
receives  eighty-seven  thousand  francs  a  year 
(which  includes  his  fifteen  thousand  as  deputy), 
and  possesses  the  franking  privilege.1  As  presid- 
ing officer  he  guides  debates,  gives  recognition  to 
deputies  who  have  had  their  names  inscribed  by 
the  secretaries,  maintains  order  and  decorum, 
and  generally  applies  the  rules. 
Rules  of  Indirectly  the  constitution  gives  to  each  cham- 
ber the  right  to  frame  its  own  rules.  It  says 
that  secret  sittings  may  be  voted  on  the  demand 
of  a  number  of  members  fixed  by  the  rules.2  The 
first  rules  were  adopted  in  June,  1876;  since  then 
there  have  been  changes  and  additions,  indeed 
something  like  a  general  revision  in  191 5.  But 
like  the  "standing  orders"  of  the  British  House 
of  Commons,  the  rules  are  permanent  in  the 
sense  that  they  apply,  unless  modified,  to  suc- 
cessive chambers;  and,  as  in  Great  Britain,  the 
inclination  has  been  to  leave  the  procedure  un- 
changed. "Imperfect  rules  which  are  well  under- 
stood by  an  assembly,"  says  Pierre,  "are  better 
than  rules  which  are  constantly  changed  and 
which  the  members  can  make  use  of  only  by 
studying  them  and  comparing  their  texts."     This 

1  The  deputies,  not  being  regarded  as  public  officials,  do 
not  have  the  right  to  frank. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  July  16,  Art.  5. 

[198] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

opinion  has  prevailed  in  the  Chamber.  All  reso- 
lutions that  propose  to  change  the  rules  are 
subject  to  the  same  formalities  (and  delays)  that 
apply  in  the  case  of  ordinary  legislation.  This 
prevents  the  majority  from  gaining  temporary 
advantage  by  tampering  with  the  procedure;  it 
minimizes  the  danger  of  hasty  action  based  upon 
interests  and  emotions  of  the  moment.  "The 
ideal  of  the  rules,"  says  Pierre,  "is  not  only  to 
have  them  voted  with  practical  unanimity,  but 
also  to  have  them  sincerely  accepted  as  just, 
wise,  and  practical.  The  experience  of  all  par- 
liaments (and  notably  that  of  the  French  Cham- 
ber) shows  that  the  rules  are  among  the  most 
delicate  concerns  and  that  they  are  endangered 
by  improvisation."  l 

The   president   interprets  the   rules.     He   may    Rules  in- 
ask  for  the  opinion  of  the  Chamber  when  he  finds   5JJJ8 
himself  confronted  by  a  doubtful  point  which  the    president 
rules  have  not   contemplated   or  when   there  is 
uncertainty  as  to  the  meaning  of  a  rule  or  of  a 
vote; 2   he  must  do  so  when  the  rules  are  silent. 
In   all  other  cases  the   decision   rests  with  him 
alone;    and  it  is  final.     If  this  were  not  the  case, 
the  meaning  of  the  rules  would  vary  from  day 
to  day  according  to  the  caprice  of  a  fluctuating 
majority. 

In  maintaining  order  the   president   does  not   Preserv- 
wield  a  gavel  like  the  speaker  of  the  House  of     gor  w 


1  Supplement,  Sec.  522. 

2  Pierre,  Sec.  452. 


[199] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Enforce- 
ment of 
discipline 


Representatives,  whose  strokes  upon  a  mahogany- 
topped  desk  resound  through  the  corridors;  nor 
does  he  go  unarmed  like  the  speaker  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  He  tries  to  quiet  disturbances  by 
ringing  a  bell.  If  the  Chamber  becomes  tumultu- 
ous and  the  bell  fails  to  calm  it,  he  takes  sterner 
measures;  he  puts  on  his  hat.1  If  this  drastic 
step  fails  of  effect,  he  threatens  to  suspend  the 
sitting.  If  the  threat  does  not  sufficiently  im- 
press the  noisy  element,  he  actually  does  suspend 
it.  And  if,  when  the  sitting  is  resumed,  the 
tumult  continues,  as  a  last  resort  the  president 
orders  an  adjournment  until  the  next  day. 

There  are  cases,  of  course,  in  which  the  presi- 
dent feels  called  upon  to  discipline  individuals.2 
The  means  of  discipline  are:  (i)  the  call  to 
order,  (2)  the  call  to  order  with  entry  upon  the 
minutes  (this  in  case  of  a  repeated  ofFense), 
(3)  censure,  and  (4)  censure  with  temporary  ex- 
clusion from  the  Chamber;  and  the  rules  describe 
in  some  detail  the  offenses  that  merit  these  dif- 
ferent grades  of  punishment.  While  the  presi- 
dent acts  independently  in  calling  deputies  to 
order,  he  must  secure  the  consent  of  the  Cham- 
ber when  he  wishes  to  take  the  more  rigorous 
course  of  censure.  No  doubt  the  deputies,  when 
called  to  order  or  censured,  would  feel  little  con- 
cern were  it  not  for  the  pecuniary  losses  involved. 
A  call  to  order  with  entry  upon  the  minutes  carries 

1  Rule  53  (1915);  Pierre,  Sec.  487. 

2  Pierre,  Sees.  455  et  seq.;  Rules  56-66  (1915). 
[  200] 


presi- 
dency 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

a  fine  of  half  salary  for  two  weeks;  simple  censure, 
a  fine  of  half  salary  for  one  month;  censure  with 
temporary  exclusion,  a  fine  of  half  salary  for  two 
months.     The  period  of  exclusion  is  two  weeks. 

So  far  as  the  rules  go  the  president  of  the  The 
Chamber  of  Deputies  has  very  much  the  same 
powers  as  presiding  officers  have  elsewhere.  But 
his  position  cannot  be  judged  merely  by  powers 
conferred  or  withheld.  In  every  legislative  body 
influences  are  at  work  which  transcend  the  rules 
and  override  formal  considerations.  The  Eng- 
lish speaker  has  gradually  been  transformed  into 
a  nonpartisan  moderator  who  is  retained  in  office 
notwithstanding  changes  in  the  party  complexion 
of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  American 
speaker  is  frankly  a  partisan,  elected  by  a  vote 
which  is  taken  as  a  significant  test  of  party 
strength,  and  until  the  fall  of  " Uncle  Joe" 
Cannon,  in  1910,  recognized  as  the  effective 
leader  of  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives. The  president  of  the  Chamber  may  be 
said  to  stand  midway  between  these  two  types. 
"His  first  duty  is  impartiality  towards  all,"  says 
Duguit.1  By  usage  —  not  by  compulsion  of  the 
rules,  he  refrains  from  voting.  He  drops  journal- 
istic activities.2  But,  possessing  all  the  privileges 
of  an  ordinary  member,  he  may  at  any  time 
leave  the  chair  and  engage  in  the  debate.3  He 
remains,  as  Pierre  freely  admits,  a  politician. 

1  Traite,  Vol.  II,  page  308. 

2  Pierre,  Sec.  435.  *  Pierre,  Sees.  908,  917. 

[20l] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

its  In   order  to  understand   the  character  of  the 

asTshown  °^ce  something  must  be  known  of  its  history, 
in  its  From  1876  to  1920  —  a  period  of  forty  odd  years 
story  —  there  have  been  twelve  presidents  of  the  Cham- 
ber. Of  these  Grevy,  Gambetta,  Floquet,  Casi- 
mir-Perier,  Brisson,  and  Deschanel  were  elected 
three  times  or  more  —  Brisson,  who  died  in  1912 
after  serving  continuously  for  half  a  dozen  years, 
twenty  times;  Deschanel,  who  occupied  the  chair 
at  the  time  of  his  election  to  the  presidency  of 
the  republic,  fifteen  times.  While  continuity  in 
ofBce  has  been  the  rule  in  late  years,1  and  has 
tended  to  bring  the  president  closer  to  the  British 
speaker  in  type,  there  have  been  occasions  not  so 
long  ago  where  the  election  roused  party  ani- 
mosities to  fever  heat.  There  were  contemptuous 
demonstrations  on  the  Left  when  Paul  Deschanel 
defeated  by  a  single  vote  his  more  radical  oppon- 
ent, Henri  Brisson,  in  1898.  The  deputies  under- 
stood quite  well  that  the  election  reflected  the 
attitude  of  the  Chamber  towards  current  political 
questions.  In  1905  opposing  policies  were  even 
more  directly  an  issue.  At  the  last  moment 
Paul  Doumer,  president  of  the  powerful  budget 
committee,  came  forward  to  oppose  the  reelec- 
tion of  Brisson.  He  was  a  vigorous  opponent  of 
the  premier  Emile  Combes,  whose  pacifist  and 
socialistic  administration  had  undermined  the 
efficiency  of  the  naval  and  the  military  establish- 

1  Brisson  from  1906  to  his  death  in  191 2;    Deschanel  from 
191 2  to  1920. 
[  202  ] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES*    PROCEDURE 

ments.1  His  election  as  president  by  twenty- 
five  votes  helped  to  force  Combes  out  of  office. 
When  he  took  the  chair  on  January  12,  he  had  to 
face  bitter  denunciations  on  the  Left,  his  inaugu- 
ral address  being  interrupted  constantly  by  inso- 
lent and  ill-bred  remarks  which  few  parliamentary 
bodies  would  have  tolerated.  Part  of  the  time 
his  voice  could  not  be  heard  above  the  uproar. 
Doumer  ignored  the  interruptions;  he  simply 
said:  "It  is  hardly  generous  to  attack  the  presi- 
dent; he  is  the  only  one  here  who  has  no  right 
to  defend  himself."  He  declared  in  the  most 
specific  way,  however,  that  his  election  must  be 
taken  as  representing  the  view  of  the  majority 
on  political  questions.  These  two  incidents  are 
enough  to  show  that  the  presidency  has  not 
been  completely  freed  from  the  play  of  parti- 
san rivalry.  It  is  quite  as  instructive  to  ob- 
serve that  the  presidents  have  almost  all  been 
leading  politicians  who  have  reached  the  presi- 
dency through  the  premiership  or  the  premier- 
ship through  the  presidency.  Gambetta  accepted 
the  premiership  in  1881  because  his  triumphant  re- 
election to  the  presidency  had  shown  that  he 
could  command  a  sufficient  following.  Brisson 
(president  1 881-1885)  was  also  translated  to  the 
premiership;  so  was  Floquet  (president  1885— 
1888);  so  was  Casimir-Perier  in  1893  and  Charles 
Dupuy  in  1894,  Casimir-Perier  once  again  be- 
coming  president  in  the  place  of  Dupuy.     Bris- 

1  Annee  politique,  1905,  page  9  a  seq. 

[203] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

son,  president  again  1 894-1 898,  became  premier 
in  the  last  year.  This  recurring  transition  from 
one  office  to  another  suggests  that  both  offices 
are  political.  Let  it  be  held  in  mind,  neverthe- 
less, that  in  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years  the 
Chamber  seems  to  have  had  some  vision  of  the 
speaker  in  the  English  guise,  the  servant  of  the 
House,  absolutely  divorced  from  politics  and 
supplanted  in  his  old  political  function  by  a 
prime  minister  who  now  asserts  legislative  leader- 
ship. Paul  Deschanel,  while  president  of  the 
Chamber,  several  times  refused  to  accept  the 
office  of  prime  minister. 

Legislative  Committees 
impor-  In  the  work  of  the  Chamber  the  committees 

o/tiie  exert  an  influence  which  hardly  seems  to  accord 
commit-  with  the  principles  of  the  parliamentary  system.1 
Under  that  system,  as  developed  in  England  and 
transmitted  to  continental  states,  the  cabinet 
should  exercise  an  effective  leadership;  it  should 
have  power  to  act  and  be  held  accountable  for 
its  action.  But  when  there  are  numerous  com- 
mittees and  government  bills  may  be  mutilated 
by  them  and  distorted  out  of  their  original  shape, 
the  government  is  obviously  embarrassed  in  its 
dealings   with    the   Chamber,    for   debate   takes 

1  On  the  system  of  committees   see   Pierre,   Traite,  Sees. 
711-786;    also   supplement,   Sees.   711-786;     Rules  of   1915, 
pages  11-36,  85-87;    Duguit,  Traitt,  Vol.  II,  pages  341-347; 
Esmein,  Elements,  pages  940  et  seq.,  and  976  et  seq. 
[204] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

place,  not  on  the  government  bill,  but  on  the 
committee  bill.  Responsibility  is  divided  or,  to 
use  a  phrase  of  Mr.  Wilson's,  "spread  thin." 
Much  depends,  of  course,  upon  the  character  of 
the  committees.  Recent  changes  in  the  rules 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  while  increasing 
the  efficiency  of  the  committees,  have  also 
brought  them  more  under  the  control  of  the 
cabinet. 

Down  to  1902  the  committees  were  temporary   Their 
and  special  —  special,  because  appointed  in  each    tw:  now 
case  to  examine  and  report  to  the  Chamber  upon    perma- 
some    particular    measure;     temporary,    because    nent 
dissolving   as   soon   as   the   Chamber  had    acted 
favorably  or  unfavorably  upon  the  report.     This 
arrangement,  which  the  Senate  still  persists  in,1 
came  down  from  the  Constitution  of  1795,  hav- 
ing been  devised  then  in  the  light  of  experience 
with  the  over-powerful  permanent  committees  of 
the    Convention.      Under    the    Third     Republic 
criticism  was  constantly  directed  against  it.     Two 
eminent  publicists  wrote  in  1889:     "These  mul- 
tiple committees  named  according  to  the  accident 
of    the    composition  of  the  bureaux,  having  no 
tradition,  able  to  devote  themselves  to  no  study 
followed  in  an  order  of  determined  ideas,  whose 

1  With  these  exceptions:  (1)  four  monthly  committees 
which  deal  with  minor  concerns  such  as  leave  of  absence  for 
the  members;  (2)  one  biennial  committee  on  customs;  and 
(3)  four  annual  committees  (army,  marine,  railroads,  and 
Senate  accounts). 

[205] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

members  will  shortly  be  scattered  among  other 
committees  with  an  absolutely  different  object, 
present  the  picture  of  a  very  complicated  mechan- 
ism whose  works  and  various  organs  are  entangled 
with  each  other  and  which,  for  a  great  expendi- 
ture of  energy  and  movement,  give  quite  inade- 
quate results."  l  The  committees  had  proved 
themselves  slow  and  inactive;  there  had  been 
lack  of  coordination,  since  related  measures  went 
to  different  committees;  there  had  been  little 
encouragement  to  members  of  the  Chamber  to 
become  specialists  in  this  or  that  direction.  In 
1898,  by  way  of  a  tentative  step,  several  per- 
manent committees  were  set  up.  Finally  in  1902 
the  Chamber  adopted  a  new  rule  which,  with  sub- 
sequent modifications  (in  1910,  1915,  and  1920), 
provides  for  twenty-one  standing  committees  of 
forty-four  members  each.  These  last  throughout 
the  life  of  the  Chamber  2  and  have  jurisdiction 
over  all  measures  coming  within  their  respective 
fields.3 

The   character   of  the   committees  was   again 

1  Quoted  in  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  page  343. 

2  Rules  11  and  12  of  1915.  Until  1915  the  budget  com- 
mittee was  renewed  annually;  but  this  proved  inconvenient 
because,  owing  to  the  recurrent  delays  in  voting  the  budget, 
the  Chamber  frequently  had  to  extend  the  competence  of  the 
committee  to  examine  the  budget  of  the  succeeding  year. 
See  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  767. 

3  Under  rule  14  of  191 5  the  committees  receive  from  the 
president  all  bills  coming  within  their  proper  field  unless  the 
Chamber  orders  otherwise. 

[206] 


CHAMBER    OF    DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

fundamentally  changed  by  the  adoption  of  a  Old 
new  rule  in  1910.  Up  to  that  time  they  had  J 
been  chosen  by  a  process  which  worked  to  the  tion 
disadvantage  of  the  majority  and,  consequently, 
of  the  cabinet  representing  that  majority.  It  has 
already  been  noted  that  —  for  the  purpose  of 
examining  and  reporting  upon  election  returns  — 
the  Chamber  and  Senate  are  divided  by  lot  re- 
spectively into  eleven  and  nine  bureaux.  These 
bureaux  are  reconstituted  monthly.  In  the 
Chamber  down  to  1910  (and  the  practice  still 
continues  in  the  Senate)  they  received  printed 
copies  of  all  bills  which  had  been  introduced, 
made  a  preliminary  examination  of  the  bills,  and 
then  appointed  committees  to  report  upon  them, 
each  bureau  naming  one,  two,  or  three  members 
according  to  the  size  of  the  committee.  It  has 
been  said  in  justification  of  this  plan  that  each 
bureau  would  develop  in  its  preliminary  discus- 
sions a  general  attitude  on  the  broad  lines  of  a 
bill,  that  it  would  appoint  committeemen  who 
were  in  sympathy  with  that  attitude,  and  that 
the  members  of  the  Chamber  would  be  able 
easily  to  detect  changes  which  the  committee 
might  import  into  the  text.1  Fifty  years  ago 
this  may  have  been  true.  But  under  the  pres- 
sure of  legislative  business  today  it  is  quite  im- 
possible for  the  deputies  to  give  even  cursory 
attention  to  all  pending  bills  and  at  the  same 
time  do  all  the  other  things  expected  of  them; 
1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  711. 

[207] 


method 
selec- 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


New 
method : 
propor- 
tional 
repre- 
sentation 


the  existence  of  the  standing  committees,  by 
which  the  Chamber  seeks  to  enlarge  its  capacity 
for  work,  is  an  illustration  of  this.  Not  only 
has  the  legislative  burden  portentously  increased 
since  1814,  when  the  bureaux  were  first  estab- 
lished,1 but  the  type  of  government  has  changed. 
The  cabinet  is  now  responsible  to  the  chambers; 
its  tenure  of  office  depends  upon  a  coalition  of 
groups;  and  the  measures  which  it  introduces 
reflect  the  tendencies  of  that  coalition.  Ob- 
viously a  committee  elected  by  eleven  bureaux, 
themselves  the  offspring  of  the  lot,  might  easily 
reflect  the  tendencies  of  the  opposition  and  harass 
the  cabinet  by  recasting  its  measures.  In  advo- 
cating the  election  of  the  committees  by  the 
Chamber  the  late  Jean  Jaures  declared  that,  as 
things  were,  a  committee  would  give  long  months 
of  sterile  work- to  the  shaping  of  a  bill  and  that 
at  the  first  meeting  of  this  fortuitous  committee 
with  the  Chamber  the  bill  would  collapse  and 
chaos  reign. 

When  the  tenth  legislature  assembled  (1910) 
dissatisfaction  came  to  a  head.  The  new  rules 
then  adopted  not  only  made  the  committees  elec- 
tive, but  applied  the  principle  of  proportional 
representation;  and,  in  applying  it,  recognized 
for  the  first  time  the  function  of  parties  in  the 
business  of  the  Chamber.2     The  procedure  is  very 

1  There  had  been  bureaux  in  the  States-General.  Duguit, 
Traite,  Vol.  II,  page  341. 

2  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  739,  and  Rule  12  of  1915. 
[208] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

simple.  It  rests  frankly  upon  the  initiative  of 
the  party  leaders.  Five  days  before  the  election 
of  committees  the  officers  (bureaux)  of  the  vari- 
ous groups  in  the  Chamber  prepare  membership 
lists  which  thereupon  are  published  in  the  Journal 
oificiel;  and  —  contrary  to  the  earlier  usage,  so 
destructive  of  party  discipline  and  responsibility 
—  no  deputy  can  appear  upon  more  than  one 
list;  as  the  phrase  goes,  the  groups  are  now 
"locked/'  l  The  number  of  committee  assign- 
ments for  each  group  is  determined  mathemati- 
cally on  the  basis  of  its  relative  strength,  the 
group  itself  selecting  the  members  who  are  to 
serve;  the  leaders  of  all  the  groups,  meeting  to- 
gether three  days  before  the  election,  then  fix 
the  composition  of  all  the  twenty-one  committees; 
and  this  slate  is  presumed  to  have  the  approval 
of  the  Chamber  unless  fifty  deputies  indicate 
their  opposition  in  writing.  In  case  of  such 
opposition,  where  alternative  tickets  are  put  for- 
ward, the  Chamber  proceeds  to  a  vote.2  Once 
every  four  years,  in  the  June  following  the 
general  election,  the  bureaux  examine  election 
returns.     Beyond  that  they  do  nothing  but  name 

1  Although  the  groups  are  locked  only  for  the  purposes  of 
committee  elections,  they  do  as  a  matter  of  fact  remain 
stable,  partly  because  new  elections  are  held  from  time  to 
time  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  committees.  The  independents 
of  various  shades  form  themselves  into  a  group  temporarily 
so  as  to  have  some  voice  in  selecting  committeemen. 

2  Now  that  the  committees  are  permanent  and  directly 
elected  the  survival  of  the  bureaux  seems  anomalous. 

[209] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  surviving  monthly  committees  on  leave  of 
ahsence,  petitions,  local  affairs,  and  initiative; 
and  of  these  the  first  two  are  now  often  chosen 
directly  by  lot  and  the  last  two  hardly  ever 
meet.  Under  the  circumstances,  as  Pierre  re- 
marks, "the  monthly  drawing  of  lots  becomes 
almost  a  senseless  operation."  l 
Commit-  These  changes  in  the  committee  system,  all 
checkon  occurring  since  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
cabmet  tury  when  Bodley  and  Lowell  described  it,  have 
undoubtedly  improved  the  situation.  Above  all 
the  ministers  are  strengthened.  The  committees, 
when  chosen,  represent  the  majority  as  found  in 
a  coalition  of  groups  and,  even  when  this  coali- 
tion gives  way  to  another,  they  will  represent 
the  new  majority;  for  since  the  party  complexion 
of  the  Chamber  is  reflected  faithfully  in  the  com- 
mittees, the  same  shiftings  in  party  alliances  take 
place  simultaneously  in  both  quarters.  In  normal 
circumstances  the  committees  will  support  the 
cabinet  when  the  Chamber  does.  It  would  be 
a  mistake,  however,  to  suppose  that  the  cabinet 
has  been  freed  from  all  menace  of  rivalry.  In- 
deed the  menace  has  increased  in  one  direction. 
The  committees,  having  acquired  a  permanent 
tenure  and  a  jurisdiction  over  all  measures  com- 
ing within  their  various  fields  (such  as  the  army, 

1  Supplement,  Sec.  711.    Yet  it  should  be  remembered  that 
when  any  bill  falls  within  the  competence  of  no    standing 
committee  it  is  sent  to  the  bureaux  which  then  elect  a  special 
committee.    Id.,  Sec.  692. 
[210] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

agriculture,  commerce  and  industry,  instruction, 
and  fine  arts),  tend  to  become  intimately  ac- 
quainted with  departmental  business  and  to  in- 
terfere in  its  conduct;  the  minister  finds  himself 
checked  in  countless  ways  and  hampered  in  his 
freedom  of  action.  This  does  not  make  for  ad- 
ministrative efficiency.  Moreover,  in  the  work 
of  legislation  the  committees  continue  to  play  a 
role  which  places  the  minister  at  a  disadvantage. 
Under  the  English  practice  a  government  bill  is 
in  the  charge  of  a  minister  from  the  time  of  its 
introduction  to  the  time  of  its  passage;  he  has 
charge  of  it  during  the  second  reading  in  the 
House,  during  committee  stage,  and  when  it  is 
reported;  and  the  committee  stage  does  not 
occur  till  the  House  has  debated  the  bill  and  ac- 
cepted its  general  principles.  Under  French 
practice,  on  the  other  hand,  the  bill  goes  imme- 
diately before  a  committee  which  meets  in  secret 
without  the  guidance  of  a  minister  and  which 
still  has  charge  of  the  bill  when  it  is  brought 
before  the  Chamber.  For  the  moment  the  minis- 
ter is  overshadowed.  Not  he,  but  the  reporter 
explains  and  defends  the  bill,  accepts  or  rejects 
proposed  amendments.  Of  course,  the  minister 
may  interpose  at  any  time;  the  premier  himself 
may  force  his  views  upon  the  Chamber  by  de- 
manding a  vote  of  confidence.  Nevertheless  the 
formal  procedure  does  create  a  divided  leader- 
ship. The  cabinet,  instead  of  defending  a  meas- 
ure of  its  own,  may  at  times  be  in  the  position 

[211] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

of  persuading  the  Chamber  to  reject  the  pro- 
posals of  the  committee.  Not  that  this  occurs 
frequently.  As  a  rule,  when  the  committee  is 
examining  a  bill,  it  acts  in  close  collaboration 
with  the  government  and  shows  a  disposition  to 
give  way  when  it  cannot  convert  the  minister  to 
its  own  way  of  thinking. 
Reguia-  In  view  of  the  important  functions  of  the  corn- 

commit-     mittees  their  proceedings  are  regulated  in  some 
tees  detail.     Although    they    frequently    meet    while 

the  Chamber  is  sitting,  the  rules  provide  (Rule 
26,  of  191 5)  that  "at  least"  one  day  a  week  shall 
be  reserved  for  their  work.  The  meetings  are 
secret,  only  the  author  of  the  bill  and  those  who 
propose  amendments  having  the  right  to  appear 
(Rule  28).  In  American  legislatures  secrecy  has 
sometimes  covered  up  illicit  maneuvers;  but 
the  French  committees  are  required  to  publish 
each  day  the  list  of  members  in  attendance,  to 
keep  a  record  of  their  transactions,  and  to  deposit 
this  record  in  the  archives  of  the  Chamber  (Rules 
27  and  30).  Eleven  members,  one  quarter  of  the 
whole  number,  constitute  a  quorum  (Rule  30). 
Unless  a  bill  is  reported  within  a  period  of  six 
months,  the  author  of  the  bill  may  ask  the  Cham- 
ber to  place  it  forthwith  on  the  order  of  the  day. 

Legislative  Procedure 

The  bills  which   come   before  the  committees 
fall  into  two  classes:    government  bills  (projets) 

[2.2] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

and  private-member  bills  (propositions).1  The  Govem- 
distinction  is  not  so  sharply  made  as  in  England,  ^Ug^ 
where  the  cabinet  has  almost  a  monopoly  of  private 
legislation;  but  though  the  constitution  simply  ™ee™~ 
says  2  that  the  initiative  belongs  equally  to  the  bills 
executive  and  the  deputies,  procedure  does  con- 
cede superior  facilities  to  the  government.  "It 
has  always  been  recognized,"  says  Pierre,  "that, 
under  the  parliamentary  system,  the  government 
is  a  delegate  of  the  assembly  charged  by  it  not 
only  with  the  execution  of  existing  laws,  but 
with  the  preparation  of  new  laws  and  the  sug- 
gestion of  reforms.  To  accord  the  same  confi- 
dence, the  same  method  of  procedure  to  bills 
elaborated  in  this  way  and  to  bills  which  mem- 
bers may  introduce  individually  would  leave  the 
way  open  to  an  excessive  number  of  useless  and 
sometimes  dangerous  proposals." 3  A  govern- 
ment bill  (projet),  which  may  be  introduced  at 
any  time,  takes  the  form  of  a  decree  signed  by 
the  President  of  the  Republic  and  countersigned 
by  a  minister.  There  can  be  no  debate  when  it 
is  introduced,  no  question  raised  as  to  its  consti- 
tutionality. As  a  matter  of  routine  it  is  printed 
and  referred  to  the  appropriate  committee,  for 
the  Chamber  feels  itself  bound   to  consider  all 

1  On  the  general  subject  of  legislative  procedure  see  Esmein, 
Elements,  pages  972-1053;  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II,  pages  328- 
364;   Pierre,  Sees.  58-81,  683-710,  and  787-1058. 

2  Constitutional  law  of  February  25,  Art.  3. 

3  Traite,  Sec.  691. 

[213] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

proposals  of  the  cabinet.  Not  so  in  the  case  of 
private  members.  Over  and  over  again,  either 
by  the  president  or  by  the  Chamber  when  con- 
sulted by  him,  bills  of  private  members  have 
been  refused  consideration  as  conflicting  with  the 
rules,  the  laws,  or  the  constitution.1  Before  the 
permanent  committees  were  set  up  these  bills 
had  to  meet  a  further  obstacle.  jThey  were  sent 
to  a  monthly  committee  called  the  committee  on 
initiative  which,  considering  their  broader  as- 
pects, sifted  the  good  from  the  bad  and  recom- 
mended to  the  Chamber  that  consideration  should 
be  accorded  or  withheldj  This  winnowing  process 
has  now  been  entrusted  to  the  standing  com- 
mittees. Quite  aside  from  the  rules  the  leader- 
ship of  the  cabinet  is  so  well  respected  that  nearly 
all  important  bills  originate  with  it;  that  when 
the  Chamber  desires  legislation  on  a  particular 
subject  its  usual  course  is  not  to  proceed  inde- 
pendently, but  to  invite  the  government  to  bring 
forward  a  bill;  and  that  the  committees  com- 
monly acquiesce  whenever  a  minister  suggests 
modifications  in  a  private  member's  bill.  Unless 
specially  instructed  by  the  Chamber,  committees 
have  a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  bills  referred 
to  them.  They  may  even  substitute  new  bills. 
Commit-  Every  committee  appoints  a  reporter  whose 
business  it  is  to  explain  and  defend  the  com- 
mittee's action.2     He  presents  a  printed  report. 

1  Pierre,  Traits,  Sees.  63-64;  also  supplement,  Sees.  63-64. 

2  The  budget  has  a  reporter  for  each  division  of  the  budget 

[21-1] 


tee  re- 
port 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:   PROCEDURE 

This  contains  not  only  the  text  of  the  measure  as 
recast  by  the  committee  and  arguments  to  sup- 
port it,  but  also  (though  not  always)  the  text  of 
the  measure  as  introduced,  the  explanatory  docu- 
ments, and  the  dissenting  views  of  the  minority. 
While  the  bill  is  before  the  Chamber  the  com- 
mittee occupies  a  bench  immediately  facing  the 
tribune  and  adjoining  the  bench  occupied  by  the 
ministers.  Three  days  after  the  distribution  of 
the  report  debate  may  begin.1  Under  the  re- 
vised rules  of  the  Chamber  there  is  only  one 
reading  of  the  bill  {deliberation).2  This  involves 
first  a  debate  on  the  general  features  of  the 
measure.  When  this  debate  closes,  the  president 
consults  the  Chamber  as  to  whether  it  wishes  to 
pass  to  a  consideration  of  the  details.  If  the  vote 
is  affirmative,  he  reads  each  article  in  turn  so 
that  amendments  may  be  offered  clause  by  clause 
as   in    committee   of  the   whole   in    British    and 

and  a  reporter-general  who  centralizes  control  and  speaks  for 
the  whole  committee  when  important  decisions  are  taken  in 
the  Chamber. 

1  Under  exceptional  circumstances  the  Chamber  may  reduce 
the  period  to  one  day.  In  case  of  budget  reports  the  normal 
period  is  eight  days.     (Rule  33  of  1915.) 

2  The  Chamber  may  decide  upon  a  second  reading,  but  in 
that  case  the  bill  goes  back  to  the  committee  which  prepares 
another  report  substantially  as  if  it  were  dealing  with  a  new 
bill.  (Rule  82.)  The  rules  formerly  prescribed  two  readings 
with  five  days  intervening  except  in  the  cases  of  financial  and 
local  bills.  But  the  second  reading  did  not  include  general 
debate  on  the  principles  of  the  bill.  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II, 
page  353- 

[215] 


Hon  of 
debate 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

American  procedure;1  and  finally  the  whole  bill,  in 
its  amended  form,  comes  before  the  Chamber  for 
passage  or  rejection.  A  negative  vote  on  "passing 
to  the  articles'*  means  that  the  bill  is  rejected  and 
that  it  cannot  be  reintroduced  during  the  next 
three  months  unless  it  is  a  government  bill.2 
Limita-  Deputies  who  wish  to  take  part  in  the  debate 

apply  to  the  secretaries  beforehand  and  are  " in- 
scribed "  in  the  order  of  their  application.3  But 
this  requirement  does  not  affect  the  ministers 
or  the  officials  (president  and  reporter)  of  the 
committee  concerned;  they  may  speak  at  any 
time.4  The  president  of  the  Chamber,  having 
the  list  before  him,  adheres  to  the  order  of  in- 
scription except  that  he  recognizes  alternately, 
so  far  as  possible,  supporters  and  opponents  of 
the  bill.  Though  permitted  to  speak  from  their 
places,6  deputies  seldom  do  so  unless  suffering 
from  ill  health.  They  mount  the  tribune  in 
order  to  face  their  audience;  and,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, with  the  members'  seats  rising  above 
one  another  tier  on  tier  and  surmounted  by 
crowded  galleries,  there  is  a  strong  temptation 
to  indulge  in  oratory  and  play  upon  emotions. 
Questions  cannot  forever  be  pending  in  an  as- 
sembly; they  must  be  not  only  discussed  but 
decided.  If  the  minority  enjoyed  unrestricted 
freedom  of  speech,  that  right  would  be  used  to 
prolong  debates  and  embarrass  the  government 

1    Rule  84  of  1915.         2  Rule  92. 

3    Rule  42.  *  Rule  43.        6  Rule  41. 

[216] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:  PROCEDURE 

in  its  effort  to  carry  through  its  legislative  pro- 
gram. A  century  ago  the  volume  of  legislation 
was  relatively  small  and  its  character  for  the 
most  part  simple;  but  today,  with  the  social 
and  economic  metamorphosis  which  has  come  in 
the  wake  of  the  industrial  revolution,  the  Cham- 
ber has  to  deal  with  an  enormous  mass  of  tech- 
nical and  complicated  problems;  new  laws  must 
recognize  and  regulate  conditions  that  have 
outgrown  the  existing  body  of  law.  There  is  a 
heavy  tale  of  work  to  be  done;  and  willful  ob- 
struction on  the  part  of  the  minority  cannot  be 
tolerated.  The  Chamber,  therefore,  like  other 
modern  assemblies,  has  protected  itself  against 
such  dilatory  tactics.  Whenever  there  has  been 
debate  —  that  is,  whenever  two  deputies  of  op- 
posing views  have  spoken,  a  motion  to  terminate 
the  discussion  will  be  entertained;  and,  in  case  of 
opposition  to  the  closure,  only  one  deputy  will 
be  recognized  to  speak  against  it.1  The  vote  is 
first  taken  by  a  showing  of  hands,  then,  if  the 
president  is  doubtful,  by  "seated  and  standing." 
If  the  result  is  inconclusive,  the  debate  continues. 

Whenever  a  vote  is  taken  in  the  Chamber,  the   The 
presence  of  a  quorum  is  required  for  its  validity.2   quorum 
This  quorum  is  an  absolute  majority  of  the  full 

1  Rule  48.  The  closure  cannot  be  applied  while  a  minister  or 
government  commissioner  desires  to  speak;  and  after  he  speaks 
one  private  member  must  be  heard  in  reply.  It  might  be  noted 
that  the  closure  is  by  no  means  a  recent  device  in  France. 

2  Rule  80;  Pierre,  Traite,  Sec.  978  et  seq.  For  debate  no 
quorum  is  required. 

[2.7] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

membership  as  determined  by  the  electoral  law, 
vacancies  not  being  deducted  (in  other  words  314 
of  the  626  members);  and  a  deputy  physically 
present  is  counted  present  for  the  purposes  of 
the  quorum,  although  he  cannot  be  compelled 
to  vote.1  The  difficulty  of  maintaining  so  large 
an  attendance  may  be  gathered  from  a  provision 
of  the  rules  that,  if  a  vote  fails  because  of  no 
quorum,  the  same  question  can  be  brought  for- 
ward at  the  next  sitting  and  decided  irrespective 
of  the  number  present;  sometimes,  to  conform 
with  this  provision,  the  Chamber  adjourns  for 
fifteen  minutes  and  then  begins  a  new  sitting.2 
According  to  the  rules  no  deputies  may  be  absent 
without  the  express  permission  of  the  Chamber; 3 
but  they  so  often  ignore  this  formality  that  in 
1909  a  rule  was  adopted  which  required  them  to 
sign  their  names  on  entering  the  Chamber  and 
held  those  who  failed  to  appear  through  six  con- 

1  In  fact  deputies  cannot  be  compelled  to  vote  even  in 
cases  of  collective  abstention  provided  that  the  abstentions 
are  "spontaneous"  (that  is  not  concerted).  Pierre,  Traite> 
Sees.  1024- 1026.  Duguit,  sometimes  inclined  to  confuse  what 
is  with  what  ought  to  be,  takes  a  different  view.  Traite, 
Vol.  II,  page  360. 

2  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II,  page  360. 

3  Their  requests  for  leave  of  absence  go  first  to  the  bureau 
of  the  Chamber  (secretaries,  etc.)  and  from  it,  with  recommen- 
dations, to  the  Chamber  itself.  Rules  128-129.  The  English 
and  American  practice  of  "pairing"  (by  which  two  men  of 
opposite  parties,  agreeing  not  to  vote  on  certain  questions, 
may  absent  themselves  without  disadvantage  to  their  parties) 
is  not  permitted.    Pierre,  Traite,  Sec.  1023. 

[2.8] 


of  voting 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

secutive  sessions  liable  to  a  loss  of  salary.1     This 
remedy,  after  a  trial  of  two  years,  was  abandoned. 

There  are  four  methods  of  voting  in  the  Cham-  Methods 
ber  —  raised  hands,  "sejited_and  standing,"jjub- 
lic  ballotT^secret  ballot  having  been  abolished  in 
1885),  jmd  jjublic  ballot  at^he-Jxibune.2  If,  on 
a  show  of  hands,  the  secretaries  do  not  agree  as 
to  the  result,  the  president  calls  successively  on 
the  ayes  and  noes  to  stand.  If  the  secretaries 
are  again  in  disagreement,  recourse  is  had  to 
public  ballot;  and  this  method  of  voting  must 
be  used  at  the  very  outset  when  money  bills  are 
under  discussion  or  when  twenty  members  de- 
mand it  in  writing.  Procedure  in  the  public 
ballot  is  primitive  and  imperfect,  opening  the 
way  to  serious  abuses  and  consuming  a  great  deal 
of  time.  Each  member  has,  in  a  compartment  of 
his  miniature  desk,  a  number  of  ballots,  some 
white  and  some  blue,  with  his  name  printed  upon 
them;  the  white  ballots  indicate  an  affirmative 
vote,  the  blue  a  negative  vote.  He  places  one  of 
these  in  the  urn  or  ballot  box  as  it  passes  his 
seat.  When  the  voting  is  finished,  the  secre- 
taries count  the  white  and  blue  ballots  without, 
however,  ascertaining  who  cast  them.3  Now  al- 
though "the  principle  of  the  personal  vote,"  as 

1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  492. 

2  Rules  68-77.     But  the  bureau  of  the  Chamber  is  still 
chosen  by  secret  ballot  (Rule  78). 

8  In  view  of  the  time  which  this  operation  takes,  the  bureau 
of  the  Chamber  proposed  in  1884  that  the  ballots   should  be 

[219] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

a  committee  of  the  Chamber  maintained  in 
1909,1  "is  strongly  affirmed  by  the  letter  and 
spirit  of  the  rules"  and  "the  vote  of  absent 
members  has  never  been  recognized  by  any  text 
whatever,"  proxy  voting  has  prevailed  for  half  a 
century.  A  deputy  who  is  detained  by  political 
or  social  duties  asks  some  friendly  member  to 
cast  a  ballot  for  him  or,  by  way  of  being  on  the 
safe  side,  he  asks  several  of  his  friends  to  do  so. 
Half  a  dozen  of  his  ballots  may  be  thrown  into 
the  urn.  Ballots  are  sometimes  cast  for  absent 
members  without  their  permission,  and  even  for 
members  who  are  present.  One  deputy  com- 
plained that  on  certain  occasions  his  vote  had 
been  lost  because  of  another  ballot's  being  cast 
for  him  in  the  opposite  sense.  President  Brisson 
could  do  no  more  than  "recommend  to  the 
deputies  that  they  show  less  zeal  in  voting  for 
each  other  and  that,  above  all,  when  they  do 
vote  for  each  other,  they  take  pains  to  discover 
beforehand  the  opinion  of  those  whose  mandate 
they  assume  without  having  received  it." 

For  the  past  twenty  years  there  has  been  an 
agitation  to  suppress  proxy  voting;  but  the 
Chamber  clings  to  it  tenaciously.  Deputies  must 
frequently  be  absent;  they  serve  on  the  standing 
committees,     attend    political    conferences,    and 

weighed  instead  of  being  counted.  In  1890  a  committee 
recommended  voting  by  means  of  an  electrical  device.  Pierre, 
Traite,  Sec.  1042. 

1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  1020. 
[  220  ] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

once  a  week,  perhaps,  return  to  their  constituencies 
to  keep  in  touch  with  the  local  party  organiza- 
tion. Should  the  electors,  it  is  asked,  be  deprived 
of  a  voice  in  the  Chamber  through  the  temporary 
absence  of  the  deputy?  If  so,  there  would  be 
unfair  discrimination  in  favor  of  Paris  and  the 
near-by  departments  where  deputies  can  keep  in 
touch  with  their  local  committees  without  neg- 
lecting the  work  of  the  Chamber.  Moreover,  if 
proxy  voting  were  abolished,  an  active  and  dis- 
ciplined minority  might  gain  control  of  the 
Chamber  at  times  and  carry  measures  quite 
opposed  to  the  views  of  the  real  majority.  Such 
arguments  not  only  find  little  support  in  the 
experience  of  other  legislative  bodies,  but  they 
overlook  the  fact  that  under  the  existing  rules 
this  minority  may  at  any  time  insist  upon  a  per- 
sonal vote  at  the  tribune.  Nevertheless  they 
have  prevailed.  All  that  the  Chamber  has  done, 
while  adhering  to  this  system,  is  to  protect  itself 
against  plural  voting.  When,  after  the  ballots 
have  been  counted,  the  secretaries  find  that  the 
majority  is  not  more  than  thirty  or,  if  the  gov- 
ernment has  asked  for  a  vote  of  confidence,  sixty, 
they  examine  the  ballots  and  accept  only  one  for 
each  deputy.     This  is  called  pointage.1     Without 

1  Rule  75.  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  144.  Where  both  a 
white  and  a  blue  ballot  appear  in  the  name  of  a  deputy  both 
are  rejected.  Pointage  may  be  demanded  by  twenty 
deputies  before  the  result  cf  the  vote  has  been  announced; 
the  secretaries  may  under  any  circumstances  resort  to  it. 

[221] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

pointage  the  public  ballot  is  farcical;  with  it,  too 
dilatory.  As  an  alternative,  fifty  members  whose 
presence  must  be  established  by  roll-call  may 
demand  public  ballot  at  the  tribune.1  This 
eliminates  proxy  voting.  Each  deputy,  when  his 
name  is  called,  advances  to  the  tribune  and  hands 
his  ballot  to  a  secretary.  A  mechanical  appara- 
tus registers  the  number  of  votes  as  the  ballots 
are  deposited  in  the  urn. 

Financial  Legislation 

The  most  important  legislative  activity  of 
Parliament  is  in  the  field  of  finance.2  The  power 
of  the  purse,  the  control  over  the  granting  of 
supply  to  the  executive  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment, must  be  regarded  as  a  fundamental  attri- 
bute of  modern  assemblies.  It  was  mainly 
through  the  power  of  the  purse  that  the  English 
Parliament,  after  a  protracted  conflict,  gained  its 
ascendency  over  the  executive;  and  wherever 
parliamentary  institutions  have  been  set  up,  the 
doctrine  has  been  accepted  that  taxes  can  be 
levied  and  appropriations  made  only  by  virtue 
of  law.  That  has  been  the  doctrine  in  France 
ever  since  the  adoption  of  the  first  written  con- 
stitution in  1791.3     Parliament,  by  refusing  sup- 

1  Rule  76. 

2  On  the  general  subject  of  the  budget  see:  Rene  Stourm, 
Le  Budget  (1909);  Gaston  Jeze,  Le  Budget  (1910);  Pierre, 
Traite,  Sees.  511-545;  Esmein,  Elements,  pages  990-1017; 
Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II,  pages  380-396. 

"  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II,  page  380;   Pierre,  Sec.  512. 
[222] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

plies,  can  always  drive  an  executive  out  of  office; 
in  that  way  it  drove  out  Rocheboiiet  in  1877.1 
And  although  such  a  violent  specific  will  be  used 
only  in  extremities,  the  discussion  and  passage 
of  the  budget  each  year  give  the  deputies  an 
opportunity  to  bring  the  administration  under  a 
searching  and  detailed  criticism.  By  means  of 
the  annual  budget  Parliament  exercises  a  very 
real  control  over  the  cabinet. 

The  budget 2  deals  with  two  aspects  of  finance  its  prep- 
—  the  raising  and  the  spending  of  money,  revenue  araUon 
and  supply.  It  takes  final  form  in  the  finance 
act  which,  though  the  fiscal  year  begins  on  Janu- 
ary 1,  is  hardly  ever  passed  before  the  spring  or 
summer  of  the  year  of  its  operation.3  With  the 
passage  of  the  act  the  minister  of  finance  begins 
at  once  to  prepare  the  budget  for  the  next  fiscal 
year.  He  requests  his  colleagues  to  make  known 
their  needs,  advising  them  that,  unless  the  cir- 
cumstances are  exceptional,  they  should  not  ask 
for  larger  credits  than  Parliament  has  just  au- 
thorized; and  if,  upon  estimating  the  revenue  for 
the  next  year,  he  finds  that  an  equilibrium  be- 
tween income  and  outgo  will  be  difficult  to  estab- 
blish,  he  suggests  possible  reductions.     He  cannot 

1  Leon  Bourgeois  resigned  in  1896  when  the  Senate  refused 
credits  for  the  Madagascar  campaign. 

2  This  word  is  derived  from  boudgette  (little  purse)  and 
came  into  English  usage  in  the  time  of  Louis  XIV;  the  French, 
reestablishing  parliamentary  assemblies,  took  back  the  word 
in  its  English  form.  3  1913,  July  30;    1914,  July  15. 

[223] 


tent 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

himself  enforce  such  suggestions;  whenever  a 
controversy  arises,  the  decision  rests  with  the 
cabinet  alone;  but  the  influence  that  he  exerts 
in  negotiations  with  the  other  ministers  is  very 
considerable, 
its  con-  After  disagreements  have  been   adjusted,  the 

minister  of  finance  presents  the  budget  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies.  He  explains  the  estimates 
and  describes,  in  view  of  the  financial  condition 
of  the  country,  how  the  necessary  revenues  are 
to  be  raised.  The  estimates  are  divided  into, 
chapters,1  each  referring  to  closely-related  ser- 
vices and  each  requiring  a  separate  vote.  Under 
a  law  of  1 871  the  executive  cannot  alter  the  desti- 
nation of  authorized  credits  by  transferring  them 
from  chapter  to  chapter;  they  must  be  employed 
only  for  the  purposes  contemplated  in  the  finance 
act.  With  the  steady  increase  in  the  number  of 
chapters,  in  the  practice  of  appropriating  sup- 
plies to  specific  objects,  Parliament  has  been 
given  a  more  effective  control  over  expenditure.2 
The  budget  proposals  deal  in  the  second  place 
with  the  raising  of  revenue.  It  has  not  been 
found  convenient  to  embody  all  of  these  pro- 
posals in  the  finance  bill.  Direct  taxes  are 
authorized  each  year  in  a  special  measure  which 
Parliament  passes  before  adjourning  in  July;   the 

1  For  further  details  as  to  the  form  in  which  the  estimates 
are  presented  see  Duguit,  Traite,  Vol.  II,  pages  388-391. 

2  Between  1872  and  1892  the  number  of  chapters  rose  from 
338  to  829. 

[224] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

finance  act  does  not  emerge  from  Parliament  for 
another  six  or  eight  months.  This  practice  has 
been  adopted  because  the  general  councils  of  the 
departments,  meeting  in  the  middle  of  August, 
cannot  act  upon  the  local  budgets  unless  Parlia- 
ment has  already  determined  how  many  centimes 
may  be  added  for  local  purposes  to  the  national 
tax  rates.  Besides  fixing  the  aggregate  revenues 
applicable  to  the  general  budget,  the  finance  act 
determines  what  indirect  taxes  shall  be  levied; 
all  existing  taxes  lapse  unless  explicit  provision  is 
made  for  their  maintenance. 

The   proposals  of  the  minister  of  finance  go   Action 
before  the  budget  committee,  the  most  powerful   budggt 
of   the    twenty-one   standing   committees.      Not    commit- 
only  the  annual  budget,  but  all  money  bills  are    tee 
referred  to  it.     There  are,  of  course,  many  bills 
which,  without   being  classified   as  money  bills, 
would  have  the  effect  of  imposing  charges  upon 
the  finances  of  the  State;    and  the  budget  com- 
mittee, while  not  having  jurisdiction  over  these, 
must  be  invited  to  express  an  opinion  on  their 
financial  provisions,  an  opinion  which,  with  sup- 
porting explanations,  is  attached  to  the  report  of 
the  committee  in  charge.1     In  dealing  with  the 
budget,  the  committee  labors  indefatigably  for 
several    months.     It  explores   the   minutest   de- 
tails;   it  seeks  to  expose  administrative  abuses 
everywhere.     To    accomplish    the   task   subcom- 
mittees are  set  up  as  soon  as  general  considera- 

1  Rule  32  of  1915. 

[225] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tions  have  been  disposed  of,  and  to  each  is 
assigned  a  single  branch  of  the  government 
service.  There  was,  even  as  late  as  the  close  of 
the  last  century,  sharp  criticism  of  the  budget 
committee  on  the  very  ground  that  it  carried  its 
activities  too  far,  being  inclined  to  substitute  its 
own  conclusions  for  those  of  the  government. 
"The  committee  pays  hardly  any  attention  to 
the  budget  prepared  by  the  ministers,',  wrote 
Leon  Say  in  1896,  "and  considers  itself  charged 
with  preparing  the  budget  as  if  it  were  the  minis- 
ter. .  .  .  The  committee  regards  itself  as  a  gov- 
ernment, and  the  reporters  are  its  ministers."  1 
Such  language  would  not  apply  to  the  practice 
that  has  prevailed  in  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty 
years,  and  especially  since  the  adoption  of  pro- 
portional representation  in  the  choice  of  com- 
mittees. Only  with  great  moderation  and  with 
the  approval  of  the  government  does  the  com- 
mittee now  use  its  right  of  initiative.2  Paul 
Doumer,  when  president  of  the  committee  in 
1903,  said:  "The  committee  has  a  method  which 
it  follows  rigorously;  it  does  not  accept  proposed 
increases  of  credits  made  by  our  colleagues, 
whether  or  not  they  are  members  of  the  com- 
mittee, without  being  assured  previously  that 
the  government  will  make  them  its  own."  3      In 

1  Les  Finances,  page  24.     Leon  Say  could  speak  with  au- 
thority, having  been  minister  of  finance. 

2  Jeze,  Le  Budget,  page  226. 

3  Quoted  hv  Jrze,  op.  cit.,  page  226. 
[226] 


on  the 
budget 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

1905  the  committee  declared  that,  while  the  esti- 
mates for  the  war  department  were  quite  inade- 
quate, it  would  not  be  proper  to  ask  the  Chamber 
to  increase  them  unless  the  government  agreed  to 
ask  for  the  additional  revenues  needed.1  Col- 
laboration with  the  government,  as  the  president 
of  the  committee  told  the  Chamber  in  1907,2 
must  be  "absolutely  loyal  and  complete."  The 
disappearance  of  the  old  spirit  of  rivalry  is  seen 
in  the  persistent  refusal  of  the  committee  to 
make  special  reports  on  private  member  bills 
which  call  for  supplementary  appropriations; 3 
initiative  is  left  to  the  government. 

Eight  days  after  the  committee  report  has  Debate 
been  distributed  debate  may  begin  in  the  Cham- 
ber.4 The  first  stage  is  general  debate  in  which 
questions  of  a  broad  nature  are  raised,  such  as 
the  possibility  of  realizing  economies  and  re- 
forms; then,  after  the  vote  on  "passage  to  the 
articles,"  6  comes  a  close  scrutiny  of  individual 
items,  with  criticism  and  amendment.  This  pro- 
cedure is  not  always  followed.6  The  Chamber, 
wishing  to  avoid  unnecessary  delay,  may  decide 
to  postpone  general  debate  and  occupy  itself  at 

1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  771. 

2  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  849. 

3  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  774. 

4  Or,  if  the  Chamber  votes  urgency,  twenty-four  hours 
after. 

6  Each  chapter  of  the  budget  is  divided  into  articles  which 
are  examined  separately,  but  voted  en  bloc. 
6  Pierre,  Traite,  Sec.  845. 

[227] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Amend- 
ments of- 
fered by 
private 
members 


once  with  the  departmental  budgets  which  are 
reported  separately  before  the  report  on  the  bud- 
get as  a  whole  has  been  presented.  The  govern- 
ment and  the  committee  arrange,  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  Chamber,  the  order  in  which  the 
budgets  of  the  various  ministries  shall  be  consid- 
ered.1 Throughout  the  discussions  the  minister 
of  finance  is  the  most  prominent  figure,  speaking 
with  the  authority  of  the  cabinet  behind  him 
and  usually  with  the  sympathetic  accord  of  the 
committee.  His  colleagues  will  accept  no  amend- 
ments that  reduce  or  expand  credits  without 
obtaining  his  consent.2  Louis  Barthou,  when 
minister  of  justice  in  1909,  said  in  the  Chamber: 
"You  know  very  well  that  the  initiative  (in  pro- 
posing a  new  credit)  cannot  come  from  me  alone, 
I  must  have  the  support  of  the  minister  of 
finance."  2  Two  years  later  the  premier  himself, 
Joseph  Caillaux,  declared  that  he  must  have  the 
approval  of  the  minister  of  finance  before  con- 
senting to  a  reduction  of  credits. 

There  is  no  rule  in  France,  as  there  is  in  Eng- 
land, which  reserves  absolutely  to  the  govern- 
ment the  right  of  initiating  money  bills  and  of 
proposing,  by  way  of  amendment  to  such  bills, 
increases  in  the  original  figures.  French  authori- 
ties on  finance  regard  this  situation  as  very  un- 
fortunate.    It  involves,  says  Rene  Stourm,3  two 


1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  847. 

2  Id.,  supplement,  Sec.  849. 
8  Le  Budget,  page  56. 


[228] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

grave  abuses:  it  tempts  deputies  to  play  upon 
the  interests  and  passions  of  the  Chamber;  it 
destroys  the  equilibrium  of  the  budget.  The 
terms  "logrolling"  and  "pork  barrel"  may  not 
be  used  in  France,  but  the  things  they  represent 
are  familiar  enough.  The  activity  of  private 
members  is  most  pernicious  on  the  eve  of  general 
elections  when  large  sums  may  be  added  to  the 
budget  for  obvious  purposes.1  In  late  years, 
however,  there  has  been  much  improvement; 
usage  tends  to  support  the  view  which  Leon  Say 
expressed  in  1877  that  "supply  bills  should  be 
reserved  as  far  as  possible  to  government  initia- 
tive." 2  Indeed  the  rules  themselves  have  not 
been  unaffected  by  the  growing  impatience  of  the 
taxpayers.3  In  1900  the  Chamber  adopted  the 
famous  Berthelot  resolution  which,  notwithstand- 
ing many  efforts  to  repeal  it,  still  stands  as 
Article  102  of  the  rules.  Under  its  terms  no 
private  member  may  offer  an  amendment  to  the 
budget  which  would  create  new  offices  or  pen- 
sions or  increase  existing  pensions  or  salaries. 
At  first  deputies  sought  to  circumvent  the  rule 
by  presenting  resolutions  that  invited  the  gov- 

1  Jeze,  page  221.  Gambetta  wished,  by  constitutional 
amendment,  to  deprive  private  members  of  the  right  of 
initiating  money  bills.  He  found  the  cabinet  unwilling  to 
support  him. 

2  Pierre,  Sec.  66. 

3  Abolition  of  the  parliamentary  (i.e.  private  members') 
initiative  became  the  chief  demand  of  the  Taxpayers'  League. 
Stourm,  Le  Budget,  page  57. 

[229] 


no 
longer 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

eminent  to  offer  specific  amendments.  As  such 
resolutions  are  now  prohibited,1  the  deputy  who 
wishes  to  reward  or  bribe  his  constituents  at 
public  expense  must  rely  solely  upon  his  influ- 
ence with  the  government. 
Riders"  Another  important  reform  was  effected  in  1913. 
French  authorities  agree  that  the  granting  of 
per-  supply  is  not  a  legislative  act  in  the  strict  sense 

mltted  and  that  it  should  not,  directly  or  indirectly, 
bring  about  changes  in  existing  law.2  An  insti- 
tution established  by  law,  they  maintain,  cannot 
constitutionally  be  suppressed  by  the  refusal  of 
the  appropriations  needed  to  maintain  it;  for  the 
law,  not  having  been  repealed,  must  continue  to 
be  applied  by  the  government.  After  some  hesi- 
tation the  chambers  have  accepted  this  principle. 
It  is  true  that,  by  refusing  supplies,  they  sup- 
pressed the  Catholic  faculties  of  theology  in  1886, 
and  the  inspectors-general  of  superior  education 
in  1888.  But  more  recently,  in  1903  and  1906, 
when  the  deputies  took  this  indirect  means  of 
abolishing  the  office  of  subprefect  (established  by 
a  law  of  the  year  VIII),  they  found  themselves 
opposed  both  by  the  government  and  by  the 
Senate  and  finally  gave  way.3  It  still  would 
have  been  possible  to  achieve  the  desired  object 
by  attaching  a  rider  to  the  finance  act.     Not  only 

1  Rule  102. 

2  See,  for  instance,  Duguit,  Vol.  II,   page  390  el  seq.,  and 
Esmein,  Elements,  page  990  el  seq. 

1  Esmein,  page  998. 

[230] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

private  members  but  the  ministers  themselves 
have  often  been  guilty  of  using  that  act  as  a 
vehicle  for  ordinary  legislation;  l  a  good  example 
may  be  found  in  the  provisions  of  1907  which 
regulate  the  appointment  of  judges.  The  prac- 
tice is  unsound;  once  admitted,  it  tends  to  de- 
velop into  a  serious  abuse;  measures,  which,  if 
presented  separately  and  considered  on  their  own 
merits,  would  have  little  hope  of  success,  may 
slip  through  almost  unnoticed.  The  budget  must 
be  passed;  it  carries  the  riders  with  it.  To  cor- 
rect this  growing  evil  the  finance  act  of  191 3 
provided:2  "There  can  be  introduced  into  the 
finance  act  only  dispositions  relating  directly  to 
revenue  or  supply,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other 
questions.'' 

The  budget  debates  usually  begin,  not  at  the   Delay  in 
regular  session,  but  at  the  special  session  which   {£gSmg 
covers  the  last  two  or  three  months  of  the  year,    budget 
Under  the  most  favorable  circumstances  it  would 
be  difficult  to  carry  the  budget  through  the  two 
Chambers  successively  before  the  opening  of  the 
fiscal  year  on  January  1.     As  a  matter  of  fact 
proceedings  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  are  un- 
necessarily protracted.3   Skillful  politicians,  taking 
advantage  of  technicalities  in  procedure,  wander 
far    afield     from    the    financial    questions    that 
are  supposed  to  be  under  discussion.     In  1006  it 

1  Pierre,  Traite  and  supplement,  Sec.  851. 

2  Article  105. 

3  Pierre,  Traite  and  supplement,  Sec.  845. 

[23O 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

was  pointed  out  that,  while  forty-seven  days  had 
been  assigned  to  debate  on  the  budget,  only  four- 
teen days  had  really  been  devoted  to  that  pur- 
pose.1 One  of  the  chief  causes  of  delay  was 
eliminated  in  191 1  by  the  adoption  of  a  rule  that 
prohibits  the  interpellation  of  ministers  on 
matters  arising  in  the  course  of  budget  debates.2 
Even  so  the  finance  acts  applying  to  1913  and 
1914  were  not  promulgated  until  July.  The  gov- 
ernment must  be  tided  over  by  votes  on  account. 
These  votes,  because  they  apply  to  one  month  or 
several  months,  are  known  as  "provisional 
twelfths."  At  the  request  of  the  minister  of 
finance  Parliament  places  at  the  disposal  of  the 
government  an  aggregate  sum  which  is  distrib- 
uted among  the  several  departments  by  decree; 
whatever  a  department  spends  in  this  way  is  set 
off  against  the  supply  afterwards  granted  in  the 
finance  act.  Paul  Doumer,  president  of  the  bud- 
get committee,  when  reporting  the  provisional 
twelfths  for  1910,  said:  "Save  in  exceptional 
cases,  in  the  midst  of  great  events  which  Parlia- 
ment must  consider  to  the  exclusion  of  every- 
thing else,  the  vote  of  the  provisional  twelfths 
has  no  justification.  It  is  an  irregularity  in  our 
organization  and  financial  legislation;  and  ir- 
regularity and  disorder  are  always  costly."  3  No 
one  disputes  this  statement.     The  evil,  recurring 

1  Pierre,  Traite  and  supplement,  Sec.  845. 

1  Rule  112  of  1915. 

8  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  537. 

[232] 


accounts 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:   PROCEDURE 

constantly,  has  given  rise  to  proposals  for  a  bien- 
nial budget.1  But  there  seems  to  be  a  general 
opinion  that  the  yearly  voting  of  revenue  and 
supply  is  necessary  to  safeguard  the  position  of 
Parliament.  "The  Parliament  which  should  vote 
a  tax  for  more  than  one  year,  or  the  budget  or 
supply  or  a  part  of  it  for  more  than  one  year 
would  be  doing  an  unconstitutional  act,"  says 
Professor  Duguit.2  He  bases  that  view  upon  a 
provision  of  the  Constitution  of  1791. 

Parliamentary  control  over  the  national  Audit  of 
finances  does  not  end  with  the  voting  of  supply. 
After  the  close  of  each  fiscal  year  the  accounts  of 
the  executive  departments  are  scrutinized.3  The 
preliminary  examination  is  made  by  the  court  of 
accounts,  a  court  established  in  1807  and  con- 
sisting of  one  hundred  and  forty  members  of 
different  grades.  This  court  has  jurisdiction  over 
all  officials  who  touch  the  public  funds  and  makes 
report  of  malversation  or  other  irregularities  so 
that  criminal  prosecutions  may  be  instituted. 
Naturally,  therefore,  it  reviews  the  accounts  of 
the  various  ministries,  making  report  to  the 
President  of  the  Republic  annually  after  May  I. 
Upon  the  rendering  of  the  report  a  committee  is 

1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  512;  Esmein,  page  993;  Duguit, 
Vol.  II,  page  390. 

2  Traits,  Vol.  II,  page  3 So.    But  see  Esmein,  page  994. 

3  Pierre,  Traitt,  Sec.  539;  Duguit,  Vol.  II,  pages  395-396; 
Esmein,  page  997;  Poincare,  Hozv  France  is  Governed,  pages 
275-276  and  320. 

[233] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

appointed  by  decree,  its  personnel  drawn  from 
the  chambers,  the  Council  of  State,  and  the  court 
of  accounts.  This  committee  makes  an  elabo- 
rate report  to  Parliament  which  finally  passes  a 
resolution  (called  the  "law  of  accounts")  as  to 
the  final  auditing  and  closing  of  the  previous 
year's  transactions.  The  passage  of  this  resolu- 
tion, though  apparently  so  important  an  affair, 
has  become  a  mere  formality. 

Control  of  the  Cabinet 

In  this  chapter  and  elsewhere  (especially  in 
Chapter  III)  something  has  been  said  of  the 
position  which  the  ministers  occupy  over  against 
Parliament.  That  position  shows  elements  of 
strength  and  elements  of  weakness;  and  no 
doubt  the  chief  source  of  weakness  is  the  absence 
of  ajiy  coherent  and  fairly  enduring  majority  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  At  this  point  it  will 
be  serviceable  to  consider  some  of  the  means  which 
Parliament  employs  to  keep  the  cabinet  under 
control.1 

Perhaps  the  most  effective  means  of  control 
lies  in  the  power  of  the  purse  —  in  the  voting  of 
the  budget  and  in  the  examination  of  accounts. 
Opportunity  is  given  for  a  detailed  review  of 
administrative  conduct,  for  searching  and  insist- 
ent criticism,  and  for  the  punishment  of  executive 
derelictions  in  a  very  practical  way.     And  out- 

1  Impeachment,  as  an  ultimate  resort,  has  already  been 
touched  upon. 
[234] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:   PROCEDURE 

side  of  money  bills  the  business  of  legislation 
leaves  the  chambers  free  to  harass  cabinets  or 
drive  them  from  office  by  mutilating  or  rejecting 
first-class  government  measures.  Legislative  pro- 
cedure permits  the  imposition  of  checks  upon  the 
executive  in  various  other  directions.  Parlia- 
ment may,  for  instance,  require  the  government 
to  communicate  information  (documents,  statis- 
tics, etc.).  Thus,  under  a  statute  of  1910,  there 
must  be  published  every  five  years  a  statement 
showing  the  remuneration  of  public  employees 
and  increases  made  in  the  five-year  period;  under 
another  statute  (1906)  two  members  designated 
by  each  house  shall  be  permitted  to  investigate 
conditions  in  the  war  and  marine  departments. 
Again,  the  Chamber  or  Senate  may  authorize 
committees  to  make  inquiries  into  executive  acts.1 
Before  1914  such  committees  had  no  power  to 
compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses;  but  a  law 
of  that  year  fixes  a  penalty  for  failure  to  appear 
or  refusal  to  take  the  oath. 

France   has   borrowed   from   England   what  is   other 
known   as   the   ''question."2     In   the   House   of  me^V 

/  t  control: 

Commons  something  like  five  thousand  questions    the 
are  addressed  to  the  ministers  each  year.     "They   «0Qn»s" 
must,"  says  President  Lowell  in  his  Government  of 
England,  "contain  no  argument,  no  statement  of 
fact  not  needed  to  make  their  purport  clear,  and 
they  must  be  addressed  to  that  minister  in  the 

1  Pierre,  Traite  and  supplement,  Sees.  584-596. 

2  Pierre,  Sec.  650  et  seq.;   Rules  of  1915,  Nos.  1 18-120. 

[235] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

House  in  whose  province  the  subject-matter  of 
the  inquiry  falls."  The  question,  of  which  notice 
must  be  given  a  couple  of  days  in  advance,  is 
printed  on  the  question  paper,  and  after  the 
minister  has  replied  to  it,  there  can  be  no  debate 
and  no  vote.  The  French  adaptation  differs 
very  little  from  its  prototype.  The  question 
may  be  asked  orally  if  the  minister  has  accepted 
it  beforehand;  or  (since  1909)  it  may  be  put  in 
writing  and  answered  by  the  minister  within  eight 
days  in  the  Journal  Officiel,  though  the  rules  allow 
him,  in  the  public  interest,  to  refuse  a  reply,  or  to 
delay  it  because  of  difficulty  in  getting  sound 
information.  The  chief  point  of  difference  lies  in 
the  fact  that  the  deputy  who  has  proposed  the 
question  has  the  right  to  reply  in  a  summary 
fashion  to  the  remarks  of  the  minister.  The 
question  has  not  appealed  very  strongly  to  the 
chambers  as  an  instrument  of  control.  They 
prefer  the  interpellation. 

The  interpellation  is  itself  a  question,  but  a 
question  that  precipitates  a  discussion  and  a 
vote.1  The  deputy  hands  his  interpellation  to 
the  president  of  the  Chamber  who,  after  reading 
it    to    the    Chamber,    communicates    it    to    the 

1  Pierre,  Traite  and  supplement,  Sees.  656  et  seq.;  Duguit, 
Vol.  II,  pages  368  et  seq.;  Esmein,  pages  1018  et  seq.;  Rules 
of  1915,  Nos.  1 1 1— 1 17.  It  appeared  first  in  the  Constitution 
of  1791,  but  was  not  recognized  in  later  constitutions  until 
1830.  Abolished  in  1852,  it  was  renewed  in  1869  when  Napo- 
leon III  liberalized  the  government.     It  has  continued  in  use 

[236] 


CHAMBER  OF  DEPUTIES:    PROCEDURE 

minister  whose  department  is  concerned  or,  if 
the  subject  be  one  of  general  policy,  to  the  prime 
minister.1  The  Chamber  then  fixes  a  day  for 
debate.  This  day  must  fall  within  the  period 
of  the  next  month  unless  the  question  has  to  do 
with  foreign  affairs  (when  the  cabinet  may  ask 
for  indefinite  postponement) 2  and,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  is  normally  chosen  by  agreement  between 
the  minister  and  the  deputy  proposing  the  inter- 
pellation. The  latter  opens  the  debate,  develop- 
ing his  attack  and  demanding  explanations;  the 
minister  replies;  and  although  the  closure  may 
cut  short  debate  after  one  deputy  has  spoken, 
usually  there  is  a  good  deal  of  oratory  and  a  de- 
termined effort  seriously  to  embarrass  the  cabinet 
or  even  to  force  it  out  of  office.  Debate  finished, 
there  must  be  a  motion  to  return  to  the  order  of 
the  day  which  the  interpellation  has  interrupted. 
This  motion  or  order  of  the  day,  as  it  is  styled  in 
parliamentary  language,  may  be  "pure  and  sim- 
ple" (for  instance:  "The  Chamber,  having  heard 
the  explanation  of  the  minister,  returns  to  the 
order  of  the  day/')  or  it  may  be  "motive"  (quali- 
fied), that  is,  it  may  embrace  a  qualifying  clause 
which  expresses  approval  or  disapproval  of  the  ex- 

since  that  time,  recognized  in  legislation  and  in  parliamentary 
practice.  Both  Duguit  and  Pierre  regard  it  as  a  logical  conse- 
quence of  ministerial  responsibility  —  and  this  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  it  does  not  exist  in  Great  Britain  or  in  the  British 
Dominions. 

1  Under  the  rules  (No.  in)   an  interpellation  may  be  ad- 
dressed only  to  the  ministers.         '   2  Rule  No.  112. 

[237] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

planations.  The  "pure  and  simple"  order  of  the 
day  must  always  be  put  to  vote  first.1  If  it  is 
defeated  the  Chamber  may  then  have  to  make  a 
choice  between  numerous  ordres  du  jour  motives 
which  show  towards  the  government  different 
degrees  of  friendship  and  hostility.2  If  the 
debate  has  gone  badly  for  the  government,  its 
friends  seek  to  extricate  it  from  embarrassment 
by  using  adroit  phraseology  that  will  enable 
deputies  to  support  it  without  sacrifice  of  con- 
science; and  the  opposition  shows  the  same  dex- 
terity in  framing  orders  of  the  day  that  will 
solidify  all  the  separate  and  incongruous  factions 
of  dissent.  The  question  of  priority  among  the 
orders  of  the  day  is  decided  by  the  Chamber 
itself  which  then  votes  to  accept  or  reject  them. 
Sometimes,  when  the  situation  is  highly  complex, 
the  various  motions  are  referred  to  a  committee 
—  either  one  of  the  standing  committees  or  a 
special  committee  elected  by  the  bureaux.  The 
choice  which  the  Chamber  makes,  either  directly 
or  upon  report  of  a  committee,  will  indicate  the 
final  decision.  If  the  decision  is  hostile,  the  cabi- 
net may  retire;  it  will  feel  bound  to  retire  when- 
ever the  question  at  issue  is  really  important. 
Writing    in    1896,    President    Lowell    observed3 

1  Rule  No.  114. 

2  For    an   excellent    illustration    see    Lowell,    Governments 
and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  I,  page  121,  note  1. 

*  Governments  and  Parties   in    Continental  Europe,  Vol.   I, 
page  122. 

[238] 


CHAMBER  OF   DEPUTIES:   PROCEDURE 

that  of  twenty-one  cabinets  which  had  fallen  in 
consequence  of  a  vote  of  the  Chamber  ten  had 
retired  before  hostile  orders  of  the  day  or  in  the 
course  of  debate.  Even  when  the  cabinet  holds 
its  ground  in  face  of  an  adverse  vote  on  some 
question  of  detail  and  minor  importance  its 
prestige  and  its  capacity  for  leadership  are  cer- 
tain to  be  affected. 

Foreign  observers  have  not  looked  kindly  upon  Criticism 
the  interpellation.  "Except  in  a  despotism/'  J^* 
says  Lowell,1  "the  interpellation  followed  by  a  peiiation 
motion  expressing  the  judgment  of  the  Chamber 
is  a  purely  vicious  institution. "  His  point  of 
view  is  cogently  set  forth:2  "A  government 
would  be  superhuman  that  never  made  mistakes, 
and  yet  here  is  a  method  by  which  any  of  its 
acts  can  be  brought  before  the  Chambers,  and  a 
vote  forced  upon  the  question  whether  it  made  a 
mistake  or  not.  Moreover,  members  of  the  op- 
position are  given  a  chance  to  employ  their 
ingenuity  in  framing  orders  of  the  day  so  as  to 
catch  the  votes  of  those  deputies  who  are  in  sym- 
pathy with  the  cabinet,  but  cannot  approve  the 
act  in  question.  Now  if  adverse  votes  in  the 
Chamber  are  to  be  followed  by  the  resignation 
of  the  cabinet  and  the  formation  of  a  new  one, 
it  is  evident  that,  to  secure  the  proper  stability 
and  permanence  in  the  ministry,  such  votes  ought 
to  be  taken  only  on  measures  of  great  importance, 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  123. 

2  Op.  cit.y  pages  120-121. 

[  239  ] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

or  on  questions  that  involve  the  whole  policy 
and  conduct  of  the  administration."  Similar 
criticism  has  come  occasionally  from  French 
publicists.  De  Lanessan  complains  that  the  inter- 
pellation is  employed,  not  to  control  executive 
conduct  or  to  rectify  it,  but  to  get  possession  of 
office.1  Ostensibly  a  cabinet  is  overthrown  on 
some  matter  of  policy,  he  says,  but  the  Chamber 
will  afterwards  support  with  equanimity  a  cabi- 
net which  does  nothing  to  reverse  the  policy  of 
its  predecessor.  He  regards  interpellations  merely 
as  "circus  tricks."  Principles  are  of  no  moment. 
Crowds  go  to  the  Palais  Bourbon  making  bets  as 
at  race  tracks  and  subordinate  the  interests  of 
France  to  the  excitement  of  the  immediate  con- 
test of  maneuver  and  intrigue.  De  Lanessan 
goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  all  ministers  should 
be  chosen  outside  of  Parliament  so  that  their 
tenure  would  not  depend  upon  the  evanescent 
emotions  which  an  eloquent  speech  may  arouse.2 
Such  criticisms  cannot  lightly  be  dismissed. 
Undoubtedly  the  interpellation  gives  opportuni- 
ties to  the  opposition:  opportunities  to  con- 
coct crises  that  do  not  really  exist;  to  provoke 
debates  that  divert  attention  from  the  real 
business  of  government;  to  substitute  for  sane 
control  of  the  cabinet  a  vexatious  and  perpetual 
nagging;  and  to  maintain  parliamentary  life  in 
an  unwholesome  and  feverish  activity.     Worst  of 

1  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  page  285. 

2  Op.  cit.,  page  286. 
[240] 


CHAMBER   OF   DEPUTIES:   PROCEDURE 

all,  perhaps,  the  time  of  the  Chamber  is  spent  in 
oratory  when  it  should  be  spent  in  legislation. 
The  president  of  the  Chamber  (Brisson)  remarked 
in  October,  1904,  that  in  the  past  two  years  two 
hundred  and  sixty-two  interpellations  had  been 
offered  and  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  de- 
bated.1 In  1906,  as  has  already  been  noted,  only 
fourteen  of  the  forty-seven  days  assigned  to  the 
budget  were  really  devoted  to  it.  Complaints 
have  not  been  altogether  without  effect.  Under 
a  resolution  of  1900,  readopted  after  the  elections 
of  1902  and  1906,  but  now  abandoned,  interpella- 
tions were  limited  to  one  day  a  week  (Friday). 
This  limitation  was  carried  further  in  practice. 
While  Combes  was  premier  (1 902-1905)  and  bent 
upon  carrying  his  anti-clerical  program,  he  found 
ways  of  stopping  objectionable  interpellations. 
The  Republican  bloc  which  supported  him  often 
made  use  of  technicalities  to  check  opposition 
schemes.  They  assigned  to  successive  Fridays 
so  many  innocuous  interpellations  that  those 
which  might  have  injured  the  cabinet  (and  were 
therefore  put  in  a  subordinate  place)  as  a  rule 
never  came  to  debate  or  vote.  The  success  of 
such  tactics  when  something  like  a  stable  ma- 
jority existed  in  the  Chamber  seems  to  show 
that  if  the  interpellation  now  contributes  to  the 
weakness  of  the  cabinets,  it  does  so  because  the 
cabinets,  lacking  assured  support,  are  inherently 
weak;  they  succumb  to  germs  that  a  vigorous 
1  Pierre,  supplement,  Sec.  659. 

[241  ] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

constitution  would  easily  resist.  "As  a  govern- 
ment has  rarely  a  majority  on  which  it  can  rely 
[Bodley's  observation,  though  made  a  quarter  of 
a  century  ago,  reflects  the  conditions  of  today1] 
the  House  is  not  often  in  a  disposition  to  deny 
itself  its  favorite  diversion  of  seeing  a  minister 
baited.,, 
inter-  French  authorities,  however,  generally  regard 

restrict-**  tne  interpellation  as  a  desirable  counterpoise  to 
ed,  i9ii  the  despotic  tendencies  of  a  highly  centralized 
administration.  Duguit 2  calls  it  "the  chambers* 
chief  means  of  action  and  the  best  weapon  of 
minorities. "  Holding  a  like  opinion,  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  has  dropped  the  Friday  rule  of 
1900.  But  in  view  of  the  notorious  delays  in 
voting  the  annual  finance  act  it  has  adopted  one 
very  important  limitation.  Under  rule  No.  112  3 
no  interpellation  may  take  place  in  the  course  of 
the  budget  debates. 

1  France,  book  3,  page  234,  in  1900  ed. 

2  Vol.  II,  page  370. 

3  Adopted  in  191 1. 


[  242  "] 


F 


CHAPTER  VIII 

LOCAL    GOVERNMENT 

RANCE   is,   like   Great   Britain   or   Italy,   a    Local 


autonomy 
restricted 


unitary  state.  All  thf  powers  of  govern- 
ment reside  in  the  executive  and  legislative  organs  in  France 
at  Paris;  there  are  no  competing  authorities,  no 
territorial  divisions  that  Parliament  cannot 
modify  or  obliterate  at  will.  The  form,  the  ex- 
tent, the  very  existence  of  local  autonomy  depend 
upon  statutory  law.  This  offers  a  marked  con- 
trast to  the  federal  system  of  the  United  States 
in  which  the  constitution,  itself  subject  to  change 
only  by  an  elaborate  special  process,  entrusts  cer- 
tain specified  powers  to  the  national  government 
and  leaves  the  residuary  powers  (covering  a  much 
wider  field)  to  the  states.  Federalism  of  some 
kind  accords  well  with  a  stage  of  evolution  in 
which  full  national  consciousness  has  not  been 
reached.  The  unitary  France  of  today  has 
evolved  from  feudal  principalities  which  had 
separate  laws,  separate  armies,  separate  diplo- 
matic relations,  and  which  were  held  loosely 
together  by  the  recognition  of  a  common  suzerain, 
the  Capetian  king.  By  gradual  degrees  and  under 
the  play  of  economic  forces  local  patriotism  gave 
way  and  became  reconciled  with  the  idea  of 
French  unity.     France  is  now  a  highly  central- 

C243] 


areas 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

ized  state  in  which  the  powers  of  locaLpfficers 
(such  as  the  mayors  of  communes)  are  defined  by 
national    law    and    in    which    their    conduct    is 
brought  under  detailed  supervision. 
Local  Of  the  local  areas  into  which  France  has  been 

divided  —  departments,  arrondissements,  can- 
tons, and  communes  —  only  the  first  and  the 
last  deserve  particular  attention.  The  two  others, 
which  have  no  corporate  personality  and  hold  no 
property,  exist  mainly  as  electoral  and  judicial 
districts;  in  each  canton  (including  on  the  aver- 
age twelve  communes)  *  the  justice  of  the  peace 
sits,  and  the  councilors  of  arrondissement  and 
department  are  elected;  in  each  arrondissement 
(including  on  the  average  about  eight  cantons) 
the  court  of  first  instance  sits.2  In  addition,  the 
arrondissement  has  (i)  a  council,  elected  for  a 
six-year  term,  which  participates  in  the  choice  of 
senators  3  and  distributes  among  the  communes 
their  proper  share  in  the  burden  of  direct  taxes 
assigned  to  the  arrondissement,  and  (2)  a  sub- 
prefect  who  is  appointed  by  the  minister  of  the 
interior  and  who  acts  simply  as  the  agent  of  the 
prefect  of  the  department  in  his  role  as  central 
officer.  With  the  vast  improvement  in  means  of 
communication    the   subprefect's    office   has   less 

1  Large  communes,  however,  may  include  several  cantons. 

2  Until  the  adoption  of  the  general  ticket  in  1919  the 
arrondissements  were  used  as  districts  for  the  election  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies. 

3  See  Chapter  V. 
[244] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

reason  for  existence  than  it  had  at  the  time  of 
its  origin,  late  in  the  eighteenth  century.  "The 
subprefects  were  then  like  branches  of  a  business 
firm/'  says  Berthelemy.1  "Branches  are  useless 
when  it  is  infinitely  easy  to  get  to  the  main  estab- 
lishment. "  Instead  of  abolishing  the  office  of 
subprefect,  however,  as  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
has  more  than  once  sought  to  do  by  refusing  ap- 
propriations for  salaries,  Professor  Berthelemy 
would  give  him  a  wider  discretion,  making  him 
less  dependent  upon  the  prefect. 

Departmental  Organization 

The  departments  are  now  eighty-nine  in  num-   Charac- 
ber.2     The  thirty-two  royal  provinces,  with  their   depart- 
separate  historical  traditions  and   their  varying    ments 
systems  of  customary  law,  were  swept  away  by 
the  Revolution  of  1789.     The  National  Assembly 
substituted  the  departments,   artificial  creations 
which  bore  new  names  taken  mainly  from  rivers 
and    mountains    and    which,    like   the    trittyes    of 

1  Traite  elementaire  de  droit  administratif  (Seventh  edition, 

1913). 

2  Alsace-Lorraine,  recovered  by  the  peace  treaty  of  1919 
(June  28),  was  organized  provisionally,  by  a  law  of  October  19, 
as  the  departments  of  the  Upper  Rhine,  the  Lower  Rhine,  and 
the  Moselle.  This  provisional  arrangement  did  not  affect  the 
''territory"  of  Belfort,  a  part  of  Alsace-Lorraine  which  France 
retained  after  the  war  of  1870;  but  no  doubt  Belfort  will 
eventually  be  incorporated  in  the  department  of  the  Upper 
Rhine.  Since  1881  the  departments  of  Algeria  have  been 
dealt  with  substantially  as  if  part  of  continental  France. 

[245] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Athens,  were  designed  to  cut  across  whatever 
remained  of  provincial  patriotism.  Thouret,  re- 
flecting the  passion  of  the  time  for  uniformity, 
even  proposed  that  the  departments  should  be 
precisely  of  the  same  size  —  mere  "astronomical 
expressions,"  as  Stephen  Leacock  has  styled  the 
Middle-Western  American  states.  They  were, 
however,  given  irregular  shapes,  conforming  to 
the  natural  features  of  the  country,  and  varying 
areas.  The  Seine,  which  contains  little  territory 
outside  of  the  city  of  Paris,  has  an  area  of  only 
185  square  miles;  the  other  departments  run 
from  1381  square  miles  (Vaucluse)  to  4140 
(Gironde).  Created  by  national  law  and  sub- 
ject to  regulation  by  it,  the  departments  resemble 
the  American  states  only  in  the  fact  that  they  are 
the  largest  local-government  units  in  the  coun- 
try. In  the  place  of  a  popularly-chosen  execu- 
tive they  have  a  prefect  appointed  by  the  national 
government  and  responsible  to  it.  The  council, 
elected  under  national  laws,  possesses  very  limited 
powers  (for  instance  it  cannot,  like  a  state  legis- 
lature, define  property  and  crime);  the  courts, 
the  schools,  the  main  highways  are  national.  The 
departments  must  be  regarded  as  serving  the 
purposes  of  national  administration  rather  than 
those  of  local  autonomy. 
Decen-  Many   Frenchmen    believe  that   centralization 

has  been  carried  too  far.  The  officials  at  Paris 
are  overburdened;  the  administrative  machine 
threatens    to    break    down    under   the    excessive 

[246i 


traliza 
Hon 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

weight  it  carries;  and  with  restricted  powers  the 
local  legislative  bodies  do  not  give  enough  room 
for  the  growth  of  a  healthy  spirit  of  self-govern- 
ment. Proposed  reforms  incline  either  to  "  de- 
concentration,"  wThich  would  give  local  agents 
of  the  central  ministries  more  independence  and 
initiative,  or  to  " decentralization,"  which  would 
enlarge  the  scope  of  local  autonomy.  It  seems 
possible  that  in  the  near  future  the  departments 
may  be  superseded  by  twenty  or  thirty  "regions" 
each  with  an  assembly  of  its  own  and  boundaries 
determined  by  social  and  economic  factors.  In 
the  summer  of  1919  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
endorsed  "regional  reform."  l 

The  prefect,  whom  the  minister  of  the  interior 
appoints,  and  may  at  any  time  transfer,  place  on 
half-pay,  or  remove,2  is  at  once  the  agent  of  the 
central  government  and  the  executive  head  of 
the   department   in   the   administration   of  local 

1  See  Jean  Henessey,  La  Reorganisation  administrative 
de  la  France  (19 19);  articles  in  La  Revue  politique  et  parle- 
mentaire  for  November,  1910,  by  C.  Beauquier  and  A.  Brette; 
and  J.  W.  Garner,  " Administrative  Reform  in  France"  Ameri- 
can Political  Science  Rroiew,  Vol.  XIII  (1919),  pages  17-46. 

2  Strictly  speaking  the  prefect  is  nominated  by  the  minister 
and  appointed  by  decree.  Measured  by  French  standards  he 
receives  a  large  salary  —  18,000  to  35,000  francs.  A  law  of 
191 1  has  grouped  the  prefectures  into  three  classes  on  the 
basis  of  salaries  paid  and  has  provided  for  automatic  increases 
of  salary.  The  prefect  is  entitled  to  a  pension  when  he  has 
served  30  years  and  reached  the  age  of  60;  and  because  of  his 
precarious  tenure  he  is  not  required  to  contribute  to  the 
pension  fund.     He  may  be  placed  on  half  pay  for  a  certain 

[247] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Double      affairs.     In  the  latter  role  he  appoints  all  em- 
Ihe  °f       ployees  of  the  department,  initiates  all  measures 
prefect      which  come  before  the  general   council  for  con- 
iocaiaS       sideration,  and  carries  out  the  resolutions  of  the 
execu-       council.     In  his  dealings  with  the  departmental 
authorities  he  is  master  rather  than  servant;   for 
his   tenure   is   dependent,    not   upon   them,    but 
upon  the  minister  of  the  interior,  and  the  council, 
whose  meetings  he  attends,  can  discuss  only  such 
matters  as  he  chooses  to  bring  to  its  attention. 
(2)  as  In  his  role  as  agent  of  the  central  government 

agent  of  ^Q  prefect's  duties  are  manifold.1  He  must 
ministry  transmit  information  and  complaints,  give  effect 
to  ministerial  instructions,  direct  state  services 
within  the  department,  control  the  subprefects 
and  mayors  (the  latter  being  agents  of  the  state 
for  many  purposes),  and  supervise  local  adminis- 
tration. Though  directly  responsible  to  the 
minister  of  the  interior,  he  is  obliged  to  be  in 
correspondence  with  at  least  six  other  members  of 
the  cabinet  with  regard  to  state  services.  His 
activity  extends  to  such  miscellaneous  matters  as 
education,  sanitation,  agriculture,  highways,  the 
public  domain,  taxation,  and  police  —  the  police 
power  having  within  its  range  the  regulation  of 
such    matters   as  hunting   and   fishing,  theaters, 

length  of  time  without  loss  of  pension  rights.  Hauriou, 
Precis  de  droit  administratif,  page  238;  Berthelemy,  Elements  de 
droit  administratif,  page  130. 

1  Berthelemy,  op.  cit.,  pages  131  et  seq.;   Hauriou,  op.  cit., 
pages  241  et  seq. 

[248] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 


newspapers,  and  public  assembly.  He  appoints 
several  hundred  officials,  such  as  school-teachers, 
tax-collectors,  letter-carriers,  and  postmasters. 
In  the  government  of  the  communes  he  makes  his 
will  felt  more  by  the  arts  of  persuasion  than  by 
the  exercise  of  formal  authority;  but  this  au- 
thority, which  has  been  widened  somewhat  by 
ministerial  decrees  and  by  decisions  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  State,  is  quite  extensive,  including  as  it 
does  the  right  to  suspend  communal  officers  (even 
members  of  the  council)  for  not  more  than  one 
month,  to  pass  upon  proposed  increases  in  com- 
munal debts,  to  increase  or  reduce  any  item  on 
the  revenue  side  of  the  annual  budget,  and  to 
reduce  proposed  appropriations. 

In  the  exercise  of  some  of  his  powers  the  pre- 
fect has  a  free  hand;  he  proceeds  upon  his  own 
responsibility  without  needing  to  secure  approval 
beforehand  or  afterwards;  and  his  acts  may  be 
annulled  or  corrected  only  on  the  ground  of 
illegality.  In  most  cases,  however,  —  as  when  he 
executes  national  laws  and  decrees  —  he  is  bound 
bv  detailed  instructions.  The  traffic  regulations 
which  one  reads  while  traveling  through  a  dozen 
departments  are  signed  by  a  dozen  different  pre- 
fects; but  they  have  a  striking  family  resem- 
blance; they  are,  in  fact,  couched  in  precisely 
the  same  language.  Deconcentration  has  made 
no  headway  in  recent  years;  rather  the  reverse; 
railroad  and  telegraph  have  brought  the  remotest 
prefect  very  near  to  the  minister  at  Paris.     Never- 

[249] 


Usually 
bound  by 
instruc- 
tions 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

theless,  the  prefect  is  a  very  powerful  as  well  as 
a  very  busy  official  —  the  real  pivot  of  the  ad- 
ministrative system.1 
His  As  agent  of  the  central  government  the  prefect 

political      £ncjs    hjmseif   involved    in    activities    that    are 

activities  .  .  .    . 

altogether  outside  the  routine  ot  administration. 
The  ministers  whom  he  serves  are  politicians, 
often  far  more  preoccupied  with  political  concerns 
than  with  state  business;  and  he  is  the  medium 
through  which  the  minister  of  the  interior  keeps 
\in  touch  with  the  local  situation  and  "makes" 
the  parliamentary  elections  every  four  years. 
He  exerts  himself  in  the  municipal  elections  also, 
both  because  these  test  the  strength  of  the 
national  parties  and  because  he  is  naturally 
anxious  to  secure  the  success  of  candidates  who 
will  cooperate  harmoniously  with  him  when  they 
are  in  office.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  he 
has  a  great  deal  of  patronage  to  dispose  of. 
Cases  occur,  of  course,  where  the  prefect,  belong- 
ing to  a  different  political  party,  will  not  let  him- 
self be  used  and  where  the  minister  thinks  it 
inadvisable  to  transfer  or  remove  him  on  the  eve 
of  the  campaign.  A  new  prefect,  unacquainted 
with  his  surroundings  and  lacking  local  prestige, 
would  be  of  little  value  in  political  intrigues. 
Nor  does  public  opinion  acquiesce  as  readily  as 
it  once  did  in  the  sacrifice  of  experienced  officials 
to  partisan  exigencies. 

In  the  discharge  of  his  multifarious  duties  the 
1  Munro,  The  Government  of  European  Cities,  page  60. 
[250] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

prefect  is  assisted  by  a  considerable  headquarters   His 
staff.     He  has  a  confidential  assistant  known  as   gtaffand 
"cabinet  chief";    a  general  secretary  appointed    advisory 
by  the  minister  of  the  interior,  who  directs  the    counc 
several    bureaux   in    which    the   employees     are 
grouped;    and  a  council  of  three  members  asso- 
ciated with  him  in  his  functions  as  national  officer. 
Besides    acting   as   an   administrative  court,     as 
described  in  Chapter  XI,  the  prefectoral    coun- 
cil examines  certain  accounts  (those  of  receivers 
of  taxes,  for  instance),  authorizes  communes  and 
departmental    institutions    to    commence     legal 
proceedings,  and  advises  the  prefect.     On  a  good 
many  matters  the  prefect  is  bound  to  consult  his 
council;    and  though  he  need  not  follow  its  ad- 
vice, he  finds   it  politic  to  do  so  in   important 
cases,  as  where  the  acts  of  a  communal  council 
are  to  be  annulled  or  changes  made  in  a  com- 
munal budget. 

It  is  obvious,  even  from  this  casual  glance  at  Hisdtf- 
his  position,  that  the  prefect  should  be  a  man  of  p™tion 
ripe  experience  and  of  unusual  accomplishments. 
His  position  is,  indeed,  one  of  peculiar  difficulty. 
"Today,"  says  Hanotaux,1  "placed  between  uni- 
versal suffrage,  which  really  rules,  and  the  central 
power,  which  wishes  to  govern,  he  is  between 
the  anvil  and  the  hammer.  Since  he  is  concerned 
in  everything,  he  concentrates  in  his  own  person 
the  perpetual  conflict  of  authority  and  freedom. 

1  Quoted  by  P.  W.  L.  Ashley,  Local  and  Central  Government 
'1906),  page  82. 

[  251  ] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

He  reports  to  the  authorities  the  demands  of  the 
crowds,  and  to  the  crowds  the  needs  of  the  au- 
thorities. There  is  no  question  now  of  the  old 
high-handed  prefects  who  led  the  mayors  as  a 
colonel  leads  his  regiment.  The  prefect  no  longer 
commands;  he  simply  requests.  More  than  any 
other  official  he  must  dictate  by  persuasion.  He 
is  at  once  the  agent  of  the  government,  the  tool 
of  the  party,  and  the  representative  of  the  area 
which  he  administers.  Yet  he  must  remain  im- 
partial, foresee  difficulties  and  disputes,  and  re- 
move or  mitigate  them;  conduct  affairs  easily 
and  quickly,  avoid  giving  offense,  show  the 
greatest  discretion,  prudence,  and  reserve,  and 
yet  be  always  cheerful,  open,  and  a  good  fellow; 
he  must  always  be  accessible,  speak  freely,  and 
in  his  official  position  be  neither  affected  nor 
churlish.  ...  He  is  in  daily  contact  with  the 
elected  representatives  of  the  government,  sena- 
tors, deputies,  councillors  of  the  department  and 
arrondissement,  mayors,  and  communal  council- 
lors; he  is  assailed  by  all  the  various  ambitions, 
claims,  demands,  frauds;  he  is  bombarded  at 
short  range  by  the  local  Press,  much  more  daring 
and  less  indulgent  than  the  Press  of  Paris;  and 
he  is  obliged  to  pay  attention  to  and  conciliate 
all  the  opinions,  interests,  and  jealousies  which 
rage  around  him  or  which  turn  towards  or  upon 
him."  Evidently  he  must  have,  as  Ashley  ob- 
serves,1 tact,   talent,  skill,   patience,   resignation, 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  81. 
[252] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

and  a  long  preliminary  training  in  the  office  of 
subprefect. 

Associated  with  the  prefect  in  conducting  the  The 
affairs  of  the  department  is  the  general  council,  *^jf 
a  body  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for  a  term  of  the 
of  six  years,  one-half  of  the  members  retiring  ^JJJr" 
every  three  years.1  As  each  canton  returns  one 
member,  the  size  of  the  council  depends  upon 
the  number  of  the  cantons  in  the  department; 
the  largest  general  council  has  sixty-seven  mem- 
bers, the  smallest  seventeen.  No  salaries  are 
paid.  Aside  from  special  sessions,2  the  council 
meets  twice  a  year,  the  spring  session  lasting  not 
more  than  two  weeks  and  the  summer  session 
not  more  than  one  month.  It  is  in  the  summer 
session  3  that  the  budget  of  the  department  is 
voted,  direct  taxes  apportioned  among  the  ar- 
rondissements,  and  the  accounts  of  the  prefect 
examined.  Were  it  not  for  this  financial  control, 
the  powers  of  the  council  would  seem  very  meager 
indeed;  they  relate  to  matters  of  departmental 
concern  (such  as  the  maintenance  of  public  build- 
ings and  highways)  and  to  a  few  cases  where  its 
approval  is  required  in  communal  administration 
(such  as  changes  in  boundaries  or  increases  in 
the  tax-rate).     Within   the   range  of  its   powers    ! 

1  Elections  occur  simultaneously  throughout  France. 

2  Called  by  the  central  government  or  by  two-thirds  of  the 
members. 

3  It  begins  normally  in  mid-August,  but    (under  a  law  of 
1907)  may  be  postponed  until  October  1. 

[253] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  council  is  limited  by  the  fact  that  business 
can  come  before  it  only  on  the  initiative  of  the 
prefect  and  that  its  decision,  while  final  in  regard 
to  some  questions,  in  regard  to  others  either  re- 
quires the  approval  of  the  central  government 
before  it  takes  effect  or,  taking  effect  without 
such  approval,  may  be  vetoed  by  the  government 
within  a  period  of  three  months.  The  council  is 
not  permitted  to  make  representations  of  a  po- 
litical character  to  the  central  government;  its 
only  political  function  is  participation  in  the  elec- 
tion of  senators.  It  may  be  dissolved  at  any 
time.1 

There  is  also  a  departmental  committee  of  four 
to  seven  members  elected  by  the  general  council 
at  the  close  of  its  summer  session.  This  com- 
mittee meets  at  least  once  a  month,  the  prefect 
being  entitled  to  share  in  its  deliberations.  It 
handles  whatever  business  the  council  delegates 
to  it  and  at  the  same  time  has  original  powers  of 
its  own.  It  examines  the  prefect's  monthly  state- 
ments of  expenditure.  It  reports  to  the  council 
on  the  tentative  budget  framed  by  the  prefect. 


Variation 
in  size  of 
the  com- 
munes 


Communal  organization 

The  communes  are  the  fundamental  units  in 
administration  and  self-government,  with  a  his- 
tory looking  back  far  beyond  the  period  of  revo- 

1  By  the  central  government.  If  parliament  is  in  session 
the  date  of  the  new  elections  is  fixed  by  statute;  otherwise 
they  occur  on  the  fourth  Sunday  after  dissolution. 

[254] 


HEPUBLIQUE  iiia\<;aisi: 

LIBCRTE,  EGALlT£,*FRATC:iXlTE 


•ItROrmiSSEWENT 


V1LLE  DE  P. 


CARTE. 


ECTEUR 


RENOUVF] 


fNT  T)U  CONSEIL  MUNICIPAL 


Mai  1912.  de  8  i:    «Ju  matin  a  6  h.  du 


rJJrl^a&ro  mai  iyrz,  ae  5  i:    ui:  maun  a  t»  ti.  au  son* 

Itr  erpportera  tort  milletin  ureparc  en  dehors  ./<•  CAuembUt. 
■bulletin  sera  stir  papier  Olanc  el  tans  $lgnt  exierteur. 
evr&   etre   consenee   p»r  I'Eleetecr    en    c»3    d'ua   sscond   lour   i«   senilis 
qui  await  lien  le   1L   lai 


•  "      .'. 


- 

IwtJM 

LIEU  DE  REUNION 

i  1 

,\()M 

PREXOMS 

DATE 

qualification! 

DEMEl  RE       1 

Signature  de  I'Elecleur: 

Fait  a  Paris,  le  }u  Avril  iyi2. 
Le  Maire, 

Vans.  —  Iuij>.  Paul  Dlpom  (.CI.).  —  ii  1.1'JlJl    —  ^Carte  iwmii  lu  kil.  —  02u,'JWl ex.) 


THE  ELECTORAL   CARD 
See  page  275 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

lutionary  reconstruction.  They  were  not  arrested 
in  their  natural  development  and  forced  into  a 
uniform  mold  by  the  legislators  of  1789.  They 
differ  greatly  in  area  and  population.  They  may 
cover  several  acres  or  several  thousand  acres. 
More  than  half  of  them  have  a  population  of 
500  or  less.1  Only  Paris,  Marseilles,  Lyons,  and 
Bordeaux  exceed  250,000  in  population.  What 
Levasseur  calls  the  "fatal  attraction"  of  the 
cities  has  not  been  so  marked  in  France  as  in 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  or  the  United  States.2 
France  remains  predominantly  an  agricultural 
country  in  which  the  land  is  cultivated  by  peasant 
proprietors;  and  with  a  low  birth-rate  the  in- 
crease of  population  is  very  slight.3 

Although  the  communes  are  so  unequal  in  Uni 
size,  the  framework  of  their  government  reflects 
the  French  inclination  towards  system  and  uni-  ganiza- 
formity.  The  municipal  law  or  code  of  1884 
applies  alike  to  hamlets  of  fifty  inhabitants  and 
to  large  cities  like  Marseilles  or  Havre.4  The 
code  provides  for  a  council  of  one  chamber  elected 
byjumversal  suffrage  and  for  a  mayor  and  one  or 
more  adjoints  (department  heads)  chosen  by  the 

1  According  to  the  census  of  191 1  the  number  was  19,270 
out  of  a  total  of  36,241  communes. 

2  Only  2,717  communes  are  classified  as  urban;    that  is,  as 
having  a  population  of  over  2,000. 

3  The  net  increase  was  less  than  350,000  between  1906  and 
1911. 

4  A  translation  of  the  code  will  be  found  in  the  appendix 
to  Albert  Shaw's  Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe 

[255] 


formity 
of  or- 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

council  from  among  its  own  members.  Paris 
alone  stands  outside  this  scheme.1  Such  uni- 
formity may  at  times  entail  disadvantages. 
"The  machinery  of  local  government  in  France," 
observes  Munro,2  "is  undoubtedly  too  complex 
and  cumbrous  for  the  thousands  of  small  com- 
munes, most  of  which,  like  the  English  parishes, 
are  too  diminutive  to  serve  properly  as  adminis- 
trative units.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  perhaps 
not  elaborate  enough  for  the  largest  municipali- 
ties." The  code  does,  however,  classify  the  com- 
munes according  to  population  in  fixing  both  the 
size  of  the  council  and  the  number  of  adjoints. 
The  The  council  is  a  small  body,  with  a  minimum 

muxtai  °^  ten  memDers  (where  the  population  is  500  or 
council  less)  and  a  maximum  of  36  members  (where  the 
population  is  over  60,000).  Its  size  varies  ac- 
cording to  a  graduated  scale,  there  being  eight 
classes  between  the  two  extremes.3  It  is  elected 
for  a  term  of  four  years.  The  quadrennial  elec- 
tions, occurring  simultaneously  in  all  communes 
on  the  first  Sunday  in  May,  are  conducted  very 
much  like  the  national  elections  described  in 
Chapter  VI.  The  voters'  list  is  compiled,  the 
vote  cast  and  counted  in  the  same  way;  the  same 

1  Certain  modifications  have  been  made  in  the  case  of 
Lyons  which  has  a  larger  council  and  more  numerous  heads  of 
departments  than  the  code  provides  for  in  other  communes. 

2  The  Government  of  European  Cities,  page  14. 

3  Lyons,  with  a  council  of  54,  and  Paris,  with  a  council  of 
80,  are  the  only  exceptions.    See  Article  10  of  the  code. 

[256] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

principles  are  applied  in  disqualifying  as  candi- 
dates certain  officials  (such  as  prefects,  judges, 
school-teachers)  whose  position  in  the  commune 
might  enable  them  to  exercise  undue  influence  in 
the  election,1  and  in  requiring  certain  other  offi- 
cials within  ten  days  of  their  election  as  councilors, 
to  relinquish  their  offices  or  retire  from  the  coun- 
cil.2 As  in  national  elections,  corrupt  practices 
(personation,  bribery,  etc.)  come  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  criminal  courts;  but  in  the 
case  of  alleged  irregularities  the  validity  of  an 
election  is  determined  by  the  prefectoral  council 
from  whose  decision  appeal  may  be,  and  often  is, 
taken  to  the  highest  administrative  court,  the 
Council  of  State.3 

The  procedure  in  municipal  elections  differs  Munici- 
from  the  procedure  in  national  elections  chiefly 
in  the  fact  that  there  is  no  provision  for  minority 
representation.  The  scrutin  de  liste  or  general 
ticket  is  employed  in  its  simple  form.  The  mean- 
ing of  these  terms  has  already  been  explained.4 

1  The  mayor,  adjoints,  and  councilors,  however,  though 
acting  as  election  officers,  are  not  disqualified. 

2  The  same  rule  applies  to  persons  directly  connected  with 
the  providing  of  public  utilities  or  direct  partners  to  a  municipal 
contract. 

3  Any  qualified  voter  may  petition  for  the  annulment  of 
the  elections  within  five  days,  the  councilors  affected  by  the 
petition  being  allowed  another  five  days  to  file  their  reply. 
If  a  question  of  fact  is  involved,  the  prefectoral  council  makes 
an  investigation.  Elections  are  never  annulled  for  mere 
technical  violations  of  the  law.  4  See  Chapter  VI. 

[257] 


pal  elec- 
tions 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

In  a  commune  of  ten  thousand,  let  us  say,  where 
twenty-three  councilors  are  to  be  elected,  the 
commune  is  treated  as  a  single  constituency  and 
each  voter  expected  to  vote  for  twenty-three  dif- 
ferent candidates.  This  is  a  heavy  burden  to 
impose  on  the  electorate,  though  not  such  a  bur- 
den as  overwhelms  citizens  of  the  United  States 
when,  after  a  confused  campaign,  they  have  to 
decide  upon  the  qualifications  of  candidates  for 
twenty  or  thirty  offices  ranging  in  importance 
from  coroner  to  mayor  or  even  governor.  Only 
one  office  is  filled  by  election  in  the  commune, 
the  office  of  councilor.  The  voter  does  not 
as  a  rule  prepare  his  own  ballot.  If  he  is  a 
loyal  party  man,  he  accepts  a  printed  ballot 
which  has  been  placed  in  his  hands,  either  at  his 
home  or  outside  the  polling-place,  by  a  party 
worker.  Under  the  circumstances  the  strongest 
among  the  competing  parties  is  likely  to  win  all 
the  twenty-three  seats.  It  will  do  so  unless  a 
considerable  number  of  its  adherents  split  their 
tickets  (crossing  out  some  of  the  names  and  sub- 
stituting others)  because  of  antipathy  to  certain 
designated  candidates,  or  unless  two  or  more  of 
the  weaker  parties,  entering  into  a  bargain,  com- 
bine their  strength  on  a  composite  ticket.1  Such 
combinations  frequently  occur  when  the  strongest 

1  Sometimes  an  independent  candidate  will  distribute 
printed  ballots  differing  from  the  party  ticket  only  in  the 
substitution  of  his  own  name  for  the  name  of  one  of  the  regular 
candidates. 

[258] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

party  has  not  commanded  a  majority  of  the  votes 
in  the  first  election  and  a  second  election  therefore 
becomes  necessary.1  Broadly  speaking,  however, 
the  general  ticket  tends  to  give  domination  to  a 
single  party,  to  leave  minorities  unrepresented  in 
the  council;  and  this  tendency  grows  more  em- 
phatic as  the  national  parties  strengthen  their 
organization,  enforce  stricter  discipline,  and  appre- 
ciate more  fully  the  part  which  local  elections  can 
play  in  keeping  the  combative  spirit  alive  in  the 
rank  and  file.  It  is  idle  to  maintain  that  muni- 
cipal government,  being  a  matter  of  business 
rather  than  policy,  should  not  be  regarded  as  a 
proper  field  for  competition  between  national 
parties  which  are  concerned  primarily  with 
national  issues.  Clearly  enough  the  economic 
doctrine  of  the  Socialist  party  applies  to  the  com- 
mune; and  if  the  Socialist  party  is  determined  to 
fight,  the  other  parties  can  hardly  be  expected 
to  stand  aloof.  Minorities  find  themselves  more 
favorably  situated  in  some  of  the  larger  cities 
where,  by  virtue  of  a  provision  of  the  municipal 
code,2  a  modified  form  of  the  district  ticket  is 
used.  Any  commune  with  a  population  of  more 
than  ten  thousand  may  be  divided  into  districts,3 

1  In  the  second  election  a  plurality  suffices.       2  Article  n. 

3  Not  by  the  local  authorities,  but  by  the  general  council  of 
the  department  whose  decision  may  be  modified  by  the 
Council  of  State  —  a  procedure  which  prevents  gerrymander- 
ing. The  district  boundaries,  when  once  fixed,  are  seldom 
changed;  with  the  shifting  of  population  the  number  of  seats 
assigned  to  each  district  is  increased  or  reduced. 

[259] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

each  district  electing  (by  scrutin  de  liste)  at  least 
four  members  of  the  council.  This  compromise 
between  the  general  ticket  and  the  district  ticket 
opens  the  way  to  a  certain  degree  of  minority 
representation  (because  the  minority  is  often 
concentrated  in  a  particular  section  of  the  com- 
mune) and  at  the  same  time  avoids  the  danger 
of  ward  politics  which  the  small  single-member 
district  is  not  unlikely  to  develop. 
Limita-  From   a  first  casual  glance  at  the  municipal 

UpJ^         code  one  would  suppose  that  the  council,  as  the 
council's     direct  offspring  of  universal  suffrage,  had   been 
uTnot'      invested   with   a  very  wide  range  of  authority, 
in  con-      It  "regulates  by  its  deliberations  the  affairs  of 
adminis-    tne  communes,"  says  the  code.     "It  votes  on  all 
tration       subjects  of  local  interest."     The  actual  powers  of 
the  council,  however,  are  less  extensive  than  this 
general    language    suggests.     Its    competence    is 
limited  in  two  directions.     In  the  first  place  it  is 
not    an    administrative    body    like    the    English 
borough   council  which,   through   standing  com- 
mittees,  manages   every   municipal   department, 
even  making  appointments  to  the  civil  service. 
Under  the   French    system   the   business  of  ad- 
ministration —  and   this  covers  a  great   part  of 
the  whole  field  of  government  in  the  communes 
—  rests  with  the  mayor  and  adjoints.     It  is  true 
that  these  executive  officers   are  chosen   by  the 
council  from  among  its  own  members,  that  they 
continue  to  serve  as  members  after  election  to 
office,   and   that   they  are   unlikely  therefore   to 
[260] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

pursue  any  course  which  the  majority  seriously 
opposes.  Nevertheless,  their  subordination, 
wherever  it  exists,  is  not  due  to  restraints  in 
the  law;  the  council  has  no  means  of  compelling 
obedience  —  even  its  financial  control  is  far  from 
complete,  and  it  cannot  discipline  them  or  remove 
them  from  office.  "A  standing  committee  in  a 
French  council, "  to  quote  Dr.  Albert  Shaw,1 
"consults,  advises,  and  keeps  itself  informed,  and 
it  may  exercise  a  considerable  influence  over  the 
action  of  the  mayor  and  adjuncts;  but  it  does 
not  act  of  itself."  The  function  of  the  council 
is  to  formulate  policy;  the  function  of  the  execu- 
tive is  to  put  this  policy  into  operation. 

A  second  limitation  upon  the  competence  of   (2)  ap- 
the  council  is  found  in  the  fact  that,  as  regards   J^er° 
some  of  the  most  important  concerns  of  the  com-   authon- 
munes,   its  decisions  take  effect  only  when  ap-   q*^~ 
proved  by  the  higher  authorities.2     Without  such 
approval,  for  instance,  it  cannot  make  leases  for 
more  than  eighteen   years,   grant  franchises  for 
public    utilities,    borrow   or   appropriate    money, 
alter  or  abolish   streets,   buy  or  sell    communal 
property.     Usually  the  "higher  authority"  is  the 
prefect;    but   in  the  case  of  franchises  it   is   the 
general   council   of  the  department,   and   in  the 
case  of  the  budgets  of  large  communes   (where 
the    estimated    revenue    exceeds    three    million 
francs)  the  cabinet  acting  on  the  advice  of  the 

1  Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe,  page  175. 
1  See  Article  68  of  the  code. 

[261] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Meetings 
of  the 
council 


minister  of  the  interior.  A  brief  description  of 
budget  procedure  will  serve  to  illustrate  the 
somewhat  restricted  functions  of  the  council. 
It  is  the  mayor  who  prepares  the  annual  budget 
and  who,  having  presented  it  to  the  council,  de- 
fends and  justifies  it  at  every  stage  of  discussion. 
After  passing  the  council  it  goes  to  the  prefect 
(or,  under  the  condition  mentioned  above,  to 
the  minister  of  the  interior)  accompanied  by  the 
annual  reports  of  the  mayor  and  treasurer,  the 
minutes  of  the  council  bearing  on  the  budget, 
and  other  apposite  documents.  Financial  ex- 
perts make  a  searching  analysis.  With  full 
information  before  him  the  prefect  decides.  He 
has  the  right  to  reduce  any  appropriation  and 
either  to  reduce  or  increase  any  item  on  the 
revenue  side  of  the  budget.  Moreover,  the  code 
gives  a  long  list  of  obligatory  appropriations  — 
for  the  taking  of  the  census,  the  conduct  of  elec- 
tions, the  payment  of  debts;1  and  where  any 
one  of  these  is  omitted  the  prefect  must  insert  it. 
A  recalcitrant  council  may  be  suspended  for  a 
month  by  the  prefect  or  dissolved  by  the  minis- 
try; but  the  occasion  for  such  drastic  action  is 
likely  seldom  to  occur. 

The  council  does  not  meet  at  frequent  inter- 
vals, as  the  custom  is  in  Great  Britain  and 
America.  It  holds  four  regular  sessions  each 
year,  in  February,  May,  August,  and  November. 
The  May  session,  in  which  the  budget  is  con- 
1  Article  136  of  the  code. 
[262  1 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

sidered,  may  last  six  weeks;  the  other  sessions 
only  two  weeks.  This  arrangement  would  be  as 
absurd  and  inconvenient  as  the  analogous  re- 
strictions laid  upon  the  American  state  legisla- 
tures were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the  regular 
sessions  may  be  extended  by  the  prefect  and  that 
special  sessions  may  be  called  at  any  time  by  the 
prefect  or  mayor  and  must  be  called  on  the  de- 
mand of  a  majority  of  the  councilors.  Perhaps 
the  framers  of  the  code  felt  that  frequent  meet- 
ings would  tend  to  exalt  the  council  at  the 
expense  of  the  mayor.  The  mayor  presides  — 
except  when  his  official  "statements  are  under 
discussion.  He  is  also  chairman  ex-officio  of  all 
standing  committees;  and  even  though  he  often 
assigns  the  adjoints  to  take  his  place  on  particu- 
lar committees,  close  contact  between  the  ex- 
ecutive and  legislative  branches,  with  all  the 
obvious  advantages  which  flow  from  it,  is 
still  maintained.  The  members  of  the  council 
serve  without  pay,  as  do  also  the  mayor  and 
adjoints. 

"The  mayor  alone  is  charged  with  administra-   The 
tion,"  says  the  code;1    "but  he  may,  under  his   ^or 
supervision  and  responsibility,  delegate  by  order   adjoints 
a  part  of  his  functions  to  one  or  more  of  his 
adjoints"  or,  when  the  adjoints  are  unable  to 
act,  to  other  members  of  the  council.     The  num- 
ber of  adjoints  varies  from  one  (for  communes  of 
2500  population  or  less)  to  12,2  towns  of  2500 

1  Article  82.  2  Lyons,  bv  special  provision,  has  17. 

[263] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

to  10,000  having  two,  and  larger  towns  having  an 
additional  adjoint  for  each  2500  inhabitants  in 
,  excess  of  10,000.  The  council  elects  both  mayor 
and  adjoints.1  This  method  of  choice,  while 
tending  to  secure  a  sympathetic  accord  between 
the  executive  officers  and  the  council,  may  not 
result  so  happily  in  the  relations  between  the 
mayor  and  his  deputies  (adjoints).  The  mayor 
is  responsible  for  the  whole  administration;  he 
is  responsible  for  the  operation  of  those  depart- 
ments which  he  places  under  the  charge  of  ad- 
joints, although  he  did  not  appoint  the  adjoints 
and  cannot  remove  them.  In  case  of  disagree- 
ment or  open  conflict  two  remedies  are  available. 
The  mayor,  who  is  not  required  by  the  code  to 
delegate  his  functions,  may  assign  no  duties  to 
an  insubordinate  adjoint  or  he  may,  by  applica- 
tion to  the  prefect,  secure  his  suspension  or 
removal.  Both  the  mayor  and  adjoints  may  be 
suspended  by  the  prefect  for  one  month  (a  period 
which  the  minister  of  the  interior  may  extend  to 
three  months)  or  removed  by  decree. 
The  Someone  has  said  that  France  is  governed  by 

double'8      tne  mavors  °f  tne  thirty-six  thousand  communes, 
r&ie:         The    mayor   is,  indeed,  invested    with  so  many 

(1)  ?        important   functions,   that,   notwithstanding  the 

agent  .         i-i  1  •  r  u- 

of  the        restraints  laid  upon  the  exercise  or  his  powers, 

mlnistry     he  has  the  means  of  making  himself  a  veritable 

political  boss.     In  a  large  city  he  may,  if  pos- 

1  By  secret  ballot,  an  absolute  majority  being    required 
until  the  third  ballot. 
[264] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

sessed  of  marked  ability  and  force  of  character, 
become  a  figure  of  national  prominence;  but  on 
the  other  hand,  by  giving  wide  discretion  to  his 
adjoints  and  allowing  the  council  to  encroach 
upon  the  administrative  field,  he  may  subside 
into  the  position  of  a  figurehead.  Only  a  broad 
description  of  the  mayoral  powers  can  be  given 
here.  The  mayor,  like  the  prefect,  has  to  fill  a 
double  role.  Just  as  the  prefect,  appointed  by 
the  central  government,  acts  both  as  its  agent 
and  as  executive  head  of  the  department,  so  the 
mayor,  appointed  by  the  council,  acts  in  the 
commune  both  as  its  executive  head  and  as  an 
agent  of  the  central  government.  In  the  latter 
role  the  mayor  performs  his  duties  quite  free  from 
interference  by  the  council,  but  subject  to  the 
supervision  of  the  higher  authorities.  These 
duties  are  numerous  and  varied.  They  involve 
an  immense  amount  of  detailed  work  in  connec- 
tion with  matters  regulated  by  national  law  — 
for  example,  poor  relief,  direct  taxation,  the 
registration  of  voters,  military  service,  vital  sta- 
tistics, primary  education,  and  the  quinquennial 
census;  and  they  have  been  much  increased  in  late 
years  by  social  legislation.  In  the  enforcement  of 
national  laws  within  the  commune  the  mayor 
issues  many  ordinances,  giving  to  the  general  lan- 
guage of  the  laws  a  detailed  application;  but  in 
the  exercise  of  this  delegated  legislative  power  he  is 
always  bound  closely  by  instructions  from  the  pre- 
fect who  may  even  draft  the  ordinances  himself. 

12651 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

(2)  as  As  an  officer  of  the  commune  the  mayor    has 

m^ai  both  legislative  and  executive  functions.  He 
executive  presides  at  meetings  of  the  council.  As  chairman 
ex-officio  of  its  standing  committees  he  takes 
part,  either  personally  or  through  his  adjoints, 
in  reviewing  the  work  of  the  administrative 
departments  and  preparing  reports.  He  issues 
ordinances  not  only  for  the  enforcement  of  resolu- 
tions passed  by  the  council,  but  also,  under  the 
police  power,  for  the  protection  of  life  and 
property.  The  prefect  may  suspend  or  annul 
such  ordinances; 1  private  individuals  may  ques- 
tion their  validity  before  the  administrative 
courts;  and  when  any  person  is  prosecuted  for 
violation  of  an  ordinance,  the  ordinary  courts 
will  acquit  him,  as  noted  in  Chapter  XI,  if 
they  find  that  the  ordinance  was  not  "legally 
made." 

As  the  executive  head  of  the  commune  the 
mayor  represents  it  in  legal  proceedings  and  on 
ceremonial  occasions.  He  manages  the  municipal 
property.  He  conducts  the  municipal  services. 
/.  In  the  business  of  administration  full  responsi- 
u  bility  rests  with  him;2  and  it  is  the  function  of 
the  council,  not  to  direct  him  in  matters  of  de- 
tail, but  to  formulate  the  broad  lines  of  policy 

1  In  such  cases  the  mayor  has  the  right  of  appeal  to  the 
Council  of  State. 

2  In  the  management  of  the  police,  however,  the  discretion 
of  the  mayor  is  much  limited.  The  organization  of  muni- 
cipal police  is  described  at  the  end  of  Chapter  XII. 

[266] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

which  he  is  to  follow.  Evidently  this  is  the  sys- 
tem that  the  code  was  intended  to  establish. 
But,  as  it  is  often  hard  to  decide  just  where  the 
domain  of  policy-determination  ends  and  the 
domain  of  administration  begins,  the  council  can, 
with  colorable  pretext,  seriously  curtail  the 
mayor's  freedom  of  action  unless  the  higher 
authorities  intervene.  Nor  is  it  certain  that  the 
balance  of  power  between  the  mayor  and  council 
will  always  remain  as  it  is.  By  the  growth  of 
custom  and  precedent  and  without  any  formal 
change  in  the  law  the  time  may  come  when  the 
committees  of  the  council  will  supplant  the  mayor 
in  supervising  the  work  of  the  administrative 
departments. 

The  employees  of  the  commune,  high  and  low,  Em- 
are  (with  a  few  exceptions)  appointed  by  the  of°^eees 
mayor  and  by  him  disciplined  or  removed.  The  commune 
council  has  no  voice  in  the  matter.  In  large 
cities  where  the  merit  system,  the  holding  of 
colrTpetitive  examinations  to  test  the  relative 
capacity  of  candidates  for  office,  has  made  some 
headway,  the  scope  of  the  appointing  power  has 
been  much  reduced.  Even  where  the  merit  sys- 
tem does  not  obtain,  the  mayor's  patronage  is 
less  extensive  than  might  be  supposed.  Vacan- 
cies seldom  occur.  The  civil  servants  are  not 
swept  out  of  office  with  each  change  of  admin- 
istration; custom  has  given  them  something 
like  a  permanent  tenure;  and  an  employee 
who  believes  that  he  has  been  unjustly  removed 

[267] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

may  seek  redress  before  the  Council  of  State  and 
perhaps  secure  an  award  of  damages  against  the 
commune.  The  treasurer  and  police  commis- 
sioner are  appointed  not  by  the  mayor,  but  by 
the  central  government;  and  the  mayor  can 
appoint  or  remove  no  police  official  without  the 
concurrence  of  the  prefect.  Attracted  by  the 
security  of  tenure  and  (in  large  cities)  the  pros- 
pect of  retirement  pensions,  able  and  conscien- 
tious men  have  entered  the  civil  service  of  the 
communes.  It  is  their  trained  intelligence  which 
keeps  the  machinery  of  administration  working 
smoothly.  " Herein,"  says  Dr.  Shaw,1  "lies  the 
explanation  of  much  that  puzzles  many  foreign 
observers,  who  cannot  understand  how  to  recon- 
cile the  seemingly  perfect  system  of  French  ad- 
ministration in  all  matters  of  practical  detail 
with  the  rapid  and  capricious  changes  in  the 
highest  executive  posts." 
The  Paris,  the  capital  city  and  metropolis,  is  not 

menTof  governed  like  the  other  communes.  Two  cir- 
Paris  cumstances  have  made  some  deviation  from  the 
uniform  scheme  of  the  municipal  code  advisable. 
In  point  of  size  Paris  is  exceptional,  covering  as 
it  does  nearly  the  whole  area  of  the  department 
of  the  Seine  and  having  five  times  the  population 
of  Marseilles,  the  next  largest  city.  It  has  been 
convenient  therefore  to  blend  departmental  and 
communal  institutions.  The  general  council  of 
the  department  is  simply  the  Paris  council  with 
1  Op.  cit.y  page  27. 

[268] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

additional  members  representing  the  two  arron- 
dissements  outside  the  city  limits,  and  executive 
authority  in  both  commune  and  department  has 
been  entrusted  to  two  prefects,  one  of  whom 
deals  solely  with  police  administration.  Again, 
as  the  seat  of  the  national  government  Paris  has 
been  improved  and  beautified  at  national  expense, 
adorned  with  palaces,  monuments,  and  art  gal- 
leries. The  government  must  have  adequate 
means  of  protecting  its  material  interests  as  well 
as  the  social  order  from  the  recurrence  of  such 
sudden  revolutionary  outbreaks  as  have  often 
manifested  themselves  in  Parisian  history.  Local 
autonomy  therefore  has  been  given  less  play  than 
in  other  communes.  This  is  seen  mainly  in  the 
fact  that  the  executive  officers  (the  prefect  of  the 
Seine  and  the  prefect  of  police)  are  appointed 
not  by  the  council,  but  by  the  central  government. 

The  municipal  council  is  chosen  for  a  four-year   The 
term  by  district  ticket.     Relatively  speaking  it   J^11^. 
has   a   large   membership,   four  councilors   being   cu 
elected  from  single-member  districts  in  each  of 
the  twenty  arrondissements  included  within  the 
city  limits.     Although  supposed  to  serve  without 
pay,    each    councilor   draws    an    annual    sum   of 
twelve  hundred  dollars  under  guise  of  "expenses"; 
and  for  reasons  of  expediency  the  minister  of  the 
interior  has  acquiesced  in  a  practice  which,  as  the 
Council  of  State  has  held,  is  clearly  unauthorized. 
The  powers  of  the  council  resemble  those  of  the 
ordinary  municipal  councils.     Since  it  does  not 

[269] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

choose  the  executive  officers,  however,  it  is  less 
likely  to  exert  an  effective  influence  upon  them. 
The  two  The  prefect  of  police  possesses  the  combined 
prefects  p0}{ce  p0wers  of  a  mayor  and  a  prefect.  He  is 
responsible  not  only  for  the  maintenance  of  order, 
but  also  for  the  regulation  of  traffic,  the  enforce- 
ment of  sanitary  rules,  and  many  other  matters 
that  the  French  regard  as  coming  properly 
under  the  scope  of  police  administration.  Like- 
wise the  prefect  of  the  Seine,  who  receives  a 
salary  of  ten  thousand  dollars,  allowance  for 
expenses,  and  a  residence  in  the  city  hall,  com- 
bines in  his  person  the  functions  of  a  mayor  and 
a  prefect,  excepting  only  the  police  power. 
''There  is,  in  fact,  a  greater  concentration  of 
administrative  power  in  the  hands  of  the  prefect 
of  the  Seine,"  says  Professor  Munro,1  "than  in 
those  of  any  other  local  official  in  France,  or, 
indeed,  in  any  other  country."  Naturally  he 
must  be  a  man  of  wide  experience  and  proved 
capacity,  and  one  who  has  sufficient  tact  and 
diplomacy  to  maintain  harmonious  relations  with 
che  shifting  cabinet  ministers,  the  municipal  and 
departmental  councils,  and  his  colleague,  the  pre- 
fect of  police.  In  practice  both  prefects,  though 
subject  to  removal  at  any  time,  have  held  their 
places  for  long  terms. 
The  city  The  civil  service  in  Paris  includes,  besides  what 
employ-  may  ^  termed  the  headquarters  staff,  a  local 
staff  in  each  of  the  twenty  arrondissements. 
1  Op.  cit.}  page  97. 
[270] 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

"These  twenty  divisions,"  as  Albert  Shaw  has 
pointed  out,  "make  it  easy  to  distribute  and 
apportion  the  numerous  administrative  tasks 
that  bring  the  government  into  contact  with  the 
people/'  They  are  the  units  for  school  adminis- 
tration, the  registration  of  voters,  civil  marriage, 
the  keeping  of  vital  statistics,  poor  relief,  the  col- 
lection of  taxes,  and  much  besides.  In  each  a 
mayor  and  several  adjoints,  appointed  by  the 
government  and  serving  without  pay,  perform  a 
vast  amount  of  routine  work  as  subordinates  of 
the  prefect.  There  is  no  elective  council  in  the 
arrondissement,  but  many  citizens  serve  on  ad- 
visory commissions  which,  with  the  mayor  or  his 
adjoints  presiding,  discharge  important  functions 
in  regard  to  such  matters  as  public  education  and 
poor  relief. 


oo 


legisla- 
ture 


CHAPTER  IX 

POLITICAL     DEVELOPMENT1 

First  TX  THEN  the  first  legislature  chosen  under  the 
V  V  new  constitution  met  in  the  spring  of 
1876,  the  monarchists  controlled  the  Senate,  the 
Republicans  controlled  the  Chamber.  This  gen- 
eral situation  had  been  expected.  The  surprising 
feature  of  the  elections  was  the  strength  de- 
veloped by  the  Republicans.  They  came  within 
two  or  three  votes  of  having  a  majority  in  the 
Senate.2  They  won  more  than  360  of  the  533 
seats  in  the  Chamber.3 

1  For  brief  outlines  in  English,  see  Encyclopedia  Britan- 
nica  (nth  ed.,  1910),  Vol.  X,  pages  873-906  (by  J.  E.  C. 
Bodley);  E.  A.  Vizetelly,  Republican  France  (1913);  C.  H. 
C.  Wright,  A  History  of  the  Third  French  Republic  (1916). 
G.  Hanotaux's  Contemporary  France  (4  vols.,  translated) 
covers  only  the  early  years  of  the  Republic.  In  French  see 
L.  Hosotte,  Histoire  de  la  troisieme  Republique,  1870-IQ12 
(2  volumes;  has  clerical  sympathies);  E.  Marechal,  Histoire 
comtemporaine  de  1879  a  nos  jours  (3  vols.,  1900);  and  E. 
Zevort,  Histoire  de  la  troisieme  Republique  (4  vols.,  1896-1901). 

2  The  reactionaries,  having  a  majority  in  the  National 
Assembly  which  chose  the  seventy-five  life  senators,  and 
being  able  to  exert  administrative  pressure  upon  the  electoral 
colleges  which  chose  the  other  225  senators,  had  hoped  for 
better  things;  but  because  of  the  quarrels  between  Legitimists 
and  Orleanists,  the  Republicans  got  57  of  the  life  seats.  The 
elections  of  1879  gave  them  control  of  the  Senate. 

3  It  is  not  possible  to  determine  the  group  affiliations  of 
all  the  deputies.     Roughly  speaking  the  Bonapartists  won  as 

[272] 


/ 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

The  chief  Republican  groups,  receiving  their  Party 
titles  from  the  position  of  the  seats  assigned  to  ^°^s 
them,  were  the  Extreme  Left,  the  Left,  and  chamber 
the  Left  Center.  Leon  Gambetta,  who  led  the 
Extreme  Left,  had  put  forward  a  radical  program 
in  1869  (the  " Belleville  Program")  which  advo- 
cated the  separation  of  church  and  state,  elec- 
tive judges,  and  the  income  tax.  His  fervent 
patriotism,  his  eloquence,  his  energy  and  cour- 
age gave  him  a  hold  on  the  hearts  of  the  masses; 
but  many  prominent  Republican  politicians  dis- 
liked his  radicalism,  envied  his  popularity,  or 
suspected  him  of  harboring  dangerous  ambitions. 
The  Republican  Left  included  such  men  as  Jules 
Grevy,  Jules  Ferry,  and  Charles  de  Freycinet, 
who  were  Republicans  by  conviction  and  not 
recent  or  half-hearted  converts.  The  Left  Center, 
including  only  some  50  members,  represented  the 
bourgeois  liberalism  which  had  flourished  under 
the  July  monarchy.  Its  leaders  were  for  the 
most  part  men  of  mature  years,  like  Thiers 
(born  1797)  and  Dufaure  (born  1798).  They 
favored  a  Republic  from  motives  of  expediency 
and  wished  the  Republic  to  be  conservative. 
For  several  years,  while  the  future  still  seemed 
uncertain,  their  policy  of  caution  and  concilia- 
tion gave  them  great  influence.     The  first  two 

many  seats  as  the  two  other  monarchist  factions  combined. 
The  Orleanists  were  weakened  by  the  defection  of  more  than 
twenty  deputies  who,  styling  themselves  Constitutionalists, 
decided  to  accept  the  Republic. 

[273] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

premiers,  Dufaure  and  Simon,  were  drawn  from 
the  Left  Center. 
Hostility  Soon  after  its  organization,  the  new  govern- 
Repubiic  ment  nad  to  face  a  serious  crisis.  Jules  Simon, 
who  became  premier  at  the  end  of  1876,  while 
friendly  to  the  church,  was  not  friendly  enough 
to  suit  the  bishops.  These  urged  upon  France, 
hardly  recovered  from  the  disasters  of  1870,  the 
obligation  of  making  war  upon  Italy  and  restor- 
ing the  temporal  power  of  the  Pope.  Behind 
this  religious  agitation,  which  grew  more  and 
more  intense,  political  propagandists  were  at 
work.  The  monarchists,  seeing  an  opportunity 
to  embarrass  the  Republic,  joined  forces  with 
the  clergy.  The  Count  of  Chambord  declared 
that  "every  enemy  of  the  church  is  an  enemy  of 
France,"  and  the  clergy  took  no  pains  to  dis- 
guise their  sympathy  with  his  cause.  This  alli- 
ance of  ultramontanes  and  monarchists  proved 
unfortunate  for  the  church.  Republicans,  or  at 
least  Republicans  of  radical  temper,  came  to 
accept  Gambetta's  phrase:  "Le  clericalisme, 
voila  Tennerm."  A  generation  later,  after  pro- 
longed conflict  between  church  and  state,  Rene 
Viviani,  the  minister  of  labor,  declared  proudly, 
"We  have  extinguished  lights  in  heaven  that 
shall  never  be  relit." 
The  The  crisis  of  1877  is  known  as  the  "Seize  Mai." 

Mal  On  May  16,  Jules  Simon  was  informed  that,  in 

view   of  certain   votes   taken    by   the   Chamber 
without  the  approval  of  the  cabinet,  he  no  longer 
[274] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

enjoyed  the  confidence  of  President  MacMahon. 
He  resigned  immediately  —  the  tone  of  the  Presi- 
dent's letter  permitted  no  other  course  —  and 
was  succeeded  by  the  Orleanist  de  Broglie. 
While  MacMahon's  action  did  not  violate  the 
letter  of  the  constitution,  it  was,  in  view  of  the 
excited  condition  of  the  country,  at  least  pro- 
foundly impolitic;  and  it  could  hardly  seem 
consonant  with  the  principles  of  responsible  par- 
liamentary government  since  Simon  held  office, 
with  an  overwhelming  majority,  by  virtue  of 
an  election  which  had  occurred  only  fifteen 
months  before.  Only  in  one  way  could  the 
President  vindicate  himself  and  keep  the  new 
cabinet  in  office:  by  dissolving  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  and  making  a  successful  appeal  to  the 
electorate.  On  June  25,  with  the  consent  of  the 
monarchist  majority  in  the  Senate,  the  Chamber 
was  dissolved.  In  the  autumn  elections  how- 
ever, notwithstanding  administrative  pressure 
and  clerical  pressure,  the  Republican  majority 
was  reduced  but  slightly.  De  Broglie  resigned. 
MacMahon  then  appointed,  not  one  of  the  ma- 
jority leaders  (as  parliamentary  usage  required), 
but  a  military  man,  General  Rochebouet,  whose 
reactionary  cabinet  included  not  a  single  mem- 
ber of  Parliament.  This  autocratic  step  gave 
rise  to  apprehensions  of  a  coup  d'etat  and  led  the 
Chamber  to  refuse  supplies.  After  two  or  three 
weeks  of  complete  deadlock  Rochebouet  resigned. 
His  retirement  meant  the  collapse  of  monarchist 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 

schemes  and  humiliation  for  MacMahon,  who 
now  found  it  necessary  to  invite  the  moderate 
Republican  Jules  Dufaure  to  form  a  ministry. 
MacMahon's  position  was  very  uncomfortable 
because,  having  tried  and  failed  to  hand  the 
administration  over  to  the  reactionaries,  he  had 
no  further  means  of  making  his  personal  wishes 
prevail  over  the  cabinet.  When  Dufaure  began  to 
republicanize  the  army  by  placing  five  generals  on 
half  pay  and  transferring  five  others,  the  Presi- 
dent resigned.  He  was  succeeded  by  Jules  Grevy, 
a  septuagenarian,  who  had  been  president  of  both 
the  National  Assembly  and  the  Chamber  of  Dep- 
uties, a  loyal  Republican  of  spotless  reputation, 
but  not  a  man  of  much  force.  The  Republicans 
now  controlled  the  presidency  and  both  Chambers. 
Political  Meanwhile,  modifications  had  been  taking 
changes  pjace  jn  the  political  groups  of  the  Chamber. 
(i)  The  various  elements  of  the  right  had  con- 
solidated in  the  struggle  of  1877.  Their  conflict- 
ing claims  now  dropped  into  the  background; 
they  called  themselves  conservatives  and  be- 
came less  insistent  in  advocating  the  restoration 
of  monarchy.  (2)  The  Left  Center  had  begun 
to  decline  in  importance,  their  mildly  sympa- 
thetic attitude  towards  the  church  having  brought 
them  into  discredit  with  the  other  Republican 
groups  who  favored  an  anti-clerical  policy. 
(3)  Gambetta,  without  abjuring  the  Belleville 
program,  had  abandoned  it  for  the  time  as  im- 
practicable, and  substituted  "a  policy  of  results 

[276] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

tor  a  policy  of  chimeras."  He  declared  himself 
an  opportunist,  ready  to  govern  according  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  moment.  Gradually  his 
followers  fused  with  the  Republican  Left  and 
assumed  the  name  of  Opportunists  (Moder- 
ates after  1889,  Progressists  after  1898,  and 
recently  Republican  Federation).  Down  to  the 
formation  of  the  Waldeck-Rousseau  cabinet  in 
1899  the  Opportunists  constituted  the  most 
numerous  and  powerful  group  in  the  Chamber.1 
(4)  A  part  of  the  Extreme  Left,  unwilling  to 
abandon  the  Belleville  program,  had  become 
known  as  Radicals.  They  attacked  their  old 
leader,  Gambetta,  and  also  Jules  Ferry  who  had 
been  guilty  of  remarking  that  "the  danger  is  on 
the  Left."  The  most  aggressive  spirit  in  this 
group  was  Georges  Clemenceau  (afterwards  be- 
came prime  minister,  1906-1909,  and  1917-1920).2 
Other  eminent  members  were  Charles  Floquet 
and  Henri  Brisson.  The  Radicals  steadily  ad- 
vanced in  strength  (except  in  the  elections  of 
1889)  and  dominated  the  government  during  the 
first  decade  of  this  century. 

1  In  a  period  of  twenty  years,  all  but  half  a  dozen  of  the 
twenty-seven  cabinets  were  headed  by  Opportunists  or  by 
men  who  shortly  became  known  as  such.  But  the  anti- 
clerical policy  of  Waldeck-Rousseau  brought  about  a  cleavage, 
the  larger  faction  supporting  the  premier  and  entering  groups 
further  to  the  Left. 

2  Sometimes  called  "the  destroyer  of  cabinets"  because  he 
helped  to  overthrow  eighteen  of  them  in  fifteen  years.  See 
H.  M.  Hyndman's  Clemenceau  (1919). 

1*771 


GOVERNMENT   AND    POLITICS   OF    FRANCE 

Anti-  The  Republicans,  having  put  Jules  Grevy  in 

SeriSk-      tne  place  °f  MacMahon  and  having  temporarily 
Hon  crushed  the  hopes  of  the  monarchists,  now  turned 

jufeY  tne*r  attenti°n  to  tne  church.  They  wished  to 
Ferry  curb  the  power  of  the  clergy  and  prevent  a  re- 
currence of  the  intrigues  of  1877.  The  religious 
orders,  firmly  intrenched  in  the  schools,  molded 
the  future  citizens  of  the  country  and  zealously 
instilled  anti-Republican  sentiments.  With  few 
exceptions  these  orders  had  no  legal  standing; 
they  had  never  secured  from  the  government  the 
authorization  which  all  associations  must  have. 
Jules  Ferry,  the  minister  of  public  instruction, 
proposed  to  exclude  their  members  from  teach- 
ing in  the  schools;  and  when  the  Senate  rejected 
a  vital  part  of  his  bill,  he  proceeded  to  dissolve 
the  unauthorized  orders  by  decree.  This  was 
the  first  phase  of  the  anti-clerical  movement 
which  culminated  under  Waldeck-Rousseau  and 
Combes.  If  the  orders  had  given  way  at  this 
juncture,  France  might  have  escaped  some  of 
the  bitter  antagonisms  of  later  years;  but  in 
defiance  of  law  they  managed  to  reorganize  af- 
ter dissolution  and  to  continue  their  work  as 
teachers.  They  also  denounced  as  godless 
Ferry's  new  system  of  elementary  schools  in 
which  education  was  compulsory,  gratuitous, 
and  non-sectarian,  and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  provision  was  made  for  religious  instruction 
by  priests. 

Kerry's  name  is  also  identified  with  the  awaken- 

[278] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 


ing  of  new  imperialistic  ambitions  in  France.  Colonial 
He  believed  in  colonial  expansion  as  a  means  of  l^11' 
restoring  national  prestige;  and  although  this  under 
policy  involved  France  in  controversies  with  j^es 
other  states,  it  gave  her  finally  an  overseas 
empire  second  only  to  that  of  Great  Britain.1 
Tunis  naturally  attracted  French  interest  be- 
cause of  its  neighboring  Algeria;  and  in  1881, 
certain  border  raids  being  taken  as  pretexts,  a 
French  protectorate  was  established  there.  Italy, 
also  interested  in  Tunis,  felt  aggrieved  and  in 
consequence  entered  the  Triple  Alliance  with 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in  1882.  Cordial 
relations  between  France  and  Italy  were  not 
restored  for  twenty  years.  It  was  Ferry  also 
who,  while  premier  in  1883,  annexed  Tonkin  and 
Annam,  thus  greatly  extending  the  possessions 
acquired  in  Indo-China  two  decades  earlier.  This 
period  also  marks  the  forward  movement  of 
France  in  the  Congo  and  in  Madagascar;  but 
her  refusal  to  cooperate  with  Great  Britain  in 
suppressing  disturbances  in  Egypt  (1882)  assured 
British  ascendency  there  and,  since  Egypt  had 
appealed  strongly  to  the  French  imagination 
from  the  time  of  Bonaparte's  expedition,  tended 
to  create  a  feeling  of  antagonism  between  the 
two  colonial  powers. 

1  On  the  French  colonial  possessions  see  H.  Busson,  Notre 
Empire  colonial  (1910);  C.  Humbert,  VCEuvre  francais  aux 
colonies  (1913);  and  Victor  Piquet,  La  Colonisation  francaise 
(1912). 

[279] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Failure  The  elections  of  1881  gave  the  conservatives, 

bet?aam"     or  reactionaries,  only  some  90  of  the  547  seats  in 
1881  the    Chamber;     the    Radicals,    46.      While     the 

split  between  the  Radicals  and  Opportunists 
had  definitely  taken  place,  the  Republican  Left 
(186  deputies)  had  not  yet  coalesced  with  Gam- 
betta's  followers  (204  deputies).  Gambetta,  who 
had  been  president  of  the  Chamber  for  three 
years  and  who  had  exercised  from  the  chair  an 
"occult  power"  (as  Clemenceau  termed  it),  now 
became  prime  minister.  There  had  been  prophe- 
cies of  "a  great  ministry,"  a  ministry  of  all  the 
talents  which  would  unite  the  Republican  factions. 
The  men  of  established  reputation,  however, 
regarded  Gambetta  with  jealousy  or  distrust. 
They  held  aloof.  Gambetta's  cabinet,  drawn 
exclusively  from  his  personal  followers,  did  not 
commend  itself  to  the  country,  although  it  in- 
cluded young  men  of  great  promise,  such  as  the 
future  premiers  Waldeck-Rousseau  and  Rouvier. 
It  maintained  itself  only  ten  weeks.1  Several 
things  contributed  to  the  fall  of  Gambetta:  his 
attempt  to  deprive  deputies  of  their  patronage 
in  the  civil  service,  his  passionate  interest  in  the 
army  and  promotion  of  able  officers  irrespective 
of  politics,  his  proposal  to  reform  and  subordi- 
nate the  Senate,  and  his  insistence  on  a  new 
system  of  electing  the  deputies  —  the  general 
ticket.     But    opposition  to  Gambetta's   policies 

1  Nov.,  1881,  to  Jan.,  1882.     Gambetta  died  on  Dec.  31, 
1882,  from  an  accidental  revolver  shot,  at  the  age  of  44. 
[280] 


centra- 
tion"  and 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

was  merely  an  excuse  offered  in  palliation 
by  the  politicians  who  overthrew  him;  these 
very  men  reformed  the  Senate  and  estab- 
lished the  general  ticket  after  his  death.1  They 
feared  Gambetta  because  he  was  so  dynamic,  a 
man  of  force  and  compelling  enthusiasm.  The 
cult  of  incompetence  and  mediocrity  which 
Georges  Sorel  supposes  to  be  inseparable  from 
democracy  had  already  set  in.2 

The  elections  of  1885  were  the  first  and,  until  "Con 
1919,  the  only  general  elections  conducted  under 
the  general  ticket  (the  election  of  all  the  mem-  "pacifi- 
bers  from  each  department  upon  a  general  ticket 
having  been  substituted  for  single-member  dis- 
tricts by  a  law  of  that  year).  The  extreme  groups, 
Conservatives  and  Radicals,  profited  by  this  new 
arrangement,  securing  respectively  about  180 
and  150  seats.3  Henceforth  the  Opportunists 
(about  250  seats)  were  unable  to  govern  alone. 
As  a  rule  cabinets  were  formed  by  a  "concen- 

1  Gambetta  proposed  to  abolish  the  single-member  districts 
and  substitute  large  districts  in  which  several  members  should 
be  elected.     This  system  is  described  in  Chapter  VI. 

2  Ernest  Dimnet  in  France  Herself  Again  (1914)  says,  "If 
the  Third  Republic  has  produced  but  few  men  of  great  civic 
virtue,  it  has  not  produced  many  who  were  remarkable  either 
for  their  eloquence  or  their  political  capacities.  .  .  .  The  roll 
of  premiers,  when  one  reads  it  over  from  the  first  days,  sounds 
like  a  list  of  incarnations  of  mediocrity." 

3  The  death  of  Gambetta  and  dissatisfaction  with  Ferry's 
colonial  policy  contributed  to  this  result  by  weakening  the 
Opportunists. 

O81] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tration"  of  the  two  main  Republican  groups, 
Radicals  and  Opportunists.  The  alternative  was 
"pacification"  by  which  one  Republican  group 
governed  with  the  help  or  toleration  of  the  Con- 
servatives, this  implying  abandonment  of  anti- 
clerical measures.  Rouvier  formed  the  first 
pacification  cabinet  in  1887.  In  that  year  Grevy, 
who  had  been  reelected  to  the  presidency  in 
spite  of  his  advanced  age,  was  forced  to  resign 
because  of  scandals  involving  his  disreputable 
son-in-law,  Daniel  Wilson,  and  his  steadfast 
refusal  to  believe  in  Wilson's  guilt  or  to  expel 
him  from  the  Elysee.  His  successor  was,  not 
Jules  Ferry,  the  most  prominent  Republican 
statesman,  but  a  compromise  candidate,  Sadi 
Carnot.  So,  too,  the  American  Whigs  chose 
Harrison  instead  of  Clay  for  the  election  of  1840 
—  Harrison's  grandfather  signed  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence;  Carnot's  grandfather  was 
the  "organizer  of  victory."  Neither  Grevy  nor 
Carnot  were  men  of  action;  and  so  the  tradition 
of  efFacement  and  torpor  began  to  entwine  itself 
about  the  French  presidency. 
Bou-  The    presidency    of   Carnot    (1 887-1 894)    was 

notable  for  two  crises  which  left  a  deep  impres- 
sion on  French  political  life  and  upon  the  for- 
tunes of  French  parties  —  the  Boulangist 
movement  and  "Panama."  The  Boulangist 
movement  came  very  near  to  ending  the  Repub- 
lic. Boulanger,  the  youngest  general  in  the  army, 
had  won  rank  and  honors  by  distinguished  serv- 

[282] 


langer 
crisis 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

ice  in  the  field;  he  had  been  wounded  in  the 
war  of  1870,  in  Indo-China,  in  Algeria.  As 
minister  of  war,  1 886-1 887,  he  became  the  most 
prominent  person  in  the  country.  His  truculent 
attitude  toward  Germany  led  Bismark  to  observe 
that  he  was  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Europe  and 
made  him  at  the  same  time  the  idol  of  French 
chauvinists.  "Throughout  her  history  France 
has  shown  a  taste  for  strong  men,"  says  Dimnet, 
as  many  others  have  said;  and  for  the  moment 
the  martial  figure  of  Boulanger  suggested  the 
strong  man  who  was  needed  to  recover  the  lost 
provinces  for  France,  restore  her  credit  in  the 
eyes  of  Europe,  her  unity  of  spirit,  her  belief  in 
herself.  His  extraordinary  popularity  alarmed  the 
politicians.  They  kept  him  out  of  a  new  cabinet 
formed  in  1887  and  sent  him  to  command  an 
army  corps  far  from  Paris  and  from  the  German 
frontier. 

Boulanger  now  entered  upon  a  series  of  in-  Bou- 
trigues.  His  secret  maneuvers  and  the  singular  JJJ^es 
alliances  which  he  contracted  indicate  that,  like 
Louis  Napoleon,  he  was  playing  for  his  own  ends. 
He  was  everything  to  every  man.  At  the  out- 
set the  Radicals  entered  into  close  and  secret 
relations  with  him,  meaning  to  embarrass  the 
Opportunists.  The  noisy  patriots  supported  him 
because  he  would  recover  Alsace-Lorraine;  the 
Bonapartists,  because  he  stood  for  the  Napoleonic 
plebiscite;  the  Royalists,  because  he  promised 
the  restoration;  the  clergy,  because  the  Royalists 

[283] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

did  and  because  Boulanger  let  it  be  known  that 
he  would  tolerate  no  religious  persecution  (that 
is,  anti-clerical  measures).  Although  several 
Jews  were  prominent  in  his  entourage,  he  some- 
times posed  as  an  anti-Semite  and  thus  took 
advantage  of  a  campaign  against  the  Jews  which 
had  got  well  under  way  with  the  publication  of 
Drumont's  La  France  juive  in  1886.  The  enormous 
sums  of  money  which  he  spent  came  from  the 
Count  of  Paris  (now  the  Royalist  pretender)  and 
from  a  duchess  devoted  to  the  Royalist  cause. 
His  sue-  He  spent  lavishly  in  building  up  a  political 
thl^kc-  organization  and  in  flooding  constituencies  with 
tions  campaign  literature  (including  portraits  of  him- 
sudden  se^  on  horseback).  Whenever  a  by-election 
collapse  occurred,  he  became  a  candidate;  and,  as  the 
general  ticket  had  been  in  force  since  1885,  all 
the  voters  of  a  department  participated  in  each  by- 
election.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  votes  were 
cast;  it  was  the  plebiscite,  taken  by  departments. 
Finally  in  January,  1889,  came  his  most  striking 
triumph.  He  was  elected  in  the  Seine  (Paris) 
by  244,000  votes  against  179,000  for  his  two 
opponents,  and  in  spite  of  the  great  efforts  put 
forth  by  the  cabinet.  At  that  moment,  appar- 
ently, he  might  have  marched  on  the  Elysee 
and  made  himself  dictator.  He  let  the  moment 
slip  by.  Perhaps  he  was  under  obligations  which 
held  him  back;  perhaps  he  expected  greater 
triumphs  in  the  general  election  of  1889;  more 
probably    he    suffered    from    indecision   of  char- 

[284] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

acter.  At  any  rate  he  failed  to  strike.  Soon 
afterwards  he  was  a  fugitive  in  England,  con- 
victed in  his  absence  of  conspiracy  against  the 
state.  That  same  year,  fearing  the  appearance 
of  some  other  "man  on  horseback,"  Parliament 
restored  the  district  ticket. 

In  the  quadrennial  elections  of  1889  no  great 
changes  were  manifested.  The  Opportunists, 
now  called  the  Moderates,  gained  somewhat; 
the  Conservatives,  while  losing  twenty  or  twenty- 
five  seats,  stood  very  close  to  a  new  group  of 
Nationalists  or  Boulangists  which  included  more 
than  forty  deputies.  The  chief  losses  were  in- 
curred by  the  Radicals  whose  strange  association 
with  Boulanger  had  done  them  much  injury. 
Not  only  were  their  numbers  reduced  by  a  third, 
but  their  claim  to  represent  the  most  extreme 
political  doctrine  was  disputed  on  the  Left  by  a 
new  group  of  seventeen  Socialists. 

Shortly  after  the  collapse  of  Boulangism  the  Panama 
Republic  had  to  confront  another  menacing  situa- 
tion. There  had  already  been  some  evidence  and 
much  gossip  of  political  corruption;  and  now, 
at  the  close  of  1892,  a  scandal  was  brought  to 
light  which  cast  its  shadow  on  many  reputations. 
In  1883  a  French  company  had  begun  to  con- 
struct a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
Through  extravagance  and  gross  mismanagement 
it  fell  into  such  straits  that,  in  the  hope  of  pre- 
venting disclosures,  lavish  subsidies  were  paid 
to  newspapers   and   Parliament    was    persuaded, 

[2%] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

apparently  by  the  purchase  of  votes,  to  authorize 
the  raising  of  over  #100,000,000  by  means  of  a 
lottery.  In  1892,  after  the  failure  of  the  lottery 
and  the  collapse  of  the  company,  one  of  the 
Nationalist  deputies  asserted  that  a  Jewish 
banker  had,  on  behalf  of  the  company,  distrib- 
uted #600,000  among  a  hundred  and  fifty  depu- 
ties. Two  other  Jews  of  German  origin  were 
said  to  be  concerned  in  these  operations.  Con- 
servatives, Nationalists,  and  anti-Semites  made 
the  most  of  the  Panama  revelations.  They  dis- 
seminated every  rumor  and  innuendo  tending  to 
compromise  Republican  politicians.  Men  like 
Rouvier,  de  Freycinet,  Floquet,  were  driven 
from  office;  Clemenceau  lost  his  seat  in  the 
Chamber.  There  was  much  talk  of  a  mysterious 
list  of  104  deputies  who  had  been  bribed.  The 
truth  was  never  fully  revealed;  the  politicians 
escaped  with  nothing  worse  than  damaged  repu- 
tations. But  since  some  charges  had  been  proved 
and  other  charges  appeared  only  too  plausible, 
"Panama"  bred  a  deep-seated  distrust  of  poli- 
ticians. It  helped  to  bring  about  that  cynicism 
and  disillusionment  which  seems  to  be  sapping 
the  vitality  of  the  democratic  regime  in  France 
as  in  other  countries. 
The  The  country  was  still  agitated  by  the  "Pan- 

orRe-  ama"  charges  when  the  election  of  1893  took 
publican  place.  The  Right  (Conservatives),  that  had 
lies.  hoped  to  make  capital  out  of  the  discrediting  of 

1893  Republican    politicians,    met    with    reverses;     it 

[286] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

carried  only  about  65  constituencies.  Some  of 
its  former  strength  had  been  drawn  off  by  the 
foundation  of  a  new  group  known  first  as  the 
"Rallies"  and  later  as  the  "Action  Liberate 
Populaire.,, 

In  the  Seize  Mai  and  in  the  Boulanger  episode 
the  Church  had  maintained  its  old  alliance  with 
the  monarchist  cause  whose  leaders  were  exploit- 
ing the  Church  for  political  ends  and  identifying 
it  with  reaction.  The  liberal-minded  Pope,  Leo 
XIII,  was  under  no  illusions;  he  saw  that  the 
French  people  would  cleave  to  the  Republic  and 
that  an  anti-Republican  Church  would  steadily 
lose  ground.  In  1892,  just  after  the  Count  of 
Paris  had  declared  that  Christianity  could  be 
saved  only  by  a  restoration  of  monarchy,  he  issued 
an  encyclical  urging  Catholics  to  "rally"  to  the 
Republic.  Most  of  the  Royalist  leaders  received 
this  appeal  with  ill-disguised  contempt.  Count 
Albert  de  Mun  and  Jacques  Piou,  however, 
organized  a  campaign  in  1893;  and  though  both 
were  defeated  in  the  elections,  some  thirty  of  their 
followers  entered  the  new  Chamber  as  Rallies. 
The  Republicans  were  frankly  sceptical.  They 
regarded  the  movement  as  an  effort  to  penetrate 
the  Republican  camp  and  give  it  over  to  the 
enemy.1    For  some  time  the  Rallies  increased  in 

1  Perhaps  there  was  ground  for  this  suspicion.  Fifteen 
years  earlier,  a  church  dignitary  had  suggested  a  similar 
strategy  to  the  Count  of  Chambord.  Vizetelly,  op.  cit.t 
page  282. 

C287] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

strength  and  gave  support  to  moderate  minis- 
tries (such  as  that  of  Meline,  1 896-1 898).  They 
became  a  more  important  group  than  the  Right; 
but  the  conflict  between  the  church  and  the 
state  in  the  early  years  of  the  century  inter- 
rupted their  development,  temporarily  at  least. 
Rise  The  elections  of  1893  also  brought  the  Socialists 

Socialist  mto  Prommence-  Although  the  Socialists  of  this 
Party  period  belonged  to  many  shifting  factions  rather 
than  to  a  party,  they  had  made  themselves  felt 
in  French  politics  for  a  decade  or  more.  A  few 
Socialists  found  their  way  into  the  Chamber; 
in  1889  (as  already  mentioned)  as  many  as  17. 
In  1893,  having  used  "Panama"  as  a  sad  ex- 
ample of  bourgeois  mismanagement,  and  having 
condemned  the  severity  of  the  administration 
in  dealing  with  labor  disturbances  that  year, 
they  won  50  seats.  Among  their  leaders  were 
Guesde,  Jaures,  Millerand,  and  Sembat.  Alexan- 
dre Millerand  laid  down  the  Socialist  program  at 
Saint-Mande  in  1896:  Nationalization  of  all  means 
of  production  and  exchange  as  soon  as  the  time 
should  be  ripe  for  such  a  transformation;  Social- 
ist control  of  the  government  by  means  of  uni- 
versal suffrage;  and  an  international  understand- 
ing among  working  people.  This  did  not  go  far 
enough  to  suit  all  Socialists;  but  it  was  accepted  as 
a  minimum  program  even  by  the  devoted  Marxian, 
Jules  Guesde.  Some  of  these  Socialist  deputies 
were  already  familiar  to  the  Chamber  as  Radicals 
of  yesterday.  The  Radicals  sometimes  found  it 
[288] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMEN 

difficult  to  remain  Radicals  without  becoming 
Socialists.  Their  leader,  Leon  Bourgeois,  con- 
demned the  Saint-Mande  program.  "I  am  not 
a  collectivism"  he  said,  ''because  there  is  no 
agreement  between  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  ideas  of  the  collectivists,  which  are  un- 
French  in  their  origin."  But  already  some  of 
the  Radicals,  while  adhering  to  the  principle  of 
private  property,  were  ready  to  go  part  way  with 
the  Socialists.  They  began  to  style  themselves 
Radical-Socialists. 

The  Moderates,  with  nearly  three  hundred  Homo- 
deputies,  remained  by  far  the  most  powerful 
group.  But  "Panama"  had  produced  discords  of 
and  removed  some  of  the  old  leaders.  New  men 
now  came  to  the  front:  Casimir-Perier,  Ray-  and 
mond  Poincare,  Louis  Barthou,  Paul  Deschanel, 
and  Charles  Dupuy.  The  differences  between  the 
Moderates  and  the  Radicals  were  accentuated 
by  the  repressive  measures  taken  against  the 
anarchists  in  1894.  For  a  time  an  experiment 
was  made  with  homogeneous  ministries,  that  is, 
ministries  drawn  from  a  single  party:  Bourgeois 
(Radical)  1 895-1 896,  Meline  (Moderate)  1896- 
1898.  Of  course,  such  ministries  could  hold 
office  only  with  the  support  of  outside  groups 
secured  by  legislative  favors  and  promises. 

Presidential  elections  occurred  in  1894  and 
1895.  Towards  the  end  of  his  term  Sadi  Carnot 
was  assassinated  at  Lyons.  This  tragic  event 
came   as   the    culmination   of  a   long   series   of 

[289] 


geneous 
cabinets 


Bour- 
geoi 


Meline 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  anarchist  outrages  which   had   led  many  to  be- 

^esi"        lieve  in  the  existence  of  a  vast   anti-social   con- 

aency : 

casimir-  spiracy.  It  greatly  strengthened  conservative 
^ier  tendencies  for  the  moment  and  made  possible 
Faure  the  election  of  Casimir-Perier,  youngest  and 
ablest  of  the  Presidents.  Like  his  father 
and  grandfather  he  had  held  high  political 
office;  but  at  the  same  time  he  was  engaged 
in  large  business  enterprises  and  ranked  as  one 
of  the  richest  men  in  France.  He  possessed 
exceptional  force  of  character,  an  imperious  will, 
and  a  fighting  spirit  which  was  not  well  suited 
to  the  restricted  functions  of  the  presidency.  He 
remained  in  office  only  six  months.  Subjected 
to  abuse  and  slander  in  the  press,1  kept  in  the 
dark  by  his  ministers  as  to  the  most  important 
transactions,  he  withdrew  from  the  Elysee  in 
disgust.  Faure  succeeded  him  (January,  1895), 
the  son  of  a  carpenter,  who  (with  the  help  of  a 
legacy)  had  made  an  ample  fortune  as  a  dealer 
in  hides.  He  was  a  vain  man  who  wished  to 
magnify  his  office,  not  by  autocratic  behavior 
toward  the  cabinet,  but  by  courting  popularity 
and  making  the  Elysee  once  more  the  center  of 
Alliance  social  life.  His  vanity  was  indulged  by  the  visit 
of  the  Czar  and  Czarina  in  1896  and  by  his  own 
visit  to  Russia  in  1897.  I*  was  on  tne  latter 
occasion  that  the  Dual  Alliance  between  France 
and  Russia  was  first  formally  announced  to  the 

1  His  treatment  of  labor  in  the  Anzin  mines  had  earned 
him  the  title  of  "The  Vampire  of  Anzin." 
[290] 


with 
Russia 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

world.  This  alliance  between  democracy  and 
despotism  came  as  the  necessary  answer  to  the 
formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  (Germany, 
Austria,  and  Italy),  and  the  provocative  atti- 
tude of  Germany.  Although  offensive  to  the 
Socialists,  it  did  give  increased  security  to  France 
and  removed  something  of  the  apprehension 
which  had  haunted  the  country  since  1870. 

In  the  early  '90*5  it  seemed  that  an  era  of 
reconciliation  was  beginning.  Spiiller,  when 
minister  of  public  instruction  in  1894,  spoke 
eloquently  of  the  "new  spirit"  of  benevolence 
which  was  to  obliterate  old  animosities  and  usher 
in  the  reign  of  justice  and  common  sense.  The 
Moderates,  indeed,  showed  a  disposition  to  ac- 
cept the  proffered  hand  of  the  Rallies.  Un- 
fortunately, just  at  this  juncture  the  country 
was  rent  by  a  new  convulsion,  the  most  severe 
and  most  disastrous  which  the  young  Republic 
had  experienced. 

In  1894,  Captain  Alfred  Dreyfus,  an  Alsatian  The 
Jew,  was  convicted  by  court-martial  of  betray- 
ing military  secrets  to  a  foreign  power.  At  first 
the  conviction  passed  unchallenged  except  by 
his  family  and  friends.  But  gradually  —  through 
the  efforts  of  courageous  and  disinterested  men, 
such  as  Colonel  Picquart,  Senator  Scheurer- 
Kestner,  and  Emile  Zola  —  startling  facts  were 
brought  to  light  which  seemed  to  indicate 
that  guilt  had  been  fastened  upon  Dreyfus  in 
order   to    divert    suspicion    from    a    disreputable 

[291] 


Dreyfus 
affair 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

soldier  of  fortune,  Major  Esterhazy,  and  that 
men  in  high  places  were  deliberately  suppressing 
the  truth  in  order  to  protect  the  "honor"  of  the 
army.  In  the  face  of  widespread  suspicions, 
which  tended  to  become  more  definite,  the 
charges  against  Esterhazy  could  not  safely  be 
ignored;  he  was  brought  to  trial  and  acquitted 
—  by  order,  Zola  declared.  Soon  afterwards  the 
minister  of  war  made  a  speech  before  the  Cham- 
ber in  which  he  sought,  by  means  of  new  docu- 
mentary proofs,  to  quiet  any  remaining  doubts 
of  Dreyfus'  guilt.  The  Chamber  was  convinced; 
the  speech  was  placarded  throughout  France; 
and  then,  to  the  confusion  of  the  anti-Dreyfus- 
ists,  it  transpired  that  the  documents  had  been 
forged  by  Colonel  Henry,  head  of  the  intelli- 
gence department  of  the  war  office.  Henry  cut 
his  throat.  Esterhazy  fled.  Although  Dreyfus, 
granted  a  new  trial,  was  convicted  again,  the 
court  discovered  extenuating  circumstances,  im- 
posed a  very  light  sentence,  and  recommended 
mercy.  The  government  granted  a  pardon 
(September,  1899).  In  other  words,  the  rancor- 
ous controversy  which  by  this  time  had  divided 
France  into  two  hostile  camps,  was  to  be  set  at  rest 
by  compromise,  a  compromise  calculated  to  soothe 
the  Dreyfusists  and  at  the  same  time  save  the 
face  of  the  army.  The  Dreyfusists  did  not  accept 
this  solution,  however;  they  demanded  complete 
vindication.  In  1906,  after  the  Court  of  Cassa- 
tion had  set  aside  the  second  verdict,  Dreyfus  was 
[292] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

restored  to  the  army  with  the  rank  of  major  and 
decorated  with  the  cross  of  the  Legion  of 
Honor. 

Naturally  the  Dreyfus  affair  had  important  its 
political  effects.  It  was  utilized,  says  Bodley,1  l^^1 
"by  the  Reactionaries  against  the  Republic,  by 
the  clericals  against  the  non-Catholics,  by  the 
anti-clericals  against  the  church,  by  the  military 
party  against  the  parliamentarians,  and  by  the 
revolutionary  Socialists  against  the  army.  It 
was  also  conspicuously  used  by  rival  Republican 
politicians  against  one  another,  and  the  chaos 
of  political  groups  was  further  confused  by  it." 
Every  one  took  sides.  The  most  significant  as- 
pect of  the  controversy  was  the  close  alliance 
between  army  and  church  —  the  army  which 
had  blundered  into  condemning  an  innocent  man 
and  which,  to  disguise  its  mistake,  had  denounced 
every  accusation  as  dictated  by  unpatriotic 
motives;  the  church,  which  had  in  every  other 
crisis  (such  as  the  Seize  Mai  and  the  Boulanger 
affair)  shown  its  hostility  to  the  Republic  and 
whose  clergy  and  newspapers  now  gave  pas- 
sionate support  to  the  army.  Both  army  and 
church  suffered  for  this.  Republicans,  except 
those  of  the  conservative  sort,  became  pacifists 
and  (to  put  it  mildly)  anti-clericals.  They  formed 
a  combination  known  as  the  bloc  which  purged 
the   army  of  its   reactionary  officers,   freed   the 

1  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  eleventh  edition,  Vol.  X,  page 
883. 

C293] 


Rousseau 
cabinet 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

schools  of  ecclesiastical  domination,  and  effected 
a  complete  divorce  between  church  and  state. 
Elections  It  was  not  the  elections  of  1898,1  occurring  as 
La  the  tney  ^id  before  the  dramatic  suicide  of  Henry, 
Waideck-  but  the  subsequent  developments  of  the  Drey- 
fus affair  that  led  to  the  new  political  combi- 
nations. The  elections  had  made  no  marked 
changes  in  the  complexion  of  the  Chamber. 
While  the  Right  lost  some  twenty  seats,  the 
Rallies,  or  Action  Liberale  Populaire  (who  had 
much  in  common  with  the  Right),  gained  eight 
seats,  and  a  new  group  of  Nationalists  (former 
Boulangists  and  anti-Semites)  won  twelve  or  fif- 
teen seats.  Among  the  Republicans,  the  Progress- 
ists (or  Moderates)  were  weakened  by  successes 
of  the  Radicals  and  Radical-Socialists  (now  178 
deputies)  and  the  Socialists  (now  57  deputies). 
For  a  time  it  was  uncertain  what  kind  of  a  ma- 
jority could  be  held  together  in  support  of  a 
cabinet.  Meline,  who  had  been  premier  since 
1896  with  a  homogeneous  ministry  of  Moderates, 
was  forced  out  of  office  when  he  allied  himself 
with  the  Right,  a  resolution  of  the  Chamber  de- 
claring that  the  government  should  rely  upon 
"an  exclusively  Republican  majority."  He  was 
followed  by  Brisson  (Radical  cabinet)  and 
Dupuy  (Republican  concentration  cabinet).  In 
the  meantime   (February,   1899)   the  election  of 

1  Parliament,  finding  the  autumn  elections  inconvenient, 
had  postponed  the  election  period  from  September,  1897,  to 
May,  1898. 

[294] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Emile  Loubet  as  President,  upon  the  death  of 
Felix  Faure,  was  interpreted  as  a  victory  for  the 
Dreyfusists.  The  reactionaries,  who  felt  that 
France  was  escaping  them,  made  hostile  de- 
monstrations; they  assaulted  Loubet  at  the  Au- 
teuil  races;  a  few  months  later  they  actually 
conspired  to  overthrow  the  Republic.  There 
were  ominous  signs  of  insubordination  among 
officers  of  the  army.  It  required  a  strong  hand 
and  a  definite  policy  to  check  such  manifesta- 
tions. In  June,  1899,  Waldeck-Rousseau  formed 
his  cabinet  of  "Republican  defense." 

"Republican  defense"  differed  from  "Re- 
publican concentration"  in  the  fact  that  it 
implied  a  policy  of  retaliation  against  the  ene- 
mies of  the  Republic  in  army  and  church.  It 
implied  also  a  wider  sweep  to  the  Left.  Not  only 
were  Radicals  brought  into  the  cabinet;  the 
Socialist  Alexandre  Millerand,  author  of  the 
Saint-Mande  program,  became  minister  of  com- 
merce and  industry.  This  union  of  the  groups 
of  the  Left  —  a  few  revolutionary  Socialists  and 
somewhat  more  than  half  the  Progressists  held 
aloof — soon  came  to  be  known  as  the  Republi- 
can bloc.  It  lasted  till  1905  when  the  Socialists, 
refusing  further  cooperation  with  bourgeois  gov- 
ernments, withdrew. 

Waldeck-Rousseau    was    not    opposed    to    the   The 
church,    but    to    those    elements    in    the    church    tion°°ia" 
which  were  most  active  in  propaganda  against   Law, 
the    Republic  —  the   religious   orders,   and   espe- 

[295] 


1901 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

cially  the  Jesuits  and  Assumptionists.  He  carried 
through  Parliament  (1901)  the  Associations  Law. 
This  law,  designed  primarily  to  authorize  trade 
unions,  dealt  specifically  with  the  religious  orders 
as  well.  The  orders  could  be  authorized  only 
by  statute;  they  could,  after  authorization,  be 
dissolved  by  decree;  and  no  member  of  any 
unauthorized  order  could  conduct  any  educa- 
tional establishment  or  teach  in  one. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  elections  of  1902 
gave  evidence  of  enthusiasm  even  for  this  mild 
anti-clerical  measure.  In  the  new  Chamber  the 
ministry  had  a  majority  of  little  more  than  50 
votes,  the  Progressists  —  led  by  Meline,  Ribot, 
and  Charles  Dupuy  —  having  allied  themselves 
with  the  opposition.1  On  June  6  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  resigned.  Because  of  his  forceful  per- 
sonality and  sound  judgment,  perhaps  still  more 
because  of  the  formation  of  the  bloc,  he  had  held 
office  longer  than  any  premier  under  the  Third 
Republic  —  almost  three  years.  Ill  health  and 
the  prospect  of  an  embittered  struggle  compelled 
him  to  retire.  His  mantle  fell  upon  ftmile  Combes 
who  lacked  both  the  force  of  Waldeck-Rousseau 
and  his  broad  vision. 

Combes  had,  as  the  fortunes  of  French  pre- 
miers go,  a  long  tenure  of  office  (1902-1905);    but 

1  The  government  forces  included  48  ministerial  Republi- 
cans (former  Progressists),  228  Radicals  and  Radical-Social- 
ists, and  45  Socialists;  the  opposition  forces,  45  Nationalists, 
33  Right,  50  Rallies,  and  140  Progressists. 

[296] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

during  that  period  he  was  less  the  leader  than  Combes 
the  servant  of  the  majority.  Under  Waldeck-  ^L^Jj. 
Rousseau  the  four  groups  of  the  Left  (Democratic  can  moo, 
Union  or  Ministerial  Republicans,  Radical  Left,  £0~ 
Radicals  and  Radical-Socialists,  and  Socialists) 
had  begun  to  act  through  a  joint  committee,  the 
Delegation  of  the  Lefts.  Under  Combes  that 
committee  usurped  the  direction  of  policy. 
"The  cabinet  during  the  three  years  he  held 
office,"  says  Dimnet,1  "was  purely  a  name;  the 
heads  of  parliamentary  groups,  meeting  regu- 
larly the  prime  minister  and  informing  him  in 
advance  of  the  pleasure  of  their  adherents,  did 
duty  for  the  ministers."  "Every  day  the  cabi- 
net would  meet  as  usual  at  the  Elysee,  and  the 
routine  of  government  seemed  just  the  same  as 
ever;  every  day  also  a  consultation  of  a  much 
more  practical  character  was  held  at  the  Cham- 
ber in  the  premier's  office.  There  M.  Combes 
met  the  chiefs  and  whips  of  the  various  groups, 
not,  of  course,  in  the  whole  Chamber,  but  in  the 
majority;  submitted  to  them  the  order  of  the 
day,  took  their  opinions,  made  sure  by  a  very 
simple  calculation  of  the  number  of  votes  that 
each  opinion  represented,  and  decided  upon 
ministerial  action  accordingly."  2 

In  his  attitude  towards  the  church,  Combes  Combes 
was  prepared  to  go  much  further  than  Waldeck-  ^urche 
Rousseau.     He  had  studied  for  the  priesthood; 

1  France  Herself  A gain,  page  62. 

2  Dimnet,  op.  cit.,  page  115. 

[297] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

he  had  written  an  essay  on  St.  Thomas  Aquinas; 
and  now  he  hated  the  church  with  a  deep  and 
abiding  hatred.  Perhaps  he  represented  the 
dominant  temper  of  the  country.  The  hostile 
reception  which  the  church  had  given  to  the 
Associations  Law,  a  legitimate  and  even  a  gener- 
ous measure,  seemed  to  show  that  the  time  for 
moderation  was  past.  If  extreme  counsels  pre- 
vailed under  Combes,  the  church  —  mixing  in 
politics,  inculcating  anti-Republican  doctrines, 
refusing  to  recognize  the  claims  of  modern 
liberalism  —  clearly  must  bear  a  large  share  in 
the  blame.  Combes  acted  with  severity.  He 
used  the  law  to  suppress  rather  than  to  regulate 
the  religious  orders,  easily  persuading  the  cham- 
bers to  refuse  authorization  and  afterwards,  in 
the  face  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  monks 
and  their  sympathizers  as  well  as  disobedience 
on  the  part  of  certain  army  officers,  closing  some 
fifteen  hundred  establishments. 
Separa-  It  was  Combes  who  took  the  first  steps  toward 

Hon  of       tjie   separation   of  church    and   state.      He   had 
and  become  involved   in   disputes  over  the   appoint- 

ment of  bishops,  the  visit  of  President  Loubet 
to  the  King  of  Italy  (which  gave  great  offense  to 
Pius  X),  and  other  matters.  A  complete  breach 
of  diplomatic  relations  ensued.  Papers  seized 
in  the  papal  legation  showed  that  the  nuncio  had 
been  intriguing  actively  in  French  politics.  It 
was  this  situation  that  persuaded  Combes  to 
propose   the   denunciation   of  the   Concordat  of 

[298] 


state 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

1801,  an  agreement  between  Napoleon  I  and 
the  Pope,  settling  the  terms  of  union  between 
church  and  state.  The  Separation  Law,  which 
was  adopted  at  the  close  of  1905,  nearly  eleven 
months  after  the  fall  of  Combes,  was  largely  the 
work  of  the  Socialist  Aristide  Briand  who  re- 
ported it  from  committee.  Under  this  law  the 
government  gave  up  all  right  to  nominate  or 
appoint  bishops,  guaranteed  pensions  to  aged 
priests,  and  left  the  churches  in  the  hands  of 
local  associations  which  the  clergy  could  form 
very  much  as  they  saw  fit.  The  Roman  Catholic 
Church  was  simply  given  a  status  such  as  it  had 
in  England  or  in  the  United  States.  The  Vatican 
might  have  dampened  the  zeal  of  its  enemies  by 
a  ready  acquiescence;  but  ignoring  the  fact  that 
a  great  part  of  the  French  people  had  come  to 
distrust  the  church  and  even  repudiate  the  form 
of  Christianity  that  the  church  taught,  Pius 
X  refused  to  recognize  the  law.  His  bitter 
attacks  upon  the  government  merely  strength- 
ened anti-clerical  feeling.  The  elections  of  1906 
gave  the  opposition,  which  included  66  Progress- 
ists of  the  Meline  school,  only  174  of  the  591 
deputies.  The  four  groups  supporting  the  gov- 
ernment controlled  343  votes.  Further  to  the 
left  were  the  independent  Socialists  (22  dep- 
uties) and  the  Unified  Socialists  (52  deputies), 
groups  which,  in  1906,  no  longer  adhered  to  the 
bloc. 

The  Combes  ministry  was  pacifist  as  well  as 

[299] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

anti-clerical.  It  was,  after  all,  under  the  control 
Pacifist  of  the  Socialists  who,  by  threats  of  secession, 
Panda  could  exact  terms  for  their  continued  support. 
Jaures,  the  Socialist  leader,  was  in  a  position  to 
dictate  the  cabinet  policy,  on  certain  points  at 
least.  The  Socialist  belief  in  pacifism  and  inter- 
nationalism found  in  Combes  a  ready  convert 
who  allowed  the  red  flag  instead  of  the  tricolor 
to  be  displayed  on  official  occasions  and  the 
"Internationale"  to  be  played  instead  of  the 
"Marseillaise."  Throughout  the  country,  in- 
deed, patriotism  was  at  a  low  ebb.  It  was  said 
that  the  absorption  of  France  by  another  State 
would  be  no  calamity  for  the  people;  a  professor 
in  the  Superior  Normal  School  condemned  pa- 
triotism before  his  classes  and  was  not  repri- 
manded. Never  had  belief  in  the  fraternity  of 
nations  been  so  complete.  "War  appeared  as 
a  barbarous  impossibility,"  says  Dimnet,1  "and 
the  chief  preoccupation  of  the  ministers  of  war 
and  marine  was  to  civilize  the  army  and  navy, 
turn  the  ships  and  barracks  into  institutions  for 
the  civic  perfection  of  young  Frenchmen,  and, 
in  short,  prepare  the  world  for  universal  peace." 
Officers  were  expected  to  teach  the  arts  of  peace; 
they  lectured  on  such  subjects  as  the  raising  of 
bees  and  pigeons.  General  Andre,  the  minister 
of  war,  falling  in  with  the  pacifist  point  of  view, 
introduced  a  bill  to  reduce  military  service  from 
three  to  two  years,  a  bill  which  was  passed 
1  Op.  city  page  81. 
[300] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

shortly  after  the  fall  of  Combes  and  which, 
though  placing  France  at  an  obvious  disadvan- 
tage in  case  of  German  attack,  was  not  repealed 
till  191 3.  Under  the  journalist  minister,  Camille 
Pelletan,  the  navy,  like  the  army,  fell  into 
disorganization. 

Combes  wished  to  republicanize  and  democ-  Fail  of 
ratize  the  army.  The  Dreyfus  affair  had  shown  Combes 
the  need  of  taking  measures  of  this  kind.  Year 
after  year  two  hundred  thousand  young  men 
passed  into  the  army  and  were  subjected  too 
often  to  anti-Republican  influences.  In  "purify- 
ing" the  army,  however,  General  Andre  resorted 
to  methods  which  were  quite  as  objectionable  as 
the  clerical  intrigues  denounced  by  the  govern- 
ment. He  made  use  of  secret  information  sent 
in  by  Freemasons.  Officers  were  spied  upon 
even  by  their  fellow-officers;  if  they  went  to 
church,  if  they  carried  prayer  books,  if  they 
failed  to  show  proper  regard  for  the  prefect,  the 
minister  of  war  heard  about  it.  Some  of  the 
secret  reports  came  into  the  hands  of  a  Catholic 
deputy  and,  when  published  by  him,  damaged 
the  cabinet  irretrievably.  Combes  did  not  wait 
to  be  voted  out.  In  January,  1905,  when  his 
majority  was  reduced  to  six,  he  delivered  his 
resignation  to  the  President.  Not  the  general 
policies  of  the  cabinet,  but  the  methods  of  car- 
rying them  out  had  alienated  his  supporters. 
Maurice  Rouvier  who  succeeded  him  was  a 
milder  man.     He  stopped  the  removal  of  army 

[301] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OP   FRANCE 

officers;  he  appealed,  in  a  rather  cryptic  fashion, 
to  "an  enlarged  majority";  and  he  gained  the 
support  of  a  good  many  Progressists,  although 
he  admitted  none  of  them  to  office.  He  succeeded 
in  carrying  to  final  passage  the  measures  reduc- 
ing the  term  of  military  service  and  separating 
Church  and  State;  but,  accused  by  some  of 
being  too  mild,  and  by  others  of  being  too  harsh 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  Separation  Law,  he 
was  compelled  to  resign  in  March,  1906,  shortly 
after  the  election  of  Armand  Fallieres  as  the 
successor  to  President  Loubet. 
"Unifi-  Meanwhile    a    momentous    change    had    been 

ri  the"  taking  place  in  French  political  life.  Hitherto, 
Socialist  the  Socialist  deputies,  though  increasing  in  num- 
lsoT'  Ders>  nad  Deen  ne^  together  by  no  regular  party 
organization.  They  had  professed  divergent 
views;  they  had  belonged  to  divergent  factions. 
But,  in  1905,  after  a  Socialist  congress  at  Am- 
sterdam had  condemned  participation  in  bour- 
geois governments,  these  factions  composed  their 
differences,  expressed  common  faith  in  the  pure 
gospel  of  Karl  Marx,  and  joined  hands  in  the 
Unified  Socialist  party  —  the  French  section  of 
the  international  Socialist  party.  The  new  party 
formulated  strict  rules  to  bind  local  federations 
in    their    choice    of    parliamentary    candidates,1 

1  As  to  electoral  tactics,  the  local  federations  were  left  free 

to    recommend    compromise    candidates    whenever    Socialist 

candidates  had  been  unsuccessful  on  the  first  ballot.     (The 

conduct  of  elections  is  explained   in  Chapter  VI.)     Jaures 

[302] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

and  it  not  only  forbade  Socialist  deputies  taking 
office  in  the  cabinet,  but  placed  them  under  the 
control  of  the  party's  national  council.  Not  all 
the  Socialists  in  parliament  entered  the  party. 
Those  who  believed  in  cooperating  with  other 
groups  of  the  Left  remained  outside  and  took 
the  name  of  Independent  Socialists  or  (later) 
Socialist  Republicans.  Some  of  them  were  men 
of  great  eminence:  Alexandre  Millerand,  Victor 
Augagneur,  Aristide  Briand,  Rene  Viviani.  The 
cleavage  between  Unified  Socialists  and  Inde- 
pendent Socialists  was  illustrated  in  October, 
1905,  when  a  banquet  was  tendered  to  Aristide 
Briand  as  a  tribute  for  his  services  in  shaping 
the  Separation  Law.  Jaures  took  no  notice  of 
an  invitation  to  attend  the  banquet;  Briand,  in 
the  course  of  his  address,  deprecated  the  attitude 
of  aloofness,  of  criticism  without  responsibility, 
which  the  Unified  Socialists  had  assumed. 

The  founding  of  this  new  party  and  its  steady    its  effect 
accretion  of  strength  may  have  a  wholesome  effect   [jJJJJ 
upon  parliamentary  conditions.     The  Socialists,    parties 
like  the  monarchists  who  have  now  disappeared 
as    a    serious   political   force,   are  irreconcilables. 
They  wish  to  transform  the  government,  not  by 
the  slow  process  of  legislative  reforms,  not  by 
cooperating  with  bourgeois  governments  as  they 
did  while  Combes  was  in  office,  but  by  revolu- 

favored  this  concession  because  it  would  help  the  Republicans 
of  the  Left  against  the  Reactionaries;  Guesde  opposed  it  as  a 
sacrifice  of  principle. 

[303] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tion.  The  more  formidable  the  Socialists  grow, 
the  more  ready  will  the  Republican  groups  be  to 
combine  in  defense  of  existing  institutions.  The 
new  menace  on  the  Left  will  compel  some  ap- 
proach to  union,  as  did  the  old  menace  on  the 
Right;  indeed,  since  the  Socialists  are  much 
better  organized  than  the  monarchists  were, 
much  more  united,  and  much  more  hopeful  for 
the  future  of  their  cause,  an  effective  union  may 
reasonably  be  expected.  Perhaps  something  like 
a  two-party  system  may  emerge  before  long. 
"The  bourgeois  Republicans  of  all  denomina- 
tions," says  Guerard,1  "aspire  to  form  a  party 
of  social  conservation,  whose  sole  enemies  would 
be  the  Socialists,  trade-unionists,  and  anti-mili- 
tarists. The  sooner  this  evolution  is  completed, 
the  sooner  definite  lines  are  drawn,  the  better 
for  French  political  life,  which  suffers  from  the 
prevailing  confusion  of  party  names,  principles, 
and  policies." 
The  The    consolidation    of    Socialist    factions    was 

"Tyn-      itself  the  outcome  of  a   menace  on  the  Left  — 
dicaiism     Syndicalism.2      The    workmen,    or    rather    the 
more  turbulent  spirits  among  them,  had  begun 
to    show    disquieting    symptoms:     symptoms    of 

1  French  Civilization  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (19 14),  page 

173- 

2  See  L.  Levine,  The  Labor  Movement  in  France  (191 2: 
revised  ed.,  1914);  G.  Weill,  Histoire  du  Mouvement  Social 
en  France  de  18 52-1910  (2d  ed.,  191 2);  A.  L.  Guerard,  op. 
cit.;   J.  A.  Estey,  Revolutionary  Syndicalism  (191 3). 

[304] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

impatience  with  parliamentary  Socialism,  which 
seemed  to  have  become  "harmless  and  respect- 
able"; with  the  Socialist  politicians,  who  were 
nothing  but  bourgeois  after  all;  and  with  the 
somewhat  distant  prospect  of  establishing  the 
Socialistic  millennium  only  when  the  political 
machinery  had  been  captured.  They  felt  that 
the  class  struggle  was  economic,  not  political; 
and  from  the  economic  standpoint  they  were 
organized  in  syndicates  or  trade  unions  which, 
though  formerly  submissive  to  the  will  of  Socialist 
politicians,  were  now  controlled  by  the  anar- 
chistic General  Federation  of  Labor  (Confedera- 
tion Generale  du  Travail).  The  Syndicalists  still 
adhered  to  Socialist  doctrines,  but  they  wished 
to  employ  methods  of  their  own.  They  believed 
in  "  direct  action,"  in  violence,  in  taking  what 
they  wanted  by  force.1  Direct  action  might  take 
the  form  of  slow  work,  inferior  work,  destruction 
of  property  (sabotage),  or,  above  all,  the  strike. 
By  striking,  the  Syndicalists  could  not  only 
obtain  material  advantages,  but  they  could  at 
the  same  time  accentuate  the  class  struggle  and 
open  the  way  to  the  final  goal  which  was  to  be 
achieved  by  means  of  a  general  strike.  The  final 
goal?  Apparently  it  involved  the  ownership  of 
industries  by  the  operatives  and  the  substitu- 
tion of  an  industrial  state  —  a  federation  of  labor 

1  Georges  Sorel,  in  his  Illusions  du  Progres  and  Reflexions 
sur  la  violence  (which  may  be  had  in  translation),  has  lent  a 
certain  dignity  to  this  Syndicalist  philosophy  of  force. 

[305] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

unions  —  for  the  political  state.  This  movement 
threatened  seriously  to  deplete  the  Socialist 
ranks.  In  fact,  the  very  existence  of  the  State 
seemed  to  be  imperiled  in  the  years  1906-1910. 
Disorder  prevailed  on  every  hand.  Syndicalism 
invaded  the  government  services; 1  the  postal 
employees  struck;  the  railroad  employees  struck; 
the  vine-growers  of  the  south  rose  in  rebellion. 
The  state  was  saved  by  the  sudden  resurgence  of 
French  nationalism  under  the  stimulus  of  Ger- 
man aggressions  and  by  the  firm  leadership  of 
Georges  Clemenceau  and  Aristide  Briand. 
inter-  For    some    time    the    importance    of   interna- 

nationai     tjonai  relations  had  been  obscured  by  a  succes- 

relations:  t  " 

the  sion  of  domestic  crises.     Boulanger,  '  Panama, 

Entente  Dreyfus>  and  the  anti-clerical  legislation  had 
intervened.  The  Lansdowne-Cambon  conven- 
tion of  1904  had  settled  controversies  which 
might  have  drawn  France  and  Great  Britain 
into  war,  France  recognizing  British  predomi- 
nance in  Egypt,  and  receiving  in  return  a  free 
hand  in  Morocco.  This  Entente  Cordiale,  which 
was  necessitated  by  the  growing  power  and  ambi- 
tion of  Germany,  gave  France  a  new  sense  of 
security;  the  sky  was  clear;  and  the  man  in  the 
street,  so  far  as  he  speculated  about  the  future, 
seemed  to  have  found  salvation  in  the  cult  of 
pacifism  and  international  brotherhood.  Ger- 
many, however  —  and  even  German  Socialists, 
in  spite  of  their  pacifistic  mouthings  —  lived  in 
1  See  Chapter  IV. 
[306] 


GEORGES  CLEMENCEAU 

Bust  by  Rodin 


•   . . 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

a  dream  of  world  domination  and  wished  to  make 
that  dream  an  actuality.  The  collapse  of  France's 
ally,  Russia,  in  her  war  with  Japan  (1904-1905) 
gave  Germany  a  chance  safely  to  test  the 
strength  of  the  Entente  Cordiale.  On  March 
31,  1905,  the  Kaiser,  landing  at  Tangier,  declared 
that  his  visit  was  a  recognition  of  the  independ-  The 
ence  of  Morocco  This  was  an  affront  to  France  JJjJJ800 
with  her  special  interests  in  Morocco;  but  France, 
in  view  of  the  disorganization  of  army  and  navy 
and  the  prostration  of  her  ally  before  Japan, 
could  not  risk  the  prospect  of  war,  even  with  the 
assistance  of  Great  Britain.  She  dropped  her 
foreign  minister,  Delcasse,  whose  policy  had 
tended  towards  the  isolation  of  Germany,  and 
agreed  to  submit  the  Moroccan  question  to 
an  international  conference.  Unfortunately,  this 
conference,  which  was  held  at  Algeciras  in  1906 
and  which  conceded  certain  special  privileges  to 
France,  did  not  bring  the  controversy  to  an  end. 
Friction  continued.  It  was  not  till  191 1,  when 
war  was  so  imminent  that  the  British  ministry 
felt  it  advisable  publicly  to  announce  its  support 
of  France,  that  Germany  acknowledged  the  para- 
mount position  of  France  in  Morocco  in  return 
for  a  large  strip  of  territory  in  the  Congo.  Next 
year  Morocco  became  a  French  protectorate. 

The  truculence  of  Germany  had  startled  and   Revival 
angered   the   French    people.      It   had   suddenly   ^t^i' 
awakened  them  to  the  danger  of  an  unbearable 
foreign  domination.     "The  Tangier  affair  was  a 

[307] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

flash    of    lightning.      After    which    the    clouds 
lifted,''   says    Ernest   Dimnet.     "It  was  one  of 
those    events    which    rapidly    destroy    a    whole 
system  of  thought  or,  at  any  rate,  throw    into 
the    shade   the   protagonists   who   only    a    short 
time  ago  seemed  alone  to  hold  the  field,  mean- 
while liberating  another  system   until  then   un- 
noticed  or  disregarded.     What  has   been  called 
the    regeneration    of    France    dated    from    that 
shock."     "In  truth  it  is  on  the  memory  of  those 
moments  that  France  has  lived  ever  since,  and 
her  fountain  of  new  energy  rose  when  she  real- 
ized the  significance  of  the  Kaiser's  demonstra- 
tion in  Morocco."  * 
Vigorous         The    country    now    felt    the    need    of   capable 
shftf"       leadership.     The   Radical-Socialist   Georges   Cle- 
ciemen-     menceau  ("The  Tiger"),  whose  role  had  hitherto 
190^1         Deen    tnat    °f   critic    and    destroyer,    came    into 
1909  power,  first  as  minister  of  the  interior  in  the  short- 

lived Sarrien  cabinet  which  his  forceful  personal- 
ity dominated,  afterwards  as  premier  (October, 
1906,  to  July,  1909).  He  kept  the  chambers  in 
proper  submission  to  his  leadership,  employing 
at  times  an  almost  flippant  tone  in  his  explana- 
tions to  the  deputies.  The  basis  of  authority 
was  moving  from  the  deputies,  who  had  been  so 
capricious  in  making  and  unmaking  cabinets,  to 
the  premier.  Clemenceau  did  not  wait  for  the 
whispered  orders  of  the  majority  as  Combes 
had  done;  the  Delegation  of  the  Lefts,  so  power- 
1  Op.  cit.y  pages  151  and  159. 

[308] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

ful  from  1902  to  1905,  had  disappeared.1  He  did 
not  attempt  to  reconstitute  the  Republican  bloc, 
although  the  cabinet  included  Moderates,  like 
Barthou  and  Pichon,  and  the  Independent  Social- 
ists, Briand  and  Viviani.  He  shaped  his  own 
course  and  let  the  majority,  with  his  own  Radical 
following  as  a  nucleus,  register  approval.  His 
program  stood  firmly  against  any  diminution  of 
the  military  power  of  France;  in  view  of  the 
epidemic  of  labor  disturbances  it  included  a 
number  of  social  reforms;  and  it  favored  con- 
ciliatory methods  in  the  enforcement  of  the 
Separation  Law.  Outvoted  on  a  minor  issue, 
Clemenceau  resigned  after  holding  office  for  two 
years  and  nine  months. 

Briand,  who  succeeded  him,  retained  half  the   Briand 
members  of  the  outgoing  cabinet  and  most  of  its    JJ^er' 
policies.     He  dealt  firmly  with  the  lawless  Syn-   1911 
dicalists,  got  Parliament  to  enact  a  pending  bill 
for  old-age  pensions,  and  sought  to  assuage  the 
angry  emotions  which  the  domestic  struggles  of 
the  past  decade  had  aroused.    As  always  happens 
in    France,    the   government    came   through   the 
elections  of  1910  successfully.2    The  four  parlia- 

1  In  1908  the  Delegation  of  the  Lefts  was  brought  to  life 
again.  It  included  the  Democratic  Left,  the  Radical  Left, 
the  Radical-Socialists,  and  the  Socialist  Republicans.  The 
Republican  Union  (Progressists)  was  not  invited  to  join;  the 
Unified  Socialists  refused  to  do  so.    The  experiment  failed. 

2  The  new  Chamber  was  composed  as  follows: 
Independents,  21;   Right,  20;    A.  L.  P.,  32;    Republican 

[309] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

mentary  groups  which  habitually  voted  with  the 
government  (Democratic  Left,  Radical  Left, 
Radical  and  Radical-Socialist,  Socialist-Republi- 
can) won  373  of  the  597  seats.  The  ministerial 
declaration,  submitted  to  Parliament  after  the 
elections,  emphasized  two  fundamental  aspects 
of  Briand's  policy:  conciliation  and  leadership. 
In  view  of  their  victory,  Briand  said,  "Repub- 
licans may  face  the  future  with  full  security; 
but  precisely  because  they  are  conscious  of  their 
strength  they  must  resist  every  temptation  to 
misuse  it.  In  no  case,  under  no  pretext,  should 
it  be  transformed  in  their  hands  into  an  instru- 
His  ment  of  tyranny  and  oppression  nor  engender  in 

concilia-     tne  con(Iuct  of  public  business  violations  of  per- 
tioa  sonal  liberty  which  all  right-thinking  men  would 

condemn.  Universal  suffrage  has  expressed  itself 
clearly.  It  intends  that  justice  and  liberty  should 
be  not  the  exclusive  possession  of  some,  but  under 
every  circumstance  assured  to  all,  equal  to  all. 
.  .  .  Victory  is  won,  but  enthusiasm  continues; 
the  combatants  have  thoughts  of  rancor  and 
reprisals;  they  dream  of  a  victory  more  complete, 
of  a  more  absolute  extinction  of  the  enemy; 
they  may  commit  atrocities.  It  is  the  moment 
when  the  commander  who  respects  his  army 
and  wishes  victory  to  be  without  stain  should 
throw  himself  between  the  combatants  and   cry 

Union  (Progressists),  76;  Democratic  Left,  77;  Radical  Left, 
113;  Radicals  and  Radical-Socialists,  149;  Socialist  Republi- 
cans, 34;  Unified  Socialists,  75. 

[310] 


decisive 
action 


strike 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

to  the  conquerors:  'Enough!  Go  no  farther !'" 
And  as  to  leadership,  "the  fundamental  func- 
tion of  the  government  is  to  govern;  it  will  not 
allow  that  function  to  be  endangered.  It  means 
to  employ  the  executive  authority  in  all  its  mani- 
festations, with  all  the  responsibilities  which  it 
involves,  without  allowing  it  to  be  enfeebled  by 
abusive  interference." 

A  few  months  later,  Briand's  determination  to  His 
enforce  the  law  was  put  to  the  test  by  railroad 
strikes  which  paralyzed  the  transportation  system  in  the 
and  were  accompanied  by  rioting  and  sabotage.  ' 
Briand  proved  himself  a  resolute  man  of  action. 
He  placed  the  railroads  under  military  control 
and  called  the  striking  employees  to  the  colors. 
Nor  was  he  at  all  unnerved  by  the  savage  attacks 
of  Socialist  deputies.  There  is,  he  said,  a  right 
superior  to  all  other  rights,  the  right  of  a  coun- 
try to  preserve  its  independence  and  power. 
"A  country  cannot  allow  its  frontiers  to  remain 
exposed;  that  is  impossible.  And  I  am  going  to 
say  something  that  will  startle  you:  if  the  gov- 
ernment had  not  found  legal  means  for  retaining 
control  of  its  frontiers,  of  its  railroads  —  that  is 
to  say,  of  the  instrument  necessary  to  national 
defense,  —  if  recourse  to  illegal  measures  had 
been  necessary,  very  well,  the  government  would 
have  gone  that  far."  Socialists  and  Radical- 
Socialists  regarded  this  as  an  apology  for  dicta- 
torship; the  Chamber  broke  into  an  uproar;  and 
although   the   government   was   sustained   by   a 

[3»] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

majority  of  146  (all  moderate  deputies  gathering 
about  the  cabinet),  Briand  resigned  on  Novem- 
ber 2.  Next  day  he  returned  to  office  with  a 
reorganized  cabinet,  ready  to  remain  as  long  as 
the  four  allied  groups  of  the  Left  should  stand 
behind  him.  On  February  24  the  government 
was  interpellated  on  the  leniency  of  the  courts  in 
dealing  with  the  reconstitution  of  suppressed 
religious  establishments  and  with  the  reopening 
of  closed  schools.  Briand,  reasonably  enough, 
refused  to  take  responsibility  for  the  decisions  of 
the  courts.  When  he  found  himself  deserted  by 
two  thirds  of  the  Radical-Socialists  and  his  ma- 
jority reduced  to  24,  he  decided  that  a  new 
premier  would  better  be  able  to  carry  out  the 
policy  of  pacification  and  of  even-handed 
justice. 
Monis  The  new  cabinet,  headed  by  Senator  Monis, 

Cauiaux  was  predominantly  Radical-Socialist,1  moderates 
1911-  like  Poincare  and  Ribot  refusing  to  join  it. 
Yet  there  was  no  such  noticeable  shifting  of 
policy  as  might  have  been  expected,  and  the 
four  allied  groups  of  the  Left  gave  almost  unani- 
mous support.  In  less  than  four  months  the 
minister  of  finance,  Joseph  Caillaux,  a  promi- 
nent, unscrupulous  politician,  supplanted  Monis 
as  premier.  There  was  no  change  of  policy. 
Caillaux  declared  that  the  honor  of  France  would 
be  maintained  by  its  alliances  and  friendships  as 
well  as  by  the  increasing  strength  of  army  and 
1  Eight  of  the  twelve  ministers  belonged  to  that  party. 

[312] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

navy.  His  would  be  "a  government  which  gov- 
erns and  pursues  a  policy  of  social  evolution." 
He  made  no  concessions  to  the  Socialists,  oppos- 
ing motions  which  would  have  compelled  the 
railroads  to  reinstate  dismissed  employees,  pro- 
ceeding vigorously  against  pacifist  propaganda 
in  the  military  barracks,  and  refusing  to  permit 
Socialist  manifestations  against  the  government. 
The  high  command  of  the  army  was  reorganized. 
Caillaux  himself  did  not  inspire  confidence,  how- 
ever. When  it  transpired  that  he  had  negotiated 
privately  with  the  German  government  during 
the  last  stages  of  the  Morocco  crisis,  the  cabinet 
fell  (January,  191 2). 

For  the  next  year  Senator  Raymond  Poincare,   The 
a  Republican  of  moderate  views,   presided  over 
the  council  of  ministers.      Briand   served   under   care, 
him  as  minister  of  justice;   Millerand,  as  minister   J^*  ' 
of  war.     Conciliation,  national  defense,  and  elec-   Barthou; 
toral   reform  were  the  three  cardinal   points  in 
his  program.     He  carried  through  the  Chamber 
a  bill  providing  for  proportional   representation.1 
Elected   President  of  the   Republic  in  January, 
1913,   notwithstanding  the  vehement  opposition 
of  Socialists  and  Radical-Socialists  who  thought 
him  too  conservative  and  too  sympathetic  in  his 
attitude  towards  the  church,2  he  was  succeeded 
by  Briand.     Briand   resigned  two  months  later 
when  the  Senate  refused  to  accept  the  propor- 

1  Described  in  Chapter  VI. 

2  See  Chapter  II. 

[313] 


cabinets 
of  Poin- 


1912- 
1913 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tional  representation  bill.1  Louis  Barthou  (Demo- 
cratic Left),  who  stood  veiy  close  to  Poincare  and 
Briand  politically  —  he  was  minister  of  justice  in 
the  outgoing  cabinet  —  made  no  further  attempt 
to  coerce  the  Senate,  although  he  himself  fa- 
vored electoral  reform.  He  had  inherited  from 
his  predecessor  another  bill,  one  which  he  felt 
to  be  of  more  immediate  importance,  a  bill  re- 
Miiitary-  storing  the  three-year  period  of  military  service, 
service  Hateful  as  it  was  to  the  Socialists  and  to  most 
Radical-Socialists,  the  bill  passed  both  chambers 
with  the  help  of  conservative  groups.  The 
Barthou  cabinet  did  not  survive  long.  The  Rad- 
ical-Socialists, who  had  obtained  only  three  port- 
folios, had  regarded  it  with  suspicion  from  the 
first;  it  included  Thierry,  a  leader  of  the  Progress- 
ists, and  other  men  of  conservative  mold;  its 
chief  was  too  militaristic,  too  harsh  towards  labor, 
too  complaisant  towards  the  church.  Defeated  by 
25  votes  on  a  proposal  to  exempt  a  new  loan  from 
taxation,  Barthou  resigned  on  December  1. 
The  The    Radical-Socialists,    having    been    instru- 

Dou"  mental  in  his  overthrow,  now  came  to  power 
cabinet,  under  Gaston  Doumergue.  Seven  of  the  twelve 
ministers  were  Radical-Socialists.  In  view  of  the 
approaching  electoral  campaign,  the  party  had 
recently  "unified"  itself  at  the  Congress  of  Pau, 
adopted  a  minimum  program,  and  elected  as 
its  president  the  discredited  Joseph  Caillaux,  who 

1  He   still   had   a   large   majority  in   the  Chamber.      See 
Chapter  III. 

[314] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

now  became  once  more  minister  of  finance  and 
directing  genius  of  the  cabinet.  The  principles 
enunciated  at  Pau  sat  lightly  on  Doumergue. 
He  seemed  to  prefer  the  principles  of  the  preced- 
ing cabinet,  explaining  that  the  proximity  of  the 
elections  made  a  restricted  program  necessary. 
The  cabinet  became  involved  in  scandal.  It 
transpired  that  in  191 1,  when  Caillaux  was 
minister  of  finance  and  Monis  premier,  the  former 
asked  and  the  latter  obtained  for  him  a  post- 
ponement in  the  public  prosecution  of  a  notorious 
swindler.  Both  Caillaux  and  Monis  (minister  of  Radical- 
marine)  resigned.  Nevertheless,  in  the  elections  ^^st 
of  1914  the  Unified  Radical  and  Radical-Socialist  in  decline 
party  more  than  held  its  own,  winning  172  of 
the  602  seats.  This  must  not  be  taken  to  mean 
that  the  party  which  had  played  such  a  promi- 
nent role  since  the  beginning  of  the  century  still 
possessed  real  vitality  and  still  enjoyed  the  con- 
fidence of  the  country.  It  was  fast  approaching 
bankruptcy.  Its  president  stood  convicted  of 
rascality.  At  the  very  moment  when  it  boasted 
of  "unification"  and  of  steadfast  principles  its 
candidates,  anxious  for  election  on  any  terms, 
flouted  the  Pau  program.  The  party  was  pledged 
to  repeal  the  three-year  military  law,  yet  Dou- 
mergue spoke  strongly  in  favor  of  national  de- 
fense and  declared  that  he  would  loyally  apply 
the  law  while  the  European  situation  remained 
what  it  was.  Success  in  the  elections  was  pri- 
marily due  to  the  fact  that  the  party,  controlling 

[315] 


of  1914 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  administrative  machinery,  had  extensive 
influence  and  patronage  at  its  disposal.  There 
is  no  "swing  of  the  pendulum"  in  France.  The 
government  always  wins  the  elections  —  "makes" 
the  elections,  as  the  phrase  goes. 
Elections  When  the  new  Chamber  assembled  in  June, 
1914,  the  deputies  indicated  their  group  affilia- 
tions as  follows;  Right,  16;  Action  Liberale 
Populaire,  23;  Republican  Federation  (formerly 
Progressists),  36;  Democratic  Left,  34;  Republi- 
cans of  the  Left,  54;  Radical  Left,  65;  Independ- 
ent Left,  23;  Radical  and  Radical-Socialists,  172; 
Socialist-Republicans,  23;  Unified  Socialists,  102; 
"Not  inscribed,"  46;  1  Independents,  8.  The 
two  new  groups  (Republicans  of  the  Left  and 
Independent  Left)  dated  from  1914.  The  Cham- 
ber was  not  quite  so  chaotic  as  the  mere  enumera- 
tion of  groups  would  suggest,  because  most  of 
the  members  of  four  groups  (Democratic  Left, 
Republicans  of  the  Left,  Radical  Left,  and  Inde- 
pendent Left)  were  identified  with  either  the 
Democratic-Republican  party  or  the  Federation 
of  the  Lefts,  a  new  party  whose  formation  by 
Briand,  Millerand,  and  others  definitely  marked 
the  end  of  the  anti-clerical  coalition,  the  Republi- 
can bloc.2 

That   is,   deputies   who    belong  to  no   group,   but  who 
associate  themselves  for  the  purpose  of  securing  representa- 
tion on  parliamentary  committees.      See  Chapter  VII.     The 
deputies  not  inscribed  generally  vote  with  the  Right. 
2  Regarding  these  parties  see  Chapter  X. 

[316] 


POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

In  the  elections  the  candidates  had  been  called  Rene 
upon  to  express  their  attitude  on  three  main  J22JL 
issues:  the  three-year  military  law,  proportional  i9i±- 
representation,  and  the  ''controlled"  income  tax  19  5 
(the  question  being  as  to  whether  the  govern- 
ment should  have  authority  to  investigate  and 
check  the  tax  returns).  In  the  new  Chamber 
there  would  be  an  affirmative  majority  on  all 
three  questions,  but  in  each  case  the  major- 
ity would  be  differently  constituted.  The  Uni- 
fied Socialists,  the  Socialist-Republicans,  and  the 
Radical-Socialists  were  arrayed  against  the  three- 
year  law;  they  formed  part  of  the  slender  ma- 
jority favoring  the  controlled  income  tax;  and 
proportional  representation  could  not  be  carried 
without  the  support  of  the  Unified  Socialists  who, 
on  that  issue,  parted  company  with  the  Radical- 
Socialists.1  What  sort  of  cabinet  could  hope  to 
carry  out  the  mandate  of  the  country  (if  the 
election  returns  may  be  interpreted  as  showing 
such  a  mandate)  in  favor  of  all  three  measures? 
No  mere  coalitions  of  groups  would  suffice. 
Doumergue,  not  liking  the  prospects  of  naviga- 
tion, scuttled  his  ship.  No  one  seemed  anxious 
to  face  the  perils  he  had  shirked.  President 
Poincare  appealed  successively  to  five  politi- 
cians —  representing  the  Democratic  left,  the 
Radical    left,    the    Radical-Socialists,    and    the 

1  Five  sixths  of  the  Radical-Socialist  deputies  were  op- 
posed to  proportional  representation;  the  Socialist-Republi- 
cans were  equally  divided. 

[317] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

Socialist-Republicans  —  before  Alexandre  Ribot, 
a  senator  of  rather  conservative  type,  consented 
to  form  a  cabinet.  The  Chamber  turned  him 
out  at  once.  Rene  Viviani,  the  Socialist-Re- 
publican, then  took  office  with  a  cabinet  which 
resembled  that  of  Doumergue  (seven  of  the 
former  ministers  reappearing),  but  reduced  the 
representation  of  the  Radical-Socialists  and  in- 
creased that  of  the  Democratic  Left.1  Viviani 
had  pledged  himself  to  maintain  the  three-year 
service  law,  although  his  own  party  and  the 
Radical-Socialist  party  were  pledged  to  repeal 
it.  In  a  vote  of  confidence  the  Chamber  gave 
him  a  majority  of  223. 
Cabinets  Not  long  after  Viviani  became  premier,  the 
during  the  Qreat   war    Degan>      Jn   the   face   of  this   crisis 

war  >  & 

partisan  conflicts  disappeared;  the  parliamentary 
groups  concluded  a  truce  known  as  the  Union 
sacree;  and  on  August  26  Viviani  recognized  the 
new  situation  by  reorganizing  his  cabinet  and 
bringing  in  the  moderate  Republican  Ribot  and 
the  Unified  Socialists  Marcel  Sembat  and  Jules 
Guesde.  For  the  moment  at  least  the  Socialists 
abandoned  their  conflict  with  the  bourgeoisie. 
In  October,  191 5,  after  the  failure  of  its  Balkan 
policy,  the  cabinet  resigned.  The  new  premier, 
Aristide  Briand,  adhering  to  the  coalition  plan, 
went   farther  than   Viviani;    he  gave  office  not 

1  The  cabinet  included  two  Socialist-Republicans,  four 
Radical-Socialists,  two  members  of  the  Radical  Left,  and  two 
of  the  Democratic  Left. 

[318] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

only  to  three  Unified  Socialists,  but  also  to  a 
deputy  of  the  Right,  Cochin.  In  his  endeavor  to 
satisfy  the  claims  of  all  the  groups,  however,  he 
had  built  up  an  unwieldy  cabinet  —  twenty- 
three  ministers  including  the  undersecretaries; 
and  it  became  necessary,  fourteen  months  later, 
to  reduce  the  cabinet  to  half  its  former  size  and 
to  entrust  the  direction  of  the  war  to  a  group  of 
five  ministers.  Briand  resigned  in  March,  1917, 
after  the  Chamber  had  criticized  his  economic 
policy  and  driven  from  office  the  war  minister, 
General  Lyautey.  The  two  succeeding  cabinets, 
which  had  to  face  military  disappointments, 
sinister  pro-German  intrigues  on  the  part  of 
certain  Radical-Socialists,  and  the  hostility  of 
the  Unified  Socialists,  were  short-lived.  Ribot 
held  office  for  six  months,  Painleve  for  two.  A 
strong  hand  was  needed.  On  November  15,  1917, 
Georges  Clemenceau,  "The  Tiger,"  nowT  a  man 
of  advanced  age  but  of  indomitable  spirit,  became 
premier.  He  abandoned  coalition.  His  cabinet 
included  no  Unified  Socialists,  no  Socialist- 
Republicans,  no  conservative  Republicans,  no 
monarchists;  it  was  more  homogeneous  than  its 
predecessors,  more  closely  identified  with  the  Radi- 
cal-Socialist party.  Clemenceau  subordinated 
everything  to  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war. 
He  fought  the  foreign  enemy;  he  fought  the 
domestic  enemy  —  the  bolshevistic  Socialists, 
the  traitors  in  the  ranks  of  the  Radical-Socialist 
party;    and  the  country  accepted  his  leadership 

[319] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

with  a  splendid  confidence.  The  post-war  elec- 
tions, while  disastrous  to  the  Radical-Socialist 
party,  did  not  weaken  the  position  of  the  prime 
minister.  He  retired,  however,  in  January,  1920, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Alexandre  Millerand. 
Political  Under  normal  circumstances  a  new  Chamber 

alter  the     would  have  been  elected  in  the  spring  of  1918. 
war  It  was  considered  advisable,  however,  to  prolong 

the  life  of  the  existing  Chamber  until  the  con- 
clusion of  peace.  The  elections  took  place  on 
November  16,  1919.  In  order  to  explain  the 
character  of  the  campaign  and  the  results  of 
the  balloting  three  circumstances  must  be  men- 
tioned: In  the  first  place  France  was  still  under 
the  spell  of  the  war.  The  nation,  though  saved 
from  annihilation,  had  suffered  terrible  losses; 
the  practical  business  of  supplying  necessities 
and  at  the  same  time  making  good  the  wastage 
of  war  would  absorb  the  full  energies  of  the 
French  people.  "Hier  la  France  devait  vaincre 
ou  perir,"  said  Alexandre  Millerand.  "Au- 
jourd'hui  il  lui  faut  produire  ou  disparaitre.,, 
Internal  dissensions  must  be  dropped;  the  nation 
must  act  as  a  unit  in  the  work  of  reconstruction. 
It  was  not  the  time  to  play  with  social  experi- 
ments or  revolutionary  doctrines.  In  the  second 
place  the  Unified  Socialists,  who  sympathized 
with  the  soviet  rulers  of  Russia,  were  busily 
propagating  such  doctrines.  In  1917  they  had 
broken  the  party  truce  and  begun  to  attack  the 
government  in  the  Chamber  and  in  the  country. 
[320] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

They  demanded  peace  by  negotiation,  a  pleb- 
iscite to  determine  the  future  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
friendly  relations  with  the  Russian  bolsheviki, 
freedom  to  attend  the  International  Socialist 
Congress  at  Stockholm.  They  had  refused  to 
enter  the  cabinets  of  Ribot  and  Painleve.  The 
extremists  were  in  the  saddle.  So  unpatriotic 
was  the  official  conduct  of  the  party  that  forty- 
one  deputies,  afterwards  known  as  Dissident 
Socialists,  seceded.  It  is  not  strange  that  sober- 
minded  people  had  fears  of  a  revolutionary  out- 
break, a  revival  of  the  Commune  of  1871.  The 
danger  was  great  enough  to  bring  antagonistic 
political  elements  together  in  temporary  union. 
In  a  rather  unpolished,  but  characteristic,  phrase 
Clemenceau  sounded  the  note  of  the  election 
campaign  in  his  Strasbourg  speech:  "To  hell 
(jus)  with  the  bolsheviki!"  Finally  a  new  system 
of  election  had  been  adopted,  a  modified  form 
of  the  scrutin  de  liste  or  general  ticket  having  re- 
placed the  scrutin  cT arrondissement; l  and  the 
new  system  would  undoubtedly  work  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  Unified  Socialists  if  separate  lists 
of  candidates  were  put  forward  by  the  numerous 
parties  opposed  to  them. 

In  October  therefore  the  Democratic-Republi-  Foundation 
can  party  entered  into  negotiation  with  the  other  National 
parties  and  succeeded  in  finding  a  basis  of  coop-  Republican 
eration.      "Each    party,    each    candidate,"    said 
Adolphe   Carnot,    president   of  the   Democratic- 
1  The  new  election  law  is  described  in  Chapter  VI. 

[32l] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Republican  party,  ''will  undoubtedly  preserve 
his  own  ideal;  but  during  the  four  years  of  the 
next  legislature  the  grand  work  of  national  re- 
construction will  be  achieved  through  a  program 
common  to  all  Republicans."  On  this  under- 
standing the  A.  L.  P.,  the  Republican  Federation, 
the  Socialist-Republicans,  the  Radical-Socialists, 
and  a  number  of  other  organizations  joined 
hands  with  the  Democratic-Republican  party 
and  formed  the  National  Republican  bloc. 
its  program  In  a  manifesto  of  October  24  the  National 
Republican  bloc  pledged  itself  to  "ensure  the 
victory  of  the  democratic  Republic  in  social 
peace  and  progress;  leave  each  signatory  of  this 
appeal  entire  independence  as  to  the  program 
he  has  formulated;  but  condemn  and  repudiate 
every  alliance  with  reaction  or  with  revolution; 
and  recommend  to  Republican  voters,  in  every 
district  where  it  may  be  possible,  union  in  defense 
of  the  following  program."  The  program  dealt 
mainly  with  questions  on  which  all  parties,  even 
the  Unified  Socialists,  would  be  likely  to  agree: 
the  restoration  of  the  devastated  areas,  eco- 
nomic reconstruction,  agricultural  development, 
etc.  There  were,  however,  two  controversial 
clauses.  One,  directed  against  the  Unified  Social- 
ists, declared  "war  upon  bolshevism,  upon  all 
dictatorships,  upon  all  forms  of  violence,"  while 
promising  at  the  same  time  the  development  of 
social  laws  and  of  the  powers  of  syndicates.  The 
other,  referring  to  the  anti-clerical  laws,  insisted 
[322] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

upon  "the  absolute  neutrality  of  the  state  and 
the  school  as  the  safeguard  of  absolute  liberty 
of  conscience."  !  The  program  itself  is  not  of 
much  consequence.  The  vital  point  is  that  the 
formation  of  the  bloc,  loose  as  its  arrangements 
were,  made  it  possible  for  the  five  parties  to  put 
forward  a  composite  list  in  every  district  where 
the  Socialists  showed  strength. 

It  is  perhaps  significant  that  the  officers  of  the    Attitude 
Catholic  party,  the  A.  L.   P.,  did  not  sign  the    aJJjj 
manifesto  of  October  24.     They  had  been  taken    party 
to  task  for  adhering  to  the  bloc  and  had  felt  it 
necessary,    in    a    communication    to    the    clerical 
organ,  La  Croix,  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the 
party  had  gone  into  the  coalition  "with  all  its 
past  and  all  its  beliefs. "     La  Croix,  like  some  of 
the  prelates,  looked   askance  at  the  bloc.     Dur- 
ing the   campaign   it    opposed    one   list  because 
some   of  the    candidates   were    Protestants    and 
another     list     because     it     bore     the     name    of 
Alexandre  Millerand.    The  archbishop  of  Paris, 
however,  took  a  different  view.     "Better  to  cast 
your  votes,"  he  said,  "for  candidates  who,  with- 

1  During  the  campaign  the  question  of  church  and  state 
was  naturally  discussed  by  the  leading  politicians.  See 
especially  the  speech  of  Alexandre  Millerand,  Le  Temps, 
November  9,  1919.  In  the  department  of  the  Seine  the  bloc 
advocated  constitutional  amendments  to  secure  the  separation 
of  powers,  to  incorporate  the  essential  principles  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Rights,  and  to  erect  a  supreme  court  which  should 
protect  those  principles  from  invasion  by  the  government.  It 
also  advocated  administrative  reform. 

[323] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 


Attitude 
of  the 
Radical- 
Socialists 


out  giving  satisfaction  to  all  our  legitimate  de- 
mands, would  permit  us  nevertheless  to  expect 
a  course  of  action  useful  to  the  country,  than  to 
support  others  whose  program  might  be  more 
perfect,  but  whose  almost  certain  defeat  would 
risk  opening  the  door  to  the  enemies  of  religion 
and  the  social  order."  Apparently  the  A.  L.  P. 
stood  faithfully  by  its  agreement;  and  a  month 
after  the  elections  one  of  its  leaders  spoke  of 
"the  imperious  necessity  of  continuing  the 
Union  sacree,  which  has  assured  victory,  and  of 
establishing  internal  peace,  social  peace,  and 
religious  peace." 

As  to  the  Radical-Socialist  party,  its  position 
was  a  difficult  one.  The  conviction  of  one  of  its 
leaders,  Malvy,  by  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  and 
the  pending  trial  of  its  former  president,  Joseph 
Caillaux,  on  the  charge  of  treason  had  struck  it 
damaging  blows.  Led  now  by  £douard  Herriot, 
Senator  and  Mayor  of  Lyons,  it  had  broken  with 
the  Unified  Socialists,  but  it  could  not  look  with 
equanimity  upon  cooperation  with  its  bitter  ene- 
mies towards  the  Right.  True,  Herriot  spoke  of 
administering  the  religious  laws  in  a  generous  spirit, 
but  it  is  not  clear  that  he  carried  the  left  wing 
of  the  party  with  him.  In  many  districts  the 
Radical-Socialists  put  forward  independent  lists. 
Results  of  In  the  new  Chamber  there  are  626  deputies, 
111919  °n24  seats  having  been  assigned  to  the  three  de- 
partments of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Shortly  after  the 
elections,  a  table  prepared  by  the  Minister  of 
[324] 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  Interior  gave  the  party  or  group  affiliations 
loosely  as  follows:  *  Conservatives,  in;  Progres- 
sists, 126;  Republicans  of  the  Left,  139;  Radicals 
and  Radical-Socialists,  138;  Socialist-Republicans, 
30;  Unified  Socialists  (including  four  Dissidents  — 
that  is,  Socialists  who  oppose  violent  measures), 
72.  In  view  of  the  peculiar  circumstances  of 
the  time,  the  confusion  of  old  party  lines  in 
the  common  struggle  against  the  Unified  Social- 
ists, it  was  perhaps  impossible  to  be  more 
precise;  even  when  Parliament  met  in  Decem- 
ber, the  deputies  showed  some  indecision  as 
to  whether  they  would  reconstitute  the  old  groups 
or  fuse  into  larger  units.  It  was  not  till  the 
end  of  January  that  the  official  membership  list 
of  the  groups  was  published:2  Independents,  29; 
Non-inscrits,  21;  Republican  and  Social  Action, 
46;  Democratic-Republican  Entente,  183;  Demo- 
cratic-Republican Left,  93;  Republicans  of  the 
Left,  61;  Radical-Socialists,  86;  Socialist-Re- 
publicans, 26;  Unified  Socialists,  68. 3  The  In- 
dependents and  Non-inscrits  apparently  include 
some  of  the  more  conservative  elements;  the 
regular  groups  are  now  reduced  from  ten  to 
seven.  The  aggregate  loss  in  the  elections  fell 
mainly  upon  the  Radical-Socialists,  who  lost  86 

1  The  table  does  not  include  10  deputies  elected  in  the 
colonies. 

2  Journal  officiel,  Jan.  30,  1920. 

3  Four  other  members  were  elected,  but,  being  opposed  to 
revolutionary  measures,  refused  to  join  the  group. 

[325] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

scuts,  and  upon  the  Uniried  Socialists,  who  lost 
34  seats.  The  aggregate  gain,  while  shared  hy 
the  Democratic-Republican  party  (Democratic- 
Republican  Left  and  Republicans  of  the  Left), 
went  mainly  to  the  two  parties  that  have  opposed 
anti-clerical  legislation,  the  Republican  Federa- 
tion (Progressists)  and  the  Action  Liberate  Popu- 
laire.  It  is  evident  that  the  war  has  produced, 
for  the  time  at  least,  a  Catholic  revival. 

Alexandre  Millerand,  who  succeeded  Clemen- 
ceau  as  premier  on  January  20,  1920,  broke  away 
from  traditional  practice  in  distributing  cabinet 
portfolios.  He  made  no  attempt  to  base  the 
cabinet  upon  a  coalition  of  groups.  Only  three 
of  his  colleagues  could  properly  be  styled  profes- 
sional politicians.  Millerand  appealed  for  sup- 
port, not  to  the  political  coteries  in  Parliament, 
but  to  organized  and  articulate  economic  inter- 
ests outside.  Banking  institutions  were  repre- 
sented by  Marsal,  minister  of  finance,  who  was 
not  even  a  member  of  Parliament;  the  federated 
chambers  of  commerce,  by  Isaac;  the  federated 
agricultural  associations,  by  Ricard;  and  the 
new  economic  council,  which  includes  not  only 
artisans  and  public  employees,  but  managers  and 
engineers  as  well,  by  Coupat.  "The  Millerand 
ministry  emphasizes  the  passing  of  parliamenta- 
rism and  the  rise  to  power  of  the  economic  unit 
in  government."  l 

1  E.  D.  in  The  Xation  (New  York),  April  10,  1920,  page  458. 

[326] 


CHAPTER  X 


PARTIES 


POLITICAL  parties,  once  proscribed  and  out-  Function 
lawed  as  fomenters  of  sedition  and  solemnly  fU^BB 
condemned  by  George  Washington  in  his  farewell 
address,  are  now  accepted  as  a  convenient,  even  a 
necessary,  instrument  of  democratic  control. 
Their  function  is  something  like  that  of  attorneys 
in  the  courts  of  law:  they  marshal  the  arguments; 
the  jury  decides.  By  putting  forward  candidates, 
by  drawing  up  platforms,  by  conducting  cam- 
paigns, they  make  it  possible  for  the  electorate  to 
act  efficiently.  They  formulate  questions  which 
the  electorate  can  answer  with  a  "yes"  or  "no."  * 
i  But  while  parties  exist  wherever  popular  govern- 
ment exists,  they  are  not  always  of  the  same  type. 
They  vary  with  political  conditions.  There  is, 
for  instance,  marked  difference  in  the  functioning 
of  English  and  American  parties,  while  neither  an  and 
Englishman  nor  an  American  can  easily  penetrate 
the  mysteries  of  party  arrangements  in  the 
countries  of  continental  Europe.  Any  one  who 
attempts  to  describe  foreign  party  organizations 
should  be  wary  and  circumspect.    It  is  easy  to  be 


French 
parties 
con- 
trasted 
with 
English 


1  On  the  function  of  parties  see  A.  L.  Lowell,  Public  Opinion 
and  Popular  Government  (1913). 

[327] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

misled  by  superficial  resemblances  to  familiar 
phenomena  at  home;  it  is  easy  to  brush  aside 
rebellious  facts  which  will  not  square  with  a 
ready-made  formula  and  to  ignore  vague  half 
lights  which  may  really  be  of  great  significance. 

Some  years  ago  the  French  historian,  Charles 
Seignobos,  sounded  a  warning  against  such  mis- 
conceptions.1 k  "The  character  of  the  French 
parties  differs  very  materially  from  that  of  Ameri- 
can and  English  parties/'  he  wrote,  "it  deviates 
widely  from  the  conception  that  the  theorists  of 
public  rights  have  formed  for  themselves  of  a 
political  party,  according  to  the  English  and 
American  models.  Consequently,  it  is  not  as- 
tounding that  the  French  parties  are  a  puzzle  to 
foreign  observers,  and  appear  to  them  like  a 
monstrous  vagary.  ...  In  the  English  countries 
every  party  is  made  up  with  a  definite  official 
programme,  common  to  the  whole  party.  In 
France  there  is  no  exact  equivalent  to  the  Ameri- 
can platform;  the  word  'programme*  means  or- 
dinarily the  *  profession*  of  the  political  belief  of 
each  individual  candidate.  Each  one  presents 
himself  with  his  own  personal  declaration,  and 
there  is  no  general  declaration  in  the  name  of  the 
party.  .  .  .  Often  two  deputies  who  belong  to 
the  same  party  speak  a  very  different  language 
according  to  the  sentiments  or  customs  of  their 
electors.     Even  the  same  deputy  will  change  his 

1  "  The  Political  Parties  of  France"  International  Monthly, 
August  1901,  pages  139-165. 

[328] 


PARTIES 

speech  from  one  ballot  to  another,  according  to 
the  allies  of  which  he  feels  the  need.,,  And  again: 
"In  France  the  parties  have  no  programme  in  a 
direct  sense,  no  precise  formula  that  defines  their 
politics  and  their  demands.  They  have  senti- 
ments, passions,  if  you  prefer  it  so,  and  general 
tendencies  which  suffice  to  classify  the  politicians 
and  those  who  elect  them.  Politics  in  France  is 
purely  an  affaire  de  sentiment:  the  elector  votes 
for  the  candidate  whose  political  feelings  approach 
most  nearly  to  his  own.  .  .  .  French  politics  are 
directed,  not  by  parties,  but  by  tendencies,  and 
those  who  desire  to  understand  them  must  give 
heed,  not  to  the  programmes  of  the  candidates 
but  to  the  sentiments  of  the  electoral  masses." 

Part   of  what    Professor   Seignobos   says   is   a   No  ef- 
little    cryptic.     To    describe    French    politics    as   !^Je 
"purely  an  affaire  de  sentiment"  and  in  that  way   organi- 
contrasting  with  Anglo-American  politics  serves    ^ion 
only  to  make  the  mystery  still  more  mysterious;    1901 
such   things    as    "sentiment"    and    "tendencies" 
may  be  observed  in  American  politics;   American 
voters    have   on    occasion    shown    a    sentimental 
tendency  to  stand  by  a  party  which  has  broken 
free  from  its  principles  and  pledges.     This  much 
deserves  emphasis,  however:  at  the  beginning  of 
the   century,   when   the   article  in   question  was 
written,  there  were  no  parties  in  the  American 
sense,  no  political  associations  with  a  hierarchy 
of   committees    and    conventions,    with    detailed 
platforms  and  disciplined  ranks. 

[329] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

In  1901  the  seven  groups  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  could  hardly  be  called  parties.  They 
were,  with  the  exception  of  the  monarchist  Right 
and  the  revolutionary  Socialists,  unorganized 
factions  of  the  Republican  party  which  had  dis- 
integrated more  and  more  after  its  chief  mission 
of  establishing  the  Republic  had  been  accom- 
plished. It  is  true  that  they  had  a  certain  con- 
tinuity, each  group  persisting  through  successive 
parliaments,  and  principles  of  a  sort,  usually  in- 
definite and  formulated  not  by  an  official  party 
convention,  but  by  some  prominent  parliamentary 
leader,  as  Gambetta  had  formulated  the  Radical 
program  at  Belleville  in  1869  and  Millerand  the 
Socialist  program  at  Saint-Mande  in  1896.  They 
were  embryo  parties,  as  yet  unprovided  with 
machinery  for  making  nominations  and  fighting 
campaigns.  In  the  election  campaign  each  candi- 
date announced  his  own  program  or  "profession 
of  faith";  whether  he  came  forward  as  the  sup- 
porter of  some  parliamentary  group  or  as  an  in- 
dependent, he  framed  his  principles  to  suit  his 
own  taste  or  the  predominant  local  interests.  He 
might  pose  in  the  first  election  as  a  member  of 
the  Democratic  Left,  in  the  second  election 
(necessary  when  no  candidate  received  a  majority 
on  the  first)  as  an  "indefinite  liberal,"  and,  upon 
entering  the  Chamber,  identify  himself  with  the 
Progressist  Union.  He  might,  indeed,  affiliate 
with  several  groups.  In  looking  over  the  lists  in 
the  Annuaire  du  Parlement  one  finds  that  some- 

[330] 


PARTIES 

times  half,  sometimes  three  quarters  of  the  mem- 
bers of  particular  groups  were  at  the  same  time 
identified  with  other  groups.  Under  the  circum- 
stances it  was  impossible  to  determine,  except  in 
the  roughest  fashion,  the  relative  strength  of  the 
different  parties  or  tendencies.  The  membership 
lists  of  the  parliamentary  groups  of  that  day 
must  be  used  with  caution  since  the  deputies, 
elected  on  individual  platforms  of  their  own  in- 
stead of  party  platforms,  often  found  it  advan- 
tageous to  work  simultaneously  with  two  or  more 
groups.  Nor  could  the  election  returns  safely  be 
taken  as  a  guide.  The  newspapers  attempted 
then,  as  they  do  now,  to  show  the  popular  strength 
of  the  party  groups  in  the  country  by  adding 
together  the  votes  received  by  candidates  profess- 
ing to  belong  to  particular  groups.  Such  statistics 
were,  however,  misleading.  "In  the  electoral 
districts,  wThich  are  sufficiently  numerous,  where 
a  single  candidate  presents  himself,"  says  Pro- 
fessor Seignobos,1  "the  number  of  votes  attrib- 
uted to  this  candidate  alone  gives  a  false  idea  of 
the  proportion  of  parties;  and  in  the  still  more 
numerous  electoral  districts,  where  there  is  only 
one  Republican  and  one  Conservative  in  competi- 
tion, it  is  impossible  to  recognize  the  parts  of  the 
different  Republican  groups.  The  totals  obtained 
by  these  additions  are  consequently  valueless." 

Since  the  opening  of  this  century  momentous 
political  changes  have  taken  place.     France  has 
1  Op.  cit.,  page  148. 

[331] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

Forma-  evolved  a  party  system  which  resembles  the  party 
TOUticai  system  prevailing  in  Great  Britain  or  the  United 
parties,  States,  and  which  will,  under  the  process  of  con- 
ma"  solidation,  now  apparently  setting  in,  come  to 
resemble  it  still  more.  The  fluctuating  and 
chaotic  system  of  parliamentary  groups  is  passing 
away.  There  are  still  groups  in  the  Chamber, 
more  of  them,  in  fact,  than  fifteen  or  twenty  years 
ago:  Right,  Action  Liberale  Populaire,  Republican 
Federation,  Democratic  Left,  Republicans  of  the 
Left,  Radical  Left,  Independent  Left,  Radical- 
Socialist,  Socialist-Republican,  and  Unified  So- 
cialist.1 But  alongside  of  these  groups  or  merged 
with  them  are  elaborate  party  organizations 
national  in  scope,  with  membership  dues,  annual 
congresses,  central  and  local  committees,  and 
nomination  machinery.  The  transformation  took 
place  within  a  very  short  period.  The  singular, 
almost  feverish  activity  which  within  little  more 
than  a  decade  brought  eight  parties  into  being, 
may  be  explained  in  some  measure  by  the  success 
of  the  Socialists;  for  the  Socialists,  while  suffering 
from  factional  discords  until  the  "unification"  of 
1905,  had  set  the  example  of  holding  annual  con- 
ventions and  of  formulating  a  set  of  principles  to 
which  all  adherents  must  subscribe.  In  1901  the 
Radical-Socialist  party  was  founded  and  also  the 
Democratic-Republican  Alliance  which  ten  years 

1  These  were  the  groups  in  the  nth  legislature  (1914-1919). 
For  the  new  groups  in  the  12th  legislature,  elected  after  the 
war,  see  supra,  page  325. 

[332] 


PARTIES 

later  adopted  a  more  definite  program  and  became 
known  as  the  Democratic-Republican  party;  in 
1902  the  Action  Liberate  Populaire  (A.  L.  P.), 
descended  from  the  Rallies  group  of  1893;  m 
1905  the  Unified  Socialist  party  and  the  royalist 
Ligue  de  l'Action  francaise;  in  1906  the  Republi- 
can Federation;  in  191 1  the  Socialist  Republican 
party;   and  in  1913  the  Federation  of  the  Lefts. 

Naturally  the  new  parties  have  close  relation-   Relation 
ship  with   the   parliamentary  groups,   the  latter   J^^ 
tending   to    become    real    party   groups   like   the   to  the 
Republicans    and    Democrats    in    the    American    J^wy 
House  of  Representatives  or  the  Laborites  and   groups 
Liberals  in  the  English  House  of  Commons.    The 
A.  L.  P.,  Republican  Federation,  Radical-Social- 
ists, Socialist-Republicans,  and  Unified  Socialists, 
including    considerably    more    than    half  of  the 
personnel  of  the  Chamber  between  1914  and  1919, 
are   real  party  groups  bearing  the  party  name. 
Such  is  not  the  case  with  the   Right,  although 
the  Royalists  have  a  form  of  party  organization 
in  the  Ligue  de  l'Action  francaise;   or  with  the 
Democratic  Left,  Republicans  of  the  Left,  Radi- 
cal Left,  and  Independent  Left,   although  many 
of  their   members    belong    to    the    Democratic- 
Republican  party;  but  we  may  safely  assume  that 
isolated  groups,  without   party  organizations  of 
their  own  to  support  them  in  the  country,  will 
eventually    succumb    before    the    compact,    dis- 
ciplined forces  arrayed  against  them.     Electoral 
victories  cannot  be  improvised.    A  waving  plume 

[333] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

decides  nothing  in  the  mass  movements  of  modern 
warfare.  "The  introduction  of  universal  suffrage 
in  the  political  order,''  says  Charles  Benoist,1 
"resembles  closely  the  introduction  of  steam  in 
the  economic  order;  both  equally  have  inaugu- 
rated the  reign  of  the  machine."  The  machine 
has  come  to  its  own  in  France  much  later  than  in 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States  because  the 
French  have  had  a  much  shorter  experience  in 
the  working  of  popular  representative  institutions. 
Through  the  influence  of  party  organizations 
the  groups  are  now  officially  recognized  in  the 
procedure  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  They 
choose  the  members  of  the  nineteen  standing  com- 
mittees,2 each  being  represented  on  the  committees 
in  accordance  with  its  numerical  strength.  In 
consultation  with  the  president  of  the  Chamber 
they  fix  the  "order  of  the  day,"  determining  how 
time  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  measures 
awaiting  consideration.  Because  of  the  new 
functions  entrusted  to  the  groups,  deputies  are 
no  longer  allowed  to  enroll  in  two  or  three  of 
them  at  the  same  time.  When  a  new  Parliament 
convenes  after  the  elections,  each  deputy  an- 
nounces himself  as  belonging  to  some  one  particu- 
lar group  or  to  no  group  at  all  (non-ins -crit) 3  and 


1  Revue  des  Deux  Monies,  April,  1904,  page  542. 

2  See  Chapter  VII. 

3  The  deputies  not  inscribed  in  any  group  (46  in  1914)  are 
regarded  as  forming  a  group  for  the  purpose  of  choosing 
committee  members. 

[334] 


PARTIES 

a  membership  list  of  the  groups  is  printed  in  the 
Journal  officiel,  a  list  which  provides  the  only  safe 
basis  of  determining  the  result  of  the  elections.1 
In  the  Senate,  however,  the  groups  remain  as 
chaotic  as  they  used  to  be  in  the  Chamber;  for  ex- 
ample, Antonin  Dubost,  the  president  until  1920, 
appeared  as  a  member  of  all  three  Republican 
groups.2  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Senate, 
which  responds  slowly  to  political  changes,  does 
not,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Right,  use  the  group 
designations  current  in  the  Chamber.  The  Re- 
publican Left  corresponds  with  the  Republican 
Federation  of  the  Chamber;  the  Republican 
Union  with  the  Democratic  Left;  the  Democratic 
Left  with  the  Radical-Socialists. 

French  Party  Organization 

It  is  true  as  a  general  proposition  that  the 
parties   towards   the   Left   are   more   highly   or- 

1  The  returns  printed  in  the  newspapers  before  the  meeting 
of  Parliament  are  quite  unreliable.  Thus  the  London  Chronicle 
(May  12,  1914)  gives  the  Radical-Socialists  136  seats  when 
they  actually  won  172;  the  Right  26  instead  of  16;  the  A.  L.  P. 
34  instead  of  23;  the  Republican  Federation  54  instead  of  36; 
the  Socialist-Republicans  31  instead  of  23;  and  these  errors 
reappear  in  the  Statesman's  Year-Book  (1916,  page  853). 
There  is  further  confusion  in  the  fact  that  the  group  names 
used  in  different  newspapers  do  not  always  correspond. 

2  For  the  composition  of  the  groups  in  both  chambers  and 
data  regarding  the  careers  of  the  politicians  see  Samuel  et 
Bonet-Maury,  Les  Parlementaires  francais  (1914),  a  volume 
which  is  somewhat  similar  to  the  American  Congressional 
Directory. 

[335] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

ganized  and  more  efficiently  disciplined  than  the 
parties  towards  the  Right.  The  machine  of  the 
Unified  Socialists  is  a  model  of  efficiency.  The 
Conservatives  ("reactionaries"  their  enemies  call 
them),  who  include  the  sixteen  members  of  the 
Right  and  a  good  many  of  the  forty-six  deputies 
"not  inscribed/'1  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  a 
machine  at  all.  The  term  "Conservative"  is 
applied  to  Royalists  and  Imperialists  alike;  for 
these  two  monarchist  factions,  so  long  allied  in  a 
common  and  hopeless  opposition  to  the  Re- 
public, have  been  blended  together  as  far  as 
parliamentary  action  is  concerned.  Outside  of 
Parliament,  however,  they  have  separate  party 
organizations  of  a  primitive  kind  and  separate 
propaganda. 

The  Royalists  2  maintain  an  office  in  the  capital 
where  members  are  enrolled;  local  committees  in 
the  eleven  zones  into  which  the  pretender,  the 
Duke  of  Orleans,  has  divided  the  country  for 
political  action;  newspapers  such  as  (in  Paris) 
Le  Soleil,  V Action  francaise,  and  La  Gazette  de 
France;  and  an  energetic  political  association, 
La   Ligue   de   PAction    francaise.     This   league, 


1  The  figures  given  here  relate  to  the  eleventh  legislature 
(1914-1919),  the  composition  of  the  groups  in  the  new  Chamber 
not  being  available  at  the  time  of  writing.  The  election  seems 
to  have  made  little  change  in  the  strength  of  the  monarchists. 

2  Charles  Maurras,  "Les  Idees  royalistes"  Revue  hebdoma- 
dairey  March,  1910,  pages  34-58;  Leon  Jacques,  Les  Partis 
politiques  sous  la  3*  Republique  (1913),  pages  171-191. 

[336] 


PARTIES 

founded  in  1905,  does  not  believe  in  the  negative, 
Fabian  attitude  which  formerly  characterized 
Royalist  tactics.  It  strives  to  popularize  the  idea 
of  an  anti-democratic  monarchy,  of  a  king  who 
will  reign  as  well  as  govern.  It  seeks  to  show  that 
Republican  institutions,  hostile  to  the  army, 
operating  through  a  "sterile  and  ruinous"  party 
system,  have  brought  about  a  general  demoraliza- 
tion, a  national  decadence;  and  that  unmistak- 
able signs  of  resurgent  nationalism,  of  a  yearning 
for  stable  authority  favor  the  reestablishment  of 
the  traditional  monarchy.  This  neo-royalism 
condemns  political  democracy  and  endorses  vio- 
lence quite  in  the  manner  of  the  Syndicalists. 
"The  democratic  ideal  is  false,  not  in  its  details 
or  its  accidents,  but  in  principle  and  essence."  l 
"The  new  government  will  necessarily  rely  upon 
the  army.  .  .  .  The  monarchy  must  be  estab- 
lished by  force;  a  vigorous  and  even  violent 
solution  would  not  be  unpopular."  2  Under  the 
monarchy  there  will  be  special  privileges  for 
the  Catholic  church;  an  hereditary  aristocracy; 
assemblies  representing  "rights  and  interests," 
instead  of  individuals,  and  entrusted  with  a  very 
limited  function  of  control;  administrative  de- 
centralization; and  the  withdrawal  of  the  state 
from  the  field  of  labor  regulation.  With  this 
absolutist  ideal  of  the  league  the  Duke  of  Orleans 
apparently  sympathizes.     In  his  introduction  to 

1  Quoted  by  Jacques,  op.  ctt.,  page  177. 
8  Quoted  by  Jacques,  op.  cit.y  page  186. 

[337] 


periallsts 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

La  Monarcbie  jranqaise,  a  volume  of  documents 
in  which  the  declarations  of  the  Count  of  Cham- 
bord  are  given  the  greatest  prominence,  he  speaks 
the  language,  not  of  his  own  branch  of  the  royal 
house,  but  of  the  Legitimists.1 
T11??1."  The  Bonapartists  or  Imperialists2  resemble  the 
Royalists  in  little  more  than  their  desire  to  sub- 
stitute monarchy  for  republic.  They  would 
preserve  intact  the  institutions  created  in  the 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  period;  harmonize 
the  principles  of  order  and  democracy;  combine 
hereditary  rule  with  popular  designation  (or 
acceptance)  of  the  ruler,  dynastic  right  with  the 
right  of  universal  suffrage  exercised  by  means  of 
the  plebiscite.  They  deny,  as  the  Royalists  do, 
that  they  constitute  a  party.  Napoleon,  says 
Jules  Delafosse,3  "is  not  the  pretender  of  a  party, 
but  the  eventual  head  of  a  system  of  govern- 
ment which  will  take  as  collaborators,  without 
distinction  of  origin,  the  worthiest  and  the  most 
meritorious.  ...  It  would  be  unjust  and  even 
absurd  to  wish  to  convert  this  marvelous  heritage 
of  grandeur,  of  power,  and  beauty  into  the  posses- 
sion of  a  party.  .  .  .  The  Napoleonic  epic  is  a 
national  treasure  which  all  Frenchmen  possess  in 
common."    The  Imperialists  have  a  committee  in 

1  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  page  173. 

2  Jules  Delafosse,  "  Le  Bonapartism,"  Revue  hebdomadaire, 
February,  1910,  pages  308-332;  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages  191- 
197. 

3  Op.  cit.,  pages  309,  322. 

[338] 


PARTIES 

Paris  which  keeps  in  communication  with  the 
exiled  Victor  Napoleon;  newspapers  like  Le  Petit 
Caporal  and  UAppel  au  Peuple;  political  groups 
wThich  hold  banquets  and  listen  to  speeches,  says 
Delafosse,  like  vestals  keeping  alight  the  sacred 
fire.  But  the  attitude  is  one  of  expectation, 
reserve,  passivity.  It  is  not  through  party  propa- 
ganda that  the  Empire  will  be  restored.  The 
Republic  —  a  collective  tyranny,  discredited  by 
scandals  and  abuses  —  will  destroy  itself;  political 
and  social  anarchy  will  inevitably  open  the  way 
to  the  predestined  man.  "The  Empire  is  not  a 
party;  it  is  a  refuge.  No  one  recognizes  it  in  the 
days  of  prosperity.  The  deluge  comes.  It  ap- 
pears then  as  the  rock  of  salvation  on  which' all 
the  miserable,  threatened  with  submersion,  throw 
themselves  pell-mell,  frightened  and  confounded."1 
Royalists  and  Imperialists,  like  the  Syndicalists, 
build  their  hopes  upon  the  failure  of  the  Republic 
to  fulfill  its  early  promise.  It  is  perhaps  true 
that  France,  weary  of  political  intrigues,  almost 
contemptuous  of  Parliament  and  politicians, 
would  accept  a  resolute  leader  with  equanimity. 
In  his  "France  Herself  Again"  Ernest  Dimnet 
contends  that  a  coup  d'etat  could  easily  be  ac- 
complished. He  is  even  considerate  enough  to 
give  a  recipe:  the  appointment  of  the  right  men 
as  minister  of  the  interior  and  prefect  of  police; 
the  arrest  of  a  handful  of  deputies  and  senators 
(specifying  Caillaux  and  Clemenceau)  who  might 
1  Delafosse,  op.  cit.,  page  331. 

[339] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

cause  trouble;  a  sudden  blow  in  the  night.  The 
cardboard  giant  would  topple  over.  The  Pari- 
sians, reading  of  the  dramatic  episode  in  their 
newspapers,  would  regard  it  at  first  with  acquies- 
cence, then  with  enthusiasm;  suppression  of  the 
newspapers  would  be  a  capital  blunder  —  it  would 
spoil  breakfast.  Dimnet,  however,  while  explain- 
ing how  the  thing  should  be  done,  does  not  believe 
that  it  will  be  done.  A  necessary  element  is  miss- 
ing. The  hour  is  propitious;  but  there  is  no 
man. 
The  The  A.  L.  P.  whose  members  x  sit  next  to  the 

Liberaie  Rignt>  is  descended  in  direct  line  from  the  Rallies 
Popu-  of  1893.2  The  new  name,  assumed  in  1899  when 
Waldeck-Rousseau  had  definitely  taken  an  anti- 
clerical position  in  his  famous  Toulouse  speech, 
indicated  a  mission  to  defend  popular  liberties 
(in  this  case  the  privileges  of  the  Catholic  Church) 
from  invasion.  Three  years  later  the  group  trans- 
formed itself  into  a  party.  It  is  a  Catholic  party 
which  accepts  the  Republic;  Catholic  first  and 
by  conviction,  Republican  by  conversion  and  as  a 
matter  of  expediency  and  tactics.  Its  objects 
have  been  defined  thus:3  "To  defend  and  conquer 

1  Twenty-three  in  the  eleventh  legislature  (1914-1919); 
more  than  seventy  in  the  twelfth  legislature. 

2  Jacques  Piou  "  V A.  L.  P."  Revue  kebdomadaire,  February, 
1910,  pages  476-492;  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages  320-344;  E. 
Flournoy,  La  Lutte  par  association;  U Action  liberaie  populaire 
(1907).  Parker  T.  Moon  of  Columbia  University  will  soon 
publish  a  volume  dealing  exhaustively  with  the  A.  L.  P. 

*  Quoted  by  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  page  321. 

[340] 


PARTIES 

all  liberties  necessary  to  the  life  of  the  nation, 
particularly  religious  liberty  which  is  of  a  superior 
order  and  which  today  is  subjected  to  the  most 
serious  assaults.  To  defend  public  liberties  con- 
stitutionally by  all  legal  means  and  in  particular 
by  electoral  propaganda,  to  support  legislative 
reforms,  to  create  or  develop  social  activities  and 
institutions,  to  improve  the  lot  of  the  working 
class."  The  program  is  by  no  means  connected 
with  religion  alone;  its  political  and  economic 
aspects  are  highly  important;  1  but  the  interests 
of  the  church  take  first  place  in  the  preoccupa- 
tions of  the  party  and  in  determining  its  attitude 
towards  other  parties. 

The  A.  L.  P.  is  bitterly  opposed  to  the  legisla-  its  rela- 
tion which  has  separated  church  and  state,  secu- 
larized the  schools,  and  debarred  the  unauthorized 
religious  orders  from  teaching.  As  to  the  status 
of  the  church  no  legal  organization  is  possible 
without  the  previous  approval  of  the  Pope;  and 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Vatican  should 
forthwith  be  reestablished.  As  to  education  the 
state  has  no  right  to  instruct  Catholic  children  in 

1  In  the  campaign  of  1914  the  party  advocated  (Journal  des 
Debats,  February  22):  maintenance  of  the  three-year  military 
service  law;  proportional  representation;  economy  in  ex- 
penditures; an  income  tax  levied  upon  external  signs  of 
wealth  and  not  by  unjust  and  inquisitorial  methods;  restora- 
tion to  the  religious  orders  of  the  right  to  teach;  distribution 
of  public  funds  to  private  schools  on  the  basis  of  attendance; 
instruction  in  duty  towards  God  in  public  schools;  revision 
of  the  constitution. 

[341] 


ious  and 
political 
program 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  doctrines  of  the  Masonic  lodges  and  to  impart 
religious  indifference  and  unbelief.  There  should 
be  absolute  educational  freedom;  Catholic  schools, 
freed  from  state  interference,  should  receive  from 
the  state  a  share  of  the  public  funds  based  upon 
the  number  of  scholars  {repartition  proportionnelle 
which,  with  representation  proportionnelle  in  elec- 
tions and  representation  professionnelle  in  the  field 
of  commerce  and  industry,  constitutes  the  three 
"R.  P.'s"  of  the  program).  The  chief  political 
demand  is  amendment  of  the  constitution  which 
now  permits  "the  omnipotence  of  an  anonymous 
and  irresponsible  collective  power."  The  Declara- 
tion of  the  Rights  of  Man  ("modified  in  certain 
points")  should  be  incorporated  in  the  constitu- 
tion and  protected  from  legislative  infringement, 
as  in  the  United  States,  by  a  supreme  court;  the 
President  should  be  chosen  by  a  special  electoral 
college  and  thus  relieved  of  dependence  upon 
Parliament;  the  chambers  should  be  deprived  of 
their  power  of  deciding  election  contests;  and  a 
referendum  should  be  required  on  all  laws  touch- 
ing rights  and  liberties.  The  party  advocates 
proportional  representation,  administrative  de- 
centralization, and  a  national  civil-service  law. 
its  The  economic  demands  of  the  platform  are  in 

some  respects  very  advanced  and  bring  the  party 
closer  to  the  Left  than  to  the  Right  and  Republi- 
can Federation  with  which  it  is  usually  associated. 
Laissez-faire  is  denounced  as  "the  dream  of 
chimerical  theorists"  and  "the  refuge  of  egoism." 
[342] 


economic 
program 


PARTIES 

'If  State  Socialism  is  a  peril,  the  complete  ab- 
stention of  the  state  is  a  desertion;  in  face  of  the 
growing  antagonism  of  capital  and  labor  it  [the 
party]  should  cooperate  in  the  task  of  pacifica- 
tion." The  platform  endorses  vocational  training, 
workingmen's  compensation,  conciliation  and  arbi- 
tration, limitation  of  working  hours,  a  minimum 
wage  for  home  workers,  and  extension  of  the  civil 
capacity  of  syndicates  (unions).  "Professional 
representation/'  however,  must  "be  regarded  as 
its  most  original  and  striking  feature.1  "The 
syndicate,  maintained  on  a  professional  [voca- 
tional] basis,  is  a  means  of  social  pacification  and 
prepares  the  way  for  the  stable  organization  of 
the  world  of  labor.  .  .  .  The  epoch  of  purely 
political  parliaments  has  closed;  national  repre- 
sentation must  become  political  and  economic" 
Parliament  and  the  other  governmental  organs 
of  today  will  continue  to  represent  the  general 
interests  of  the  country,  but  alongside  of  them 
will  appear  a  council  representing  the  special 
interests  of  vocational  syndicates,  syndicates 
organized  in  each  commune  and  composed  of 
both  employers  and  employees.  The  government 
must  consult  the  council  on  every  proposed  law, 
decree,  or  order  which  affects  the  interests  of 
these  vocational  syndicates.  The  council  itself 
will  have  an  extensive  ordinance  power,  subject 
to  the  referendum. 
The  A.  L.  P.  admits  to  membership  either 
1  See  on  this  subject  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages  328-330. 

[343] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 

its  or-  groups  or  individuals,  the  latter  being  termed 
^za"  membres  societaires  when  they  pay  five  hundred 
francs  or  at  least  twenty-five  francs  a  year  and 
membres  adherents  when  they  pay  at  least  one 
franc  a  year.  The  party  organization  includes: 
(i)  Local  committees  in  the  communes,  cantons, 
and  departments;  (2)  a  central  committee,  com- 
posed of  the  founders  and  coopted  members, 
which  formulates  the  party  rules  and  elects  the 
party  officers;  and  (3)  a  general  assembly  or 
convention  meeting  every  two  years.  The  general 
assembly  includes  the  founders  and  delegates 
from  the  local  groups,  each  group  having  one  vote 
as  a  minimum  and  an  additional  vote  for  every 
one  hundred  members  up  to  a  maximum  of 
twenty-five  votes.  The  president  of  the  party  is 
invested  with  very  extensive  powers;  in  fact, 
says  Dr.  Jacques,1  "the  A.  L.  P.  is  almost  the 
property  of  M.  Piou,  its  president." 
The  Re-  The  Republican  Federation  is  the  rump  of  the 
Federal  f°rmer  Moderate  or  Progressist  party,  reorganized 
turn  and  renamed  in  1906.2    For  twenty  years  (1878- 

1898)  the  Moderates  governed  France  under 
Gambetta,  Ferry,  Ribot,  and  Meline,  sometimes 
allied  with  the  Radicals,  occasionally  even  dis- 
placed by  them.  Then  came  a  period  of  hesita- 
tion and  schism.    Half  the  members  of  the  group 

1  Op.  cit.y  page  445. 

2  J.  Thierry,  "  Le  Parti  republicain  modere"  Revue  heb- 
domadaire,  March,  1910,  pages  478-487;  Jacques,  op.  cit., 
pages  199-222. 

[344] 


PARTIES 

followed  Waldeck-Rousseau  in  his  evolution 
towards  the  Left.  The  other  half,  repelled  by  his 
anti-clerical  policy  and  by  the  still  more  radical 
position  of  his  successor  Combes  (1902-1905), 
found  themselves  acting  in  concert  with  the 
Right.  From  that  time  the  Radicals  and  Socialists 
have  classified  them  as  reactionaries.  The  Re- 
publican Federation  is,  indeed,  the  most  con- 
servative of  the  Republican  parties.  Imbued 
with  the  principles  of  1789,  it  is  very  tolerant  in 
religious  matters,  strongly  individualistic,  and  at- 
tached to  the  classical  school  of  political  economy 
(laissez-faire).  Above  all  it  stands  for  personal 
liberty;  and  for  the  sake  of  that  principle  it 
broke  with  the  other  Republican  groups  and  op- 
posed anti-clerical  legislation.  "It  appeals  to 
the  moderation  and  wisdom  of  men,"  says  Leon 
Jacques,1  "to  their  calm,  reasoned,  and  measured 
ideas,  to  their  disinterested  devotion  to  public 
affairs;  and  it  proclaims  that  the  progress  of 
democracy  depends  in  great  measure  upon  moral 
progress.  Only  the  imperious  necessity  of  main- 
taining public  order  and  social  progress  can 
justify  restrictions  upon  the  liberty,  initiative, 
activity,  and  responsibility  of  individuals.''  The 
party  has  no  love  for  reform;  but  it  is  ready  to 
give  way  (without  enthusiasm)  before  the  neces- 
sities of  evolution  and  the  logic  of  events.  Re- 
ferring to  proposed  labor  legislation,  Jules  Meline 
said  in  the  party  congress  of  1912:2  "Since  it 
1  Op.  cit.,  page  203.  2  Id. 

[345] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

must  be  done  and  since  it  is  better  that  it  should 
be  done  with  us  than  against  us,  let  us  strive  at 
least  to  do  it  methodically,  scientifically  and  pro- 
gressively." The  attitude  toward  reform  was 
thus  expressed  by  the  congress  of  1908:  "Order 
by  progress,  progress  with  order.  The  weakness 
of  the  old  conservative  party  lies  in  the  attempt 
to  conserve  without  reforming,  the  weakness  of 
the  revolutionary  parties  lies  in  their  attempt  to 
reform  without  conserving;  our  strength  lies  in 
the  will  and  the  power  at  once  to  conserve  and 
develop. "  On  the  political  side  the  party  plat- 
form is  very  much  like  that  of  the  A.  L.  P.: 
constitutional  amendments  to  incorporate  the 
Declaration  of  Rights  and  to  erect  a  supreme 
court  as  its  guardian;  trial  of  election  contests 
by  an  extra-parliamentary  commission;  propor- 
tional representation;  administrative  decentrali- 
zation; a  civil-service  law;  an  income  tax  levied 
without  inquisitorial  methods;  and  in  the  matter 
of  education  entire  liberty  except  that  the  state 
may  enforce  proper  hygienic  standards  and  see 
that  teachers  are  properly  qualified.  In  economic 
policies,  however,  the  Federation  parts  company 
with  the  A.  L.  P.  Stanchly  individualistic,  it 
would  reduce  state  intervention  to  a  minimum 
compatible  with  humanitarianism  and  social 
solidarity.  It  has  favored  old-age  pensions  and 
the  protection  of  women  in  industry,  for  instance, 
but  opposed  the  minimum  wage  and  other  limita- 
tions upon  the  freedom  of  contract.     Stateism  is 

[346] 


PARTIES 

an  " immense  danger"  which  would  suppress 
liberties,  endanger  the  productive  forces  of  the 
country,  and  culminate  in  a  crisis  of  collectivism. 

The  Federation  admits  to  membership  either  itsor- 
groups  which  pay  from  five  to  fifty  francs  a  year  ^z&~ 
according  to  their  numerical  strength  or  indi- 
viduals who  pay  from  five  \francs  (adherents)  to 
five  hundred  francs  a  year  (founders).  The  party 
organization  includes:  (i)  an  annual  congress 
consisting  of  individual  members  of  the  party 
and  delegates  from  local  groups; x  (2)  a  general 
council  of  at  least  fifty  members  chosen  by  the 
congress,  one  fifth  retiring  each  year;  (3)  a 
bureau  of  party  officials  chosen  by  the  council 
every  two  years;  and  (4)  an  executive  commit- 
tee consisting  of  the  bureau  and  twelve  others 
chosen  by  the  council. 

The  Democratic-Republican  party  —  the  party   The 
of    Poincare,     Barthou,     and     Deschanel  —  was    cra™c°_~ 
founded  in   1901   with   the  idea    of  uniting   iso-    Repubii- 
lated    Republican   groups    against    "triumphant    p^ 
anti-semitism   and   the   menaces  of  the  Nation- 
alists. "2     It  has  oscillated  between  the  moderates 
and  the  radicals,  seeking  to  preserve  the  happy 
mean  and  combine  as  judiciously  as  possible  the 

1  Each  group  is  entitled  to  one  delegate  for  every  fifty 
members  up  to  a  maximum  often. 

2  Paul  Deschanel,  "U  Alliance  re  public aine"  Revue  heb- 
domadaire,  April,  1910,  pages  34-52;  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages 
350-361.  It  was  at  first  known  as  the  Democratic-Republi- 
can Alliance  or  (popularly)  the  Republican  Alliance  or  the 
Democratic  Alliance.    It  took  the  name  of  party  in  191 1. 

[347] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

principle  of  progress  and  reform  with  the  principle 
of  order  and  stability.  It  supported  the  Radical- 
Socialists  in  passing  the  anti-clerical  laws,  but 
afterwards,  antagonized  by  the  intolerant  spirit 
of  the  Radical-Socialists  and  their  growing  con- 
fidence in  State  intervention,  drew  closer  to  the 
Republican  Federation.  The  party  wishes  to 
establish  "equal  justice  for  all,  liberty  for  all, 
social  peace. "  It  favors  "neither  reaction  nor 
revolution."  It  is  "anti-clerical  but  not  anti- 
religious;  anti-Nationalist l  but  vigilant  guardian 
of  the  honor  and  strength  of  the  country;  respect- 
ful of  all  rights,  but  resolutely  bent  upon  reform; 
adversary  of  communist  Utopias,  distinctly  hostile 
to  violent  methods,  but  constantly  preoccupied 
with  all  forms  of  progress  and,  above  all,  social 
progress."  To  realize  the  Republican  ideal  there 
must  be  formed  "a  close  and  loyal  union  of  all 
democratic  forces  against  the  reactioharies,  the 
anti-patriots,  and  the  collectivists.  It  wishes  to 
base  this  necessary  union  upon  a  program  exclud- 
ing fantastic  formulas  and  rash  promises.  Only 
ideas  and  programs  serve  to  classify  parties."  2 
its  The    Democratic-Republican    party    sees    the 

program  nee(j  o^  a  government  which  will  really  govern, 
which  will  recover  forgotten  or  abdicated  rights, 
and  insist  upon  respect  for  the  law  —  a  govern- 
ment, as  Raymond  Poincare  has  said,3  "firm  in  its 

1  That  is,  opposed  to  the  jingoes. 

2  Annuaire  du  Parlement,  1909,  page  244. 

3  Quoted  by  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  page  352. 

[348] 


PARTIES 

initiatives,  courageous  in  its  responsibilities,  and 
disinclined  to  sacrifice  the  very  dignity  of  its 
existence  and  the  force  of  its  authority  in  the 
effort  to  remain  in  office."  Among  the  proposed 
reforms  are:  proportional  representation,  a  civil- 
service  law,  an  income  tax  designed  to  equalize 
burdens  and  not  to  equalize  fortunes,  and  es- 
pecially decentralization.  The  power  of  the 
prefect,  says  Paul  Deschanel,  in  explaining  the 
importance  which  the  party  attaches  to  decentrali- 
zation,1 is  an  anachronism  and  a  peril  —  a  peril 
because  it  accustoms  Frenchmen  to  the  idea  of 
one-man  power  and  prepares  the  way  for  a  despot. 
In  other  countries  citizens  serve  their  apprentice- 
ship in  local  government;  in  France  local  govern- 
ment is  conducted  by  officials.  "We  shall  have 
to  choose  between  a  system  of  government  which 
consists  in  holding  France  at  the  end  of  a  tele- 
graph wire  and  a  system  of  government  which 
consists  in  making  men  and  citizens. "  While 
denouncing  clericalism  —  the  exploitation  of  relig- 
ion for  political  ends,  —  the  party  pledges  itself 
to  maintain  religious  liberty.  "  Religion, "  said 
Louis  Barthou  in  the  election  campaign  of  1914,2 
"has  passed  from  the  domain  of  the  state  into 
the  domain  of  the  individual  conscience;  and  we 
think  that  the  state  would  be  guilty  of  an  in- 
tolerable wrong  if  it  made  use  of  its  power  and  its 
influence    against    religion."      In    the   matter   of 

1  Op.  cit.,  page  44. 

2  Journal  des  Debats,  February  28. 

[349] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

education  there  should  be  state  inspection  of 
private  schools  and  state  diplomas  to  insure  the 
capacity  of  teachers;  all  doctrines,  all  creeds, 
should  be  treated  with  equal  respect.  In  other 
words  the  party  favors  state  control,  but  will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  scheme  of  a  state 
monopoly  of  education,  now  making  headway 
among  the  Radical-Socialists  as  a  punitive 
measure  against  the  Catholics.  The  party  favors 
social  and  economic  reform.  It  proposes,  for 
instance,  the  public  operation  of  utilities,  as  in 
England  and  Germany;  insurance  against  acci- 
dent, sickness,  and  unemployment;  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  civil  capacity  of  syndicates;  the 
erection  of  permanent  courts  of  arbitration  and 
conciliation;  measures  which  will  encourage  the 
workmen  to  become  co-proprietors  in  industrial 
enterprises  and  thus  transform  salaried  labor  into 
"associated  labor."  But  the  basis  of  the  existing 
social  order  must  not  be  undermined  by  exag- 
gerated reforms.  "We  consider  it  dangerous," 
said  Louis  Barthou,1  "  to  discourage  capital,  with- 
out which  no  enterprise  can  live,  and  to  wreck 
the  vitality  of  labor  in  a  sort  of  state  officialism, 
depriving  the  workers  of  all  initiative  and  trans- 
forming them  into  what  may  be  termed  ad- 
ministrative and  irresponsible  automata."  With 
regard  to  foreign  relations  France,  while  desiring 
righteous  and  honorable  peace,  needs  a  strong 
army  and  navy  to  protect  herself  from  attack. 
1  Journal  des  Debuts,  February  28,  1914. 
[350] 


PARTIES 

The  part}'  admits  to  membership  individuals  itsor- 
who  pay  from  two  francs  (adherents)  to  one  ^^^ 
hundred  francs  a  year  (founders)  and  groups 
which  pay  in  proportion  to  their  size  and  re- 
sources, but  not  less  than  thirty  francs  a  year. 
The  party  organization  includes:  (i)  A  bureau  of 
officers  chosen  by  the  central  executive  com- 
mittee; (2)  a  central  executive  committee  chosen 
by  the  superior  council  for  three  years;  (3)  a 
superior  council  which  includes  the  members  of 
Parliament,  the  members  of  the  executive  com- 
mittee, one  hundred  notables  in  arts,  letters, 
science,  commerce,  and  industry,  paying  two 
hundred  francs  a  year  and  named  by  the  execu- 
tive committee,  and  general  delegates  from  the 
departments  also  named  by  the  executive  com- 
mittee; and  (4)  an  annual  assembly  which  all 
members  of  the  party  are  free  to  attend.  The 
party  has  no  separate  group  of  its  own  in  the 
Chamber;  but  more  than  one  hundred  deputies 
belonging  to  the  groups  seated  between  the 
Radical-Socialists  and  the  Republican  Federation 
were  elected  as  candidates  of  the  party  in  1914. 

The  Federation  of  the  Lefts,  because  it  gave  The 
expression  to  political  readjustments  which  were 
to  display  themselves  more  clearly  after  the  close  the  Lefts 
of  the  Great  War,  deserves  an  important  place 
in  the  recent  history  of  French  parties.  It  was 
founded  at  the  close  of  191 3  after  Aristide  Briand, 
in  a  speech  at  St.  Etienne,  had  urged  Republicans 
to  consolidate  their  ranks  in  resistance  to  dema- 

[35i] 


Federa- 
tion of 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

gogy  and  revolution.  It  did  not  put  forward  any 
elaborate  program  in  the  electoral  campaign  of 
1914.  The  principal  points  were  national  defense 
(the  maintenance  of  the  three-year  military 
service  law),  proportional  representation,  and 
application  of  the  anti-clerical  laws  in  a  generous 
spirit.  The  first  two  points  in  no  way  distin- 
guished the  Federation  of  the  Lefts  from  the 
Right,  the  A.  L.  P.,  or  the  Republican  Federation; 
all  three  were  urged  in  the  same  campaign  by 
the  Democratic-Republican  party.  A  foreign 
observer  finds  it  hard  to  understand  why  Briand 
and  Barthou,  leaders  of  the  Democratic-Republi- 
can party,  should  launch  a  new  movement  with- 
out distinctive  policies  and  be  active  in  promoting 
simultaneously  the  interests  of  two  organizations. 
Why  should  there  be  both  a  Democratic-Repub- 
lican party  and  a  Federation  of  the  Lefts,  led 
by  the  same  men,  propounding  very  much  the 
same  doctrines?  Apparently  the  answer  is  that 
the  Democratic-Republican  party,  formed  to 
resist  the  seditious  agitation  of  jingoes  and 
clericals  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  and  com- 
promised by  its  support  of  the  anti-clerical  legis- 
lation of  the  next  few  years,  could  not  easily 
become  the  vehicle  of  Briand's  policy  of  "pacifi- 
cation" and  "  conciliation. "  Briand  as  premier  in 
1910  had  declared  that,  victory  won,  the  conflict 
with  the  church  should  be  brought  to  an  end, 
and  that  the  moment  had  come  "when  the 
commander  who  respects  his  army  and  wishes 
[352] 


PARTIES 

victory  to  be  without  stain  .  .  .  should  cry  to 
the  conquerors  *  Enough!  Go  no  farther !"'  He 
and  his  lieutenants  felt  the  necessity  of  allay- 
ing the  antagonisms  evoked  during  the  Combes 
period  and  of  tempering  the  asperities  of  the 
anti-clerical  laws.  The  new  situation  demanded 
a  new  party,  a  party  which  should  announce 
definitely  the  collapse  of  the  old  Republican  bloc 
and  marshal  the  Republican  forces  to  resist,  not 
the  old  danger  on  the  Right,  but  the  exaggerated 
hostility  of  the  Radical-Socialists  and  Unified 
Socialists  towards  the  Catholic  Church  and 
towards  the  army.  It  was  for  this  reason  that 
the  Radical-Socialists  constantly  referred  to  the 
Federation  as  "of  the  Lefts  improperly  so-called. " 
The  new  party  does  not  seem  to  have  maintained 
any  organization  after  the  election  campaign  of 
1914.  But  the  purposes  which  had  animated  it 
did  not  die.  When  the  war  was  over  they  served 
as  the  basis  of  agreement  in  the  formation  of  the 
National  Republican  bloc. 

The  Radical-Socialist  (or,  more  correctly,  the   ™®    , 

.  .      .  Radical- 

Unified  Radical  and  Radical-Socialist)  party  was    socialist 

until    1919    much    the    strongest    party    in    the   Party 

Chamber  and,  except  for  the  Unified  Socialists, 

much  the  best  organized.1    During  the  first  decade 

of  the  century  it  dominated  the  government  as 

1  A.  Charpentier,  Le  Parti  radical  et  radicahsocialiste  a 
travers  ses  congres  (1913);  F.  Buisson,  "La  Politique  radicale- 
socialiste"  Revue  hebdomadaire,  February,  1910,  pages  159- 
181;  Jacques,  op.  cit.y  pages  223-266. 

[353] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

the  Moderates  had  done  in  the  preceding  twenty 
years.  Never  having  a  clear  majority,  it  main- 
tained itself  in  power  first  by  means  of  the  anti- 
clerical Republican  bloc  with  a  managing  com- 
mittee known  as  the  Delegation  of  the  Lefts  and 
afterwards,  when  the  Unified  Socialists  seceded, 
by  means  of  an  alliance  with  the  Democratic- 
Republican  groups  and  the  Independent  Socialists. 
After  the  fall  of  the  Clemenceau  cabinet  in  1909, 
however,  and  the  formulation  of  Briand's  policy 
of  appeasement,  Radical-Socialists  and  Demo- 
cratic-Republicans separated.  From  that  time 
until  the  outbreak  of  the  war  there  was  no  settled 
majority  in  the  Chamber;  and  this  worked  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Democratic-Republican 
party  which  —  under  Briand,  Poincare,  and 
Barthou,  —  dictated  the  national  policies  for 
three-quarters  of  the  period.  Imposing  as  are 
the  past  achievements  of  the  Radical-Socialists, 
their  strength  in  the  country  has  greatly  declined. 
The  party  is  rent  by  fatal  discords  which  persist 
in  spite  of  the  formal  "unification"  of  1913.  The 
Right  right  and  left  wings,  tending  respectively  towards 
wings^f  individualism  and  collectivism,  stand  so  widely 
the  apart   that   complete   separation   seems   not  im- 

party  probable.  "Better  the  rivalry  of  two  groups 
knowing  what  they  want  and  saying  it  than  the 
unstable  equilibrium  of  a  single  group  which 
unceasingly  advances  and  retires,  votes  the  princi- 
ple and  refuses  the  applications,  affirms  dogmas 
which  it  tramples  under  foot,  and  maintains  the 
[354] 


PARTIES 

appearance  of  an  imposing  unity  at  the  price  of 
an  eternal  equivocation."  x  Doumergue,  while 
premier  in  1914,  did  nothing  to  repeal  the  three- 
year  service  law,  although  bound  by  the  minimum 
program  of  his  party  to  do  so.  He  declared  that 
military  service  could  not  be  reduced  until  the 
European  situation  changed.  A  Radical-Socialist 
candidate,  denounced  by  other  Radical-Socialists 
for  endorsing  the  three-year  law,  replied:  "I 
pray  them  to  summon  to  their  bar  Messrs. 
Deloncle,  Steeg,  G.  L.  Bonnet,  Doumergue, 
Leon  Bourgeois,  and  many  others  whose  opin- 
ion and  attitude  have  been  identical  with  my 
own."  2 

The  party  has  sought  a  middle  ground  between    official 
the  extreme  wings:    "We  have   repudiated   the   JJ22l 
selfish    individualism    which,    under    pretext    of  Socialism 
liberty,  submits  liberty  and  justice  to  the  dicta- 
tion of  the  money  power.     Nor  do  we  wish   a 
rigid  and  tyrannical  organization  in  which,  under 
pretext  of  equality,  we  should  take  part  in  neu- 
tralizing initiative  and  restricting  human  effort. "  3 
The   congress   of   1908    adopted    unanimously   a 
declaration  to  the  effect:  (1)  that  social  classes 
as  defined  by  Marx  do  not  exist;    (2)  that  the 
theory  of  the  class-struggle  is   an   error   and   a 
practical  danger  as  involving  anarchy;    (3)  that 
private    property    should    be    maintained    as    a 

1  Charpentier,  op.  cit.,  introduction  by  F.  Buisson,  page  xi. 

2  Quoted  by  de  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de  la  Republique,  page  27. 

3  Declaration  of  1910  quoted  by  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  page  229. 

[355] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

sacred  thing;  but  (4)  that  "private  property 
should  give  way  whenever  the  interests  of  the 
owner  are  found  to  be  in  manifest  conflict  with 
the  interests  of  society."  Although  the  Radical- 
Socialists  officially  condemn  collectivism,  they 
maintain  friendly  relations  with  the  collectivists. 
Without  describing  the  various  changes  in  those 
relations  since  the  collectivists  (Unified  Socialists) 
abandoned  the  bloc,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  two 
parties  worked  together  in  the  elections  of  1914 
by  supporting  the  same  candidates  on  the  second 
ballot.  After  the  elections  Emile  Combes  said:1 
"Ever  since  the  dissolution  of  the  bloc  the  Re- 
public has  marked  time.  The  country  has  just 
indicated  its  will  to  move  forward.  It  has  re- 
constituted the  bloc,  seeing  that  in  most  districts 
on  the  second  balloting,  and  in  some  on  the  first, 
Radical  and  Socialist  votes  have  been  blended." 
In  the  Socialist  congress  there  was  even  a  proposal 
openly  to  reconstruct  the  bloc  as  a  union  of  Uni- 
fied Socialists,  Radical-Socialists,  and  Socialist- 
Republicans.  Apparently  the  Radical-Socialists, 
having  broken  with  the  Democratic-Repub- 
licans, can  make  their  future  alliances  only  on 
the  extreme  Left. 
The  The  Radical-Socialist  party  draws  its  strength 

Socialist     mamly  from  the  lower  middle  class  —  from  the 
program     shopkeepers,  the  peasant  proprietors,  the  govern- 
ment officials.     It  is,  as  Ferdinand  Buisson  has 
said,  a  bourgeois  party  with  the  soul  of  a  popular 
1  De  Lanessan,  op.  cit.,  page  186. 

[356] 


PARTIES 

party;  that  rare  thing  in  the  history  of  democ- 
racies, a  class  which  seeks  to  confound  itself  with 
the  nation.  It  has  been  described  in  the  party 
conventions  as  "passionately  attached  to  the 
cause  of  the  people,  to  the  well-being  of  the  great 
disinherited  masses."  It  is  definitely  evolution- 
ist. "In  politics  sleep  is  death.  More  than  ever 
we  must  show  that  we  are  a  party  which  remains 
young,  a  party  of  combat  and  conquest. "  It  is 
sharply  anti-clerical,  pledged  to  the  supremacy  of 
the  civil  power  as  expressed  in  the  phrase  "free 
churches  in  the  sovereign  state."  This  anti- 
clericalism,  which  has  been  the  most  pronounced 
characteristic  of  the  party,  is  seen  in  its  insistence 
upon  secular  education,  upon  education  divorced 
from  all  religious  creeds  and  confined  to  lay 
teachers.  Many  Radical-Socialists  wish  to  make 
education  a  government  monopoly  as  a  means  of 
circumventing  the  activities  of  the  Catholic 
church.  Several  times  (in  1903,  1905,  1910) 
this  proposal  has  been  endorsed  by  the  party 
congress;  but  no  further  action  has  been  taken; 
the  weapon  is  still  held  in  reserve.  The  party, 
setting  great  store  by  education,  wishes  to  equalize 
opportunity  by  making  all  branches  free  and 
greatly  to  expand  the  facilities  for  vocational  and 
technical  training.  Much  attention  is  given  to 
measures  for  improving  the  condition  of  labor: 
minimum  wages;  reduced  working  hours;  co- 
operative societies;  profit  sharing;  pensions; 
insurance  against  accident,  sickness,  and   unem- 

[357] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

ployment.  The  program,  which  is  more  complete 
and  practical  than  that  of  any  other  party,  also 
proposes:  a  civil-service  law;  administrative  de- 
centralization; judicial  reform  (elective  judges, 
improved  procedure,  reduced  costs,  etc.);  a 
system  of  commercial  and  industrial  credits;  a 
progressive  income  tax  with  means  of  discovering 
hidden  wealth;  heavier  and  graduated  inheritance 
taxes;  compulsory  processes  of  conciliation  and 
arbitration;  public  operation  of  municipal  utili- 
ties; new  ports  and  transportation  routes  to 
develop  commerce;  expansion  of  public  health 
activities,  and  much  else.  On  the  subject  of 
electoral  reform  the  party  has  hesitated,  some- 
times disguising  its  uncertainty  in  vague  phrases, 
more  often  endorsing  the  general  ticket;  unlike 
the  Socialist  party  it  has  always  opposed  propor- 
tional representation.  With  respect  to  inter- 
national relations  its  program  reflects  to  some 
extent  the  pacifistic  tendencies  which  showed  so 
plainly  during  the  Combes  period.  The  party 
has  recommended  a  cordial  understanding  with 
all  nations,  recourse  to  arbitration,  reduction  of 
armaments;  it  has  condemned  the  policy  of  ad- 
venture, which  openly  or  secretly  seeks  new 
colonies,  and  the  excesses  and  abuses  of  the 
military  spirit.  Just  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  it  made  the  repeal  of  the  three-year  military 
service  law  the  chief  issue  of  the  election 
campaign. 

The  Radical-Socialists  have  a  very  complete 

[358] 


PARTIES 

organization,  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  Radical- 
that  the  party  rules  (relating  to  such  matters  as  ^^^ 
membership,  discipline,  party  machinery,  propa-  zation 
ganda,  and  finances)  would  occupy  twenty-five 
or  thirty  pages  of  this  book.  Membership  in- 
cludes: (i)  local  groups  which  have  been  approved 
by  the  departmental  federation  and  admitted  by 
the  national  executive  committee;  (2)  newspapers 
admitted  by  the  executive  committee;  and  (3)  ex- 
officio  deputies,  senators,  general  councilors  of  the 
departments,  and  councilors  of  the  arrondissement 
belonging  to  the  party.  All  must  pay  annual  dues: 
groups,  eight  francs;  councilors  and  newspapers, 
thirteen  francs;  senators  and  deputies,  two  hun- 
dred francs;  and  these  dues  cover  the  three-franc 
subscription  to  the  Bulletin  du  Parti  which  is  one 
of  the  agencies  of  propaganda.  The  party  mem- 
bers, besides  being  required  to  accept  the  minimum 
program  and  to  affiliate  with  no  other  party,  must 
always  support  Radical-Socialist  candidates  in  all 
elections.  This  is  a  "rigorous  duty."  If  a  mem- 
ber fails  in  any  of  his  obligations,  the  national 
executive  committee  may  warn  him,  censure  him, 
or  expel  him  from  the  party;  and  publicity  is 
given  to  censure  or  expulsion  in  the  Bulletin  and 
in  the  party  newspapers.  An  expelled  member 
may  appeal  to  the  annual  congress  against  the 
committee's  decision.  The  members  of  the  party 
in  each  commune  constitute  the  communal  com- 
mittee and  send  delegates  to  the  committees 
higher  up  (in  canton,  arrondissement,  and  depart- 

[359] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

ment);1  and  the  departmental  committee  or 
federation  sends  delegates  to  the  annual  congress. 
This  annual  congress,  which  has  power  to  regulate 
all  the  affairs  of  the  party,  is  also  attended  by 
representatives  of  the  party  newspapers  and  by 
the  senators,  deputies,  and  councilors.  It  adjusts 
controversies,  draws  up  a  party  program,  and 
elects  an  executive  committee  of  more  than  six 
hundred  members,  each  departmental  delegation 
nominating  a  number  of  committeemen  propor- 
tional to  the  population  of  the  department.2  The 
executive  committee  meets  once  a  month  or 
oftener  and  through  numerous  subcommittees 
occupies  itself  with  all  the  interests  of  the  party: 
preparing  the  business  which  shall  come  before 
the  next  congress;  admitting  and  disciplining 
members;  passing  upon  the  nomination  of  candi- 
dates for  elective  office;  sending  out  campaign 
speakers  and  campaign  arguments;  distributing 
pamphlets  at  cost  price;  arranging  local  rallies; 
keeping  in  close  touch  with  party  groups  all 
through  the  country  and  harmonizing  their  ac- 
tivities. The  cooperation  of  the  committee  with 
lower  units  is  shown  in  the  making  of  nominations. 
Within  each  department  the  federation  issues  the 
call  for  every  nominating  convention  and  deter- 

1  Committees  are  also  being  organized  in  "regions"  which 
include  several  departments. 

2  Each  department  is  entitled  to  at  least  two  members  and 
to  two  additional  members  for  every  two  hundred  thousand  of 
population. 

[360] 


PARTIES 

mines  its  composition  subject  to  the  rule  that  all 
party  groups  within  the  constituency  shall  be 
represented.  The  nominee  of  a  convention  before 
entering  the  campaign  as  a  Radical-Socialist 
candidate  must  receive  the  sanction  of  the  de- 
partmental federation  and  official  investiture  at 
the  hands  of  the  executive  committee.  In  view 
of  the  rather  unmanageable  size  of  the  committee 
important  functions  are  entrusted  to  its  bureau 
which  consists  of  the  president  of  the  party,  six- 
teen vice  presidents,  and  sixteen  secretaries.  The 
president  holds  office  for  a  year  and  is  not  reeli- 
gible;  the  rest  of  the  bureau  hold  office  for  two 
years,  half  retiring  annually.  The  members  of 
Parliament,  who  are  ex-officio  members  of  the 
executive  committee  and  entitled  to  half  the  vice 
presidencies  and  secretaryships  of  the  bureau, 
take  a  leading  place  in  the  direction  of  the  party. 
Although  the  Radical-Socialists  and  Freemasons 
have  been  closely  allied  in  the  conflict  with  the 
Catholic  church,  there  is  no  official  connection 
between  them. 

The    Socialist-Republican    party,    which    pro-   The 
claims  "the  indissoluble  union  of  Socialism  and    KemaA. 
the  Republic,"  was  founded  in  191 1.1    It  is  not  a   can 
class  party  in  the  dogmatic  sense.     It  believes   party 
that  "reforms  should  be  considered  as  steps  in  a 
more  complete  transformation  and  in  the  progres- 
sive establishment  of  a  social  order  in  which  the 
workers   will   secure,   with    their   share   of  prop- 
1  Jacques,  op.  cit.,  pages  361-367. 

[361] 


program 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

erty  and  the  whole  fruits  of  their  labor,  complete 
emancipation."  Its  policy  conforms  to  economic 
^__  realities.  In  enterprises  where  the  development 
of  machinery  and  the  concentration  of  capital 
have  definitely  reduced  the  workers  to  the  posi- 
tion of  wage  earners  collective  ownership  must 
be  established;  and  by  way  of  preparing  for  this 
change  the  party  advocates  the  formation  of 
syndicates  and  cooperative  societies,  the  participa- 
tion of  workers  in  management  and  profits,  and 
the  substitution  of  state  services  for  private 
monopolies.  The  party  does  not  strive,  as  the 
Unified  Socialists  do,  to  assimilate  the  peasant 
proprietors,  who  cultivate  their  own  land,  to 
the  proletariat;  an  association  of  independent 
producers  will  suffice  to  adapt  them  to  the  exi- 
gencies of  modern  economic  life.  The  party 
favors  fiscal  reform,  including  a  progressive  in- 
come tax  with  means  of  checking  the  declarations 
of  taxpayers;  administrative  reform,  including 
participation  by  employees  in  the  management 
of  public  services;  an  understanding  among  the 
workers  of  all  countries;  resolute  defense  of  the 
anti-clerical  laws;  and  pacificism  (not  excluding, 
however,  resistance  to  foreign  aggression).  The 
party  has  right  and  left  wings.  There  is  a  Briand- 
ist  faction,1  a  faction  that  looks  with  approval 
on  the  new  policy  of  appeasement;  but  its  oppo- 
nents,  having  control  of  the  party  congress  in 

1  Briand,  originally   a  Socialist,    resumed    membership   in 
this  party  after  the  war. 

[362] 


ganiza- 
tion 


PARTIES 

1914,  put  forward  a  declaration  almost  identical 
with  the  minimum  program  of  the  Radical- 
Socialists:  Return  to  two-year  military  service; 
progressive  taxation  of  income  and  capital  with 
means  of  checking  the  returns;  and  defense  of 
secular  education,  with  state  monopoly  of  educa- 
tion as  an  ultimate  resort.  It  has  already  been 
noted  that  the  Socialist-Republican  Rene  Viviani, 
becoming  premier  after  the  elections  of  1914,  stood 
by  the  three-year  service  law,  as  his  predecessor, 
the  Radical-Socialist  Doumergue,  had  done. 

Members  of  the  Socialist-Republican  party  in  its  or 
return  for  an  annual  payment  of  twelve  cents 
receive  a  party  card.1  The  local  groups  in  each 
department  form  a  federation  and  send  delegates 
once  a  year  to  the  national  congress.2  There  is  an 
administrative  committee  composed  of  the  Parlia- 
mentary group,  nine  members  elected  by  the 
congress,  and  one  delegate  from  each  depart- 
mental federation.  The  body  meets  every  three 
months.  It  appoints  an  executive  committee  of 
fifteen  members  and  a  bureau.  Candidates  must 
subscribe  to  the  party  platform  and  have  their 
nominations  confirmed  by  the  appropriate  federal 
committee;  after  election  their  conduct  is  under 
"the  exclusive  control"  of  the  federation. 

1  Members  of  Parliament  are  subject  to  an  assessment  the 
amount  of  which  is  not  specified  in  the  rules  of  the  party. 

2  In  the  congress  each  federation  has  one  vote  as  a  minimum 
and  one  additional  vote  for  each  one  hundred  members  and 
for  each  seven  thousand  votes  cast  in  the  national  elections. 

[363] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  The  Unified  Socialist  party,1  founded  in  1905, 

??!£,     is,  like  the  monarchists,   irreconcilable,   bent  on 

Socialist  ' 

Party  overthrowing  the  Republican  state.  Even  when 
it  cooperates  with  those  in  power  for  the  defense 
of  proletarian  rights  and  interests,  declared  the 
congress  of  1905,  it  "  remains  always  a  party  of 
fundamental  and  irreducible  opposition  to  the 
whole  bourgeois  class  and  to  the  state  which  is 
the  instrument  of  that  class.  .  .  .  The  Socialist 
group  in  Parliament  should  withhold  from  the 
government  all  the  means  which  insure  the  domi- 
nation of  the  bourgeoisie  and  its  maintenance  in 
power."  And  again:  "The  Socialist  party  is  a 
class  party  whose  object  is  to  socialize  the  means 
of  production  and  exchange  —  that  is,  to  trans- 
form capitalistic  society  into  a  collectivist  and 
communistic  society  —  and  whose  method  is  the 
economic  and  political  organization  of  the  prole- 
tariat. By  reason  of  its  object,  by  reason  of  its 
ideal,  by  reason  of  the  method  which  it  employs, 
the  Socialist  party,  while  seeking  the  realization 
of  immediate  reforms  demanded  by  the  working 
class,  is  not  a  party  of  reform,  but  a  party  of 
class  struggle  and  revolution. "  The  Socialists 
believe  that  small  industry  and  small  commerce 
will  disappear  before  the  growing  concentration 
of  capital;  that  society  tends  to  become  divided 
into   two   classes,   capitalists   and   wage  earners, 

1  Marcel  Sembat,  "  Les  Id'ees  socialistes"  Revue  hebdoma- 
daire,  March,  1910,  pages  325-350;  Jacques,  op.  cit.>  pages 
266-316. 

[364] 


PARTIES 

bourgeois  and  proletarians;  and  that  between  the 
two  classes  there  exists  an  antagonism,  a  class 
struggle,  which  will  not  end  until  the  proletariat 
has  triumphed  and  taken  control  of  society. 
There  are  practical  objections  to  this  doctrine, 
and  not  the  least  serious  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  peasant  proprietors,  at  once  owners  and  tillers 
of  the  soil,  give  no  sign  of  disappearing  and  of 
being  merged  in  the  class  of  wage  earners.  The 
Socialists  do  not  know  how  to  face  this  disquieting 
enigma.  Some  would  modify  the  application  of 
their  theory  to  suit  exceptional  cases  when  there 
is  no  divorce  between  capital  and  labor;  others, 
striving  to  explain  away  the  facts,  insist  that  the 
party  must  propound  the  same  theory  of  economic 
evolution  in  the  cities  and  in  the  country.  All 
unite  in  persuading  the  peasant  proprietors  that 
their  situation  is  miserable  and  that  eventually 
they  must  be  the  victims  of  capitalism.  While 
the  Unified  Socialists  are  definite  enough  in  their 
criticism  of  the  existing  capitalistic  state,  they 
have  made  no  attempt  to  describe  the  character 
of  the  communistic  state  which  will  supplant  it. 
Marcel  Sembat  has  said x  that  new  forms  of 
organization  will  be  devised  by  experiment;  "we 
are  as  pretentious  as  science  and  as  modest. " 
According  to  him  the  new  "joint-stock  company 
of  France'*  will  be  directed,  not  by  a  state  bureau- 
cracy, but  by  the  producers  themselves. 

The   Unified    Socialists,   besides   advocating   a 
1  In  the  article  cited. 

[365] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

its  new  society,  are  actively  engaged  in  the  ameliora- 

towids  tlon  °f  t^ie  existing  one.  At  the  outset  the  party 
reform  committed  itself  "to  the  extension  of  the  political 
liberties  and  rights  of  the  workers,  to  the  pursuit 
and  realization  of  reforms"  that  would  improve 
living  conditions  and  better  equip  the  proletariat 
for  the  class  struggle.  And  the  election  manifesto 
of  1914  declared:1  "We  are  trying  to  give  the 
world  of  labor  increased  opportunities  for  carry- 
ing on  the  struggle,  thus  preparing  it  for  the 
great  work  of  social  renovation  which  is  incumbent 
upon  it.  We  wish  to  secure,  to  seize,  the  maximum 
of  political  and  social  reforms  obtainable  under 
the  present  social  system."  The  party  must  live 
politically;  it  must  gain  the  sympathy  and 
confidence  of  the  proletariat;  and  therefore,  while 
awaiting  the  revolution  which  will  install  collectiv- 
ism, it  cannot  stand  aloof  from  the  reform  move- 
ment. And  yet  in  promoting  reform  there  is  an 
obvious  danger,  a  danger  of  compromising  the 
future,  of  consolidating  the  bourgeois  state,  of 
erecting  a  barrier  to  the  establishment  of  collectiv- 
ism. The  farther  reform  is  carried,  the  harder  it 
will  be  to  persuade  the  proletariat  that  its  cir- 
cumstances are  intolerable;  the  more  the  existing 
social  order  is  improved,  the  harder  it  will  be  to 
justify  the  substitution  of  a  different  social  order. 
In  the  face  of  this  dilemma  many  Socialists  look 
coldly  upon  reform.  The  majority,  however, 
accept  the  position  of  the  late  Jean  Jaures. 
1  W.  E.  Walling  et  al.,  Socialism  Today  (1916),  page  64. 

[366] 


PARTIES 

u  Precisely  because  the  Socialist  party  is  essentially 
a  party  of  revolution,"  he  said  in  1908,  "it  is  the 
party  most  actively  and  genuinely  bent  upon 
reform."  In  1914  the  party  demanded: ■  electoral 
reform  (proportional  representation)  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  constitutional  revision;  immediate 
return  to  the  two-year  service  law  and  gradual 
substitution  of  a  militia  for  the  regular  army; 
progressive  taxation  of  income  and  capital  with 
means  of  checking  the  returns;  freedom  for  all, 
including  government  officials,  to  organize  syndi- 
cates; a  complete  system  of  national  insurance 
against  old  age,  sickness,  accident,  and  unemploy- 
ment; development  of  education  by  all  possible 
means.  It  expressed  abhorrence  of  nationalism 
and  militarism  and  advocated  a  Franco-German 
rapprochement  "which  will  permit  of  a  definite 
alliance  between  England,  France,  and  Germany, 
a  condition  necessary  to  the  peace  of  the  world." 

Members  of  the  Unified  Socialist  party  must  itsor- 
belong  to  their  proper  labor  union  and  to  their  tioa 
local  cooperative  society;  they  must  also  pay  five 
cents  a  year  for  a  membership  card  and  one  cent 
a  month  by  way  of  dues  to  the  central  organiza- 
tion.2 In  each  commune  the  members  form  a 
"section"  which  acts  through  a  general  assembly 
meeting   monthly    and    an    administrative   com- 

1  Proposals  made  in  the  platform  and  in  the  election  mani- 
festo are  combined  here.    See  Walling,  op.  cit.,  pages  58-60,  64. 

2  Payment  is  made  by  means  of  stamps  which  are  put  on 
the  membership  card. 

[367] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS   OF   FRANCE 

mittee  meeting  fortnightly.  In  each  department 
these  sections  form  a  federation  with  a  delegate 
council  and  an  executive  committee.  The  federa- 
tion must  pledge  itself  to  respect  the  principles 
and  program  of  the  party  as  well  as  decisions 
taken  by  national  and  international  congresses. 
The  affairs  of  the  party  are  regulated  by  an  annual 
congress  composed  of  delegates  from  the  federa- 
tions. Representation  is  based  upon  paid  mem- 
bership.1 The  parliamentary  group,  which  makes 
an  annual  report  to  the  congress  and  transmits  it 
to  the  federation  a  month  before  the  congress 
meets,  is  represented  only  for  consultative  pur- 
poses, that  is,  for  convenience  in  discussing  ques- 
tions relative  to  the  report.  In  the  interval 
between  congresses  the  management  of  the  party 
is  in  the  hands  of:  (i)  a  national  council  com- 
posed of  delegates  from  the  federations,2  delegates 
from  the  parliamentary  group,3  and  the  members 
of  the  permanent  administrative  committee; 
(2)  a  permanent  administrative  committee  of 
twenty-three  members  elected  annually  by  the 
congress;   and  (3)  a  small  salaried  bureau  chosen 

1  A  federation  is  entitled  to  at  least  one  "mandate"  with 
an  additional  mandate  for  every  twenty-five  members;  and 
to  two  delegates  for  the  first  ten  mandates  and  an  additional 
delegate  for  every  additional  ten  mandates.  If  one  tenth  of 
the  delegates  demand  it,  the  congress  must  vote  by  mandates. 

2  Two  delegates  for  the  first  thirty  mandates  in  the  con- 
gress with  an  additional  delegate  for  each  additional  thirty. 

8  Equal  in  number  to  one  twentieth  of  the  federation 
delegates. 

[3683 


PARTIES 

by  the  national  council  from  among  the  members 
of  the  administrative  committee. 

The  party  rules  give  much  attention  to  the  Party 
maintenance  of  discipline.  They  entrust  the  scip  e 
national  council  with  control  over  the  parlia- 
mentary group,  the  party  workers,  and  the  party 
press.  Although  the  press  is  free  to  discuss  all 
matters  of  doctrine  and  method,  it  is  subject 
to  restraint  in  dealing  with  party  action;  "all 
socialist  newspapers  and  reviews  must  conform 
to  the  decisions  of  national  and  international 
congresses  as  interpreted  by  the  national  council. " 
The  party  owns  several  important  publications, 
among  them  Le  Socialiste  (weekly),  to  which  all 
sections  and  federations  must  subscribe,  and 
UHumanite  (daily).  Nominations,  which  are 
made  by  the  combined  sections  in  each  con- 
stituency, require  the  approval  of  the  appropriate 
federation.  Candidates  must  sign  a  pledge  to 
observe  the  principles  and  program  of  the  party. 
Electoral  tactics  are  fixed  with  some  precision 
by  the  annual  congress.  Thus  in  1914  the  con- 
gress decided  upon  cooperation  with  the  Radical- 
Socialists  on  the  second  ballot,  that  is,  in  cases 
where  no  candidate  received  the  required  majority 
on  the  first  ballot.  "Wherever  it  will  be  im- 
possible to  win  a  direct  electoral  victory,  the  de- 
partmental federations  will  declare  themselves 
in  favor  of  Republican  candidates  who  give  them 
the  maximum  guarantees  .  .  .  against  the  dan- 
gers of  war  and   in   favor  of  a   Franco-German 

[369] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

understanding,  of  the  secular  idea,  and  of  fiscal 
reform."  The  administrative  committee  was 
given  jurisdiction  in  cases  where  federations 
should  violate  the  rule.  Members  of  Parliament, 
who  are  controlled  individually  by  the  federations 
and  collectively  by  the  national  council,  are  sub- 
ject to  an  assessment  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
francs  a  month,  one  hundred  francs  being  paid  to 
the  national  council  and  one  hundred  and  fifty 
to  the  group  which  defrayed  the  election  ex- 
penses. Those  who  fail  to  make  payments  for  a 
period  of  three  months  are  liable  to  expulsion 
from  the  party.  Any  Socialist  who,  after  election 
to  public  office,  voluntarily  leaves  the  party  or  is 
expelled  from  it,  is  expected  to  resign  his  office. 

Tendency  toward  Consolidation 

There  is  an  aspect  of  party  government  which 
many  writers  have  described  without  explaining. 
In  France,  as  in  the  countries  of  continental 
Europe  generally,  the  parties  or  groups  are  quite 
numerous;  in  England  and  the  offshoots  of 
England  (the  United  States,  Canada,  Australia, 
etc.)  the  two-party  system  normally  prevails. 
Such  a  variation  in  practice  challenges  serious 
attention;  for  today  it  is  the  parties  which  impart 
vitality  to  government  and  which,  by  the  charac- 
ter of  their  activities,  determine  how  government 
shall  be  carried  on. 

In  England  the  two-party  system  evolved  very 
slowly  and  as  a  result  of  practical  adjustments 

[370] 


land  and 
America 


PARTIES 

rather  than  conscious  purpose.  The  evolution  The  two- 
was  still  incomplete  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  JJ^m 
century  when  the  Tories  were  tainted  with  dis-  inEng- 
loyalty  and  the  dominant  Whigs  were  split  into 
factions  or  groups  somewhat  in  the  manner  of  the 
French  Republicans  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  As  the  system  took  shape,  with  two 
major  parties  contending  for  the  mastery,  with 
government  and  opposition  engaged  in  a  con- 
tinuous debate  in  their  appeal  for  popular  support, 
its  virtues  came  to  be  understood,  and  a  philoso- 
phy was  devised  to  explain  and  justify  it.  No 
doubt  the  logician  may  find  in  it,  as  in  other 
institutions  which  have  had  a  natural  growth, 
provoking  anomalies;  he  may  affect  amusement 
at  the  strange  phenomenon  (to  quote  "Iolanthe") 

"  That  every  boy  and  every  gal 

Who's  born  into  this  world  alive 
Is  either  a  little  Liberal 

Or  else  a  little  Conservative." 

But  there  is  always  an  answer  to  such  criticism: 
practically  speaking,  the  system  works;  it  is 
intelligible  to  the  masses  who  can  decide  between 
alternatives,  but  who  are  likely  to  become  con- 
fused and  helpless  when  half  a  dozen  solutions, 
with  fine  shades  and  nice  distinctions,  are  set 
before  them.  Two  parties  reflect  the  peculiar 
limitations  of  the  human  mind,  which,  as  Henri 
Bergson  maintains,  reaches  its  final  solutions 
through   the   conflict  of  extremes.       They   best 

[371] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Possible 
explana- 
tion of 
the  nu- 
merous 
parties 
in  France 


satisfy  those  combative  instincts  which  are  the 
underlying  cause  of  party. 

The  question  here,  however,  is  not  to  determine 
whether  Anglo-American  practice  is  better  than 
French  practice,  but  why  the  difference  between 
them  exists.  Is  it  only  a  matter  of  accident,  the 
two-party  system  having  been  developed  in  Eng- 
land through  local  circumstances  and  transmitted 
to  the  colonies  along  with  other  political  institu- 
tions? If  that  were  the  sole  explanation,  the 
system  would  not  have  persisted  so  long,  outside 
of  England  and  especially  in  the  United  States, 
without  profound  modifications.  Is  it  a  matter  of 
racial  temperament,  of  the  hard-headed,  practical 
sense  which  disposes  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  reach 
concrete  results  by  way  of  compromise?  The 
continental  nations,  with  their  numerous  political 
groups,  are  not  all  lovers  of  abstraction  and 
theory.  Is  it  because  certain  issues  which  have 
inspired  the  formation  of  continental  parties  are 
lacking  in  the  English-speaking  world  ?  Monarchy 
as  a  political  issue  disappeared  in  the  United 
States  with  the  Revolution;  it  disappeared  in  the 
British  empire  with  the  attenuation  of  royal 
power,  with  the  rise  of  the  responsible  prime 
minister  as  Carolingian  mayor  of  the  palace  con- 
ducting the  government  in  the  name  of  the  roi 
faineant.  The  Catholic  religion  as  a  political 
issue  disappeared  with  the  fall  of  the  house  of 
Stuart.  Until  recently  labor  manifested  far  less 
inclination  than  in  France  or  Germany  or  Italy 

[372] 


PARTIES 

to  assert  separate  class  interests  and  to  organize 
outside  the  existing  parties.  Whatever  weight 
may  be  given  to  these  various  arguments,  they 
are  obviously  insufficient,  even  in  combination, 
to  explain  the  phenomenon  adequately.  President 
Lowell  has  suggested  a  very  different  explanation.1 
The  two-party  system,  he  contends,  marks  a 
later  stage  in  political  evolution  than  the  con- 
tinental group  system,  the  system  of  numerous 
parties.  The  tradition  of  self-government  runs 
far  back  in  England  and  in  the  United  States; 
long  experience  has  taught  the  advantage  of 
cooperation,  of  subordinating  doctrinaire  antag- 
onisms and  impracticable  dreams  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  immediate  objects.  On  the  other 
hand  the  continental  nations,  though  long  familiar 
with  the  ideal  of  self-government,  have  had  rela- 
tively a  very  short  acquaintance  with  its  practice. 

If  it  were  true,  as  some  maintain,  that  the  two-   is  the 
party  system  is  now  disintegrating  and  that  in    pa^y 
the  future  American  and  English  politics  will  ap-   system 
proximate  the  chaos  of  continental  politics,  Presi-    t^t. 
dent  Lowell's  hypothesis  would  naturally  be  under   ing? 
suspicion.     Disintegration   is  suggested  by  many 
familiar  facts:  by  the  decay  of  partisan  fealty, 
by  the  remarkable  increase  of  the  independent 
vote,  by  the  launching  of  new  party  organizations, 
by  the  startling  progress  of  the  Socialist,  or  labor, 
movement.    It  is  not  the  two-party  system,  how- 

1  Public  Opinion  and  Popular  Government  (191 3),  pages  81- 
99. 

[373] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

ever,  that  is  disintegrating;  it  is  the  two  major 
parties  functioning  under  that  system  that  are 
disintegrating.  This  is  a  time  of  transition  when 
new  issues  are  forcing  their  way  to  notice  and 
when  the  parties  which  do  not  wish  to  face  them 
must  be  swept  aside  by  a  new  alignment  based 
on  realities  instead  of  memories.  The  Labor 
party  in  England  and  the  Labor  party  in  Aus- 
tralia do  not  simply  add  a  new  element;  they 
compel  the  old  elements  to  make  coalition  against 
them;  and  furthermore,  by  precipitating  a  conflict 
on  real  issues,  they  restore  all  of  the  old  fervor 
and  devotion  and  discipline  to  the  rank  and  file, 
is  con-  Turning  to  France,  do  we  find  any  conclusive 

tion*1"  signs  of  a  tendency  towards  party  consolidation? 
possible  Do  the  facts  lend  support  to  President  Lowell's 
France?  hypothesis?  Certainly  the  emergence  of  strong 
party  organizations,  the  locking  of  the  parlia- 
mentary groups,  and  the  recognition  of  those 
groups  in  legislative  procedure  show  that  a 
leavening  process  is  at  work.  Equally  significant 
of  a  transition  to  new  things  is  the  history  of  the 
Republican  bloc  which,  nearly  twenty  years  ago, 
brought  together  the  Socialists,  Radical-Socialists, 
and  the  groups  identified  more  or  less  with  the 
Democratic-Republican  party  and  which,  operat- 
ing through  the  Delegation  of  the  Lefts,  intro- 
duced a  cohesion  and  discipline  hitherto  unknown. 
True,  the  bloc  did  not  long  survive  the  secession 
of  the  Unified  Socialists  in  1905.  It  continued 
for  a   few  years  as  a  rather  shaky  alliance  of 

[374] 


PARTIES 

Democratic-Republicans,  Radical-Socialists,  and 
Independent  Socialists;  and  it  fell  utterly  to 
pieces  when  Briand,  as  a  leader  of  the  Demo- 
cratic-Republican party,  declared  that  the  anti- 
clerical conflict  was  at  an  end  and  that  the  time 
had  come  to  make  a  generous  peace.  But  the 
collapse  of  the  bloc  does  not  by  any  means  portend 
a  return  to  chaos.  It  requires  no  prophetic  eye 
to  discern  a  tendency  in  the  opposite  direction. 
While  the  secession  of  the  Unified  Socialists 
wrecked  the  bloc,  that  party,  with  its  steadily 
increasing  strength  l  and  its  vigorous  discipline, 
will  be  an  important  factor  in  bringing  about  a 
redistribution  of  political  forces,  as  the  labor 
party  has  been  in  England  and  Australia.  In 
the  first  place  those  who  fear  "the  danger  on  the 
Left"  are  already  showing  a  disposition  to  work 
in  harmony.  Briand's  rupture  with  the  Radical- 
Socialists  on  the  religious  question  makes  it  pos- 
sible for  his  followers  to  join  hands  with  the 
Republican  Federation,  if  not  with  the  A.  L.  P.2 

1  The  Unified  Socialists  lost  thirty  seats  in  the  election  of 
1919,  but  this  was  due  to  their  unpatriotic  attitude  towards 
the  war,  the  widespread  fear  of  Bolshevism,  the  combination 
of  the  other  parties  in  the  National  Republican  bloc,  and 
above  all  to  the  operation  of  a  new  election  system;  on  the 
basis  of  voting  strength  the  Socialists  should  have  gained 
at  least  30  seats.     See  Chapter  IX. 

2  In  the  campaign  of  1914  Jacques  Piou,  president  of  the 
A.L.P.  said  that  on  the  religious  question  there  was  little  to 
choose  between  the  "soft  manner"  of  the  Briandists  and  the 
"harsh  manner"  of  the  Radical-Socialists. 

[375] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

This  was  evident  in  the  campaign  of  1914.  For 
example,  Charles  Benoist,  president  of  the  Re- 
publican Federation,  urged  union  in  opposition 
to  the  "impious  compact"  between  Radical- 
Socialists  and  Unified  Socialists,  "the  latter 
openly  and  as  master,  the  former  secretly  and  as 
a  suppliant  seeking  a  wretched  electoral  profit  in 
the  ruin  of  the  country.  .  .  .  You  call  yourselves 
Federation  of  the  Lefts,  Democratic-Republican 
Alliance,  Republican  Federation,  and  Liberal 
Action.  That  makes  little  difference.  All  of  you 
who  call  yourselves  Frenchmen,  we  beg  of  you  no 
longer  to  think  of  anything  but  France."  It 
would  be  easy  to  multiply  illustrations  of  this  sort. 
In  the  second  place  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  as 
the  Unified  Socialists,  drawing  nearer  to  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  office,  discard  something  of  their 
doctrinaire  and  revolutionary  attitude,  they  will 
absorb,  or  at  least  establish  an  hegemony  over,  the 
Socialist-Republicans  and  the  Radical-Socialists.1 
The  Radical-Socialist  party,  having  exhausted 
its  anti-clerical  role,  has  become  divided  and  con- 
fused. It  hesitates  before  the  problems  of  the 
future.  It  sought  to  save  itself  from  isolation  by 
acting  in  concert  with  the  Unified  Socialists  in 
the  elections  of  1914;  and  that  electoral  bloc 
seems  to  foreshadow  a  parliamentary  bloc.  After 
the  elections  fimile  Combes  said:2    "I  am  more 

1  In  such  a  case  the  right  wing  of  both  parties  would  pass 
over  to  the  Briandists. 

2  De  Lanessan,  La  Crise  de  la  Republique  (1914),  pages  185- 

[376] 


PARTIES 

than  ever  attached  to  the  bloc.  First  and  fore- 
most because  I  do  not  consider  democratic 
progress  possible  without  that  battle  formation. 
There  are  two  majorities  possible:  one  altogether 
on  the  Left,  established  without  limitation  on 
democratic  progress;  the  other  depending  on  a 
vague  concentration  which  would  involve  the 
worst  deceptions/'  l  He  advocated  the  revival  of 
the  bloc  as  an  imperious  necessity.  "In  that  part 
of  their  program  which  is  really  practical  the 
Unified  Socialists  are  almost  in  accord  with  the 
Independent  Socialists  and  the  Radical-Social- 
ists." Camille  Pelletan  spoke  in  a  similar  vein. 
The  Unified  Socialist  congress  of  January,  1914, 
while  rejecting  a  proposal  to  reconstitute  the 
bloc  (as  "  likely  to  impair  the  party's  combative 
vigor"),  was  divided  in  its  opinion.  Gustave 
Herve,  editor  of  La  Guerre  sociale  and  fomenter 
of  Syndicalist  demonstrations  during  the  Morocco 
crisis,  insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  uniting  "all 
the  forces  of  the  Left."  "If  we  make  an  alliance 
on  the  second  ballot,"  he  argued,  "why  should 
we  not  continue  the  alliance  afterwards?  I  am  a 
blocard  up  to  this  point:  that,  were  an  incident 
like  that  of  Morocco  to  recur,  I  should  like  to 
have  in  the  cabinet  a  Socialist  minister  who  would 
give  warning  of  the  danger  and  bring  it  to  the 

186.  This  is  one  of  the  most  illuminating  books  that  has 
been  written  on  contemporary  French  politics. 

1  He  is  here  referring  to  the  inclination  of  Leon  Bourgeois 
and  others  of  the  right  wing  towards  the  Briandists. 

[377] 


of  party 
leaders 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

attention  of  his  bourgeois  colleagues.  ...  In 
substance  you  all  reach  the  same  conclusion  as  I. 
Only,  before  accepting  the  dish,  you  spit  upon  it." 
Evidently  an  understanding  between  the  Unified 
Socialists  and  Radical-Socialists  is  at  least  within 
the  range  of  possibility. 
Opinion  The   time   is   ripe   for   party   consolidation   in 

France.  On  every  hand  evidence  of  its  approach 
abounds.1  Leaders  of  all  parties  speak  of  the 
futility  and  incoherence  of  Parliament,  its  in- 
capacity for  any  prolonged  enterprise  of  reform; 
and  for  the  most  part  they  agree  —  men  like 
Combes  and  Poincare  who  agree  in  little  else  — 
that  Parliament  suffers,  as  the  late  Jean  Jaures 
said,  from  "its  ambiguous  parties  and  fluctuating 
program,  its  confused  and  hesitating  majorities." 
This  view  is  entertained  so  generally  that  the 
consolidation  of  parties,  when  once  the  movement 
gets  under  way,  should  proceed  at  a  rapid  pace. 
That  movement  has  in  fact  already  got  under 
way.  First,  in  the  years  preceding  the  war, 
Aristide  Briand  formulated  his  policy  of  concilia- 
tion, appealing  on  the  one  hand  to  the  Action 
Liberale  Populaire  and  the  Republican  Federa- 
tion, on  the  other  hand  to  the  Socialist-Republican 
party  and  the  Democratic-Republican  party;  and 
the  Federation  of  the  Lefts  was  organized  to 
promote  this  new  policy  in  the  elections  of  1914. 
Then  came  the  war  and  with  it  the  party  truce, 
the  Union  sacree.  Gradually  the  Unified  Socialists 
1  On  this  subject  see  especially  de  Lanessan,  op.  cit. 

[378] 


PARTIES 

drew  away  from  this  coalition,  resuming  their 
traditional  attitude  of  opposition.  In  the  elec- 
tions of  1919  they  stood  alone,  faced  by  the 
formidable  alliance  of  parties  known  as  the 
National  Republican  bloc.  It  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that  all  the  parties  which  gave  their 
adhesion  to  the  bloc  will  find  permanent  coopera- 
tion possible.  No  settlement  of  the  religious 
question  can  satisfy  both  the  A.  L.  P.  and  the 
Radical-Socialists.  But  even  on  the  assumption 
that  the  A.  L.  P.  will  eventually  reassert  its  full 
independence  and  that  the  Radical-Socialist 
party,  or  at  least  its  left  wing,  will  make  common 
cause  with  the  Socialists,  the  other  elements  of 
the  bloc  are  almost  certain  to  coalesce  —  by  a 
slow  and  interrupted  process  perhaps  —  in  a 
great  liberal  Republican  party.  The  Unified 
Socialists  will  constitute  an  effective  opposition. 
Discredited  as  they  were  by  the  prevalent  fear 
of  bolshevism  and  hampered  by  an  election  system 
which  played  into  the  hands  of  the  majority, 
they  lost  30  seats  in  the  last  elections,  14  in 
Paris  alone.  But  far  from  indicating  a  collapse, 
as  some  journalists  have  supposed,  the  showing 
which  the  party  made  under  adverse  circumstances 
puts  its  future  as  one  of  the  major  parties  quite 
beyond  any  doubt.1 

1  The  Unified  Socialists  cast  more  than  one  fifth  of 
the  aggregate  popular  vote  in  1919.  Under  a  real  system 
of  proportional  representation  they  would  have  gained  30 
or  40  seats  instead  of  losing  30. 

[379] 


CHAPTER  XI 

ADMINISTRATIVE     COURTS 

Adminis-  TN  England  and  those  countries  that  have  de- 
j"J^J  ■*■  rived  their  institutions  from  England  it  may 
France  be  said,  with  certain  reservations,  that  the  law 
does  not  discriminate  between  the  private  in- 
dividual and  the  public  officer.  The  latter,  hav- 
ing committed  a  wrongful  act  in  the  service  of 
the  state,  cannot,  because  of  his  official  character, 
escape  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  law.  He 
is  held  personally  responsible.  But  in  France, 
as  in  continental  countries  generally,  "  every 
effort  is  made  to  cover  the  responsibility  of  the 
servant  of  the  state  behind  the  liability  of  the 
state  itself,  to  protect  him  against,  and  to  save 
him  from,  the  painful  consequence  of  faults  com- 
mitted in  the  service  of  the  state."  l  As  against 
private  citizens  he  holds  a  privileged  position.  A 
separate  body  of  law,  called  administrative  law, 
determines  his  rights  and  liabilities  as  well  as  the 
rights  and  liabilities  of  citizens  in  their  relations 
with  him;  and  special  courts,  called  adminis- 
trative courts,  have  been  established  to  enforce 
these  rights  and  liabilities.    Public  law  and  private 

1  Hauriou  quoted  in  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitution  (8th  ed., 
1915),  Page  400. 
[380] 


devel- 
oped 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

law  are  two  distinct  branches  of  jurisprudence  in 
France. 

The  contrast  between  English  and  continental  How  it 
practice  has  been  variously  explained.  Perhaps, 
as  Professor  Hauriou  believes,1  it  rests  upon  the 
relatively  high  centralization  of  government  in 
continental  Europe  and  the  consequent  sub- 
ordination of  the  abstract  principles  of  justice  to 
the  requirements  of  public  policy.  Aside  from 
this  larger  aspect,  the  development  of  adminis- 
trative law  in  France  came  as  the  result  of  ex- 
perience with  a  different  system  under  the  Old 
Regime.2  In  the  eighteenth  century  serious  con- 
flicts arose  between  the  royal  administration  and 
the  law  courts;  and  while  the  independence  of 
the  latter  was  menaced,  the  authority  of  the 
former  was  subjected  to  intolerable  restraints. 
When  the  Revolution  came  in  1789,  all  parties 
looked  askance  at  the  pretensions  of  the  courts: 
those  who  stood  by  the  old  order,  because  the 
old  order  had  suffered  encroachments;  those  who 
wished  to  establish  a  new  order,  because  the  new 
order  must  be  protected  from  similar  encroach- 
ments. Moreover,  Montesquieu's  doctrine  of 
the  separation  of  powers,  as  understood  by  French- 
men, implied  that  the  courts  must  under  no  pre- 

1  Hauriou,  Precis  de  droit  administratif  (8th  ed.,  19 14), 
page  2. 

2  Berthelemy,  Traite  elementaire  de  droit  administratif  (7th 
ed.,  1913),  page  18;  Chardon,  U Administration  de  la  France: 
Us  fonctionnaires  (1908),  page  347. 

[38O 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

text  interfere  with  the  liberty  of  administrative 
action.  This  principle  was  recognized  in  the  laws 
and  constitutions  of  the  revolutionary  period.  A 
law  of  1790,  for  instance,  declares  that  judicial 
functions  are  distinct  and  must  always  remain 
distinct  from  administrative  functions;  and  the 
Constitution  of  1791  forbids  the  courts  to  take 
any  action  that  trenches  upon  the  administrative 
field. 

This  system,  which  has  continued  down  to  the 
present  time,  makes  the  administration  the 
arbitrary  judge  of  its  own  conduct.  Apparently 
it  leaves  private  rights  without  protection.  "The 
government  has  always  a  free  hand,"  says  Presi- 
dent Lowell,  "and  can  violate  the  law  if  it  wants 
to  do  so  without  having  anything  to  fear  from 
the  ordinary  courts."  l  But  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  system  is  arbitrary  only  from  a  theoretical 
standpoint.  Such  safeguards  have  been  evolved 
during  the  past  century  —  in  the  creation  of 
administrative  courts  with  a  settled  procedure 
and  a  coherent  body  of  case  law  for  their  guidance 
—  that  the  Frenchman  is  no  more  exposed  to 
official  oppression  than  is  the  Englishman  or  the 
American;  in  some  respects  his  situation  affords 
larger  guarantees.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
existence  of  a  separate  body  of  administrative  law, 
slowly  matured  by  the  decision  of  cases  and  ad- 
justed to  the  necessities  of  efficient  service,  has 

1  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe  (1896)* 
Vol.  I,  page  58. 

[382] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

much  to  recommend  it.1  It  relieves  officials  from 
the  vexatious  and  even  absurd  obstacles  that 
American  and  English  courts  sometimes  inter- 
pose; and,  because  the  procedure  is  better 
adapted  to  its  purpose,  it  permits  a  more  real 
penetration  of  the  law  into  administrative  matters. 
That  our  system  of  common  law  entails  irritating 
abuses  must  be  patent  to  any  intelligent  observer. 
Whenever  some  small  administrative  irregularity  is 
alleged,  satisfaction  may  be  sought  only  through 
courts  which  are  expensive,  technical,  and  dilatory. 
Thus  a  man  by  the  name  of  Collins,  being  dis- 
missed from  his  post  as  superintendent  of  high- 
ways in  New  York  City  and  claiming  that  the 
dismissal  violated  civil-service  regulations,  began 
action  for  reinstatement  in  1904.  Apparently  the 
question  was  very  simple;  it  would  have  been 
settled  by  a  French  administrative  court  in  a  few 
hours.  But  such  is  the  nature  of  American  civil 
procedure  that,  though  Collins  always  won,  he 
could  never  get  a  final  judgment.  On  some 
technicality  or  other  the  suit  went  to  the  appellate 
division  of  the  Supreme  Court  twelve  times  and 
to  the  Court  of  Appeals  three  times.  Finally,  in 
July,  1 91 6,  the  litigation  was  ended  by  an  agree- 
ment between  the  parties! 

From  the  standpoint  of  effective  government 
there  is  a  still  more  serious  difficulty.  Officials 
are    often    discouraged    from    performing    their 

1  For  criticism  of  administrative  law  see  Dicey,  op.  cit., 
page  396,  and  Lowell,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  page  58. 

[383] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Officials 
protected 
against 
vexatious 
inter- 
ference 


Admin- 
istrative 
courts: 
(1)  the 
Pre- 
fectoral 
Council 


duties  because  they  know  that,  though  acting 
with  the  best  intentions  in  the  world,  they  may 
subject  themselves  to  damage  suits  taken  on 
some  nice  technical  point.  In  this  way  provisions 
of  the  English  Merchant  Shipping  Acts,  which 
permit  the  Board  of  Trade  to  detain  unseaworthy 
ships,  have  been  rendered  nugatory;  the  agent 
of  the  Board  knows  that  he  is  personally  liable 
for  damages  if  a  jury  disagrees  with  his  conclu- 
sions as  to  the  condition  of  a  ship.1  In  France 
the  official  is  sheltered  behind  the  liability  of  the 
state;  and  if,  obeying  in  good  faith  the  orders  of 
his  superior,  he  does  injury  to  private  individuals, 
they  may  seek  redress  against  the  state  in  the 
administrative  courts,  knowing  that  the  claim 
will  be  decided  promptly,  that  the  costs  will  be 
negligible,  and  that  the  state  can  pay  the  damages 
awarded.  Here  are  advantages  which  both  the 
official  and  the  citizen  equally  recognize. 

There  are  two  administrative  courts:  the 
Prefectoral  Council  (Conseil  de  Prefecture)  and 
the  Council  of  State  {Conseil  d'Etat).  In  each 
department  the  Prefectoral  Council,  consisting  of 
three  or  four  members,  acts  as  a  court  of  first 
instance.  Its  jurisdiction  includes  a  variety  of 
matters  that  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  ad- 
ministrative (contested  municipal  and  district 
elections,  offenses  against  national  highway  regu- 
lations, etc.).  but  extends  mainly  to  complaints 
against  official  acts,  as  when  a  citizen  alleges  that 


[384] 


1  Dicey,  op.  til.,  page  392. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

he  has  been  taxed  inequitably  or  that  the  prefect 
has  authorized  the  erection  of  an  insanitary- 
factory.  The  procedure  is  exceedingly  simple 
because,  by  means  of  an  official  investigation,  the 
court  ascertains  the  facts  in  the  case  before  the 
hearing  takes  place.  Nevertheless,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  the  Prefectoral  Councils  inspire  any 
high  degree  of  public  confidence;  and  that  there 
are  substantial  reasons  for  this  lack  of  confidence 
appears  from  the  fact  that  almost  all  important 
decisions  are  brought  before  the  Council  of  State 
on  appeal  and  that  two  of  them  out  of  every 
three  are  there  modified  or  reversed.1  Indeed  the 
composition  of  the  councils  gives  no  sufficient 
guarantee  of  judicial  capacity.  The  salaries, 
ranging  from  $400  to  $800  outside  Paris,  do  not 
as  a  rule  attract  able  men.  The  members,  being 
appointed  and  removed  by  presidential  decree, 
have  no  security  of  tenure;  the  only  check  upon 
political  patronage  is  found  in  the  provision  that 
the  nominees  must  have  had  a  legal  training  or 
an  experience  of  ten  years  in  some  government 
office.  The  character  of  the  council  is  partly 
explained  by  its  history.  It  was  originally,  and 
still  remains,  an  advisory  body;  in  some  matters 
the  prefect  must,  in  all  matters  he  may,  seek  its 
advice,  though  his  ultimate  course  need  in  no 
way  be  influenced  thereby.  Legally  he  is  en- 
titled to  preside;  that  he  does  not  exercise  this 
right  when  the  council  acts  as  a  court  is  simply 
1  Chardon,  op.  cit.,  page  368. 

[385] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

a  concession  to  the  proprieties.    Latterly  proposals 
have  been  made  to  reform  the  councils  or  abolish 
them  altogether. 
(2)  the  The  Council  of  State  occupies  a  very  different 

of°state  position;  no  English  or  American  court  enjoys 
higher  prestige.  Like  the  Prefectoral  Council, 
however,  it  plays  a  double  role,  having  originally 
possessed  only  executive  or  advisory  functions. 
In  some  measure  the  development  of  its  jurisdic- 
tion as  a  court,  the  separation  of  its  executive 
and  judicial  functions  through  the  establishment 
of  distinct  committees,  recalls  the  process  by 
which  the  judicial  committee  of  the  privy  council 
evolved  as  the  highest  court  for  the  British 
Empire.1  Fortunately,  adequate  precautions  have 
been  taken  to  free  the  Council  acting  as  a  court 
from  political  influences  and  to  give  it  a  position 
of  independence  over  against  the  government. 
The  Council  does  include  political  elements:  the 
minister  of  justice,  who,  though  nominally  its 
president,  makes  only  one  formal  appearance 
during  his  term  of  office;  and  twenty-one  "coun- 
cilors in  special  service"  who,  representing  the 
various  ministries,  expound  the  official  point  of 
view,  when  the  Council  is  asked  for  advice,  and 
help  to  determine  the  nature  of  that  advice  as 
well.  But  these  political  members  are  excluded 
from  the  Council  when  it  decides  cases.    Only  the 

1  The  judicial  functions  of  the  Council  of  State  are  regu- 
lated by  the  law  of  April  8,  1910,  and  by  a  number  of  decrees 
issued  in  the  same  year. 

[386] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

professional  members,  the  thirty-five  "councilors 
in  ordinary  service,"  act  as  judges.  They  are  ap- 
pointed by  presidential  decree,  as  the  constitution 
requires;  but  half  of  them  must  have  served  for 
a  considerable  period  in  certain  important  posi- 
tions connected  with  the  Council,  this  preliminary 
service  being  open  only  to  those  who  have  demon- 
strated their  fitness  in  competitive  examinations. 
Such  men  bring  to  the  Council  of  State  a  mature 
knowledge  of  the  law  and  fine  ideals  of  judicial 
conduct.  The  other  half,  though  appointed  with- 
out restriction  of  any  kind,  are  men  of  proved 
capacity  who  have  won  reputation  in  the  practice 
of  law  or  in  the  higher  ranges  of  government 
service.  The  personnel  therefore  includes  two 
elements:  one  strictly  professional  and,  by  virtue 
of  a  long  preliminary  training,  familiar  with  the 
procedure  of  the  Council  and  with  the  juris- 
prudence which  a  mass  of  decisions  has  built  up; 
the  other  drawn  mainly  from  the  active  adminis- 
tration, acquainted  with  the  practical  aspects  of 
questions  which  the  Council  has  to  decide,  and  less 
apt  to  be  influenced  by  technical  considerations. 
The  mingling  of  these  two  elements  has  produced 
admirable  results.  The  councilors,  as  Duguit 
says,1  "do  not  inspire  in  the  governmental  mind 
the  distrust  or  jealousy  which  judges  of  the 
ordinary  courts  might  inspire;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  confront  the  government  without  that 
timidity  which  is  not  infrequently  displayed  by 
1  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  XXIX  (1914),  page  393. 

[387] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

the  ordinary  judges."  l  Nor  has  the  government 
sought  to  impair  this  spirit  of  independence.  No 
councilor  has  been  arbitrarily  removed  since  1879. 
It  might  be  observed  that  the  salary  of  $3200, 
which  would  be  small  indeed  for  such  an  august 
tribunal  in  England  or  the  United  States,  is  con- 
sidered liberal  in  France;  and  a  pension  is  granted 
upon  retirement. 
Advisory  The  advisory  functions  of  the  Council,  though 
ofthe°nS  ^ess  imPortant  m  practice  than  in  theory,  occupy 
Council  a  good  deal  of  its  time.  Upon  a  large  number  of 
questions  (having  to  do  with  public  works,  civil 
and  military  pensions,  the  creation  of  commerce 
courts,  etc.)  the  ministers  must  seek  its  advice 
before  taking  final  action.  This  happens  in 
something  like  thirty  thousand  cases  each  year.2 
Frequently  too  the  statutes,  which  are  enacted 
in  general  terms  and  applied  by  means  of  detailed 
ordinances,  require  the  ministers  to  frame  these 
ordinances  in  consultation  with  the  Council.  The 
latter  discharges  its  duties  conscientiously.  But 
in  any  case,  and  even  where  an  opinion  has  been 
supported  by  elaborate  explanations,  the  ministers 
are  free  to  act  as  they  choose.  It  is  only  in 
technical  matters  that  they  show  a  disposition  to 
accept  guidance.  Naturally  enough  this  attitude 
grieves  the  Council,  whose  best  efforts  have  been 

1  On  this  and  other  points  consult  Rene  Brugere,  Le  Conseil 
d'Etal  (19 10). 

2  Chardon,  op.  cit.,  page  391.    Four-fifths  of  the  cases  have 
to  do  with  civil  and  military  pensions. 

[388] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

expended  to  no  purpose;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  cabinet,  under  a  parliamentary  system,  can 
hardly  share  serious  responsibilities  with  a  non- 
political  body.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
the  ministers,  unless  excused  in  each  case  by 
Parliament,  should  be  compelled  to  act  upon 
the  Council's  recommendations.  An  alterna- 
tive solution  would  be  to  leave  the  Council 
completely  free  for  the  conduct  of  its  judicial 
business.1 

The  Council  of  State  as  an  administrative  itsorig- 
court,  besides  entertaining  appeals  from  the  am^I 
Prefectoral  Council,  exercises  original  jurisdiction 
in  three  important  classes  of  suits.  In  the  first 
place  it  may  annul  administrative  acts  that  are 
attacked  as  ultra  vires,  an  act  ultra  vires  being 
one  which  the  official  concerned  was  legally  in- 
competent to  perform,  or  which  he  performed 
without  due  observance  of  the  settled  procedure, 
or  which  involved  the  violation  of  some  law. 
The  complainant  need  not  show  that  he  has  been 
injured  by  the  act;  it  is  sufficient  that  he  has  an 
interest,  even  an  indirect  moral  interest,  in  its 
annulment.  Thus  an  association  of  government 
officials  may  attack  the  appointment  of  an  official 
if  it  seems  to  have  been  made  in  violation  of  the 
ministerial  ordinance  regulating  such  appoint- 
ments. In  the  second  place  the  court  may  annul 
any  act  which,  while  legal  in  itself,  has  been 
performed  for  a  purpose  not  contemplated  by  the 
1  Brugere,  op.  cit.,  page  165. 

[389] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

law.1  Thus  the  court  has  held  invalid  a  decree 
dissolving  a  municipal  council  because  of  irreg- 
ularities in  the  election,  for  such  a  dissolution 
can  legally  take  place  only  for  the  purpose  of 
correcting  abuses  in  the  local  administration;  and 
when  a  prefect  granted  to  a  bus  company  the 
exclusive  privilege  of  meeting  trains  at  a  railroad 
station,  it  was  held  that  he  had  not  acted,  as  he 
professed  to  have  done,  under  the  police  power. 
In  1879  the  court  found  that  the  closing  of  a 
match  factory  was  not  justifiable  under  the  police 
power  (sanitation).  The  factory  had  been  closed 
by  the  prefect,  acting  on  the  order  of  his  superior, 
not  really  because  of  insanitary  conditions,  but 
because  the  state  wished  to  save  the  expense  of 
compulsory  purchase  necessitated  by  its  estab- 
lishment of  the  match  monopoly.  Such  decisions 
are  based  upon  the  doctrine  of  "misapplication 
of  power ";  they  involve  an  examination  into 
the  motives  that  lie  behind  the  act.  But  the 
complainant  does  not  have  to  bring  positive 
proof  that  the  act  was  dictated  by  improper 
motives;  he  needs  merely  to  show  the  absence  of 
facts  that  would  be  necessary  to  justify  the  act. 
In  the  third  place  relief  is  granted  to  persons  who 
are  injured  by  the  operation  (even  the  normal 
operation)  of  the  public  services.2  "It  seems  that 
today  the  Council  of  State  recognizes  the  liability 

1  Duguit,  Les  Transformations  du  droit  public  (1913),  pages 
205-214. 

2  Duguit,  op.  cit.y  pages  254-262. 

[390] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

of  the  administration  even  in  cases  where  there 
has  been  no  fault  in  the  conduct  of  the  public 
service."  l  It  did  so,  for  instance,  where  a  police- 
man, pursuing  an  offender,  collided  with  a 
pedestrian  and  injured  him;  and  where  a  gen- 
darme, firing  at  a  mad  bull,  wounded  a  passer-by. 

The  Council  of  State  has,  however,  no  power  to  Deci" 
enforce  its  decisions.  When  damages  have  been  always 
awarded  to  an  injured  party  or  when  the  dis-  enforced 
missal  of  a  government  employee  has  been  de- 
clared ultra  vires,  the  Council  must  rely  upon 
the  proper  administrative  authority  to  grant 
redress.  Normally  the  decision  will  be  accepted 
as  a  matter  of  course.  But  now  and  then  officials 
show  a  disposition  to  resist  the  movement  by 
which  the  Council  of  State  is  steadily  extending 
its  control  over  administrative  acts.  They  boycott 
the  Council  of  State,  as  Professor  Hauriou  ex- 
presses it.  A  case  may  be  cited  for  illustration. 
Under  the  municipal  code  a  mayor  may  suspend 
a  garde  champetre  for  one  month,  but  not  remove 
him.  The  mayor  of  Cotignac  sought  to  accom- 
plish the  latter  object  by  ordering  the  suspension 
of  a  garde  champetre  and  renewing  the  order 
each  month.  When  in  1909  the  Council  of  State 
annulled  the  first  ten  orders,  the  mayor  continued 
in  his  course.  Next  year  seven  orders  were 
annulled.  Under  such  circumstances,  orders 
being  issued  and  annulled  indefinitely,  the  sus- 
pended officer  could  find  only  one  means  of  relief. 
1  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  XXIX,  page  402. 

[391] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

He  could  bring  action  in  the  ordinary  courts; 
for  since  the  mayor  knowingly  refused  to  conform 
to  the  decision  of  a  competent  court,  he  was 
guilty  of  a  personal  fault.  Nevertheless  a  person 
of  humble  position  would  hesitate  to  avail  himself 
of  this  opportunity,  the  procedure  before  the 
ordinary  courts  being  regarded  as  too  complicated 
and  too  costly. 
Proce-  Procedure  before  the  Council  of  State  is  simple, 

judicial  °  expeditious,  and  inexpensive.  The  complaint 
commit-  may  be  filed  at  a  cost  of  twelve  cents.1  One  of 
the  officials  attached  to  the  court  prepares  a 
statement  of  the  case,  including  the  pleas  of  both 
parties  to  the  suit,  adds  his  own  observations, 
and  passes  the  documents  to  a  government  com- 
missioner for  further  scrutiny.  Before  the  hearing 
takes  place  the  councilors  have  acquainted  them- 
selves with  all  the  details.  They  proceed  rapidly 
to  a  decision,  brushing  aside  technicalities  which 
so  often  absorb  the  attention  of  lawyers  and  stand 
in  the  way  of  substantial  justice.  The  Council  of 
State  has  two  judicial  committees  or  sections  du 
contentieux.  One  of  these  (composed  of  twelve 
councilors)  deals  only  with  cases  relating  to  elec- 
tions and  direct  taxes;  the  other  (composed  of 
nine  councilors)  has  a  much  wider  jurisdiction 
including  such  matters  as  highway  offenses,  dam- 
ages occasioned  by  public  works,  pensions,  danger- 
ous or  unhealthy  establishments,  etc.  Both  are 
divided  into  three  subcommittees;  but  while  in 
1  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  IX,  page  644. 
[392] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

the  case  of  the  first  section  the  subcommittees  are 
competent  to  render  decisions,  in  the  case  of  the 
second  section  their  work  is  altogether  preparatory. 
The  most  important  questions  (such  as  excess  of 
power)  are  reserved  for  hearing  by  the  Council  of 
State  in  "public  assembly"  —  that  is,  by  the 
whole  body  of  councilors  of  state  in  ordinary 
service;  and  at  the  request  of  the  government, 
or  one  member  of  a  committee,  or  the  vice- 
president  of  the  Council  any  case  may  be  with- 
drawn from  the  committees  and  decided  in  public 
assembly.  The  activity  and  zeal  of  the  Council 
of  State,  as  well  as  its  business-like  methods,  are 
universally  recognized.  But  unfortunately,  with 
its  existing  organization  and  with  the  prodigious 
increase  of  litigation  which  social  and  economic 
reforms  have  entailed,  the  Council  is  quite  unable 
to  clear  its  docket.  The  congestion  of  business 
steadily  increases.  In  1909  more  than  four  thou- 
sand cases  (representing  then  more  than  three 
years'  work)  had  accumulated.1  In  1916,  not- 
withstanding changes  in  organization  which  had, 
six  years  before,  increased  the  efficiency  of  the 
Council,  the  situation  had  grown  worse.2  Mean- 
while, because  Parliament  has  hesitated  to  spend 
a  few  thousand  francs  in  enlarging  the  Council  of 
State,  litigants  remain  without  relief,  uncertainty 
prevails  as  to  the  meaning  of  new  laws,  and  the 
government  is  rendered  liable  for  interest  when 

x  Brugere,  op.  cit.,  page  120  et  seq. 

2  Revue  du  droit  public,  Vol.  XXXIII  (1916),  pages  65-67. 

[393] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

damages  are  finally  awarded  against  it.  This  is 
another  illustration  of  the  evils  which  attend  the 
lack  of  responsible  and  effective  leadership  in 
Parliament. 

Now  although   a  well-established   principle  of 
French  law  forbids  the  ordinary  courts  to  interfere 
with  the  exercise  of  executive  power,  that  principle 
is  not  without  exceptions.     First  of  all,  criminal 
cases  are  tried  in  the  ordinary  courts.     But  this 
does  not  constitute  a  serious  invasion  of  official 
privilege,  because  normally  criminal  proceedings 
must  be  set  in  motion  by  the  state  prosecutor  and 
because    under   Article    114    of  the    penal    code 
offenders  cannot  be  prosecuted  when  they  have 
acted    in    conformity   with    the    orders   of  their 
Personal     superiors.    If,  nevertheless,  an  official  is  prosecuted 
fault  0?      an<^  convicted,  the  government  can  exercise  its 
service       right  of  pardon.    In  the  second  place,  the  ordinary 
courts   will   hold    an   official    responsible   for   his 
personal  faults  —  for  negligent  or  malicious  con- 
duct in  carrying  out  the  orders  of  his  superior. 
While  the  Council  of  State  has  jurisdiction  where 
a  "fault  of  service"  has  been  committed  —  that 
is,  where  acts  are  illegal  because  of  "excess  of 
power"   or   "misapplication  of  power,"   the   ad- 
ministrative   entity,    not    its    agent,    then    being 
defendant  —  the  ordinary  courts  have  jurisdiction 
where    the    agent    has    committed    a    "personal 
fault."     It  is  important,  therefore,  to  distinguish 
between  a  personal  fault  and  a  fault  of  service.1 
1  See  on  this  subject  Duguit,  op.  cit.,  page  271  el  seq. 
[394] 


ADMINISTRATIVE  COURTS 

If  the  mayor  of  a  commune  authenticates  a 
signature  without  observing  the  precautions  laid 
down  by  the  minister  of  the  interior  and  if  the 
signature  proves  to  be  fraudulent,  he  has  com- 
mitted a  personal  fault;  but  if  he  has  observed 
the  precautions  and  yet  been  mistaken,  the  fault 
is  a  fault  of  service.  In  this  case  the  distinction 
is  easily  made.  But  frequently  the  facts  are 
more  complicated.  In  a  doubtful  case,  when  the 
ordinary  courts  assume  jurisdiction,  and  proceed 
to  try  an  official  for  personal  fault,  the  jurisdiction 
may  be  contested  by  the  prefect.  Who  shall 
decide  between  the  prefect  and  the  judges?  Not 
the  ordinary  courts,  because  such  authority 
would  enable  them  to  encroach  upon  adminis- 
trative prerogatives;  not  the  prefect  himself,  or 
even  the  Council  of  State,  because  the  ordinary 
courts  would  then  be  at  their  mercy.  For  this 
purpose  a  special  court  called  the  Court  of  Con-  Court  of 
flicts  has  been  established.  It  is  formed  in  such  °  cts 
a  way  as  to  insure  impartiality.  There  are  nine 
members:  the  minister  of  justice  as  president, 
three  councilors  of  state  chosen  by  their  peers 
for  three  years,  three  members  of  the  Court  of 
Cassation  (highest  of  the  ordinary  courts)  chosen 
in  the  same  way,  and  two  members  chosen  by 
the  other  seven  for  three  years.  Reelection  being 
the  rule,  the  personnel  of  the  court  is  more  or 
less  permanent.  The  minister  of  justice  rarely 
presides,  his  place  being  filled  by  a  vice-president 
named    by   the   judges    from    among   their   own 

[395] 


nances 
not 


made 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

number.    It  is  the  duty  of  the  Court  of  Conflicts 
to  designate  the  competent  court  in  all  cases  of 
disputed  jurisdiction, 
ordi-  There  is  still  another  way  in  which  the  ordinary 

courts  may  exercise  control  over  the  administra- 
legaiiy  tion.  According  to  the  penal  code  "those  violat- 
ing ordinances  legally  made  by  the  administrative 
authority  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  one  to 
five  francs."  The  words  "legally  made"  are 
significant;  they  imply  that  illegal  ordinances 
may  be  violated  without  penalty.  Therefore, 
when  some  one  is  brought  into  court  and  charged 
with  the  infringement  of  an  ordinance,  he  can 
plead  the  fact  of  its  illegality;  and  the  court  may 
find  that  no  offense  has  been  committed.  But 
while  the  Council  of  State  has  power  to  annul  an 
illegal  ordinance  altogether,  the  ordinary  courts 
can  only  refuse  to  apply  it  in  a  particular  case. 

Such  are  the  chief  exceptions  to  a  system  which 
differentiates  French  public  law  sharply  from  our 
own.  Administrative  law  is  a  subject  that  has 
serious  interest  for  American  students.  The 
process  of  centralization  is  becoming  more  and 
more  accelerated  in  the  United  States,  as  in 
England;  and  there  are  indications  that,  without 
any  conscious  imitation,  we  are  being  driven 
slowly  toward  the  development  of  an  adminis- 
trative law.  The  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  illustrate 
this  tendency.  But  far  more  significant  is  the 
marked  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  leading 

[396] 


ADMINISTRATIVE   COURTS 

students  of  government,  a  change  that  may  be 
said  to  have  had  its  beginning  with  the  appearance 
of  President  Goodnow's  Comparative  Adminis- 
trative Law  in  1893.  Today  there  are  many  who 
accept  his  conclusions  as  to  the  superiority  of 
the  continental  system  and  who  see  in  it  a  ref- 
uge from  the  intolerable  abuses  of  our  technical 
procedure. 


[397] 


of  the 
Peace 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE     ORDINARY     COURTS 

justice  TJRIVATE  law,  civil  and  criminal,  is  adminis- 
A  tered  in  courts  that  are  styled  "ordinary" 
to  distinguish  them  from  the  "administrative" 
courts.  In  every  canton  (and  there  are  more  than 
twenty-nine  hundred  of  these)  a  justice  of  the 
peace  holds  court.  In  civil  cases  his  jurisdiction 
is  very  limited,  and  appeal  is  allowed  whenever 
the  amount  involved  exceeds  sixty  dollars.  His 
criminal  jurisdiction  extends  to  petty  offenses 
called  contraventions.  Now  in  the  criminal  code 
crimes  fall  into  three  main  categories:  crimes, 
which  correspond  roughly  to  our  felonies  (as 
murder,  burglary  and  forgery);  delits,  or  mis- 
demeanors which  are  punished  by  an  imprison- 
ment of  more  than  five  days  or  a  fine  of  more 
than  three  dollars;  and  contraventions,  which  are 
themselves  subdivided  into  three  classes.  The 
decision  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  is  final  only  as 
regards  the  first  class  of  contraventions,  that  is, 
when  the  fine  does  not  exceed  one  dollar  and 
when  no  sentence  of  imprisonment  is  imposed. 
Under  this  arrangement  ten  per  cent  of  the  deci- 
sions could  be  appealed;  it  speaks  well  for  the 
reputation  of  the  court  that  not  more  than  one 
per  cent  of  them  actually  are  appealed.    But  the 

[398] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

justices  are  not  expected  merely  to  decide  cases. 
They  are  expected  to  bring  parties  to  an  informal 
conference  and  to  adjust  disputes  by  methods  of 
conciliation.  In  view  of  the  complex  social  and 
economic  facts  of  today,  however,  this  process 
has  become  more  difficult  than  it  was  a  century 
ago;  and  everything  depends  upon  the  confidence 
and  respect  that  the  justices  command.  Un- 
fortunately the  salaries  are  exceedingly  meager; 
unless  the  justice  is  finally  appointed  to  one  of 
the  coveted  posts  at  the  capital,  he  can  look 
forward  to  a  maximum  of  only  a  thousand  dollars. 
Since  he  is  not  ranked  as  a  member  of  the  regular 
magistracy,  promotion  to  a  higher  court  can 
come  only  in  exceptional  cases.  There  seems  to  be 
a  very  general  feeling  that  the  justice  of  the  peace, 
whose  ability  and  standing  are  all-important  in 
view  of  his  contact  with  the  masses,  should  be 
better  paid  and  have  a  higher  official  rank.1 

In  each  arrondissement  there  is  a  District  District 
Court  (Tribunal  d' Arrondissement)  2  which  enter- 
tains appeals  from  the  justice's  court  and  exercises 
original  jurisdiction  as  well.  In  civil  cases  its 
decisions  may  be  appealed  when  they  involve 
personalty  to  the  value  of  more  than  three 
hundred   dollars  or  realty  yielding  an  income  of 

1  J.  Coumoul,  Traite  du  pouvoir  judiciaire  (2nd  ed.,  191 1), 
page  347;  Chardon,  U Administration  de  la  France  (1908), 
page  263. 

2  Sometimes  called  the  Court  of  First  Instance  or,  when 
acting  in  criminal  matters,  the  Correctional  Court. 

[399] 


Court 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

more  than  twelve  dollars.  The  presence  of  at 
least  three  judges  is  necessary;  as  a  rule  this 
number  is  exceeded.  In  fact  the  only  French 
court  in  which  a  single  judge  presides  is  the 
justice's  court;  and  authoritative  opinion  seems 
generally  favorable  to  existing  arrangements, 
which  reduce  to  a  minimum  the  danger  of  eccentric 
or  venal  decisions  and  which,  measured  by  their 
results,  have  given  good  satisfaction.1  Neverthe- 
less, it  has  been  urged  that  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  judges  (there  are  fifteen  in  each 
chamber  of  the  highest  court)  would  make  larger 
salaries  possible,  increase  the  feeling  of  responsi- 
bility on  the  part  of  individual  judges,  and  perhaps 
lead  to  the  establishment  of  more  stringent  tests 
for  appointment  to  the  bench. 
Court  of  Civil  and  criminal  cases  may  be  appealed  from 
Appeal  t}ie  j)istrict  Court  to  the  Court  of  Appeal.  There 
are  twenty-eight  of  such  courts:  one  each  in 
Corsica,  Algeria,  and  Tunis;  twenty-five  presiding 
over  areas  which  correspond  roughly  to  the  old 
provinces.  The  presence  of  five  judges  is  neces- 
sary for  a  decision.  Each  court  includes  one  or 
more  civil  chambers,  a  criminal  chamber,  and  an 
"accusation''  or  indictment  chamber.  As  will 
presently  appear,  it  is  the  function  of  the  accusa- 
tion chamber  to  decide  finally  whether  a  person 
charged  with  committing  a  felony  shall  be  prose- 
cuted;   and  when  a  misdemeanor  has   been  com- 

1  Coumoul,  op.  cit.y  page  352;    Chardon,  U  Administration 
de  la  France:  les  fonctionnaires,  page  276. 
[400] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

mitted,  it  may,  at  the  request  of  the  prosecutor 
or  of  the  injured  party,  overrule  the  examining 
magistrate  and  order  the  accused  to  be  brought 
to  trial.  Judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  are  also 
assigned  to  service  in  the  Court  of  Assizes  which 
sits  quarterly  in  the  chief  town  of  each  department. 

The  Court  of  Assizes  is  the  great  criminal  Court  of 
court,  having  jurisdiction  over  all  felonies  and 
over  certain  press  offenses  (such  as  libel).  There 
are  always  three  judges:  a  president,  who  conducts 
the  proceedings  and  who  is  designated  by  the 
minister  of  justice  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
prosecutor-general;  and  two  assistant  judges  who 
may  be  drawn  from  the  Court  of  Appeal  or  from 
the  local  District  Court.  The  judges  impose 
sentence,  but  a  jury  —  the  only  jury  employed 
in  French  courts  —  determines  the  question  of 
guilt  or  innocence  without  any  charge  by  the 
president  and  without  any  statement  of  the  law 
except  in  the  precise  language  of  the  criminal 
code.  Certain  excellent  features  of  the  French 
jury  system  will  be  discussed  later  on.  In  spite 
of  them,  however,  the  system  does  not  appear  to 
have  achieved  practical  success.  "Nobody  enter- 
tains any  illusions,"  says  M.  Chardon,  "there  are 
few  institutions  more  discredited  than  the  jury. 
.  .  .  When  we  read  in  the  best  authors  that  the 
Court  of  Assizes  is  one  of  the  most  singular 
institutions  devised  by  the  imagination  of  man, 
we  cannot  find  the  criticism  excessive."  l  Juries 
1  Op.  cit.,  page  213. 

[401] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

oscillate  between  extreme  rigor  and  extreme  in- 
dulgence. Their  attitude  is  severe  when  offenses 
against  property  are  concerned  (forgery,  arson), 
but  lenient  when  an  eloquent  barrister  has  stirred 
their  sympathies  on  behalf  of  the  defendant  or 
when  life  has  been  taken  without  premeditation 
and  in  the  heat  of  passion.  If  a  wife  has  killed 
her  husband  or  a  husband  has  killed  his  wife 
because  of  marital  infidelity,  acquittal  seems  to 
follow  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  may  be  safer  to 
commit  murder  than  to  commit  mayhem;  for 
while  a  case  of  murder  is  tried  before  a  jury  in 
the  Court  of  Assizes,  a  case  of  aggravated  assault 
and  battery  goes  before  three  judges  in  the 
District  Court.  "On  one  occasion  a  husband 
who  had  an  unfaithful  wife  gave  her  a  tremendous 
thrashing  and  broke  her  arm,  for  which  he  was 
sentenced  by  a  correctional  court  to  a  year's 
imprisonment.  As  he  left  the  dock,  he  exclaimed 
ruefully,  'That's  what  one  gets  for  being  too 
gentle.'"  l  Under  these  circumstances  the  state 
frequently  escapes  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
of  Assizes  by  charging  the  prisoner  with  a  mis- 
demeanor instead  of  a  felony. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  occasions  arise 
when  the  Court  of  Assizes,  though  a  criminal 
court,  decides  civil  suits.  Crime  is  an  offense 
against  society;  in  France,  as  in  the  United 
States,  the  government  prosecutes.  But  crime 
also  involves  injury  to  individuals,  who  may  seek 

1  American  Law  Review ',  Vol.  XL VI I  (19 13),  page  467. 

[402] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

redress  by  means  of  a  civil  action  for  damages. 
This  procedure  has  been  greatly  simplified  in 
France.  Instead  of  bringing  a  separate  suit,  the 
injured  party  may  claim  damages  at  the  criminal 
trial  and  be  represented  there  by  counsel.1  The 
success  of  his  claim  does  not,  however,  depend 
upon  the  verdict  of  the  jury;  there  are  no  juries 
in  civil  cases.  Even  in  the  face  of  a  verdict  of 
acquittal,  the  court  has  authority  to  award 
damages.  Such  circumstances  have  arisen  from 
time  to  time.  In  the  celebrated  trial  of  Prince 
Pierre  Bonaparte  the  court  ordered  him  to  pay 
damages  for  the  murder  of  a  prominent  journalist 
whom,  according  to  the  jury,  he  had  not  mur- 
dered. 

In  order  to  preserve  the  harmony  of  French  Court  of 
private  law  and  to  prevent  the  miscarriage  of  Cassation 
justice  a  supreme  appellate  court  was  established 
in  1790.  This  is  the  Court  of  Cassation.  Its 
function  is  not  to  review  the  facts  that  have 
been  established  in  the  lower  court,  but  to  sustain 
or  reverse  (casser)  the  decision;  and  in  the  event 
of  reversal,  it  cannot  substitute  an  affirmative 
decision  of  its  own;  the  case  is  then  sent  back 
for  retrial.2  Reversal  takes  place  when  the  judges 
are  found  to  have  violated  the  law  or  failed  to 
observe  the  essential  forms  of  procedure.     "This 

1  Garner,    "Criminal    Procedure    in    France"    Yale    Law 
Review,  Vol.  XXV  (1916),  page  283. 

2  For  exceptional  cases  see  Garner,  "  Criminal  Procedure  in 
France"  Tale  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXV  (1916),  page  281. 

[403] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

court,"  says  Raymond  Poincare,  "has  gradually 
introduced,  in  the  body  of  judicial  decisions, 
certain  concordant  views.  Unity  is  not  at  once 
established  upon  each  litigious  question,  but  it 
tends  toward  a  rapid  evolution,  and  when  the 
supreme  court  has  pronounced  upon  any  given 
point  or  cause,  its  opinion  rapidly  prevails  in  all 
the  trials  in  which  the  same  juridical  problem 
occurs.  Thus,  side  by  side  with  the  written  law, 
a  jurisprudence  is  created  which  fills  lacunae  and 
dissipates  obscurities. "  1  Nevertheless,  the  deci- 
sions of  the  Court  of  Cassation  are  not  legally 
binding  upon  the  lower  courts  in  subsequent 
cases.  It  has  happened  occasionally  that  its 
doctrine  has  been  modified  or  transformed  by 
the  persistence  of  the  lower  courts  in  a  difFerent 
interpretation  of  the  law.  The  court  is  divided 
into  three  sections,  each  with  a  president  and 
fifteen  judges:  the  criminal  chamber,  the  chamber 
of  requests,  and  the  civil  chamber.  Criminal 
appeals  go  direct  to  the  criminal  chamber,  but 
civil  appeals  are  subjected  to  a  more  elaborate 
procedure,  petitions  not  being  entertained  by 
the  civil  chamber  unless  the  chamber  of  requests, 
after  a  careful  examination,  has  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  are  substantial  grounds  for 
reversal.  The  Court  of  Cassation  has  no  power 
to  question  the  validity  of  acts  of  Parliament.2 

1  How  France  is  Governed  (191 3),  page  240. 

2  This  aspect  of  judicial  power  is  discussed  in  Chapter  I, 
pages  21-26. 

[404] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

There  are  two  other  French  courts  that  find 
no  counterparts  in  the  United  States:  the  Coun- 
cil of  Experts  {Conseil  des  Prudhommes)  and  the 
Commerce  Court.  The  former,  originating  in 
the  time  of  Napoleon,  has  jurisdiction  over  dis- 
putes between  employers  and  workmen.  A 
council  may  be  created  by  decree  whenever  the 
municipal  council,  the  chamber  of  commerce, 
and  certain  other  local  bodies  desire  it.  The 
members  of  the  court,  including  an  equal  number 
of  employers  and  workmen,  are  elected  for  six 
years  by  their  peers,  women  being  eligible.  In 
the  event  of  deadlock,  which  the  constitution  of 
the  court  renders  not  improbable,  the  law  of  1907 
provides  for  a  rehearing  under  the  presidency  of 
the  justice  of  the  peace.  Judgments  may  be  ap- 
pealed to  the  District  Court  when  more  than 
sixty  dollars  is  involved. 

The  judges  of  the  Commerce  Court  are  also 
elective:  merchants  chosen  by  merchants  and 
serving  gratuitously  for  two  years.  They  have 
jurisdiction  over  an  enormous  mass  of  commercial 
cases  which  may  relate  to  the  smallest  or  the 
largest  transactions,  to  the  purchase  of  a  penny 
loaf  of  bread  or  to  the  bankruptcy  of  a  great 
trading  corporation.  In  fact  commercial  law  is 
so  complex  and  difficult  to  interpret  that  in 
almost  half  of  France  it  is  administered  in  the 
District  Courts.  The  idea  that  a  business  man 
is  best  qualified  to  settle  business  disputes  has 
definite  limitations;   it  is  not  clear  that  a  grocer 

[405] 


GOVERNMENT   AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 


Tho 
bench 
as  a 
career 


Appoint- 
ment and 
tenure  of 
judges 


is  well  qualified  to  deal  with  the  operations,  let 
us  say,  of  the  General  Transatlantic  Company. 
Nor  does  the  elective  system  work  well.  In 
Paris  hardly  more  than  four  per  cent  of  the 
qualified  voters  participate  in  the  choice  of  the 
judges. 

In  the  United  States  judicial  office  sometimes 
crowns  a  successful  career  at  the  bar  (this  being 
the  normal  condition  in  England),  but  it  is  more 
often  sought  by  ambitious  young  lawyers  as  a 
means  of  gaining  recognition  and  laying  the 
foundations  of  lucrative  practice.  In  France, 
however,  the  bench  offers  a  career  by  itself. 
The  college  student  may  decide  to  become  a 
judge  just  as  he  may  decide  to  become  a  doctor 
or  a  civil  engineer.  That  stands  as  a  general 
principle  at  least,  although  it  is  true  that  one- 
fourth  of  the  vacancies  occurring  each  year  in 
the  courts  may  be  filled  by  barristers  of  ten  years 
practice,  professors  of  law,  members  of  the 
Council  of  State,  and  certain  officials.1 

Judicial  appointments  are  now  regulated  by  a 
decree  of  1908.  Qualifying  examinations,  both 
written  and  oral,  are  held  annually  in  Paris. 
Practical  in  nature,  they  seek  to  determine  the 
candidate's  knowledge  of  law  and  judicial  pro- 
cedure rather  than  his  capacity  to  acquire  that 
knowledge.  Hence  the  candidate,  besides  having 
taken  a  law  degree,  must  have  either  served  in 
the  office  of  a  public  prosecutor  for  one  year  or 
1  Decree  of  Feb.  13,  1908,  Art.  16. 

[406] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

practised  as  an  attorney  for  two  years.  Those 
passing  the  examinations  may  be  assigned  by  the 
minister  of  justice  to  certain  subordinate  positions 
where  they  gain  further  insight  into  the  conduct 
of  judicial  business  and  await  appointment  to 
vacancies  in  the  District  Court.  Then  step  by 
step,  seniority  and  merit  both  contributing,  they 
pass  from  one  grade  to  another  through  the 
hierarchy  of  courts.  Political  influence,  exercised 
through  the  minister  of  justice,  continues  to  play 
some  part  in  determining  promotions;  senators 
and  deputies  still  journey  to  the  Place  Vendome 
in  the  interest  of  their  friends.  But  the  minister 
no  longer  has  a  free  hand.  His  discretion  is  con- 
fined to  the  limits  of  a  promotion  list  which  is 
compiled  by  a  judicial  board  and  which  cannot 
contain  the  names  of  more  than  a  quarter  of  the 
judges  of  each  grade;  and  moreover  no  judge 
can  be  promoted  until  he  has  served  two  years 
in  a  particular  grade  or,  in  the  case  of  such  promo- 
tion, be  accorded  a  salary  increase  of  more  than 
six  hundred  dollars.  The  judges  hold  office 
during  good  behavior.  They  cannot  be  disciplined 
or  removed  by  the  executive;  they  are  answerable 
for  their  conduct  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  alone.1 
The  highest  court  and  the  lowest  court  are  not, 
however,  protected  by  these  arrangements.  The 
judges  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  are  appointed 
and  may  be  removed  at  the  will  of  the  government. 

1  In  the  matter  of  removals  the   court    acts    through  a 
tommittee  of  seven  judges.      See  law  of  July  12,  1918. 

[407] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

The  justices  of  the  peace,  who  technically  do  not 
form  a  part  of  the  regular  magistracy,  are  subject 
to  special  rules.1  Appointed  by  presidential 
decree,  they  must  possess  the  qualifications  of  a 
legal  training  and  of  a  period  of  service  as  a  court 
officer  (such  as  clerk  of  court)  or  as  a  political 
officer  (such  as  mayor  or  general  councilor),  the 
required  period  of  service  varying  with  the  extent 
of  legal  training.  For  their  removal  or  reduction 
in  grade  the  formality  of  a  decree  is  not  required. 
But  the  danger  of  favoritism  or  political  bias  is 
minimized  by  the  fact  that  the  minister  of  justice 
must  act  on  the  advice  of  a  board  consisting  of 
three  judges  of  the  Court  of  Cassation,  the  state 
prosecutor  attached  to  that  court,  and  certain 
high  officials  of  the  department  of  justice. 
Small  Small  as  American  judicial  salaries  are  in  com- 

jSjJH  parison  with  the  English,2  they  are  large  in  com- 
parison with  the  French.  Judges  of  the  Court 
of  Cassation  receive  #3600  or  less  than  a  fourth 
of  the  salary  paid  to  justices  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court;  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeals, 
#1400;  judges  of  the  District  Court,  $600  to 
#1200  according  to  grade;  and  justices  of  the 
peace,  $500  to  #1000,  seventy -five  per  cent  receiv- 
ing the  minimum  amount.  It  is  true  that  magis- 
trates who  are  fortunate  enough  to  be  stationed 

1  See  law  of  June  14,  1918. 

2  The  judges  of  the  highest  court  in  Great  Britain  receive 
$30,000;    there    are    many   other   judicial    officers    receiving 

$25,000. 

[408] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

in  Paris  receive  an  additional  remuneration 
(amounting  in  the  case  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 
to  $800) ;  but  the  average  remains  singularly  low.1 
There  are  two  reasons  for  this:  first,  that  any- 
substantial  increase  would,  owing  to  the  large 
number  of  judges  (49  in  the  Court  of  Cassation 
alone),  involve  a  very  considerable  aggregate 
sum;  and  second,  that  a  satisfactory  personnel 
is  secured  under  existing  conditions.  Men  of 
scholarly  tastes  are  attracted  naturally  to  a  pro- 
fession which  gives  them  a  certain  amount  of 
leisure  for  study  and  which,  though  poorly  paid, 
has  the  advantages  of  permanent  tenure  and  a 
retirement  pension.  The  dignity  and  social  pres- 
tige of  judicial  office  appeal  to  young  men  who, 
through  inheritance  or  marriage,  are  possessed  of 
independent  means.  The  social  amenities  receive 
more  attention  in  France  than  in  America.  When, 
for  instance,  the  judges  of  assize  arrive  in  a  French 
town  a  prescribed  etiquette  must  be  rigorously 
observed.  "They  are  bound  to  call  first  on  the 
Prefety  on  the  commander  of  the  garrison  if  he 
be  a  general  of  division,  .  .  .  and  the  visits  in 
such  cases  must  be  paid  in  their  scarlet  robes.  If, 
however,  the  garrison  commander  be  a  general 
of  brigade,  .  .  .  the  assize  president  and  his 
assessors  return  to  their  hotel  after  calling  on  the 
Prefet,  for  they  rank  higher  for  the  once  than  all 

1  It  should  be  observed  that  the  presidents  of  the  courts, 
on  whom  the  conduct  of  trials  really  devolves,  are  paid  more 
than  twice  the  maximum  salaries  mentioned. 

[409] 


kw  sys- 
tem 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

other  officials,  and  are  entitled  to  receive  first 
visits  from  them.  The  prefect,  accompanied  by 
his  secretary  and  the  councilors  of  the  prefecture, 
all  in  full  uniform,  speedily  arrives  at  the  hotel 
to  pay  his  return  visit,  and  after  him  come,  in 
whatever  order  they  please,  the  general,  .  .  .  the 
mayor  of  the  town,  the  president,  assessor,  and 
public  prosecutor  of  the  local  tribunal,  the  central 
commissioner  of  police,  and  divers  other  function- 
aries. They  make  but  a  short  stay,  and  as  soon 
as  they  are  gone  the  judges  divest  themselves  of 
their  robes,  and  set  out  to  pay  their  return  visits 
in  evening  dress."  l 
The  case-  Of  the  fundamental  points  of  contrast  between 
French  jurisprudence  and  Anglo-American  juris- 
prudence the  most  striking  perhaps  lies  in  the 
different  degree  of  authority  given  to  decided 
cases.2  Anglo-American  jurisprudence  rests  upon 
the  principle  of  stare  decisis  —  adherence  to  de- 
cided cases.  The  English  or  American  court  is 
not  so  much  concerned  with  doing  justice  to  the 
parties  in  a  case  as  with  following  the  precedent 
set  by  the  earlier  decision  of  a  similar  case.  Thus 
the  unwritten  law  or  case  law,  which  the  judges 
have  made  and  which  is  scattered  through  innu- 
merable reports  and  digests,  is  as  binding  as  the 
written  law.  This  system  is  supposed  to  possess 
great  advantages:  for  one  thing  the  advantage  of 
certainty.     The  lawyer  feels  that  he  is  not  de- 

1  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (1913),  page  150. 

'  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (1913),  pages  790-795. 

[410] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

pendent  upon  the  ambiguous  phrasing  of  the  law 
or  the  capricious  attitude  of  the  judge,  because 
reported  decisions  fix  the  law's  meaning  and  limit 
the  judge's  discretion.  And  again,  the  system  is 
elastic.  Upon  the  original  law  is  grafted  an  inter- 
pretation; and  while  the  original  interpretation 
stands  as  a  guide,  the  judges  do  as  a  rule  slowly 
shift  their  ground  so  as  to  reflect  changes  in  social 
and  economic  matters.  Judges  legislate;  case 
law  is  judge-made  law.  As  Professor  Dicey  re- 
marks, English  and  American  jurists  are  opposed 
to  the  adoption  of  legal  codes  because  this  might 
limit  "the  essentially  legislative  authority"  of 
judges.1  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  of  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  said  in  one  of  his  opinions  that 
"judges  do  and  must  legislate";  but  he  added 
that  "they  can  do  so  only  interstitially;  they 
are  confined  from  molar  to  molecular  motions."  2 

Now,  the  civil  and  criminal  law  of  France  has  No  case 
been  codified  since  the  time  of  Napoleon;3  and 
the  codes  expressly  declare  that  judges  shall  build 
up  no  case  law.  According  to  article  13  51  of  the 
civil  code,  "the  authority  of  a  decision  applies 
only  to  the  case  which  the  court  is  called  upon  to 
decide."  If  the  judge  has  been  mistaken  in  a 
first  interpretation,  says  one  of  the  commenta- 

1  Law  of  the  Constitution,  8th  ed.,  page  369. 

2  See  Thomas  Reed  Powell,  "The  Logic  and  Rhetoric  of 
Constitutional  Law"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and 
Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XV,  page  653. 

3  Brissaud,  History  of  French  Private  Law  (1912). 

[4H] 


law  in 
France 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

tors,  that  is  no  reason  why  he  should  feel  com- 
pelled to  follow  the  same  line  in  later  cases. 
"Justice  will  suffer  less  from  two  contradictory  de- 
cisions than  from  a  series  of  bad  decisions  which 
harmonize  with  each  other.  .  .  .  The  judicial 
authority  must  not  give  decisions  on  matters 
which  have  not  occurred  in  the  past  and  must 
not  make  any  disposition  for  the  future;  and  so 
we  see  the  difference  of  this  situation  from  that 
of  the  legislator  who  gives  a  guide  for  the  future 
without  any  reference  to  the  past." l  When,  there- 
fore, a  barrister  cites  cases  in  support  of  his  argu- 
ment, he  does  not  presume  that  these  should  be 
binding  upon  the  court;  perhaps  he  may  attempt 
to  show  that  the  highest  court,  though  having 
always  in  view  the  satisfaction  of  justice  in  par- 
ticular cases,  has  incidentally  built  up  a  doctrine 
on  some  point  of  law  and  that  the  doctrine  is  in 
itself  logical  and  just.  The  court  is  asked  to 
follow  precedent,  not  because  it  is  precedent,  but 
because  it  is  just.  There  is,  however,  one  branch 
of  French  law  which  has  not  been  codified  and 
which  is  not  subject  to  these  rules.  Administra- 
tive law,  as  evolved  in  the  last  century,  is  based 
upon  reported  decisions,  these  decisions  them- 
selves being  profoundly  influenced  by  textbook 
writers.  But  in  the  future,  no  doubt,  when  the 
case  law  of  the  Council  of  State  has  reached 
greater  maturity,  the  legislature  will  formulate  it 
in  a  written  code. 

1  American  Laio  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (19 13),  page  793. 
[412] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 


The  French  system  has  found  scant  favor 
among  American  jurists,  largely  because  they 
are  so  little  acquainted  with  its  practical  opera- 
tion. Careful  observers  have  concluded  that 
French  courts  are  freer  from  technicalities  than 
ours,  that  they  are  trusted  more  than  ours  to  do 
substantial  justice,  and  that  the  law,  as  they 
apply  it,  is  less  likely  to  be  tortured  out  of  its 
obvious  meaning.  In  one  sense  French  judges 
possess  a  wider  discretion  than  ours,  for  they  are 
controlled  by  no  precedents;  in  another  sense 
they  are  more  circumscribed,  for  the  law  can  be 
modified  only  in  express  terms  by  the  legislature 
itself  and  not  through  the  subtlety  of  scholastic 
reasoning.  In  the  development  of  judge-made 
law  there  comes  a  time,  especially  in  a  country  so 
large  and  populous  as  the  United  States,  when  the 
very  virtues  of  the  system  are  a  reproach.  Such 
is  the  mass  of  decisions,  often  confused  and  con- 
flicting, that  the  ablest  lawyers  cannot  discover 
with  any  certainty  what  the  law  is.  As  for  the 
layman  he  has  learned  that  the  simplest  English 
words  can  have  a  strange  and  distorted  signifi- 
cance. Justice  threatens  to  break  down  under 
the  burden  of  precedent. 

In  the  field  of  criminal  law  French  procedure, 
like  that  of  the  continental  European  countries 
generally,  differs  widely  from  English  and  Ameri- 
can procedure.1     The  former,  which  is  sometimes 

1  See  on  this  topic  "The  Docket"  articles  in  the  American 
Law  Review,  Vol.  XL VII   (1913),   pages   143-15 1,   300-312, 

[413] 


Merits  of 

French 

system 


"  Inquis- 
itorial 
justice  " 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

termed  "inquisitorial,"  lays  emphasis  upon  the 
rights  of  society  and  looks  to  the  prompt  repres- 
sion of  crime;  the  latter,  which  is  sometimes 
termed  "accusatorial,"  lays  emphasis  upon  the 
rights  of  the  accused  and  seeks  to  safeguard  him 
from  possible  injustice.  Both  systems  have  their 
excellent  features;  both  are  liable  to  exaggeration 
and  abuse.  On  the  whole,  perhaps,  criminal  law 
is  more  effectively  applied  in  French  courts 
than  in  American. 
Prepara-  The  first  step  in  a  criminal  case  is  taken  by 
acrimL  tne  state  prosecutor  who,  when  a  charge  is  laid 
naicase  before  him,  collects  what  evidence  he  can  and 
reports  to  the  examining  magistrate.  There  is 
no  grand  jury,  no  indictment.  The  magistrate 
determines  himself  whether  a  prima  facie  case  has 
been  made  out.  If  it  has,  he  subjects  the  accused 
and  the  witnesses  to  a  relentless  private  examina- 
tion, this  difFering  from  our  informal  "third 
degree,"  however,  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  regular 
legal  proceeding  and  that  the  accused  may  bring 
his  counsel  with  him.  The  record  thus  compiled 
includes  not  only  all  the  facts,  and  even  rumors, 
which  tend  to  incriminate  the  suspected  man,  but 
also  a  survey  of  his  past  life,  which  does  not  over- 
look suspicious  and  discreditable  incidents.  If 
the  crime  is  a  misdemeanor  (delit),  trial  begins  in 
the  District  Court.  If  it  is  a  felony  {crime),  the 
record  is  sent  to  a  body  of  five  to  fifteen  judges 

458-469;    Chardon,   op.  cit.,   pages    158-230;    and   Garner, 
Tale  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXV  (1916),  pages  255-284. 

[414] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

known  as  the  "accusation  chamber."  These 
judges  decide  whether  a  "true  bill"  has  been 
found,  or  they  may  first  require  the  examining 
magistrate  to  make  further  investigation.  Severe 
as  the  inquisitorial  process  may  seem,  the  purpose 
is  to  discover  the  truth,  not  to  establish  guilt, 
and  it  is  said  that  innocent  men  are  rarely  sent 
before  the  Court  of  Assizes  for  trial.  French  law 
does  not  adopt  the  rather  hypocritical  formula  of 
Anglo-American  law  which  presumes  the  accused 
to  be  innocent  until  he  has  actually  been  convicted. 
As  an  American  lawyer  has  said,  it  does  not  "in- 
dulge in  any  such  grotesque  flight  of  fancy.  .  .  . 
It  merely  says:  'You  have,  after  a  most  thorough 
and  patient  examination  of  yourself  and  of  every- 
body that  knows  anything  about  the  case,  by  an 
officer  of  the  state  charged  with  the  prosecution, 
by  a  judge  charged  with  the  investigation  and  by 
a  jury  of  judges  who  have  considered  and  passed 
upon  the  evidence  —  you  have  been  declared  to 
be,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  guilty  of  the 
charge  brought  against  you.  But  we  give  you 
one  more  chance;  if  you  can  explain  your  con- 
duct to  the  satisfaction  of  twelve  of  your  fellow 
citizens,  they  may  free  you  if  they  want  to/"  1 

An  American  lawyer,  watching  the  progress  of  cnminai- 
a  trial  before  the  Court  of  Assizes,  would  experi-   ™oce_ 
ence  a  succession  of  shocks.     First  of  all,  the   dure 
written    and    authenticated    statements    of   law 
officers  (as  to  their  investigation  of  the  crime) 
1  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (1913),  page  148. 

[415] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

are  accepted  in  evidence;  far  from  needing  sub- 
stantiation, they  are  in  many  cases  regarded  as 
superior  evidence  which  cannot  be  contradicted 
by  witnesses.  So  that  the  jury  may  not  know 
which  side  has  called  them,  the  witnesses  appear 
in  an  order  fixed  by  the  prosecutor.  They  tell 
their  stories  to  the  jury  without  interruption  or 
prompting  of  any  kind  and  in  their  own  way. 
They  may  describe  what  they  saw,  or  what  some 
one  else  told  them  he  saw,  or  what  conclusions 
they  have  reached  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner. 
Neither  prosecution  nor  defense  can  object  to 
testimony  as  irrelevant  or  inadmissible.  In  that 
matter  the  president  of  the  court  has  absolute 
discretion.  He  may,  says  the  criminal  code, 
"avail  himself  of  anything  which  he  thinks  will 
contribute  to  the  discovery  of  the  truth,"  the  law 
relying  upon  his  honor  and  his  conscience  alone. 
Obviously  this  disregard  of  technicalities  removes 
what  is  in  America  one  of  the  most  frequent 
grounds  of  successful  appeal.  After  the  witness 
has  concluded  his  testimony,  there  is  no  cross- 
examination:  only  the  president  may  question 
him,  though  counsel  and  jury  may  ask  that  cer- 
tain questions  be  put.  A  curious  means  is  taken 
to  test  conflicting  evidence.  When  two  witnesses 
contradict  each  other,  they  are  placed  on  the 
stand  together  and,  without  any  interference  from 
the  court,  allowed  to  argue  the  point  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  jury.  This  is  called  "confrontation  of 
witnesses." 

[4i6] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

The  president  of  the  court,  as  these  facts  show,  Active 
plays  a  very  important  (and,  to  Americans,  ^ee 
anomalous)  role.1  He  questions  the  witnesses;  he  court 
determines  the  relevancy  of  evidence.  In  fact, 
having  obtained  before  the  trial  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  all  the  details  of  the  case,  he 
conducts  the  proceedings  from  beginning  to  end. 
Although  there  are  three  judges  in  the  Court  of 
Assizes,  two  of  them  sit  in  silence  and  immobility 
while  the  president  is  incessantly  active.  Imme- 
diately after  the  opening  address  of  the  prosecutor 
comes  the  "judicial  interrogation"  of  the  accused; 
for  the  latter  cannot,  as  in  American  practice, 
excuse  his  silence  under  a  rule  that  failure  to  tes- 
tify shall  not  be  counted  against  him.  The  presi- 
dent conducts  the  interrogation  very  thoroughly 
and  does  not  hesitate  to  use  methods  that 
to  us  seem  unbecoming  in  a  judge.  Indeed 
the  prosecutor  is  so  well  satisfied  that  he  con- 
tents himself  with  making  an  address  at  the  be- 
ginning and  at  the  end  of  the  trial.  The  following 
excerpt  from  the  proceedings  of  a  murder  trial 
will  serve  as  an  illustration.2 

The  President.  Your  name  is  Bertha  Blanc 
Vilette;  you  were  born  at  Vichy  forty-two  years 
ago.  Your  parents  were  honest  people;  you  were 
sent  to  school  by  them;  later  you  entered  the  con- 

1  There  are  occasions,  as  in  the  first  trial  of  fimile  Zola, 
when  the  presiding  judge  displays  an  improper  anxiety  to 
hamper  the  defense. 

2  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (1915),  page  304. 

[417] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

vent  of  Ste.  Marie  at  Lyons  where  you  remained 
for  four  years.  You  did  not  always  conduct  your- 
self well  there;  there  were  constant  complaints 
about  your  conduct,  and  in  the  end  your  parents 
were  asked  to  take  you  home,  which  they  did. 

Madame  V.  Oh!  no,  sir,  I  left  because  I  was 
taken  ill  with  a  fever,  and  I  was  always  good  — 

The  President.  Have  a  care,  prisoner;  two  of 
the  sisters  say  differently.  I  shall  go  on.  At 
nineteen  they  apprenticed  you  to  learn  a  trade. 
You  went  to  a  dressmaker's  at  Lyons.  One  day 
some  velvet  and  silks  were  missing,  and  you  were 
charged  with  stealing  them. 

Madame  V.  Oh !  no,  sir,  I  did  not  go  back  to 
Lyons. 

The  President.  Wherever  it  was,  you  were 
charged  with  a  theft. 

Madame  V.     No,  sir. 

The  President.  But  I  have  the  charge  here  in 
writing  made  by  Madame  S.,  your  employer.  If 
I  show  you  this,  will  you  still  persist  in  the  denial? 

Madame  V.  If  you  had  said  that  at  first,  sir, 
I  would  have  said  that  I  was  innocent  —  the 
magistrate  said  so,  and  I  was  discharged. 

The  President.  My  good  woman,  you  know 
what  you  are  charged  with.  I  represent  justice 
and  am  here  only  to  get  the  truth.  A  few  years 
later  you  came  to  Paris,  etc. 

In  continental  countries  this  system  is  con- 
sidered better  than  ours.  The  witnesses  are  not 
badgered;   the  substantial  facts  are  not  obscured 

[418I 


COURT  OF  ASSIZES   (STEINHEIL  TRIAL) 


of  appeal 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

by  technicalities;  the  trial  proceeds  with  great 
expedition.  The  president,  of  course,  must  be  a 
man  of  ability  and  sound  common  sense. 

In  American  courts,  where  technicalities  com-  Grounds 
mand  more  reverence  than  they  should,  it  is 
difficult  to  secure  a  conviction.  Indictments 
have  been  set  aside  because  of  faulty  spelling  or 
faulty  punctuation;  a  new  trial  has  been  granted 
because  the  jury  reached  its  verdict  on  Sunday 
or  because  the  prisoner  left  the  court  room  for  a 
moment  to  get  a  drink  of  water.  But  formal 
defects  in  procedure  or  pleading  or  evidence  can- 
not be  taken  as  ground  for  appeal  in  France. 
The  verdict  of  the  jury  is  practically  final.  "The 
judges  have  no  power  to  grant  a  new  trial.  They 
may  grant  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Cassation. 
But  there  is  no  chance  there  for  the  French  law- 
yer to  urge  technical  questions  of  evidence  or 
procedure.  They  are  not  listened  to.  The  ap- 
pellate court  considers  only  a  question  of  juris- 
diction or  whether  the  verdict  has  been  obtained 
by  false  or  fraudulent  testimony  or  whether  it  is 
absolutely  wrong  and  the  result  of  passion  and 
prejudice  on  the  part  of  the  judge  and  jury.  And 
in  point  of  fact  this  court  (the  supreme  court  of 
France)  very  rarely  interferes  with  the  verdict 
and  judgment  of  the  Assizes."  1  Nor  can  there 
be  mistrial  because  of  the  failure  of  the  jury  to 
agree;  agreement  is  not  necessary.  Conviction 
is  by  simple  majority  vote  except  that  when  the 
1  American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII,  page  362. 

[419] 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF   FRANCE 

French  vote  stands  seven  to  five  the  three  judges  may 
system  interpose  and  acquit  the  defendant  —  in  other 
words,  add  their  three  votes  to  the  votes  of  the 
minority.  Hallam  called  the  principle  of  unani- 
mous verdict,  which  is  peculiar  to  Anglo-American 
law,  a  "preposterous  relic  of  barbarism. "  If  the 
jurors  agree,  the  agreement  is  often  due  to  in- 
difference or  to  pressure  that  approximates  com- 
pulsion. If  they  disagree,  then  the  case  must 
be  tried  again;  and  when  the  defense  can  hope 
for  nothing  better  than  a  disagreement,  the  temp- 
tation to  secure  that  result  by  bribery  is  partic- 
ularly strong.  French  juries  are  rapidly  selected, 
a  circumstance  that  contrasts  favorably  with 
the  formidable  delays  which  are  so  common  in 
the  United  States.  Prospective  jurors  are  not 
examined  as  though  themselves  on  trial,  nor  are 
they  challenged  because  they  have  formed 
opinions.  The  number  of  challenges  is  limited 
by  the  fact  that  the  jury  must  be  selected  from 
a  panel  of  thirty-six  names.  French  practice  is 
obviously  superior  on  another  point.  With  the  jury 
of  twelve  at  least  two  alternates  are  chosen,  and 
these,  sitting  through  the  trial  and  hearing  all 
the  arguments  and  evidence,  may  at  any  time  re- 
place a  disabled  juror.  It  can  never  be  necessary 
towards  the  end  of  a  trial  to  begin  all  over  again 
simply  because  a  juror  has  fallen  ill  or  (as  in  the 
second  Hyde  trial  at  Kansas  City)  gone  insane.1 

1  In   the  state  of  Washington  the   law  provides  for  the 
selection  of  alternate  jurors. 
[420] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

The  state  prosecutor  belongs  to  what  is  known 
as  the  "standing  magistracy"  from  the  fact  that 
he  stands  wThen  speaking,  while  the  judges 
("seated  magistracy")  do  not.  Clad  in  red  silk 
robes  and  sitting  beside  the  judges,  he  cannot 
easily  be  distinguished  from  them.  He  is  indeed  The 
appointed  in  the  same  way  (by  virtue  of  an  ex-  pu^ 
amination  system)  and  may,  in  the  course  of  cutor 
promotion,  become  a  judge  just  as  a  judge  may 
become  a  prosecutor.  But  since  the  government  is 
held  responsible  for  the  efficient  administration  of 
the  criminal  law,  it  does  not  concede  him  security 
of  tenure.  He  may  be  transferred  to  a  less  agree- 
able locality  or  reduced  in  grade  or  removed  by 
presidential  decree  —  that  is,  by  the  minister  of 
justice.  When  a  criminal  offense  is  brought  to 
his  attention  by  complaint  or  rumor,  he  is  ex- 
pected to  make  an  investigation  and  determine 
whether  the  complaint  is  well  founded.  The  sub- 
sequent proceedings  have  already  been  sketched. 
But  it  may  here  be  pointed  out  that  in  the  case 
of  a  misdemeanor,  when  the  prosecutor  feels  that 
he  has  gathered  sufficient  evidence  to  convict,  he 
may  proceed  immediately  to  trial  in  the  District 
Court  without  authority  from  an  examining  magis- 
trate. This  procedure,  which  resembles  prosecu- 
tion by  information  in  the  United  States,  has  the 
advantage  of  simplicity.  There  seems  to  be  a 
tendency  to  follow  it  in  doubtful  cases.  Three 
fourths  of  the  criminal  trials  are,  begun  in  this  way.1 
1  Chardon,  op.  cit.,  page  201. 

[421] 


control  of 
police 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

The  prosecutor  is  also  supposed  to  take  an 
active  part  in  certain  civil  cases  such  as  those 
that  affect  minors,  communes,  or  public  insti- 
tutions; and,  under  any  circumstances,  he  may 
interpose  after  the  pleadings  and  propose  a  solu- 
tion to  the  court. 

The  police,  though  constituting  another  im- 
portant element  in  the  repression  and  detection 
of  crime,  are  under  the  supervision  of  the  minister 
Central  of  the  interior.  While  their  primary  function  of 
preserving  order  relates  closely  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  yet  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  police  power  has  a  very  wide  range  in  France, 
embracing  such  matters  as  factory  inspection,  fire 
prevention,  and  public  health.  The  control 
exercised  by  the  minister,  through  a  subordi- 
nate known  as  the  director  of  general  security, 
varies  according  to  the  size  of  the  municipality 
and  the  class  of  police  officials  concerned.  He 
has  complete  control  over  the  secret  service,  the 
detectives  who  guard  the  person  of  the  Presi- 
dent, keep  revolutionary  agitators  under  sur- 
veillance, and  in  the  chief  ports  and  railway 
terminals  lie  in  wait  for  notorious  characters  who 
are  to  be  expelled  from  the  country  or  otherwise 
limited  in  their  movements.  The  gendarmes  (or 
state  police),  however,  are  regarded  as  forming 
part  of  the  army  and  come  mainly  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  minister  of  war.  This  admi- 
rable force,  led  by  army  officers  and  for  the  most 
part  mounted,  maintains  order  in  the  country 
[422] 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

districts  and  along  the  highways.  It  includes 
nearly  twenty-two  thousand  men  who  receive 
twenty  dollars  a  month  with  free  lodging  and  a 
small  pension  after  twenty-five  years'  service. 
Like  the  Canadian  mounted  police  and  the  Penn- 
sylvania and  New  York  constabulary,  the  gen- 
darmes have  proved  highly  effective  in  dealing 
with  disturbances  that  the  local  police  cannot 
handle. 

In  the  three  largest  cities  of  France  (Paris, 
Lyons,  and  Marseilles),  in  Toulon  (fifteenth  city 
in  point  of  size)  and  La  Seyne 1  a  special  form  of 
police  administration  has  been  established,  this 
being  due  to  the  fear  of  insurrection  or  dangerous 
and  prolonged  rioting.  In  Paris  a  prefect  of 
police,  amenable  in  no  way  to  the  departmental 
prefect,  has  autocratic  power  in  the  management 
of  the  force.  He  must,  it  is  true,  appear  before 
the  municipal  council  to  justify  his  annual  budget 
and  answer  questions,  for  the  state  merely  grants 
a  subvention  equal  to  about  a  third  of  the  cost 
of  maintenance;  but  should  the  council  refuse 
appropriations,  as  it  has  recently  done  on  several 
occasions,  the  minister  of  the  interior  may  inter- 
vene and  force  it  to  comply.  The  system  in 
the  other  communes  is  somewhat  different. 
There  the  departmental  prefects  manage  forces 
which    are   maintained   by  national   funds;    the 

1  The  police  of  Toulon  and  La  Seyne  (both  in  the  de- 
partment of  Var)  were  nationalized  by  the  law  of  Nov.  14, 
1918. 

[423  3 


GOVERNMENT  AND   POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

cities  have  not  even  a  nominal  control  over 
the  expenditures,  being  obliged  by  law  to  assist 
the  state  with  subventions  amounting  in  the  case 
of  Lyons  to  about  thirty-five  per  cent,  in  the  case 
of  Marseilles  to  about  fifty-five  per  cent.1  Out- 
side these  five  communes  central  control  is  not 
very  effective.  It  is  true  that  in  cities  of  more  than 
forty  thousand  population  all  details  of  organiza- 
tion (even  as  to  salaries)  are  fixed  by  presidential 
decree;  that  in  every  city  of  more  than  five 
thousand  population  the  police  commissioner  is 
appointed  (and  disciplined  or  removed)  by  the 
central  government;  and  that  the  municipal  coun- 
cils can  be  compelled  to  vote  the  appropriations 
asked  for.  But  in  regulating  police  organization 
and  in  appointing  commissioners  the  govern- 
ment consults  local  feeling  as  manifested  by 
the  mayor  and  council.  In  practice  the  mayor's 
influence  over  the  police  is  preponderant.2 

This  modified  local  autonomy,  as  compared 
with  the  centralized  judicial  administration,  has 
not  given  good  results.  Louis  Barthou,  formerly 
prime  minister,  declares  "that  the  municipal 
Police  in-  police  is  deplorably  organized  in  France  and  that 
there  does  not  exist  ...  a  serious  rural  police."  3 
"It  is  a  matter  of  daily  observation,"  says  M. 

1  Toulon  and  La  Seyne  are  required  to  contribute  to  the 
state  the  sum  of  the  ordinary  expenditure  of  1913  and  half 
the  additional  expenditure. 

2  Chardon,  op.  cit.,  page  186. 

3  Revue  hebdomad  aire,  191 1,  Vol.  IV,  page  632. 
[424] 


efficient 


THE  ORDINARY  COURTS 

Chardon,1  "that  in  almost  the  whole  of  France 
we  have  really  no  police. "  If  an  abnormal  situa- 
tion arises —  a  strike,  a  riot,  a  concerted  resist- 
ance to  the  enforcement  of  law  —  anarchy  prevails 
for  the  time.  Robbery,  pillage,  and  murder  can 
occur  without  the  intervention  of  a  policeman. 
"The  civilization  of  France  is  at  stake."  2  The 
gardes  champetres  or  police  of  the  rural  com- 
munes, appointed  by  the  mayor  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  subprefect,  are  "absolutely 
inefficient. "  It  is  a  matter  of  patronage:  some 
cobbler,  carpenter,  or  farmer  is  paid  a  small  wage 
for  doing  nothing  (except  at  the  approach  of  elec- 
tion time);3  blind  men  and  paralytics  have  been 
appointed.4  M.  Chardon,  describing  these  dis- 
mal conditions  and  observing  that  a  third  of  all 
the  criminal  offenders  escape  apprehension,  de- 
clares that  the  police  should  everywhere  be 
organized  and  directed  by  the  state  alone.  He 
is  astonished  that  "the  laws  and  ordinances  which 
regulate  the  conditions  of  a  Frenchman's  life  can 
be  modified,  mutilated,  or  ignored  altogether 
through  the  negligence  or  hostility  of  the  muni- 
cipalities." 5  These  words,  written  in  1908  shortly 
before  the  government  took  control  of  the  Mar- 
seilles police,  may  have  some  significance  for  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  page  174. 

2  Id.,  page  187. 

3  Revue  des  deux  mondes,  191 1,  Vol.  IV,  page  633. 

4  Chardon,  page  190. 

5  Op.  cit.,  page  206. 

[425] 


GOVERNMENT  AND  POLITICS  OF  FRANCE 

future.  "I  do  not  conceal  the  fact  that  the 
nationalization  of  the  police  is  a  radical  solution," 
says  Louis  Barthou.  "But  I  should  be  surprised 
if  it  were  not  the  solution  found  necessary,  per- 
haps in  the  near  future."  l 

1  Revue  hebdomadaire,  191 1,  Vol.  IV,  page  634. 


[426] 


APPENDIX  I 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

MANY  changes  have  taken  place  in  French 
government  since  Bodley  and  Lowell  de- 
scribed its  structure  and  its  operation  more  than 
twenty  years  ago.  Parliamentary  procedure,  for 
instance,  has  been  greatly  modified;  party  organi- 
zation has  been  quite  transformed.  In  the 
preparation  of  this  volume  the  author  has  at- 
tempted to  utilize  the  fairly  abundant  literature 
which  has  appeared  recently  in  France  and 
which,  besides  dealing  with  actual  changes,  has 
occupied  itself  with  the  discussion  of  projected 
reforms.  No  one  can  pursue  the  study  of  French 
government  very  far  without  consulting  the 
French  authorities;  and  in  order  that  the  stu- 
dent may  satisfy  his  curiosity  on  particular  points 
as  they  arise,  it  has  seemed  imperative  to  furnish 
in  text  and  footnotes  some  indication  of  the 
materials  which  have  been  drawn  upon.  The 
following  short  bibliography  supplements  the 
footnotes.  It  brings  together  most  of  the  works 
cited  there,  as  well  as  others  which  have  not 
been  cited,  and  groups  them  under  convenient 
heads  for  the  purposes  of  systematic  reading. 
For  later  publications  see  the  bibliographies  ap- 

[427] 


APPENDIX   I 

pearing  in  each  number  of  the  American  Political 
Science  Review  (quarterly),  La  Revue  du  droit 
•public  (quarterly),  and  La  Revue  politique  et  par- 
lementaire  (monthly). 

A.      GENERAL   TEXTS 

(i)  In  English: 

Bodley,  J.  E.  C.  France  (2  vols.,  1898;  also 
1  vol.  ed.,  1900).  A  work  of  established 
reputation  written  by  an  Englishman  who 
had  lived  in  France  for  several  years  and 
obtained  a  first-hand  acquaintance  with  her 
political  and  social  institutions.  Its  value 
has,  of  course,  been  much  impaired  by  the 
rapid  movement  of  events  in  the  last  two 
decades.  Mr.  Bodley,  like  many  Frenchmen 
of  the  time,  had  no  faith  in  the  permanence 
of  the  Republic  and  adopted  a  critical  atti- 
tude  that   at   times   clouded  his   judgment. 

Burgess,  J.  W.  Political  Science  and  Compara- 
tive Constitutional  Law  (2  vols.,  1893).  The 
chapters  on  French  government  in  the  second 
volume,  though  limited  in  scope  and  written 
so  long  ago,  still  command  attention  because 
of  the  admirably  lucid  presentation. 

Lowell,  A.  L.  Governments  and  Parties  in  Con- 
tinental Europe  (2  vols.,  1896).  See  Vol.  I 
for  France.  A  suggestive  and  penetrating 
analysis  by  the  foremost  American  authority. 
Two  abridgments  have  appeared:      The  Gov- 

U28] 


APPENDIX   I 

ernments  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany  (1914) 
and  Greater  European  Governments  (191 8). 
Unfortunately,  in  neither  case  have  the  edi- 
tors brought  the  subject  matter  up  to  date. 

Ogg,  F.  A.  The  Governments  of  Europe  (191 3). 
Those  who  wish  to  make  at  the  outset  a  rapid 
survey  of  the  whole  field  will  find  the  chap- 
ters on  French  government  particularly  use- 
ful; they  are  compact  (sixty-two  pages)  and 
systematic.  Extensive  bibliographies  are 
given  in  the  footnotes. 

Poincare,  Raymond.  Hozv  France  is  Governed 
(translation,  1914).  This  volume,  apparently 
designed  for  the  use  of  French  school  chil- 
dren, is  short  and  rather  elementary.  The 
chapters  on  education,  justice,  and  finance 
give  facts  not  readily  obtainable  elsewhere. 

(2)  In  French: 
Duguit,  Leon.  Traite  de  droit  constitutional 
(2  vols.,  191 1).  This  is,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Esmein's  Elements  the  best 
general  treatise.  The  student  should  become 
thoroughly  familiar  with  it  or  at  least  with 
all  of  the  second  volume  and  that  part  of  the 
first  volume  which  is  not  occupied  with  theo- 
retical and  philosophical  considerations.  It 
is  to  be  regretted  that  Duguit,  like  Esmein, 
gives  no  attention  to  the  organization  and 
activities  of  political  parties.  A  revised 
edition  is  being  prepared. 

[429] 


APPENDIX  I 

DuGUIT.  Manuel  de  droit  constitutionnel  (3d  ed., 
191 8).  Of  equal  authority  with  the  above, 
but  less  detailed.  The  new  edition  discusses 
the  effects  of  the  war  on  the  functioning  of 
the  parliamentary  system. 

Esmein,  A.  Elements  de  droit  constitutionnel 
(6th  ed.,  edited  by  Joseph  Barthelemy,  1914). 
Should  be  used  along  with  Duguit  whose  con- 
clusions frequently  differ  from  those  of  the 
late  Professor  Esmein. 

Jeze,  Gaston.  Elements  de  droit  public  et  ad- 
ministratif  (1910).  A  small  book  of  some 
three  hundred  pages,  very  simple  and  clear, 
with  emphasis  upon  general  principles. 

Moreau,  F.  P.  L.  Precis  elementaire  de  droit  con- 
stitutionnel (8th  ed.,  1 91 7).  Completely  re- 
vised. This  work,  as  the  numerous  editions 
indicate,  is  widely  used  as  a  textbook. 

Pierre,  Eugene.  Traite  de  droit  politique,  elec- 
toral, et  parlementaire  (3d  ed.,  1908;  supple- 
ment, 191 4).  This  is  a  work  of  reference 
rather  than  a  textbook.  Prepared  by  the 
general  secretary  (or,  as  we  should  say,  the 
clerk)  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  it  ranks 
as  the  standard  authority  on  parliamentary 
procedure,  although  it  is  not  confined  to  that 
field.  The  supplement  (143 1  pages)  is  ar- 
ranged in  sections  corresponding  with  those 
of  the  original  text. 
The   numerous  works   on    administrative   law, 

while  mainly  concerned  with  technical  questions, 
[430] 


APPENDIX   I 

describe  the  structure  of  central  and  local  govern- 
ment. See  "Berthclemy"  and  "Hauriou"  under 
"G"  of  this  Appendix. 

B.      THE    CONSTITUTION 

For  the  text  of  the  Constitutional  Laws  of 
1875  and  related  documents  see: 

Anderson,  F.  M.     The  Constitutions  and  Other 

Select  Documents  Illustrative  of  the  History  of 

France  (2d  ed.,  1908). 
Dodd,    W.    F.     Modern    Constitutions    (2    vols., 

1909). 
Duguit    et    Monier.     Les    Constitutions    et    les 

principals  lois  politiques  de  la  France  depuis 

1789  (3d  ed.,  1915). 

The  character  and  content  of  the  constitution 
are  discussed  by  Duguit  and  Esmein  in  the 
general  texts  already  noticed.  On  special  as- 
pects see: 

Auffray,  Jean.  Htude  sur  lafacilite  de  la  revision 
de  noire  constitution  de  1875  (1908). 

Desfougeres,  Henri.  La  Controle  judiciaire  de 
la  constitutionnalite  des  lois  (191 3). 

Saleilles,  R.  "The  Development  of  the  Present 
Constitution  of  France,"  Annals  of  the  Ameri- 
can Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
July,  1895. 

Santoni,  A.  De  la  distinction  des  lois  constitu- 
tionnelles  et  des  lois  ordinaire s  (191 3). 

[43i] 


APPENDIX   I 
C.       POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

(i)  In  English: 

Bodley,  J.  E.  C.  France,  History,  in  Vol.  X  of 
the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  (nthed.,  1910), 
pages  873-904.  An  excellent  review  of  the 
period  from  1870.  Somewhat  cynical  in 
dealing  with  party  conflicts,  but  free  from 
the  strong  partisan  bias  which  colors  most 
of  the  contemporary  histories. 

The  Church  in  France  (1906). 


Bracq,  J.  C.     France  under  the  Republic  (1910). 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  Vol.  XII,  The 
Latest  Age  (1910).  v 

Coubertin,  Pierre  de.  The  Evolution  of  France 
under  the  Third  Republic  (1897). 

Dawbarn,  Charles.  Makers  of  New  France 
(191 5).  Biographical  sketches  of  eminent 
Frenchmen,  including  Raymond  Poincare, 
Georges  Clemenceau,  Aristide  Briand,  Theo- 
phile  Delcasse,  Louis  Barthou,  and  the  late 
Jean  Jaures. 

Dimnet,  Ernest.  France  Herself  Again  (19 14). 
Drawing  evidence  from  many  phases  of  the 
national  life  —  from  politics,  education,  liter- 
ature, journalism,  Dimnet  seeks  to  show 
that,  with  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
of  1875,  France  entered  upon  a  period  of 
progressive  decline  and  that  she  was  rescued 
from  this  decadence  by  the  shock  of  German 
[432] 


APPENDIX   I 

aggressions.  His  sympathies  are  with  the 
Church  and  the  army.  A  striking  plea  for 
conservative  and  patriotic  ideals. 

Estey,  J.  A.  Revolutionary  Syndicalism  (191 3). 
Treats  of  a  recent  phase  of  social  unrest  which 
had  important  political  effects. 

Guerard,  A.-L.  French  Civilization  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  (1914).  This  is  not  a  mere 
compilation.  Professor  Guerard  shows  a 
rare  originality  and  analytical  power  in  the 
interpretation  of  his  facts. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel.  Contemporary  France  (4 
vols.,  translation  of  Histoire  de  la  France 
Contemporaine,  1903 -1909).  Confined  to  the 
first  twelve  years  of  the  Republic. 

Hyndman,  H.  M.  Clemenceau  (191 9).  Valuable 
not  only  as  a  study  of  the  eminent  Radical 
statesman,  but  also  as  a  commentary  on 
phases  of  the  political  history  of  the  Repub- 
lican period. 

Levin e,  Louis.  The  Labor  Movement  in  France 
(1912). 

Vizetelly,  E.  A.  Republican  France  (1913). 
By  an  English  journalist  who  fought  in  the 
war  of  1870,  gave  Zola  sanctuary  in  England 
during  the  height  of  the  Dreyfus  affair,  and 
who  had  a  first-hand  acquaintance  with  poli- 
tics and  politicians.  A  lively  book,  full  of 
anecdote  and  reminiscence.  Covers  the 
period  1870-19 12. 

Wright,  C.  H.  C.     A  History  of  the  Third  French 

[433] 


APPENDIX   I 

Republic      (191 6).     A      well-written,      well- 
balanced  narrative  of  only  200  pages. 

(2)  In  French: 

Bertrand,  A.  Les  Origines  de  la  Troisieme  R'e- 
publique,  18 71-18 76  (191 1). 

Debidour,  A.  VEglise  catholique  et  Vetat  sous  la 
troisieme  Republique  (2  vols.,  1909). 

Despagnet,  F.  La  Republique  et  le  Vatican, 
1 8 76-1 906  (1906). 

Hosotte,  Louis.  Histoire  de  la  Troisieme  Re- 
publique (Vol.  I,  1870— 1909;  Vol.  II,  1909- 
1912).     Favorable  to  the  church. 

Marechal,  E.  Histoire  contemporaine  de  1879  a 
nos  jours  (3  vols.,  1900). 

Weill,  G.  Histoire  du  mouvement  social  en 
France,  1852-1910  (2d  ed.,  1912). 

Zevort,  E.  Histoire  de  la  troisieme  Republique 
(4  vols.,  1 896-1901). 

(3)  Tear  Books  and  Periodicals: 

For  a  summary  review  of  each  year's  political 
events  see  in  English  the  American  Tear  Book 
(since  1910),  the  Annual  Register,  and  the  Po- 
litical Science  'Quarterly  {Record  of  Political 
Events)',  and  in  French  the  Annuaire  du  Parle- 
ment  (since  1898),  UAnnee  politique  (1 875-1 905), 
and  La  Vie  politique  dans  les  deux  mondes  (since 
1906).  A  brief  chronicle  appears  each  month  in 
La  Revue  politique  et  parlementaire  (since  1894) 
and  quarterly  in  La  Revue  du  droit  public  (since 

[434] 


APPENDIX  I 

1894).  In  the  former,  and  at  greater  length  in 
La  Revue  generate  a" administration  (published 
monthly  by  the  ministry  of  the  interior  since 
1877),  appear  abstracts  of  laws,  decrees,  circu- 
lars, and  other  official  documents.  For  transac- 
tions in  Parliament  see  Le  Journal  offi-ciel  de  la 
Republique  francaise.  The  Almanack  National 
gives  the  personnel  of  the  cabinet,  the  chambers, 
the  administrative  bureaux,  the  law  courts,  etc. 


D.    PARTIES 

The  party  system  is  described  by  Bodley  and 
Lowell  (in  the  works  already  noticed  under  "A" 
of  this  appendix)  and  more  briefly  by  Charles 
Seignobos  in  the  International  Monthly  (August, 
1901,  pages  139-165).  The  latter  contends  that 
Bodley  and  Lowell,  examining  French  parties 
from  the  standpoint  of  English  and  American 
experience,  failed  to  grasp  their  inward  character 
and  regarded  them  simply  as  a  "monstrous 
vagary/'  Since  his  article  was  written,  however, 
the  parties  have  passed  through  something  like  a 
metamorphosis.  We  are  now  almost  entirely 
dependent  upon  French  books  and  periodicals  for 
our  information.  There  is,  fortunately,  one  recent 
systematic  treatise:  Jacques,  Les  Partis  poli- 
tiques  sous  la  troisieme  Republique  (1913).  This 
describes  the  history,  policies,  organization,  and 
tactics  of  the  existing  parties  and  in  an  appendix 
gives  in  extenso  the  platforms  and  rules. 

[435] 


APPENDIX   I 

Charpentier,  Arm  and.  Le  Parti  radical  et 
radical-socialiste  a  travers  ses  congres,  igoi- 
ign  (1913).  This  is  a  documented  work  of 
high  value. 

Estey,  J.  A.     Revolutionary  Syndicalism  (191 3). 

Guerard,  A.-L.  French  Civilization  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  (1914).  See  especially  Chap- 
ter IV  on  the  evolution  of  Socialism  and 
Syndicalism. 

Jacques,  Leon.  Les  Partis  politiques  sous  la 
troisieme  Republique  (1913).  A  systematic 
and  scholarly  work  which  covers  the  whole 
field.     Disappointing  on  the  historical  side. 

Lanessan,  J.-L.  de.  La  Crise  de  la  Republique 
(1914).  An  argument  for  the  two-party  sys- 
tem. The  author  makes  concrete  proposals 
which  are  based  upon  analysis  of  prevailing 
conditions.  He  hopes  to  see  the  numerous 
parties  consolidate  into  two  organizations  — 
the  "authoritarian"  Left  and  the  " liberal" 
Right,  the  latter  seeking  to  protect  personal 
liberty  and  property  rights. 

Levine,  Louis.  Syndicalism  in  France  (19 14). 
Revision  of  The  Labor  Movement  (19 12). 

Mac  Gibbon,  D.  A.  "French  Socialism  Today" 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  XIX,  pages 
36-46  and  98-110. 

Milhac,  L.  "Les  Partis  politiques  franc ais  dans 
leur  programmes  et  devant  le  suffrage,"  An- 
nates des  sciences  politiques,  July  15,  1910. 

Revue    hebdomadaire,    February-April,     1910.     A 

[436] 


APPENDIX   I 

series  of  articles  describing  all  the  parties  of 
today  except  the  Socialist-Republican  party 
which  was  organized  later.  For  the  titles 
of  these  articles  see  the  footnotes  to 
Chapter  X. 
Weill,  G.  Histoire  du  mouvement  social  en 
France  de  1852  a  igio  (2d  ed.  191 2). 

E.      THE    PRESIDENT 

Barthelemy,  Joseph.  Le  Role  du  pouvoir  ex'ecu- 
tif  dans  les  republiques  modernes  (1906). 
Barthelemy  gives  a  clear  and  sound  state- 
ment of  the  President's  position  as  titular 
executive. 

Bompard,  R.  Le  Veto  du  President  de  la  Repub- 
lique  (1906). 

Garner,  J.  W.  "Tbe  Presidency  of  the  French 
Republic,"  North  American  Review,  March, 
1913,  pages  334-349.  Best  description  of 
the  presidency  in  English. 

Laferriere,  J.  " Le  Contreseing  ministeriel," 
Revue  generale  a" administration,  April  and 
May,  1908. 

Leyret,  Henri.  Le  President  de  la  Republique 
(191 2).  Critical  examination  of  the  presiden- 
tial powers.  Leyret  maintains  that  the  Presi- 
dent has  the  means  of  freeing  himself  from 
his  present  abject  dependence  upon  the  minis- 
ters and  of  exerting  real  initiative. 

Lubersac,  G.  DE.  Les  Pouvoirs  constitutionals 
du  President  de  la  Republique  (191 1). 

[437] 


APPENDIX  I 

Matter,  P.  De  la  Dissolution  des  assemblers  parle- 
mentaires  (1898).  A  highly  controversial 
subject  that  deserves  careful  study. 

Moreau,  F.  P.  L.  Le  Reglement  administratif 
(1902).     Legislative  powers  of  the  President. 

Nadal,  J.  Attributions  du  President  de  la  Re- 
publique  en  France  et  aux  Etats  Unis  (1909). 

F.      THE   MINISTERS 

Most  of  the  books  recommended  under  "E" 
and  "G"  of  this  Appendix  consider  the  relations 
of  the  ministers  either  to  the  President  or  to  the 
civil  service. 

Garner,  J.  W.  "Cabinet  Government  in 
France,"  American  Political  Science  Re- 
view, Vol.  VIII,  pages  353-374.  A  valuable 
article  which  cites  a  great  number  of  French 
authorities. 

Noell,  H.  V Administration  de  la  France:  les 
ministeres,  leur  organisation,  leur  role  (191 1). 

For   the    personnel  of  the  numerous  cabinets 

see  Publication  de  la  societe  d'histoire  moderne: 
les  ministeres  Jrancais,  1789-1909  (1910)  and 
Annuaire  du  Parlement,  Vol.  X,  which  gives  the 
cabinets  from  1900  to  191 3. 

G.      ADMINISTRATION 

Ashley,  P.  W.  L.  Local  and  Central  Government 
(1906).     Concerned    mainly   with    the    rela- 

[438] 


APPENDIX   I 

tions  between  central  and  local  authorities  in 
France,  England,  and  Germany. 

Berth  el  emy,  H.  Trait'e  elementaire  de  droit  ad- 
ministratif  (7th  ed.,  191 3).  In  Berthelemy 
and  Hauriou  (see  below)  the  student  will  find 
a  good  general  description  of  administrative 
machinery. 

Block,  M.  Dictionnaire  de  V administration  fran- 
caise  (2  vols.,  5th  ed.,  1905;  supplement, 
1907). 

Cahen,  Georges.  Les  Fonctionnaires:  leur  action 
corporative  (191 1).  Perhaps  the  best  ac- 
count of  the  unionizing  of  the  government 
employees,  the  demands  formulated  by  them 
(as  to  appointments,  promotion,  salary), 
their  resort  to  the  strike,  and  the  agitation 
for  a  national  civil-service  law. 

Chardon,  Henri.  Les  Travaux  publics  (1904). 
Highways,  railroads,  etc. 

V Administration  de  la  France:  les  fonc- 
tionnaires (1908).  Devoted  mainly  to  the 
administration  of  justice. 

Le  Pouvoir  administratif:  la  reorganisation 

des  services  publiques  (191 1).  A  collection  of 
essays  and  lectures  written  during  the  pre- 
vious decade. 

Garner,  J.  W.  Administrative  Reform  in  France 
{American  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  XIII, 
pages  17-46). 

Georgin,  Charles.  Le  Statut  des  fonctionnaires 
(1912). 

[439] 


APPENDIX   I 

Hennessey,  Jean.  La  Reorganisation  adminis- 
trative de  la  France  (1919).  Favors 
decentralization. 

Hauriou,  Maurice.  Precis  de  droit  administra- 
tif  (8th  ed.,  19 14;   and  9th  ed.,  19 19). 

Hugues,  P.  d\  La  Guerre  des  fonctionnaires 
(1914).  Efforts  of  the  organized  civil  ser- 
vants to  extort  concessions  from  the 
government. 

Lefas,  A.  UEtat  et  les  fonctionnaires  (1913). 
Deals  with  the  grievances  of  public  officials, 
their  organization  to  secure  reforms,  and 
especially  the  action  of  Parliament  upon  civil- 
service  bills.  An  exhaustive  bibliography  is 
given  in  the  appendix. 

Noell,  H.  Ly  Administration  de  la  France:  les 
ministeres,  leur  organisation,  leur  role  (191 1). 
The  only  systematic  treatise  on  the  organi- 
zation of  the  central  departments. 

Revue  hebdomadaire:  March-June,  191 1.  A  series 
of  articles  by  Jules  Meline,  Louis  Barthou, 
Etienne  Flandin,  and  others  describing  the 
twelve  ministerial  departments  of  that 
time. 

Saillard,  A.     Le  ministere  des  finances  (1903). 


H.       ADMINISTRATIVE    LAW    AND     ADMINISTRATIVE 
COURTS 

Berthelemy,  H.     Traite  elementaire  de  droit  ad- 
ministrate (7th  ed.,  191 3). 
[440] 


APPENDIX   I 

Brugere,  R.  Conseil  d'Etat:  son  -personnel,  evo- 
lution, tendances  (1910).  Most  detailed  de- 
scription of  the  highest  administrative  court. 

Chardon,  H.  U Administration  de  la  France:  les 
fonctionnaires  (1908),  pages  385-407. 

Combarieu,  A.  Traite  de  procedure  administra- 
tive devant  les  conseils  de  prefecture. 

Dicey,  A.  V.  The  Lazo  of  the  Constitution  (8th 
ed.  191 5).  Chapter  XII  gives  a  clear  state- 
ment of  the  outstanding  features  of  French 
administrative  law. 

Duguit,  Leon.  "The  French  Administrative 
Courts"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol. 
XXIX,  pages  385-407. 

Garner,  J.  W.  "Judicial  Control  of  Administra- 
tive and  Legislative  Acts  in  France,"  American 
Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  IX,  pages  637— 
665. 

Goodnow,  Frank  J.  Comparative  Administrative 
Law  (2  vols.,  1893). 

Hauriou,  M.  Precis  de  droit  administratif  (8th 
ed.,  191 4;   and  9th  ed.,  19 19). 

Kellersohn,  M.  Des  Effets  de  Vannullation  pour 
exces  de  pouvoir  (191 5). 

Rolland,  L.  " Le  Conseil  d'£tat  et  les  reglements 
d' administration  publique"  Revue  du  droit 
public,  April-June,  191 1. 

I.    the  ordinary  courts 
American  Law  Review,  Vol.  XLVII  (191 3),  pages 
H3-I52>  300-312,  458-469>  790-795-     "*** 

[44l] 


APPENDIX   I 

Docket"  gives  a  highly  interesting  description 
of  French  criminal  procedure  as  contrasted 
with  American. 

Chardon,  H.  U  Administration  de  la  France:  les 
fonctionnaires  (1908).  By  far  the  best  non- 
technical work  on  the  judiciary. 

Claretie,  G.  Drames  et  comedies  judiciaires  (2 
vols.,  1909-1910).  Useful  as  illustrating 
actual  procedure  in  the  courts. 

Coumoul,  Jules.  Traite  du  pouvoir  judiciaire 
(2d  ed.,  191 1).  Mainly  occupied  with  the 
discussion  of  proposed  reforms. 

Courcelle,  L.  Repertoire  de  police  administra- 
tive et  judiciaire  (2  vols.,  1899). 

Fosdick,  R.  B.     European  Police  Systems  (191 5). 

Garner,  J.  W.  "Criminal  Procedure  in  France  " 
Tale  Law  Review,  Vol.  XXV,  pages  255-284. 
A  detailed  study  with  numerous  references  to 
French  authorities. 

Irwell,  L.  "The  Judicial  System  of  France" 
Green  Bag,  November,  1902. 

La  Police  en  France  (191 3).  A  government 
publication. 

J.      ELECTIONS 

Baudouin,  F.  Loi  du  29  Juillet,  IQ13,  sur  la 
liberte  du  vote,  commentee  (1914). 

Coville.     Le  Contentieux  de  l'election  (1909). 

Dalloz.  Manuel  electoral  (1910).  A  model 
presentation,  accurate,  documented,  and 
simple  enough  to  be  understood  by  the  ordi- 
[442] 


APPENDIX   I 

nary  voter.  In  view  of  the  new  legislation 
of  1913,  1914,  and  1919,  it  requires  (and  may 
already  have  had)  complete  revision. 

Garner,  J.  W.  "Electoral  Reform  in  France" 
American  Political  Science  Review,  Vol.  VII, 
pages  610-638. 

Gasser,  H.  Manuel  des  elections  politique*  (1914). 
Includes  the  electoral  laws  of  191 3  and  1914. 

Petitjean,  T.  La  Representation  proportionelle 
devant  les  chambres  francaises  (191 5).  A 
comprehensive  study  of  the  movement 
towards  proportional  representation.  All  im- 
portant literature  on  the  subject  (and  a  great 
deal  has  been  written)  will  be  found  listed 
in  a  bibliography. 

Pierre,  E.  Traite,  cited  under  "A."  The  sup- 
plement of  1914  contains  the  election  laws 
of  1913  and  1914. 

Rabany,  Charles.  Guide  generale  des  elections 
(2d  ed.,  191 2).  Refers  particularly  to 
municipal  elections. 


K.      PARLIAMENTARY   PROCEDURE 

Jeze,  Gaston.     Le  Budget  (1910). 

Journal  officiel  de  la  Republique  jrancaise.  Re- 
ports of  the  proceedings  in  Senate  and 
Chamber. 

Moreau  et  Delpech.  Les  Reglements  des  as- 
semblies legislatives  (2  vols.,  1906).  The 
rules  of  procedure  have  been  greatly  modified 

[443] 


APPENDIX   I 

(especially  in  191 5)  since  the  publication  of 
this  work. 

Moye,  M.  Precis  elementaire  de  legislation  finan- 
cier e  (191 7). 

Onimus,  J.     Questions  et  interpellations  (1906). 

Pierre,  E.  Traite,  cited  under  "A."  This  is 
the  standard  work  on  parliamentary  pro- 
cedure. 

Poudre  et  Pierre.  Traite  pratique  de  droit 
parlementaire  (8  vols.,  1 878-1 880).  Pro- 
cedure has  been  greatly  modified  since  the 
appearance  of  this  work. 

Pollet,  J.  La  Presidence  des  chambres  fran- 
caises  (1908). 

Ripert,  Henri.  La  Presidence  des  assemblies 
politiques  (1908). 

Stourm,  Rene.     Le  Budget  (7th  ed.,  1913). 

The  Budget  (translation,  191 7). 

L.       LOCAL    GOVERNMENT 

Artigues,  G.     Le  Regime  municipal  de  la  ville  de 

Paris  (1898). 
Ashley,  P.  W.  L.     Local  and  Central  Government 

(1906). 
Block,  M.     Dictionnaire  de  V administration  fran- 

caise    (2   vols.,    5th   ed.,    1905;     supplement 

1907). 
Bonneau,  Georges.     Manuel  pratique  des  maires 

et  des  conseillers  municipaux  (2d  ed.,  1913). 

A  concise  and  intelligible  statement  of  the 

powers  and  duties  of  these  officials. 
[444] 


APPENDIX   I 

Bouffet  et  Perier.     Traite  du  departement  (2 

vols.,  1 894-1 895). 
Bouvier,  E.     Les  Regies  municipales  (1910). 
Dalem,  L.     Des  votes  de  recours  contres  les  deli- 
berations des  conseils  municipaux  (1904). 
Dethan,  G.     De  ['Organisation  des  conseils  gene- 

raux  (1889). 
Croissy,  T.  de.     Dictionnaire  municipal  (2  vols., 

1903). 
Des  Celleuls.     U Administration  parisienne  sous 

la  troisieme  Repubhque  (1910). 
Garner,     J.     W.     "Administrative     Reform    in 

France,"  American  Political  Science  Review », 

Vol.  XIII,  pages  17-46. 
Hennessey,  Jean.     La  Reorganisation  adminis- 
trative de  la  France  (191 9). 
Lappin,   B.     Le  Self-government  local  en  France 

(1909). 
Maitre,    E.     Organisation   municipale   de   Paris 

(1909). 
Morgand,    L.  La  Loi  municipale  (7th  ed.,  2  vols., 

1907).     A  commentary  on  the  code  of  1884. 
Munro,    W.    B.     The    Government    of  European 

cities  (1909).     This  is  the  standard  work  in 

English.     Consult    the    bibliography,    pages 

380-389. 
Nectoux,    A.     Des    Attributions    des    conseillers 

generaux. 
Rabany,     C.     Guide    generale    des    elections    et 

specialement   des    elections    municipales    (2d 

ed.,  1912). 

[445] 


APPENDIX   I 

Shaw,  Albert.  Municipal  government  in  Con- 
tinental Europe  (1897).  In  this,  as  in  other 
writings,  Dr.  Shaw  shows  that  rare  capacity 
to  combine  scholarly  instincts  and  a  grasp  of 
detail  with  a  free  and  lucid  style. 

M.       COLONIES 

Data  in  compact  form  regarding  area,  popula- 
tion, government,  etc.,  will  be  found  in  the 
Statesman's  Tear-Book  and  the  Encyclopedia 
Britannic  a. 

Aynard,  R.     VCEuvre  franc ais  en  Algerie  (1913). 
Broissard,  C.     La  France  et  ses  colonies  (6  vols., 

1 900-1 906). 
Buisson,  H.     Notre  Empire  colonial  (1910). 
Fallex,  E.     La  France  et  ses  colonies  au  debut 

du  vingtieme  siecle  (191 1). 
Humbert,    C.     VCEuvre   francais    aux    colonies 

(1913)- 
Merignhac.     Precis  de  legislation  et  d'economie 

coloniale  (191 2). 
Piquet,  V.     La  Colonisation  francaise  (191 2). 


[446] 


APPENDIX  II 

PRIME   MINISTERS  OF   FRANCE    UNDER  THE 
CONSTITUTION    OF    1875  x 

PRESIDENCY   OF   MARSHAL   MACMAHON 

March  9,  1876  Jules  Dufaure 

Dec.  12,  1876.  Jules  Simon 

May  17,  1877.  Due  de  Broglie 

Nov.  23,  1877.  General  de  Rochebouet 

Dec.  13,  1877.  Jules  Dufaure 

PRESIDENCY    OF   JULES    GREVY 

Feb.  4,  1879.  William  Henry  Waddington 

Dec.  28,  1879.  Charles  de  Freycinet 

Sept.  23,  1880.  Jules  Ferry 

Nov.  14,  1 88 1.  Leon  Gambetta 

Jan.  30,  1882.  Charles  de  Freycinet 

Aug.  7,  1882.  Eugene  Duclerc 

Jan.  29,  1883.  Armand  Fallieres 

Feb.  21,  1883.  Jules  Ferry 

April  6,  1885.  Henri  Brisson 

Jan.  7,  1886.  Charles  de  Freycinet 

Dec.  11,  1886.  Rene  Goblet 

May  30,  1887.  Maurice  Rouvier 

1  For  the  personnel  of  the  cabinets  see:  Publication  de  la 
tociete  d'bistoire  moderne:  les  ministeres  francais  1789- 
1909  (1910);  Annuaire  du  Parlementy  Vol.  VII  (cabinets 
from  1871  to  1908)  and  Vol.  X  (cabinets  from  1900  to  1913). 

[447] 


APPENDIX   II 


PRESIDENCY   OF    SADI   CARNOT 

Dec.  12,  1887.  Pierre  Emmanuel  Tirard 

April  3,  1888.  Charles  Floquet 

Feb.  22,  1889.  Pierre  Emmanuel  Tirard 

Mar.  17,  1890.  Charles  de  Freycinet 

Feb.  27,  1892.  Emile  Loubet 

Dec.  6,  1892.  Alexandre  Ribot 

Jan.  11,  1893.  Alexandre  Ribot 

April  4,  1893.  Charles  Dupuy 

Dec.  3,  1893.  Jean  Casimir-Perier 

May  30,  1894.  Charles  Dupuy 

PRESIDENCY   OF   JEAN    CASIMIR-PERIER 

July  1,  1894.  Charles  Dupuy 

PRESIDENCY   OF   FELIX   FAURE 

Jan.  26,  1895.  Alexandre  Ribot 

Nov.  1,  1895.  Leon  Bourgeois 

April  29,  1896.  Jules  Meline 

June  28,  1898.  Henri  Brisson 

Nov.  1,  1898.  Charles  Dupuy 

PRESIDENCY   OF    EMILE    LOUBET 

Feb.  18,  1899.  Charles  Dupuy 

June  22,  1899.  Rene  Waldeck-Rousseau 

June  7,  1902.  Emile  Combes 

Jan.  24,  1905.  Maurice  Rouvier 


[448] 


APPENDIX   II 
PRESIDENCY   OF   ARMAND   FALLIERES 

Feb.  18,  1906.       Maurice  Rouvier 
Mar.  14,  1906.       Ferdinand  Sarrien 
Oct.  25,  1906.        Georges  Clemenceau 
July  23,  1909.       Aristide  Briand 
Mar.  2,  191 1.        Ernest  Monis 
July  27,  191 1.        Joseph  Caillaux 
Jan.  13,  1912.        Raymond  Poincare 
Jan.  21,  1913.        Aristide  Briand 

PRESIDENCY  OF    RAYMOND    POINCARE 

Feb.  18,  1913.       Aristide  Briand 
Mar.  21,  1913.      Louis  Barthou 

Dec.  2,  1913.  Gaston  Doumergue 

June  9,  1914.  Alexandre  Ribot 

June  13,  1914.  Rene  Viviani 

Aug.  26,  1914.  Rene  Viviani 

Oct.  29,  1915.  Aristide  Briand 

Mar.  19,  1917.  Alexandre  Ribot 

Sept.  10,  1917.  Paul  Painleve 

Nov.  15,  1917.  Georges  Clemenceau 

Jan.  20,  1920.  Alexandre  Millerand 

PRESIDENCY  OF    PAUL    DESCHANEL 

Feb.  18,  1920.  Alexandre  Millerand 


L*449] 


APPENDIX  III 

ACT  TO  AMEND  THE  ORGANIC  LAWS  ON 
ELECTION  OF  DEPUTIES  AND  TO  ESTAB- 
LISH scrutin  de  liste  with  propor- 
tional  REPRESENTATION 

Promulgated  12  July,  iqiq 

1.  Members  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  shall 
be  elected  by  departmental  general  ticket. 

2.  Each  department  shall  elect  one  deputy  for 
every  75,000  inhabitants  of  French  nationality, 
a  remainder  exceeding  37,500  giving  the  right  to 
an  additional  deputy. 

Each  department  shall  elect  at  least  three 
deputies. 

Provisionally  and  until  a  new  census  has  been 
taken  each  department  shall  have  the  same  num- 
ber of  seats  [in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies]  as  at 
present. 

3.  Each  department  shall  form  a  single  elec- 
toral area.  Provided  that  when  the  number  of 
deputies  to  be  elected  by  a  department  is  greater 
than  six  the  department  may  be  divided  into 
electoral  areas  each  of  which  shall  be  entitled  to 
elect  at  least  three  deputies.  Such  division  shall 
be  enacted  by  law. 

Notwithstanding   the   foregoing    provision   the 
departments  of  the  Nord,  the  Pas  de  Calais,  the 
[450] 


APPENDIX   III 

Aisne,  the  Somme,  the  Marne,  the  Ardennes,  the 
Meurthe-et-Moselle  and  the  Vosges  shall  not  be 
divided  for  the  next  election. 

4.  No  person  can  be  a  candidate  in  more  than 
one  electoral  area,  and  the  law  of  17  July,  1889, 
relating  to  multiple  candidatures  shall  apply  to 
elections  under  this  Act;  declarations  of  candi- 
dature may  nevertheless  be  either  individual  or 
collective. 

5.  Lists  are  constituted  for  any  particular 
electoral  area  by  groups  of  candidates  who  sign 
a  legally  authenticated  declaration. 

Declarations  of  candidature  shall  indicate  the 
order  in  which  candidates  are  presented. 

If  the  declarations  of  candidature  are  presented 
on  separate  sheets  they  must  specify  the  candi- 
dates in  conjunction  with  whom  the  signatory  or 
signatories  stand  and  who  agree  by  joint  and  duly 
authenticated  declaration  to  put  the  names  of  the 
signatories  on  the  same  list  as  their  own. 

A  list  shall  not  include  a  number  of  candidates 
greater  than  the  number  of  deputies  to  be  elected 
in  the  electoral  area.  An  individual  candidature 
shall  be  considered  as  forming  a  separate  list.  In 
such  case  the  declaration  of  candidature  shall  be 
supported  by  one  hundred  electors  of  the  electoral 
area,  whose  signatures  shall  be  authenticated  and 
shall  not  be  used  in  support  of  more  than  one 
candidature. 

6.  The  lists  shall  be  deposited  at  the  prefec- 
ture  after  the   commencement   of  the   electoral 

[45i] 


APPENDIX   III 

period  and  at  latest  five  days  before  the  day  of 
the  election. 

The  list  and  the  title  of  the  list  shall  be  regis- 
tered by  the  prefecture. 

Registration  shall  be  refused  to  any  list  bear- 
ing more  names  than  there  are  deputies  to  elect 
or  bearing  the  name  of  any  candidate  belonging 
to  another  list  already  registered  in  the  electoral 
area  unless  such  candidate  has  previously  with- 
drawn his  name  in  accordance  with  the  procedure 
laid  down  in  Article  Seven. 

Registration  shall  be  accorded  only  to  the 
names  of  candidates  who  have  made  a  declara- 
tion in  conformity  with  the  terms  of  Articles 
Four  and  Five. 

A  provisional  acknowledgment  of  the  deposit  of 
a  list  shall  be  given  to  each  of  the  candidates  who 
compose  it. 

The  definite  receipt  shall  be  delivered  within 
the  next  twenty-four  hours. 

7.  A  candidate  inscribed  upon  a  list  cannot  be 
struck  oflF  unless  he  notifies  the  prefecture  of  his 
desire  to  withdraw  by  statutory  declaration  {par 
exploit  d'huissier)  five  days  before  the  day  of  the 
election. 

8.  Vacancies  on  any  list  may  be  filled  at  latest 
five  days  before  the  day  of  the  election  by  the 
names  of  new  candidates  who  make  the  declara- 
tion of  candidature  prescribed  by  Article  Five. 

9.  Two  days  before  the  commencement  of  the 
poll   the   prefectoral   authorities   shall   cause  the 

[452] 


APPENDIX   III 

registered  candidatures  to  be  posted  on  the  doors 
of  the  polling-places. 

10.  Any  candidate  who  obtains  an  absolute 
majority  shall  be  declared  elected  provided  that 
the  number  of  seats  to  be  filled  is  not  exceeded.1 
Any  seats  that  remain  to  be  filled  shall  be  allotted 
in  accordance  with  the  following  procedure: 

The  electoral  quota  shall  be  determined  by  divid- 
ing the  number  of  voters  (excluding  blank  or 
spoiled  ballots)  by  the  number  of  deputies  to  be 
elected. 

The  average  for  each  list  shall  be  determined  by 
dividing  by  the  number  of  its  candidates  the  total 
number  of  votes  which  they  have  obtained. 


1  The  proviso  contained  in  the  last  words  of  this  paragraph 
becomes  necessary  owing  to  the  fact  that  each  voter  has  as 
many  votes  as  there  are  deputies  to  be  elected,  and  that  cross- 
voting  (panacbage)  is  permitted.  Thus  the  following  might 
be  the  result  of  an  election  of  five  deputies  by  10,000  voters. 
The  absolute  majority  is  5001.  Two  lists  are  presented  with 
candidates  A,  B,  C,  D,  E,  and  P,  Q,  R,  S,  T,  respectively,  and 
the  voting  is  as  shown: 


10,000  voters 

Votes  received  by  candidates 

(by  groups) 

A 

B 

C   D   E 

P   Q    R 

S 

T 

Group  of  4900 

100 

"     4600 

400 

49O0 
100 

100 

4900 
100 

80 

4900  4900  4900 
100  100  

60   40  1 20 

40   30   20 
4600  4600  4600 
400  400  400 

10 

4600 

400 

4600 

Totals.  .10,000  5100 

5080 

5060  5040  5020 

5040  5030  5020 

5010 

4.600 

Thus  nine  candidates  out  of  ten  can,  if  there  is  cross- 
voting,  receive  an  "absolute  majority,"  even  though  there 
are  only  five  seats  to  distribute. 

[453] 


APPENDIX    III 

To  each  list  shall  be  allotted  a  number  of  seats 
equal  to  the  number  of  times  which  its  average 
contains  the  electoral  quota. 

The  remaining  seats,  if  any,  shall  be  allotted  to 
the  list  with  the  highest  average. 

Within  each  list  the  seats  obtained  shall  be 
allotted  to  the  candidates  who  have  received  most 
votes. 

ii.  An  independent  candidate,  provided  that 
he  has  not  obtained  an  absolute  majority  of  the 
votes,  shall  not  be  eligible  for  allotment  of  a  seat 
until  the  candidates  belonging  to  other  lists  who 
have  obtained  more  votes  than  he  has  obtained 
shall  have  been  declared  elected. 

12.  In  case  of  equality  of  votes  the  eldest 
candidate  shall  be  elected. 

If  more  lists  than  one  have  an  equal  title  to  a 
seat,  the  seat  is  allotted  to  that  one  of  the  candi- 
dates eligible  who  has  received  most  votes  or,  in 
case  of  equality  of  votes,  to  the  eldest  candidate. 
A  candidate  shall  not  be  declared  elected  unless 
the  number  of  votes  obtained  by  him  exceeds 
half  the  average  of  the  votes  of  the  list  to  which 
he  belongs. 

13.  When  the  number  of  voters  is  not  greater 
than  half  the  number  of  registered  electors  or  if 
no  list  has  obtained  the  electoral  quota,  no  can- 
didate shall  be  declared  elected,  and  the  electors 
of  the  area  shall  be  summoned  to  a  new  election 
two  weeks  later.  If  at  this  new  election  no  list 
obtains   the  electoral   quota,   the  seats   shall   be 

[454] 


APPENDIX   III 

assigned   to  the  candidates  who  have  received 
most  votes. 

14.  The  reports  on  the  proceedings  at  the  elec- 
tion in  each  commune  shall  be  prepared  in  dupli- 
cate. One  copy  shall  be  deposited  at  the  secre- 
tariat of  the  town  hall;  the  other  shall  be  at  once 
posted  under  sealed  cover  addressed  to  the  pre- 
fect for  transmission  to  the  canvassing  board. 

15.  The  votes  shall  be  counted  for  each  elec- 
toral area  at  the  chief  town  of  the  department  in 
public  session  at  latest  on  the  Wednesday  follow- 
ing the  day  of  the  poll.  The  operation  shall  be 
performed  by  a  board  composed  of  the  president 
of  the  district  court  (as  chairman)  and  the  four 
members  of  the  general  council,  not  being  candi- 
dates at  the  election,  who  have  longest  held 
office.  In  case  of  equal  length  of  office  the  eldest 
shall  be  appointed. 

If  the  president  of  the  district  court  is  unable 
to  serve,  his  place  shall  be  filled  by  the  vice-presi- 
dent and  failing  him  by  the  senior  judge.  In  case 
of  inability  to  serve  the  places  of  the  members  of 
the  general  council  shall  be  filled  by  other  mem- 
bers of  the  same  body  in  order  of  seniority. 

The  operations  of  the  count  shall  be  recorded 
in  a  report. 

16.  In  case  of  a  vacancy  through  death,  resig- 
nation, or  otherwise  an  election  shall  take  place 
within  a  period  of  three  months  counting  from 
the  day  on  which  the  vacancy  took  place. 

17.  Vacancies  occurring  within  the  six  months 

[455] 


APPENDIX   III 

preceding  the  next  general  election  of  the  Cham- 
ber shall  not  be  filled. 

1 8.  The  present  Act  shall  apply  to  the  de- 
partments of  Algeria  and  to  the  colonies  which 
shall  retain  their  present  number  of  deputies. 

Further  legislation  shall  make  provision  for  the 
application  of  the  present  Act  to  the  territory  of 
Belfort  and  for  the  organization  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine. 

19.  Any  previous  legislation  conflicting  with 
the  present  Act  is  hereby  repealed. 


[4561 


INDEX 


Accounts,  court  of,  233-234 

Accounts,  law  of,  234 

Accusation  chamber,  415 

Action  Liberale  Populaire, 
founded  (1902),  333,  340; 
organization  and  program, 
340-344;  favors  judicial 
control,  23,  342;  joins  bloc 
(19 19),  322-324;  in  elec- 
tions of  1902,  296  rc;  of 
1910,309712;  of  1914,3 16; 
of  19 19,  325-326.  See  also 
Rallies 

Action,  Republican  and  So- 
cial (1919),  325 

Adjoints  (deputies  of  mayor), 
no  salary,  263 ;  how  chosen, 
260,  264;  number,  263: 
relations  with  mayor,  264 

Adjournment.  See  Parlia- 
ment 

Adjuncts.     See  Adjoints 

Administration,  Chapter  IV 
passim;  defects  in,  98-99, 
102.  See  also  Courts,  Ad- 
ministrative; Council  of 
State;  Prefectoral  Coun- 
cil 

Administrative  Courts.  See 
Courts,  administrative 


Algeciras  Conference,  307 

Algeria,  279 

Alliance,  Democratic-Repub- 
lican. See  Democratic-Re- 
publican party 

Alliance,  Dual,  291 

Alliance,  Triple,  279 

Alsace-Lorraine,  incorporated 
in  France,  125  n,  245;  Sen- 
ators from  (14),  125;  depu- 
ties from  (24),  166 

Amendments.  See  Constitu- 
tion 

Andre,  General,  79,  300,  301 

Annam,  279 

Anti-clerical  legislation.  See 
Church  and  state 

Appeal,  Court  of,  401-402 

Appeals,  criminal,  420 

Army,  affected  by  Dreyfus 
affair,  293;  disorganiza- 
tion, 301;  two-year  service, 
300-301;  three-year  serv- 
ice, 314,  317-318;  Caillaux 
and,  312-313.  See  also 
Military  service 

Arrest,  freedom  from,  170 

Arrondissement,  council  of, 
in  election  of  senators,  127, 
244;    as  local  government 

[  457  ] 


INDEX 


unit,  244;  as  judicial  dis- 
trict, 400 

Assembly,  National.  See  Na- 
tional Assembly 

Assizes,  Court  of,  402-404, 
416-420;  criticized,  402; 
acts  in  civil  cases,  403 

Associations  Law,  296,  312 

Audit  of  accounts,  233-234 

Austria-Hungary,  279 

Augagneur,  Victor,  Socialist, 
303 

Ballottage,  163-165,  259 
Ballot,  form,   177;    distribu- 
tion, 177,  178;   state  print- 
ing of,  177-178;   secrecy  in 
voting,  178-179 
Barthelemy,  Joseph,  on  presi- 
dency, 62-63;    on  subordi- 
nation of  cabinet,  89 
Barthou,  Louis,  Democratic- 
Republican,       289,       347; 
premier,  135,314;  Radical- 
Socialists  oppose,  314;   and 
Federation   of  Lefts,   352; 
quoted,  77,  228,  349,  350, 
352,  425,  427 
Belfort,  Territory  of,  245 
Belleville  Program,  273,  276, 

330 

Bench.     See  Judges 

Benoist,  Charles,  quoted,  334, 
376 

Bergson,  Henri,  371 

Berthelemy,  H.,  on  sub- 
prefects,  244-245 

[458] 


Bloc,  anti-clerical  Republican 
(1899-1905),  374,  375;  ef- 
fect on  interpellations,  241; 
supports  Waldeck- Rous- 
seau, 295;  operates  through 
Delegation  of  the  Lefts, 
297>  3°8>  309  n;  dissolu- 
tion, 299,  316,  375;  Rad- 
ical-Socialist party  and, 
354,  356;  reconstitution 
urged,    356,    376-378 

Bloc,  National  Republican 
(1919),  321,  353,  375  n  7, 
379;  composition,  322-324; 
program,  323-324;  church 
and,  323-324;  A.L.  P.  and, 
323-324;  Radical-Social- 
ists and,  324;  effect  on 
elections,  325-326 

Board,  election,  179 

Bolshevism,  319,  321,  375  n, 

379 

Bonaparte,  Pierre,  404 

Bonapartists.  See  Imperial- 
ists 

Bordeaux  Compact,  8 

Boxer  expedition,  41 

Boulanger,  General,  154,  167, 
168;  army  career,  282- 
2S3;  minister  of  war,  283; 
singular  alliances,  283-284; 
success  in  elections,  284; 
collapse,  285 

Bourgeois,  Leon,  senator,  125, 
133;  premier,  289;  conflict 
with  Senate,  82-83,  :35J 
opposes    proportional   rep- 


INDEX 


reservation,  159  n;  opposes 
Socialists,  289 

Briand,  Aristide,  Independ- 
ent Socialist,  303;  joins 
Democratic  -  Republican 
party,  347,  354;  rejoins 
Socialists,  362  n;  premier 
(1909-1911),  309-312;  re- 
signs, 313;  premier  (1913), 
313;  premier  (1915-1917), 
72,  318-319;  minister  of 
justice,  313;  cabinet  de- 
feated in  Senate,  84;  pro- 
portional representation 
bill,  126,  130,  135,  157; 
shapes  Separation  Law, 
299,  303;  policy  of  con- 
ciliation, 310-311,357,  375; 
and  Federation  of  the  Lefts, 
316,  351-352 

Brisson,  Henri,  197,  202,  203, 
220,  241,  277,  294 

Broglie,  Due  de,  premier,  9, 
51,  275;  resigns,  275;  in 
elections  of  1877,  150  n 

Budget,  national.  See  Money 
bills 

Budget,  communal,  261-263 

Bureau  of  officers  in  Cham- 
ber, 195  et  seq. 

Bureaux  of  civil  service,  no 
etseq.;  of  party  groups,  209; 
of  Chamber,  181,  207-208 


Cabinet.         See    Ministers, 
Council  of 


Cabinet  (in  national  minis- 
tries), 107-109 

Caillaux,  Joseph,  minister  of 
finance,  312,  314-315;  pre- 
mier, 228,  312-313;  and 
Socialism,  313;  discredited 
re  Morocco,  313;  and 
Rochette  scandal,  315; 
charged  with  treason,  324; 
convicted  on  lesser  charge, 
143  n 

Campaign,  election,  173-174. 
See  also  Elections 

Canton,  244,  399 

Card,  electoral,  175-176 

Carnot,  Adolphe,  321 

Carnot,  Sadi,  career,  39; 
President,  282;  influence, 
64;  assassination,  32,  37, 
289 

Case  law,  411-414;  none  in 
France,  412;  merits  of 
French  system,  414 

Casimir-Perier,  Jean  Paul,  a 
moderate,  289;  career,  39, 
108,  290;  president  of 
Chamber,  202,  203;  pre- 
mier, 203;  President,  290; 
resigns  Presidency,  32,  37, 
53,  58,  290;  on  Presidency, 
61 

Cassation,  Court  of,  404-405, 
420;  tenure  of  judges,  408; 
and  constitution,  21-22 

Caucus,  for  nominating  Presi- 
dent, 34-35 

Center,  Left,  273,  276 

[459] 


INDEX 


Centralization,  101-102,  246 
etseq.y  342,  349 

Chamber  of  Deputies,  disso- 
lution of,  60-61,  134-135, 
171-172;  ministers  respon- 
sible to,  81  et  seq.;  Senate 
attracts  deputies,  133-134; 
impeachments,  49,  80-81, 
1  4  1  -  1  4  3;  composition, 
Chapter  VI  passim;  elec- 
tion by  district  ticket,  146- 
152;  deputies  dependent 
on  districts,  148-150;  gen- 
eral ticket,  153-155;  pro- 
portional representation, 
155  et  seq.;  endorsed  by 
Chamber  (1909),  157;  bill 
passed  (1912),  158-159; 
law  of  1919,  160-163;  size 
(626  members),  165-166; 
nominations,  166  et  seq.; 
qualifications,  169;  privi- 
leges, 170;  salary,  171; 
term,  171;  term  extended 
by  law,  172;  elections,  q.  v.; 
election  returns  examined, 
181-183;  procedure,  Chap- 
ter VII  passim;  reforms  in, 
90;  daily  sittings,  188  et 
seq.;  secret  sittings,  189- 
190;  order  of  the  day,  190- 
192;  interior  arrangements, 
192-194;  seating  of  groups, 
192  and  193  n;  speaking 
from  tribune,  193,  216; 
oratory,  194,  216;  bureaux 
examine  election  returns, 
[460] 


181,  342,  346;  bureau  of  of- 
ficers, 195  et  seq.;  how 
chosen,  196-197;  proceed- 
ings, how  reported,  195  w; 
rules,  198  et  seq.;  mainte- 
nance of  order,  199-201; 
committees,  204-212;  leg- 
islative procedure,  212  et 
seq.;  debate,  215-217; 
closure,  217;  quorum,  217- 
218;  pairing  not  allowed, 
218  w;  methods  of  voting, 
219-222.  See  also  Bureau, 
Bureaux,  Committees  of 
Chamber,  Elections, 
Groups,  Parties,  President 
of  Chamber,  Proportional 
Representation 

Chambord,  Count  of,  4,  5, 
339;  Frohsdorf  interview, 
9;  manifesto  of  1873,9-10; 
and  church,  274 

Chardon,  Henri,  on  jury  sys- 
tem, 402-403;  on  local 
police,  425 

Church  and  state,  Gambetta 
quoted,  274;  war  on  Italy 
urged,  274;  Ferry's  anti- 
clerical legislation,  278;  ef- 
fect of  Dreyfus  affair,  293- 
294;  Associations  Law 
(1901),  295;  Combes  and 
church,  297-299;  separa- 
tion of  church  and  state, 
299;  elections  (1906)  sup- 
port this  policy,  299;  eva- 
sion   of    law,    312;     elec- 


INDEX 


tions  of  19 19  favorable  to 
church,  325;  attitude 
towards  church,  of  Royal- 
ists, 337;  of  A.  L.  P., 
340;  of  Republican  Fed- 
eration, 346;  of  Demo- 
cratic -  Republican  party, 
349;  of  Radical-Social- 
ists, 357;  of  Freemasons, 
361.  See  also  Orders,  re- 
ligious;   Schools 

City  government.  See  Com- 
munes 

Civil  courts.  See  Courts, 
ordinary 

Civil  service,  Chapter  IV 
passim;  directors,  109- 
110;  bureaux,  no  et  seq.; 
merit  system  in  central 
services,  m-114;  in  ex- 
terior services,  114;  pen- 
sions, 113-114;  favoritism, 
116-117;  low  salaries,  113, 
117-118;  syndicalism,  106- 
107,  1 19-122,  362;  pre- 
fect's appointing  power, 
249;  communal  services, 
267-268,  270-271 

Civil  tribunal.  See  District 
Court 

Class-struggle,  355,  364-365 

Clementel,  92 

Clericalism.  See  Church  and 
state 

Clemenceau,  Georges,  loses 
seat  in  Chamber,  286;  in 
Senate,  125,  133;    premier 


(1906-1909),  91,  157,  160, 
277,  308-309;  again  (1917- 
1920),  319;  vigorous  lead- 
ership, 319;  not  chosen 
President,  34  n,  67 
Closure  in  Chamber,  217 
Cochin  (Royalist),  in  Briand 

cabinet,  319 
College,  electoral,  for  choos- 
ing senators,  127-130 
Colonies,  seats  in  Senate,  127; 

acquisition  of,  279 
Codified  law,  411-414 
Combes,  Emile,  in  Senate, 
125;  premier  (1902-1905), 
91,  131,  202,  241;  anti- 
clerical policy,  278,  297- 
298;  pacifist  views,  300; 
democratizes  army,  301; 
resigns,  301;  urges  recon- 
stitution  of  the  bloc,  356, 

376-377 
Commerce  Court,  405-406 
Commissioners    to    assist    in 

debate,  71 
Committees  of  Chamber,  help 
fix  order  of  the  day,  191; 
importance  of,  204-205; 
formerly  special  and  tem- 
porary, 205;  permanent 
now,  206;  old  method  of 
election,  207;  present 
method,  208-210;  relations 
with  cabinet,  204-205,  210- 
212,  226-227;  proceedings 
regulated,  212;  considera- 
tion of  bills,  214;    report 

[461] 


INDEX 


of  bills,  215;  work  on  bud- 
get, 225-228 

Communes,  varying  size,  255; 
uniform  government,  255- 
266;  council,  256-264; 
council  and  election  of 
senators,  127-130;  mayor, 
263-267;  adjoints,  263- 
264;  police,  268,  423-427; 
civil  service,  267-268,  270- 
271;  government  of  Paris, 
268-271.  See  also  Coun- 
cil, communal;   Mayor 

Concentration,  102,  247 

Concentration  cabinets,  281- 
282 

Concordat,  298 

Conflicts,  Court  of,  396 

Congo,  279 

Congregations,  religious.  See 
Orders,  religious 

Conservatives.    See  Royalists 

Conspiracy  against  state, 
141-143,  143  n,  324 

Constitution,  committee  of 
National  Assembly  drafts, 
11;  Wallon  amendment, 
11;  adopted  by  assembljr, 
11-12;  abstract  of  its  pro- 
visions, 13-15;  peculiari- 
ties, 15  et  seq.;  based  on 
compromise,  16;  force  of 
precedent  under  it,  17  et 
seq.;  courts  and  constitu- 
tion, 21-26,  342,  346;  case 
of  Le  National,  21-22; 
method  of  amendment,  26- 

[4623 


29;  amendments,  29-30; 
provisions  re  money  bills, 
137-138;  attitude  of  A.  L. 
P.  towards,  342;  of  Re- 
publican Federation,  346 

Contraventions,  399 

Corrupt  practices  in  elections, 
decree  of  1852,  184;  new 
legislation  (1913-1914), 
184-185;  in  local  elections, 

257 

Council:  of  arrondissement, 
see  Arrondissement;  com- 
munal, see  Council,  com- 
munal; of  Experts,  406; 
general,  of  department, 
composition,  253;  powers, 
253-254;  in  senatorial  elec- 
tions, 127,  254:  municipal, 
of  Paris,  269;  prefectoral, 
251;  composition  and  ju- 
risdiction, 385-386;  de- 
cides validity  of  local  elec- 
tions, 257;  proposals  to 
abolish,  386 

Council,  communal,  256,  264; 
no  salary,  263;  size,  256; 
conduct  of  elections,  256- 
260;  election  districts,  259- 
260;  limitations  on  powers, 
260-262;  annual  budget 
before,  262;  suspension  and 
dissolution,  262;  meetings, 
262-263 

Council  of  State,  determines 
validity  of  ordinances,  24- 
25,  47,   397;    decisions  re 


INDEX 


dismissed  employees,  116; 
validity  of  local  elections, 
257;  prevents  gerryman- 
dering, 259  n;  composition, 
387-388;  directors  serve 
on,  no;  tenure,  388;  sal- 
ary* 389;  prestige,  387;  ad- 
visory functions,  389-390; 
original  jurisdiction,  390- 
392;  excess  of  power,  390; 
misapplication  of  power, 
390-391;  injury  through 
public  services,  391-392; 
organization,  judicial  com- 
mittees, 392-394;  pro- 
cedure, 393;  congestion  of 
business,  394;  disputed 
jurisdiction,  395-396;  per- 
sonal fault,  395;  Court  of 
Conflict,  396 
Correctional  Court.  See  Dis- 
trict Court 
Court  of  Accounts,  233-234 
Court  of  Conflicts,  396 
Court  of  First  Instance.     See 

District  Court 
Courts,  administrative,  posi- 
tion in  France,  380  et  seq.; 
described,  385-390.  See  also 
Council  of  State;  Law, 
administrative;  Prefectoral 
council 
Courts,  ordinary,  and  con- 
stitution, 21-26,  342,  346; 
and  executive  power,  395; 
exceptional  cases,  266,  395— 
397;    justice  of  the  peace 


399-400;  District  Court, 
400-401,  414,  415,  421, 
422;  Court  of  Appeal, 
401-402;  Court  of  As- 
sizes, 402-404;  criticism 
of,  402;  acts  in  civil  cases, 
403;  Court  of  Cassation, 
404-405,  408,  420;  Coun- 
cil of  Experts,  406;  Com- 
merce Court,  406-407; 
Court  of  Accounts,  233- 
234;  judges,  407-410;  jury 
system,  402-403,  420-421; 
codes  and  case  law,  41 1-414 

Crime,  prosecution  for,  414- 
420;  examination  of  ac- 
cused, 415;  indictment, 
415-416;  accusation  cham- 
ber, 416;  no  presumption 
of  innocence,  416;  con- 
trast with  American  pro- 
cedure, 413  et  seq.;  rules  of 
evidence,  415-417;  active 
role  of  court,  418;  refusal 
to  testify,  417;  judicial  in- 
terrogation, 417  et  seq.; 
grounds  of  appeal,  420; 
jury,  402-403,  420-421 

Crimes,  399-400 

Criminal  Courts.  See  Courts, 
ordinary 

Dahomey,  41 
Dauphin,  senator,  139 
Debates,  parliamentary.    See 

Legislation;      Proceedings, 

how  reported 

[463] 


INDEX 


Decentralization.  See  Cen- 
tralization 

Deconcentration.  See  Con- 
centration 

Delits,  399,  415 

Democratic-Republican  par- 
ty founded  (1901),  332, 
347;  relations  with  groups 
in  Chamber,  333;  program 
and  organization,  347-351; 
attitude  to  neighboring 
parties,  348,  375;  towards 
church,  349-350;  towards 
Federation  of  the  Lefts, 
352;  importance  since 
1909,  354;  in  elections  of 
1914,  316,  351;  urges  co- 
alition in  1919,  321-322;  in 
elections  of  1919,  325 

Departments,  their  origin, 
245-246;  number,  245; 
unequal  size,  246;  as  elec- 
tion districts,  153-155,  158, 
160,  165-166;  prefect,  247- 
254;  general  council,  253- 
254;  departmental  com- 
mittee, 254.  See  also  Al- 
sace-Lorraine;  Prefect 

Departments,  executive.  See 
Ministries 

Deputies,  Chamber  of.  See 
Chamber  of  Deputies 

Dimnet,  Ernest,  quoted,  281 
n  2,  297,  307-308,  339-340 

Directors.     See  Civil  service 

Dissolution  of  Chamber,  with 
consent  of  Senate,  60-61, 
[464] 


134-135.  171-172;  vital 
factor  in  cabinet  govern- 
ment, 171-172 

District  Court,  400-401,  415, 
422 

District  ticket  (scrutin  d'ar- 
rondissement),  objections 
to,  146-152;  Gambetta's 
criticism,  154.  See  also 
Elections 

Dreyfus  affair,  291-294;  con- 
viction by  court-martial, 
291;  second  conviction, 
292;  rehabilitation,  292- 
293;    political  effects,  293 

Drumont,  author  of  La 
France  juive,  284 

Dual  Alliance,  290-291 

Duguit,  Leon,  quoted,  18, 
20-21,  24-25,  29,  59,  88- 
89,  140,  168,  182,  233,  242. 
388,  391-392 


Education.     See  Schools 

Egypt,  279,  306 

Elections,  1876,  272;  1877, 
274-276;  1881,  280;  1885, 
281;  1889,  285;  1893,  286 
et  seq.;  1898,  172,  294; 
1902,  296  and  n;  1906,  299; 
1910,  157,  309-310  and 
309  n  2\  1914.  316-317; 
1919,  172,  320-326;  Sen- 
ate elections,  131-132; 
Chamber,  Chapter  VI 
passim;     electoral    reform, 


INDEX 


137;  suffrage  qualifica- 
tions, 144-145;  registra- 
tion, 145-146;  district 
ticket  criticized,  146-152; 
administrative  pressure 
under,  150-153,  250,  315- 
316;  general  ticket,  153- 
I5S»  proportional  repre- 
sentation, 155  et  seq.;  law 
of  1889,  167;  law  of  1913, 
178-179;  law  of  1914,  174, 
184-185;  law  of  1919,  146, 
156,  160-163;  electoral 
period,  173;  campaign, 
173-174;  spring  elections, 
172;  Sunday  voting,  174; 
polling-places,  175;  elec- 
toral card,  175-176;  bal- 
lots, 177-178;  secret  vot- 
ing, 137,  178-179;  pro- 
cedure at  the  polls,  178- 
180;  counting  the  vote, 
180;  corrupt  practices, 
183-185;  validity  of  elec- 
tions, 181,  183,  342,  346. 
See  also  Representation, 
proportional 

Elections,  communal,  256- 
260 

Elections,  second  (ballottages), 
163-165 

Electoral  period,  173 

England,  279,  306-307,  367, 
370  et  seq.,  380  et  seq. 

Entente  Cordiale,  306-307 

Entente,  Democratic-Repub- 
lican (1919),  325 


Esmein,  A.,  quoted,  21,  87- 
88,96 

Esterhazy,  Major,  and  Drey- 
fus affair,  292 

Excess  of  power,  390 

Experts,  Council  of,  406 


Faguet,  £mile,  89 
Fallieres,  Armand,  career,  39; 
President,     32,     302;      no 
personal    policy,    55;     not 
candidate     for     reelection, 
38;  premier,  91 
Fault,  personal,  395-396 
Fault  of  service,  395-396 
Faure,     Felix,     career,     39; 
President,  290;  visits  Rus- 
sia, 290;    dies  in  office,  37, 

295 
Federation     of     the     Lefts, 
founded   (1913),   333,   351; 
program,   352;    election  of 
1914,  316;    disappearance, 

353 

Felonies  (crimes),  399,  415 

Ferry,  Jules,  28,  273;  pre- 
mier, 91;  anti-clerical  leg- 
islation, 278;  colonial  ex- 
pansion under,  279;  not 
chosen  President,  35,  282 

Finance,  minister  of,  prepares 
budget,  223-224;  presents 
it  to  Chamber,  224;  leads 
in  budget  debates,  228 

Floquet,  Charles,  277;  pre- 
mier,   203;     president    of 


C465] 


INDEX 


Chamber,  202,  203;  driven 

from  office,  286 
Freemasons,  301,  361 
Freycinet,    Charles    de,    91, 

273,  286 
Frohsdorf  interview,  9 

Gambetta,  Leon,  Republican 
leader,  3,  273,  276,  277; 
president  of  Chamber,  202; 
premier,  203,  280;  his  fall, 
280-281;  death,  280  n;  on 
church,  274;  on  money 
bills,  229  n  1,  138-139;  on 
general  ticket,  154,  280 

Garner,  J.  W.,  on  cabinet  in- 
stability, 87,  94-95;  on 
position  of  deputies,  148-149 

Gendarmes,  423-424 

General  ticket,  153  et  seq.; 
urged  by  Gambetta,  154, 
280;  established,  154,  281, 
284;  used  by  Boulanger, 
284;  abolished  (1889),  154; 
proposed  by  Senate,  160; 
law  of  1919,  160-163,  321 

Germany,  279,  306-308,  313, 

367>  369 
Goodnow,  Frank  J.,  398 
Great  Britain,  279,  306,  307, 
367;    party  system,  370  et 
seq.;  legal  system,  380*?/  seq. 
Grevy,  Jules,  273;  career,  39; 
president  of  Chamber,  202; 
President,  32,  34,  278;   in- 
fluence, 63-64;  resigns,  32, 
37,  58,  282 
[466] 


Groups,  numerous  in  Cham- 
ber, 86;  after  election  of 
1876,  273-274;  changes, 
276-277;  after  elections  of 
1881,  280;  1885,  281; 
1889,  285;  1893,  286  et 
seq.;  1898,  294;  1902,  296; 
1906,  299;  1910,  309-310 
and  309  n  2;  1914,316  and 
n;  1919,  325;  coalition  in 
Republican  bloc  (q.v.)>  241, 
295;  directed  by  Delega- 
tion of  the  Lefts  (q.v .),  297, 
308;  process  of  consolida- 
tion, 304,  370-379;  group 
of  non-inscrits,  316  and  n; 
effect  upon  cabinet  sta- 
bility, 86  et  seq.;  help  fix 
order  of  day,  191,  334; 
choose  committees  (q.v.), 
208-209,  334;  when  and 
how  formed,  192,  209,  334- 
335;  locked  in  Chamber, 
192,  334-335;  not  so  in 
Senate,  335;  seating  ar- 
rangements, 192  -  193; 
Union  sacr'e  during  the  war, 
318;  Millerand  cabinet  not 
based  on  groups,  325-326; 
antedate  parties,  330-332; 
relation  to  parties,  333- 
334;  group  system  com- 
pared with  two-party  sys- 
tem, 370  et  seq.  See  also 
Parties 

Guerard,  J.-L.,  on  party 
system,  304 


INDEX 


Guesde,  Jules,  Socialist 
leader,  288  ;  in  Viviani 
war  cabinet,  318 

Hanotaux,  G.,  on  prefect, 
251-252 

Kauriou,  Maurice,  on  ad- 
ministrative law,  380-381; 
favors  judicial  control,  23 

Henry,  Colonel,  and  Dreyfus 
affair,  292,  294 

Herriot,  Edouard,  leader  of 
Radical-Socialists      (1919), 

324 
Herve,  Gustave,  urges  recon- 
stitution  of  the  bloc,  377- 
378 

Impeachment,  of  President, 
49,  141-143;  of  ministers, 
80-81,  141-143;  of  Louis 
J.  Malvy,  80,  324 

Imperialists,  in  National  As- 
sembly, 4;  in  election  of 
1876,  272  n  2;  act  with 
Royalists  (q .*>.),  336;  pro- 
gram    and     organization, 

338-339 
Income  tax,   136,   317,   346, 

349,  362,  363,  367 
Indo-China,  279 
Indictment,  415-416. 
Information,   communication 

of,  to  Parliament,  235 
Inquiries,  parliamentary,  235 
International   relations,   274, 

279,  291,  306-308,  358,  367 


Interpellations,  history  in 
France,  236  n;  prohibited 
in  budget  debates,  232; 
contrasted  with  questions, 
236;  debate  on,  237;  dis- 
advantages of,  240-241; 
practice  under  Combes, 
241;  criticized  by  Lowell, 
238-240;  by  de  Lanessan, 
240;  criticism  overem- 
phasized, 241-242;  views 
of  Duguit,  242 

Interrogation,  judicial,  418- 
419 

Italy,  274,  279,  291 

Japan,  307 

Jaures,  Jean,  208,  288,  300, 
303,  366,  378 

Jeze,  Gaston,  23 

Judges,  numerous,  410;  ap- 
pointment and  tenure,  407- 
409;  promotion,  408;  re- 
moval, 408-409;  salaries, 
409-410;  social  position, 
410;  active  role  in  criminal 
trials,  418 

Judge-made  law,  412 

Jury,  420-421;  criticized, 
402-403 

Justice  of  the  peace,  399-400; 
tenure,  409 

Labor,    General    Federation 

of,  120,  305 
Labor    party    (England    and 

Australia),  374 

[467] 


INDEX 


Lanessan,  J.-L.  de,  on  inter- 
pellations, 240 

Lansdowne-Cambon  conven- 
tion (1904),  306 

Law,  administrative,  380  et 
seq.;  how  it  developed, 
381-382;  advantages,  382- 
385,  397-398.  See  also 
Council  of  State;  Courts, 
administrative;  Prefec- 
toral  Council 

Laws,  constitutional.  See 
Constitution 

Left,  Democratic,  in  1910, 
310  n;   in  1914,  316 

Left,  Democratic-Republican 

(I9i9)>  325 

Left,  Extreme  (1876),  273, 
277 

Left,  Independent  (1914), 
316 

Left,  Radical,  supports 
Waldeck-Rousseau  and 
Combes,  297;  in  1910, 
310  n;   in  1914,  316 

Left,  Republican  (1876),  273, 
276-277,  280 

Left,  Republicans  of.  See 
Republicans  of  the  Left 

Legislation,  cabinet  ham- 
pered by  committees,  211; 
contrast  with  English  prac- 
tice, 211;  government  bills 
and  private-members'  bills, 
212-213;  committee  stage, 
214;  report  stage,  214-215; 
debate,  215  et  seq.;    order 

[468] 


of  speeches,  216;  closure, 
217;  no  pairing,  218  n; 
methods  of  voting,  219- 
222;  proxy  voting,  220- 
221;  money  bills,  222-234. 
See  also  Chamber  of  Dep- 
uties; Committees;  Money 
bills;  Senate 
Legislation,    financial.        See 

Money  bills 
Legitimists.     See    Royalists 
Leyret,  Henri,  on  Presidency, 

55>57 
Ligue    de    Faction   francaise, 

333>  33^-337 

Local  government,  restricted 
scope,  243,  349;  local 
areas,  244;  effect  of  cen- 
tralization, 246-247;  po- 
lice, 268,  423-427;  prefect 
(q.v.),  101-102,  247-254; 
subprefect,  230,  244-245; 
communes  {q.v.),  254- 
271;  Lyons,  256  notes 
1  and  3,  424-425;  Paris, 
268-271,  424.  See  also 
Arrondissement;  Prefect; 
etc. 

Lowell,  A.  L.,  on  interpella- 
tions, 238-240;  on  party 
system,  373-375;  on  ad- 
ministrative  law,   382 

Lyautey,  General,  minister 
of  war,    forced    to   resign, 

319 
Lyons,   256   notes   1   and  3, 
424-415 


INDEX 


MacMahon,  Marshal,  Presi- 
dent, 9;  messages,  56; 
dismisses  Simon,  53,  274; 
dissolves  Chamber,  60,  171, 
275;  Dufaure  cabinet,  52, 
276;  resigns,  32,  34,  58, 
276;  opposes  direct  elec- 
tion of  senators,  127 

Madagascar,  41,  279 

Malvy,  Louis  J.,  minister  of 
interior,  92;  impeached, 
80,  324 

Marx,  Karl,  302,  355 

Mayor  of  commune,  chosen 
by  council,  264;  no  salary, 
263;  relations  with  coun- 
cil, 260-261;  presides,  263; 
serves  on  committees,  263; 
relations  with  adjoints,  264; 
responsible  for  administra- 
tion, 264;  suspension  and 
removal,  264;  agent  of 
ministry,  264-265;  local 
executive,  266-267;  ordi- 
nance power,  265-266; 
president  of  election  board, 

179 
Meline,    Jules,    premier,    91, 
135,  288,  289;  resigns,  294; 
in  Senate,  133;   on  reform, 

345 

Merit  system.  See  Civil 
service 

Military  service,  reduced  to 
two  years,  300-301;  three- 
year  act,  314,  317-318; 
Radical-Socialists  and,  315, 


355;  Socialist-Republicans 
and,  363;  Unified  Social- 
ists and,  367 

Millerand,  Alexandre,  formu- 
lates Socialist  program 
(1896),  288;  independent 
Socialist,  303;  in  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  cabinet,  295; 
minister  of  war  (1912),  313; 
joins  Federation  of  the 
Lefts,  316;  in  campaign  of 
1919,  320;  premier  (1920), 
73,  76 «,  320,  325-326; 
character  of  cabinet,  325- 
326;   its  size,  72,  75  and  n 

Ministers,  usually  members 
of  Parliament,  69;  excep- 
tions, 70  and  n;  number  of, 
72-75  and  notes;  civil  and 
military  honors,  73-74;  as 
administrative  chiefs,  100- 
101  and  Chapter  IV  pas- 
sim; control  of  civil 
service,  103-107;  impeach- 
ment of,  80-81,  141-143; 
questioned  in  Parliament, 
235-236;  interpellated, 

232,  236-242.  See  also 
Ministers,  Council  of; 
Ministries;  Undersecre- 
taries 

Ministers,  Council  of  (cabi- 
net), powers  during  presi- 
dential interregnum,  33; 
controls  powers  of  Presi- 
dent, 48;  its  meetings,  54, 
78-79;  role  of  President  at, 
[469] 


INDEX 


54-56;  responsibility  to 
Parliament,  79  et  seq.;  con- 
tinuity of  personnel,  94; 
continuity  of  policy,  94- 
95;  short  duration,  91  et 
seq.y  150;  disadvantages  of 
this,  96-99;  relations  with 
Senate,  134  et  seq.;  lack  of 
power  to  dissolve  Chamber, 
60-61,  134-135;  always 
successful  in  elections,  150 
and  n;  hampered  by  par- 
liamentary committees, 
204-205,  210-212,  226- 
227;  initiative  in  legisla- 
tion, 213,  214;  parlia- 
mentary control  through 
budget,  222-223,  233-234; 
communicating  informa- 
tion to  Parliament,  235. 
See  also  Ministers;  Minis- 
tries; President;  President 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers; 
Legislation;  Senate;  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies 

Ministries,  how  created,  72; 
number  of,  72-73,  76  n; 
undersecretaries,  74-76  and 
75  n;  ministry  of  the  in- 
terior, 77;  organization, 
103  et  seq.;  cabinet,  107- 
109;  cabinet  attaches,  108; 
permanent  staff,  see  under 
Civil  Service.  See  also 
Ministers;  Ministers,  coun- 
cil of 

Misapplication  of  power,  390 

[470] 


Misdemeanors,  399,  422 

Moderates,  in  elections  of 
1889,285;  1893,289;  1898, 
294;  leaders,  289;  rela- 
tions with  Rallies,  291. 
See  also  Opportunists;  Pro- 
gressists 

Monarchists.  See  Imperial- 
ist;  Royalists 

Money  bills,  conflicts  be- 
tween chambers  over,  137- 
141;  doctrine  of  the  last 
word,  138-139;  method  of 
voting  on,  219;  impor- 
tance of  budget,  222;  its 
preparation,  223;  its  con- 
tent, 224;  before  com- 
mittee, 225-227;  debate, 
227  et  seq.;  Berthelot  reso- 
lution limiting  amend- 
ments, 229-230;  riders 
prohibited,  230-231;  delay 
in  passing  budget,  231- 
233;  interpellations  on 
budget,  232;  provisional 
twelfths,  232;  proposed 
biennial  budgets,  233; 
audit    of    accounts,    233- 

234 

Monis,  Ernest,  premier 
(191 1),  312;  resigns  from 
marine  department,  315 

Montesquieu,  381 

Morocco,   43,   306-308,   313, 

377 
Mun,    Count    de,    leader   of 
Rallies  in  1893,  287 


INDEX 


Municipalities.      See     Com- 
munes 
Munro,  W.  B.,  256 

Napoleon,  Victor,  339 

National,  Le,  21-22 

National  Assembly  (1871- 
1876),  elected,  3;  party 
composition,  4;  by-elec- 
tions, 4;  asserts  constitu- 
ent powers,  6;  makes  Mac- 
Mahon  President,  9;  es- 
tablishes Septennate,  10; 
adopts  constitutional  laws, 
11-12;  establishes  Senate, 
123-124;  method  of  choos- 
ing Senate,  127-128 

National  Assembly  (for 
amending  constitution), 
26-30,  44 

National  Assembly  (for  elec- 
tion of  President),  32  et 
seq. 

Nationalists,   285,   286,   294, 

347,  348 
Navy,  disorganization  under 

Combes,  301,  307 
Nominations,     166    et    seq.; 

under   law   of   1889,    167; 

law  of  1919,  167 
"Not  inscribed"  group,  316 

and  n,  325 

Opportunists,  277  and  n, 
280,  281,  285.  See  also 
Moderates 

Oratory  in  Chamber,  194,  216 


Order  of  the  day,  188-192, 
334;     after    interpellation, 

237-240 

Orders,  religious,  under  As- 
sociations Law,  295-296; 
dissolved,  298;  schools  re- 
opened, 312.  See  also 
Schools 

Ordinances,  issued  by  Presi- 
dent, 45-46;  Council  of 
State  determines  validity, 
24,  47,  397J  not  "legally 
made,"  266,  397 

Orleans,  Due  de,  pretender, 
337-338 

Orleanists.     See    Royalists 

Pacification  cabinets,  282 
Pacifism,  299-301,  358,  362 
Painleve,       Paul,       premier 

(1917),  319     4 
Pairing  of  deputies,  not  per- 
mitted, 218  n 
Pams,  Jules,  in  Senate,  125; 
candidate    for    Presidency, 
35,  37  n 
Panama  scandal,  285-286 
Paris,    Count    of,    Orleanist 
pretender,     5;     recognizes 
Chambord,     9;      Royalist 
pretender,  284 
Pans,    government    of,    why 
special  arrangements,  268- 
269;    autonomy  restricted, 
269;    council,  269;    prefect 
of    police,    270,    424-425; 
prefect  of  the  Seine,  270; 

[471] 


INDEX 


civil  service,  270-271;  ar- 
rondissements,  270 

Parliament,  impeachments, 
49,  80;  wide  range  of 
powers,  123;  bicameral, 
123,  137;  not  restrained 
by  courts,  21-26;  conflicts 
between  chambers,  134  et 
seq.;  conflicts  over  money 
bills,  137-141;  privileges, 
170;  salary,  171;  annual 
session,  186-187;  special 
sessions,  187;  adjourn- 
ment, 187-188;  proroga- 
tion, 188;  reports  of 
proceedings,  195  n;  minis- 
ters responsible  to,  79 
etseq.;  ministers  controlled 
through  finance,  222-223, 
234-235,233;  through  com- 
mittees, 204-205,  210-212, 
226-227,  235;  questions, 
235-236;  interpellations, 
232.  See  also  Chamber 
of  Deputies;  Committees; 
Legislation;   Senate;  etc. 

Parties,  function  of,  327; 
character  in  France,  327 
et  seq.;  formation  (1901- 
I9I3)>  I73>  332-333;  rela- 
tion to  groups  in  Chamber, 
333-334;  why  numerous  in 
France,  371-374;  two-party 
tendency,  3°3"304>  37°~ 
379;  consolidation  under 
way,  378;  organization  and 
programs  of  existing  parties, 

[472] 


336  et  seq.;  Union  sacre  dur- 
ing the  war,  318;  formation 
of  National  Republican  bloc 
(1919)*  321-324;  election  of 
19 19,  324-326.  See  also 
Bloc,  anti-clerical  Republi- 
can; Bloc,  National  Repub- 
lican; Elections;  Groups; 
and  under  names  of  the 
various  parties. 

Pau,  Congress  of  (1913),  314, 
3i5>332w 

Peasants  and  Socialism,  362, 

365 
Pelletan,  Camille,    m,    125, 

301,  377 
Pensions,   for  civil   servants, 

113-114;   for  prefect,  247  n 

2;  workingmen's,  114,  136, 

309>  367 

Peytral,  52,  125 

Pichon,  S.,  309 

Picquart,  Colonel,  and  Drey- 
fus afFair,  291 

Pierre,  Eugene,  quoted,  42, 
141,  182 

Piou,  Jacques,  leader  of 
Rallies  in  1893,  2&6;  presi- 
dent of  A.  L.  P.,  344;  on 
religious  question,  375  n  Z 

Piux  X,  298,  299 

Poincare,  Raymond,  career, 
39;  refuses  office,  312;  pre- 
mier (1912-1913),  313;  can- 
didate for  Presidency,  35; 
elected  (1913),  32,  65-66, 
126,  313;  message  to  Parlia- 


INDEX 


ment,  57;  popularity,  131; 
Democratic  -  Republican, 
289,  347;  quoted,  348,  404 

Pointage,  221  n 

Police,  secret  service,  423; 
gendarmes,  423-424;  na- 
tional, in  five  communes, 
424-425;  local,  criticized, 
425-426;  central  control  of 
local,  268,  423,  425-427 

Posters,  use  in  elections,  174 

Practices,  corrupt.  See  Cor- 
rupt practices 

Prefect,  character  of  office, 
101-102;  how  appointed, 
247  and  n  2;  pension,  114, 
247  n  2;  functions,  247  et 
seq.;  as  local  executive, 
248;  as  agent  of  ministry, 
248-250;  bound  by  in- 
structions, 249;  as  po- 
litical agent,  150-153,  250; 
clerical  staff,  251;  ad- 
visory council,  251,  385- 
387;  his  difficult  position, 
251-253;  and  communal 
council,  261-262 

Prefect  of  police,  270 

Prefect  of  the  Seine,  270 

Prefectoral  council,  257,  385- 
386 

Premier.  See  President  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers 

President  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  how  elected,  197; 
salary  and  privileges,  198; 
functions,  198;  fixing  order 


of  the  day,  190;  enforcing 
rules,  199;  maintaining  or- 
der, 199-201:  recognizing 
speakers,  216;  compared 
with  English  and  American 
speakers,  201;  history  of 
office,  202-204;  political 
attributes,  202-204 

President  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  appointed  by 
President,  50-52,  76;  dis- 
missal, 53,  60-61;  control 
over  colleagues,  52,  76; 
usually  minister  of  interior, 
yj;  exceptional  cases,  77 
and  n;  term  of  office  short, 
91;  exceptional  cases,  91. 
See  also  Ministers;  Minis- 
ters, Council  of;  Minis- 
tries;   and  Appendix  II 

President  of  the  Republic, 
salary,  31;  legal  qualifica- 
tions, 34;  type  of  men 
chosen,  38-40;  list  of 
Presidents,  32;  how  chosen, 
32;  influence  of  caucus, 
34-35;  no  campaign,  35; 
single-term  doctrine,  37; 
vacancy  in  office,  32-33; 
foreign  travel,  33;  inau- 
guration, 37;  resignation, 
32,  34,  37,  57,  58,  59,  276, 
282;  executive  powers,  40- 
43;  treaty-making,  42; 
legislative  powers,  43-47; 
messages,  56-58;  veto,  59; 
dissolution     of    Chamber, 

[473] 


INDEX 


60;  appoints  premier,  50- 
52;  dismissal  of  premier, 
53;  powers  controlled  by 
ministers,  48;  irresponsibil- 
ity, 49-50;  impeachment, 
49,  141-143;  usefulness  of 
office,  61-63;  proposal  to 
increase  authority,  64;  to 
change  election  system, 
342;  election  of  1879,  276; 
of  1887,  282;  of  1894  and 
1895,  289-290;  of  1899, 
295;  of  1906,  302;  of  1913, 
65-66,  126,  313;  of  1920, 
66-67 

Prime  Minister.  See  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council  of  Min- 
isters 

Privileges,  parliamentary,  170 

Proceedings  in  Chamber,  how 
reported,  195  n 

Progressists,  elections  of 
1898,  294;  schism,  295; 
opposition  to  Waldeck- 
Rousseau,  296  and  n;  re- 
duced in  numbers  (1906), 
299;  elections  of  1910, 
310  n\  of  1914,  316;  of 
1919,  325.  See  also  Mod- 
erates; Republican  Fed- 
eration 

Promulgation  of  laws,  44-45 

Proportional  representation. 
See  Representation,  pro- 
portional 

Prorogation.    See  Parliament 

Provinces,  royal,  245 

[474] 


Provisional  twelfths,  231-232 
Proxy  voting,  220-222 

Questions,      addressed      tc 
ministers,     235-236.      See 
also  Interpellations 
Questors  in  Chamber,  195 
Quorum  in  Chamber,  217-218 

Radicals,  attitude  towards 
Senate,  124-125;  early 
history,  273,  277;  in  elec- 
tions of  1881,  280;  of  1885, 
281;  of  1889, 285;  of  1893, 
289;  of  1898,  294;  of  1902, 
296  n;  support  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  and  Combes, 
297;  elections  of  1919,  325- 
326.  See  also  Left,  Radical; 
Radical-Socialists 

Radical-Socialists,  party 
founded  (1901),  332-333; 
origin  of  name,  289;  pro- 
gram and  organization, 
356-361;  view  on  educa- 
tion, 350,  357;  on  Social- 
ism, 355-356;  in  elections 
of  1902,  296  n;  support 
Waldeck-Rousseau  and 
Combes,  297;  in  elections 
of  1906,  299;  of  1910, 
31071;  criticize  Briand, 
3 1 1-3 1 2;  oppose  Barthou, 
314;  Doumergue  takes  of- 
fice, 314,  355;  "unifica- 
tion" (1913),  3I4»  332  n, 
354;   in  campaign  of  191 4, 


INDEX 


317;  views  re  military 
service,  315,  355;  success 
in  elections,  315-317;  in- 
trigues during  war,  319; 
in  campaign  of  1919,  324; 
election,  325-326;  ac- 
ceptance of  Senate,  124- 
125;  leaders  in  Senate,  125; 
reject  proportional  repre- 
sentation, 126;  oppose 
Poincare,  126;  favor  gen- 
eral ticket,  154-155;  decline 
of  party,  150,  376;  anti- 
clerical role  exhausted,  376; 
party  discords,  354-355, 
376;  relations  with  Demo- 
cratic -  Republican  party, 
348,  354,  375;  relations 
with  Unified  Socialists, 
355,  356,  369,  376-379;  op- 
pose Socialism  officially, 
355-356.    See  also  Radicals 

Railroad  strike  (1910),  120- 
121,  306,  311 

Rallies,  287,  291,  294.  See 
also  Action  Liberale  Popu- 
late 

Registration.    See  Elections 

Relations,  international.  See 
International  relations 

Renoult,  Rene,  151 

Representation,  proportional, 
rapid  spread  of,  147  n  1; 
movement  in  France,  156 
et  seq.;  Chamber  passes  bill 
(1912),  158-159,  313;  Sen- 
ate rejects  (1913),  160;   is- 


sue in  1914  elections,  317; 
compromise  measure  of 
1919,  156,  160-163,  321; 
text  of  act  in  Appendix  III; 
parliamentary  committees 
chosen  by  proportional  rep- 
resentation,   208-209 

Republic,  Third,  3 

Republicans  of  the  Left,  in 
1914     elections,     316;      in 

1919,  325 

Revenue.    See  Money  bills 

Ribot,  Alexandre,  in  Senate, 
133;  in  Viviani  cabinet, 
318;  premier  (1914),  9*, 
318;    premier  (1917),  319 

Riders  to  money  bills  pro- 
hibited, 230-231 

Right.  See  Royalists;  Im- 
perialists 

Rivet  Law  (1871),  5-6 

Rochebouet  cabinet  (1877), 
70,  91,  275 

Rouvier,  Maurice,  in  Gam- 
betta's  cabinet,  280;  pre- 
mier, 282,  301;  driven 
from  office,  286,  302 

Royalists,  in  National  As- 
sembly, 4;  plan  restora- 
tion, 4-5,  8-9;  relations 
with  Thiers,  7-8;  suited  by 
Septennate,  10;  dissensions 
in  1876,  272  notes;  style 
themselves  Conservatives, 
276;  party  organization, 
333;  program  and  organ- 
ization, 336-338;    views  of 

[475] 


INDEX 


pretender,  337~338;  act 
with  Imperialists,  336;  in 
elections  of  1881,  280;  of 
1885,  281;  of  1889,  285; 
of  1893,  286;  of  1898,  294; 
of  1902,  296  n;  of  1910, 
309  n  2;  of  1914,  316;  of 
1919,  325;  Royalist  in  Bri- 
and  war  cabinet,  319.  See 
also  Chambord,  Count  of; 
Paris,  Count  of;  Ligue  de 
V  action  francaise 
Rules  of  Chamber,  198-199 
Russia,  alliance  with  France, 
33>  291,  307 

Sabatier,  Camille,  89,  149 

Sabotage,  305 

Saint-Mande  Program,  288, 
289,  295,  330 

Salary  of  members  of  Par- 
liament, 171 

Saleilles,  19 

Sarrien,  125,  133,  308 

Say,  Leon,  on  budget  com- 
mittee, 226;  on  financial 
legislation,  229 

Scheurer-Kestner  and  Drey- 
fus affair,  291 

Schools,  early  conflict  with 
church  over,  278;  legisla- 
tion affecting,  295-296, 
298;  church  schools  reopen, 
312;  A.L.  P.  and,  341-342; 
Republican  Federation  and, 
346;  Democratic-Republi- 
can   party    and,    349~35°; 

[476] 


Radical-Socialists  and,  350, 
357;  Socialist-Republicans 
and,  363 

Scrutin  d' arrondissement.  See 
Elections;    District  Ticket 

Scrutin  deliste.  See  Elections; 
General  Ticket 

Seignobos,  Charles,  on  par- 
ties, 328-329,  331 

Seize  Mai  (1877),  53,  60,  171, 
274-276 

Sembat,  Marcel,  Socialist 
leader,  288;  in  war  cabi- 
net, 318;  on  Socialism,  365 

Senate,  Chapter  V  -passim; 
constitutional  provisions  re, 
14;  ministers  not  respon- 
sible to,  82-85,  134—135; 
conflicts  with  Chamber,  82- 
85,  134  et  seq.;  desired  by 
monarchists,  123-124;  mon- 
archist majority  in  (1876- 
1879),  272;  size  (314  mem- 
bers), 125-126;  original 
structure,  126-128;  life 
seats,  126;  filled  in  1876, 
272  n;  abolished,  128; 
other  seats  how  filled,  127- 
130;  original  plan  modi- 
fied (1884),  128-130;  term, 
130;  privileges,  170;  salary, 
171;  political  groups  in, 
335;  represents  old  ideas, 
130-131;  qualifications  for 
Senate,  131;  local  influ- 
ences in  elections,  131- 
132;    personnel,    I33-I34J 


INDEX 


suoordinate  to  Chamber, 
133  et  seq.;  control  of  cab- 
inet by,  134;  and  dissolu- 
tion of  Chamber,  60-61, 
134-135;  method  of  op- 
posing Chamber,  135-137; 
social  and  economic  out- 
look, 135-136;  conflicts 
with  Chamber  over  money 
bills,  137-141;  as  high 
court  of  justice,  49,  80-81, 
141-143,  143  n,  324;  busi- 
ness not  interrupted  by 
prorogation,  188 
Separation  of  powers,  381 
Separation     Law,     298-299, 

3°9>  341 

Septennate,  10 

Sessions.    See  Parliament 

Simon,  Jules,  premier,  274; 
resigns,  50,  53,  274-275 

Socialism,  growth  of,  288; 
Saint-Mande  program,  288; 
relations  with  Radicals, 
288;  elections  of  1893,  288; 
Socialists  support  Wal- 
deck-Rousseau,  295;  and 
Combes,  297;  elections  of 
1898,  294;  of  1002,  296  n; 
Unified  Socialist  party 
founded  (1905),  299,  302; 
Socialist-Republican  party 
founded  (191 1),  333.  See 
also  Socialist-Republicans; 
Socialists,  Unified 

Socialist-Republicans  (known 
as    independent    Socialists 


before  191 1),  founded 
(191O,  333»  361;  inde- 
pendents in  elections  of 
1906,  299;  refusal  to  join 
Unified  party,  303;  elec- 
tions of  19 10,  31071;  in 
campaign  of  1914,  317; 
elections  of  1914,  316;  join 
National  Republican  bloc 
(I9I9)>  322;  elections  of 
I9I9>  325>  program  and 
organization,  361-363.  See 
also    Socialism. 

Socialists,  Independent.  See 
Socialist-Republicans 

Socialists,  Unified,  party 
founded  (1905),  302,  332, 
364;  abandons  Republican 
blocy  299;  irreconcilables, 
303,  364;  affected  by  Syn- 
dicalism {q.v.)y  304-305; 
elections  of  1906,  299;  of 
1910,  310  w;  oppose  Bri- 
and,  311;  oppose  election 
of  Poincare,  65-66,  313; 
campaign  of  1914,  317,  366- 
367,  369;  elections  of  1914, 
316;  enter  war  cabinets  of 
Viviani  and  Briand,  318- 
319;  oppose  later  war  cabi- 
nets, 319,  321,  378;  dis- 
loyal attitude  during  war, 
319-321;  coalition  against, 
322,  379;  elections  of  1919, 
325>  375  n>  379  and  n;  pro- 
gram and  organization, 
364-370;    attitude  toward 

[477] 


INDEX 


reform,  366-367;  re.ations 
of  A.  L.  P.  with,  343;  of 
Republican  Federation, 
346;  of  Democratic-Re- 
publican party,  350;  of 
Radical-Socialists,  355- 
356,  367,  376-378,  379 
Sorel,     Georges,     condemns 

democracy,   281,   305  n 
Speech,  freedom  of,  170 
Stockholm  Congress,  321 
Stourm,    Rene,    on    budget, 

228-229 
Strikes,  119-121,  305,  311 
Subprefect,  230,  244-245 
Suffrage,  woman,  144  n  3 
Supplies,  refusal  of,  in  1877, 

275;  in  1896,  134 
Syndicalism,  its  rise,  304- 
305;  effect  on  public  serv- 
ices, 119-121;  proposed 
control  of  ministries  by 
employees,  106-107,  362 

Tangier,  307 

Taxes,    224-225,    244,    253, 

3H,3i7,393 

Thiers,  on  restoration,  4; 
head  of  executive  power 
and  President,  5-6;  con- 
verted to  Republic,  7-8 

Tonkin,  41,  279 

Toulon,  police  system,  424 
and  ft,  425  n 

Treaties,  42 

Tribune,  speaking  from,  193- 
194,  216 

U78] 


Triple  Alliance,  279,  291 
Tunis,  279 

Twelfths,    provisional.      See 
Provisional  twelfths 

Undersecretaries,     74-78; 

in    19 1 5,  74  n  2\   in   1920, 

75  and  n 
Union  sacre  of  parties  during 

the  war,  318,  324,  378 
United  States,  party  system, 

370  et  seq. 

Veto  power  of  President,  59 
Viviani,  Rene,  Socialist,  303; 

premier,    52,    318,    363 
Vote.     See  Elections 
Voting   in    Chamber.      See 

Legislation 

Waldeck-Rousseau,    Rene, 
in  Gambetta's  cabinet,  280; 
premier    (1 899-1902),    91, 
277  w,    295-296;     opposes 
proportional       representa- 
tion, 159;  attitude  towards 
church,  278;    resigns,  296 
Wallon  amendment,  11 
War,  declaration  of,  41 
War,  Great,  318  et  seq. 
Weekly  Rest  Bill,  136 
Witnesses  in  criminal  trials, 

417 
Woman  suffrage,  144  n  3 

Zola,  £mile,  and  Dreyfus  af- 
fair, 291,  292 


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